GUYANA/CARICOM SECURITY ASSESSMENT

C O N F I D E N T I A L GEORGETOWN 000309 SENSITIVE SIPDIS WHA/CAR FOR MICHAEL FORTIN, WHA/FO FOR GIOVANNI SNIDLE E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/21/2018 TAGS: PTER PREL MASS MOPS XL GY SUBJECT: GUYANA/CARICOM SECURITY ASSESSMENT REF: A. STATE 51747 ¶B. GEORGETOWN 188 Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Karen L. Williams, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) Guyana Summary: As demonstrated by two mass killings by gangs earlier this year and general homicide rates across the country, Guyana is ill-equipped to address its modern security challenges. Historically, security has been hindered by limited financial and human resources, poor training regimens, an antiquated legal system, widespread corruption, and minimal political will to fight crime. The tragic events earlier this year, however, had a visible impact on the GoG's posture regarding security sector assistance and reform, and the GoG has begun committing resources and political will to reform. The U.S. can encourage and support this new reform effort by 1) responding, where feasible, to GoG requests for closer cooperation and information sharing with U.S. law enforcement; 2) supporting the U.K.-led Security Sector Reform project with complementary training programs, particularly in the area of defense force training; and 3) using diplomatic and program means to encourage the GoG to articulate a long-term national security strategy. End Guyana summary. ¶2. (C) CARICOM Summary: Growing regional concern about security prompted recent special meetings of the CARICOM Heads of Government as well as joint Chiefs of Police and Chiefs of Defense meetings. The result was for CARICOM to establish Security as the fourth pillar of its policy foundation and add specific responsibility for security to an Assistant Secretary General's portfolio. The focus of these initiatives is to foster cooperation between CARICOM members as well as support from major regional actors, and to build upon and expand security intiatives begun for Cricket World Cup 2007, including the Advance Passenger Information System (APIS). The U.S. should continue to encourage closer regional cooperation on security by supporting expansion of APIS and greater information sharing, and can also assist by offering strategic planning facilitation. End CARICOM Summary. -------------- GUYANA -------------- ¶3. (SBU) For a variety of reasons related to resource limitations and the transnational nature of criminal threats in Guyana, the government's security activities have long involved contributions from both the Guyana Police Force (GPF) and Guyana Defense Force (GDF). While spotty coordination, turf battles, and constitutional limits on the GDF's activities diminish their combined effectiveness, the so-called "Joint Services" complement each other in certain areas (e.g., the GDF maintains an air wing, albeit a modest one, while the GPF does not),and the GoG seeks to enhance the level of their collaboration, including joint training, as a means to maximize their efficiency. Training regimens, however, especially on the police side, are weak, and very few scenario-based simulations that would hone the skills of either new or veteran officers are carried out. ¶4. (SBU) Through its $6 million Security Sector Reform (SSR) Program that commenced in 2007, the British Government is the lead international partner for the GoG on security reform. While certain macro elements of the SSR involve the GDF, the bulk of the activities -- expert training, capacity-building, provision of modern, non-lethal equipment -- are/will be directed towards the police. (Note: Post's British counterparts relay that Guyana's expenditures on the police force as a percentage of total government spending constitute by far the lowest total in the region; immediate figures were not available. End Note.) The British will be carrying out various training activities throughout the remainder of this year (on intelligence analysis, tactical response, and firearms),and also will hand over certain forms of the aforementioned non-lethal equipment, e.g., night-vision goggles, radios, and GPS systems. ¶5. (SBU) Embassy Georgetown's Military Liaison Office (MLO) is the primary external actor providing resources and training activities for the GDF. International Military Education Training (IMET) funding provides professional training opportunities for key personnel; Foreign Military Financing (FMF) funds the purchase of essential long-range communications and encryption equipment; and visiting U.S. military forces conduct exercises with GDF counterparts to sharpen their counterterrorism skills. ¶6. (C) Opportunities and Challenges: In the aftermath of the Lusignan and Bartica gang attacks, and with the Guyanese public clamoring for action, the GoG has been actively pursuing tangible and immediate assistance from the international community to address its security sector deficiencies. After months of rigorous British lobbying that the GoG needed to design and implement a broad