CICIG SELECTING CASES, RECRUITING STAFF

C O N F I D E N T I A L GUATEMALA 000085 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPT FOR IO/UNP, INL/LP E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/28/2022 TAGS: PHUM PGOV SNAR ASEC KCRM KJUS GT SUBJECT: CICIG SELECTING CASES, RECRUITING STAFF REF: A. 07 GUATEMALA 1917 ¶B. 07 GUATEMALA 2164 Classified By: Ambassador James M. Derham for reasons 1.4 (b&d). Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) CICIG Commissioner Carlos Castresana told Ambassador Jan. 25 that he was in the process of selecting the first cases that CICIG would investigate. He believes CICIG should concentrate on recent cases in which new evidence could still be gathered, rather than older cases of historic interest for which it would be harder to uncover evidence. Castresana said that the processes of recruitment and making adequate security arrangements were going slower than he would like. He asked that the USG consider seconding judicial and law enforcement professionals to CICIG, and to help with recruitment. He said he was so far pleased with the new government's cooperation, and had excellent access to President Colom and his ministers. End Summary. Seeking Early Successes -------------- ¶2. (C) Carlos Castresana, Commissioner of the UN's recently inaugurated International Commission Against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG),met January 25 with the Ambassador, DCM, Pol/Econ Couns, and DEA and NAS officers. Castresana said he was currently considering which cases to investigate and prosecute. Many influential persons were giving him contradictory advice about which cases to take on first. For example, former President Berger and Vice President Stein encouraged him to begin with two major bank fraud cases, but Attorney General Florido had urged that he instead focus on the February 2007 murders of three members of the Central American Parliament (PARLACEN). Castresana said that, while some high-profile cases, such as the 1998 murder of Bishop Gerardi, were of great historic interest to Guatemalans, he wanted to begin with recent cases for which gathering evidence would be less difficult. It would be important that CICIG's early prosecutions be successful, "so as to strike a blow against impunity, and not ratify it." He also said he had told Florido that he wanted to add value by engaging where public prosecutors are currently stuck, so as to break free ongoing investigations of recent cases. The Ambassador suggested Castresana consider investigating the August 2007 murder of Jose Emanuel Mendez, son of former Member of Congress and human rights activist Amilcar Mendez. Castresana said he would consider doing so. (Following up January 28, Ambassador sent Castresana background information on the Mendez case.) Recruitment -------------- ¶3. (SBU) Thirty staff members of a full complement of approximately 100 are already in place at CICIG, Castresana said, but recruitment was proceeding more slowly than he would like. He asked that the USG help with recruitment and consider assigning or seconding Spanish-speaking judicial and law enforcement personnel to CICIG. Secondments preferably would be for at least six-moth periods. CICIG could pay salaries or could py per diem to officials seconded to CICIG who would continue to receive their USG salaries. Castresana also said he was seeking an active duty or retired U.S. military officer to serve as his liaison with the Guatemalan Army. CICIG staff would be accredited in Guatemala as UN QArmy. CICIG staff would be accredited in Guatemala as UN technical experts. ¶4. (C) Castresana responded favorably to NAS's offer to continue polygraphing prospective CICIG employees. He said that of the 30 already hired, only five had been polygraphed. All passed. ¶5. (C) Castresana sought the Ambassador's advice about selecting the senior Guatemalan member of his team. He said that Jose Carlos Marroquin, who had left Guatemala under a cloud after resigning as Colom's campaign manager in mid-campaign (ref a),had applied for a position with CICIG. Ambassador advised against hiring Marroquin, noting that, while he was a close Embassy contact, he was indiscreet and might allow his political ambitions to interfere with the work he potentially would do for CICIG. In response to Castresana's inquiry about influential Ministry of Government Advisor Victor Rivera, NAS and DEA officers said they shared concerns recently aired in the press that in addition to solving many crimes, Rivera may have perpetrated some, but noted that Rivera was key to resolving the few crimes that get resolved in Guatemala. The Ambassador discussed USG support for an inter-agency Anti-Money Laundering Unit that could prove helpful to CICIG, as well as a telephone intervention unit at the Ministry of Government that could become operational within 6-8 months. Security Arrangements -------------- ¶6. (C) CICIG could not begin criminal investigations without appropriate security arrangements in place, Castresana asserted. Initially, the UN had been slow to acknowledge its responsibility for provision of security, but had since arranged for 12 international security officers to arrive Feb. 1. By summer CICIG's complement of international security personnel would rise to 45. Local bodyguards provided by the GOG seemed professional so far, Castresana said, but their reliability was unknown. International security officers were needed not only to provide security for CICIG's personnel and installations, but also for cooperating witnesses, as well as for 5-10 local judges who would handle CICIG's cases. Castresana said that for security reasons, his family would remain in Monterrey, Mexico. GOG Cooperating with CICIG -------------- ¶7. (C) Castresana said he had just had a very satisfactory, two-hour meeting with President Colom. Colom had invited him to attend regular meetings of his security cabinet, at which operational arrangements could be made on the spot. Colom's openness had set the tone for ministers' cooperation with CICIG. Comment and Action Request -------------- ¶8. (C) Castresana clearly values having a close relationship with the Embassy. His approach of initially taking cases that offer strong prospects for successful prosecutions, as opposed to beginning with older, more difficult cases makes great sense. Embassy supports Castresana's request for USG personnel contributions to CICIG, which would contribute to the success of this ground-breaking UN mission. Embassy requests Department's guidance on how Castresana could appeal to the FBI and local law enforcement agencies to second Spanish-speaking personnel to CICIG. Derham