security sector strategy in order for the SSR program to be reasonably effective, President Jagdeo recently acknowledged this vacuum to British High Commissioner Wheeler and agreed to pursue such a strategy. President Jagdeo also asked A/S Shannon during his March 26 visit to Guyana about the possibility of law enforcement assistance to help address ongoing threats (Reftel B). The challenges, however, are also daunting: in addition to its geographic characteristics (a lightly-populated country with 1,800 miles of land borders, 250 miles of coastline, and vast uninhabited and unpatrollable areas),Guyana's outdated cyberinfrastructure, lack of a Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty with the U.S. (although Guyana recently ratified the Inter-American Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters),and series of government/law enforcement officials whose trustworthiness with sensitive information is in question, present significant impediments to efforts at reform. ¶7. (C) U.S. Assistance Opportunities/Comment: In addition to the military training and professionalization we already support, the U.S. should closely coordinate with the British to provide complementary law enforcement training/development opportunities; respond, where feasible, to law enforcement information-sharing requests; and implement information-sharing systems. The GoG has also, repeatedly, requested a permanent presence of both DEA and FBI. (Note: The current MSP calls for a DEA presence here by FY2010.) U.S. diplomatic and programmatic efforts to reinforce the need for long-term strategic planning is also key. The challenge to providing any assistance on security, especially sensitive assistance such as information sharing, is finding non-corrupt partners and overcoming decades of broken institutions. President Jagdeo has instituted some measures to 'clean up' certain offices, such as polygraphing the Customs and Anti-Narcotics Unit and seeking independent investigators in a major customs scandal, but in the current government structure, the Presidency is the only avenue for change -- which means reform only moves quickly when it has his full attention and direct action. End Comment. -------------- CARICOM -------------- ¶8. (C) While still in its nascent stages, CARICOM's evolving approach to regional security issues holds some promise. CARICOM recently designated Dr. Edward Green, Assistant Secretary General for Human and Social Development -- the directorate that oversees the offices that deal with crime, drugs, and human trafficking -- as the Secretariat's point person for security matters. (Note: As with other senior Secretariat officials, ASYG Green is frequently traveling outside of Guyana, and has not been available to meet with post reps. Post will report back after meeting with him during the first week of June. End Note.) This comes after CARICOM's designation of Security as the fourth pillar of its policy objectives (along with Economic Integration, Foreign Policy Coordination, and Functional Cooperation). ASYG Green is responsible for coordinating regional security policy and measures. While CARICOM's structural approach is still a work in progress, the Secretariat has referred on multiple occasions to the collaboration that took place in advance of the 2007 Cricket World Cup (CWC) as a foundation that can be built upon. Press reports further indicate that the bodies specifically established in advance of the CWC -- the Implementation Agency for Crime and Security (IMPACS) and the CARICOM Operational Planning and Coordinating Staff (COPACS) -- will continue to operate and may even expand. CARICOM officials have also repeatedly expressed their interest in expanding the U.S. APIS system. ¶9. (SBU) CARICOM's convocation of police and military chiefs of its member states for a March meeting in Georgetown reflected its recognition that joint activities and information-sharing among security agencies are critical for the success of security-related endeavors, as well as a mindset similar to Guyana's that security is more than a police issue. The meeting was considered a useful enough forum that the security chiefs are expected to gather again in the near future. ¶10. (C) U.S. Assistance Opportunities/Comment: The U.S. should follow up on CARICOM's offer to expand APIS to all member states instead of just the Cricket World Cup participants. Barring large amounts of funding for actual operational activities such as counter-narcotics, the U.S. should seek out ways to support CARICOM's security coordination efforts among its member states. CARICOM's weak point, traditionally, has been in long-term planning and implementation. The U.S. has a well-respected reputation in planning, particularly in security, and should try to foster a similar regard for planning within CARICOM's new offices on security. SOUTHCOM is already beginning to include CARICOM Secretariat officials in regional security meetings (Dr. Green is scheduled to brief at CANSEC in June). Inclusion of the Secretariat in other regional security fora, whether State, DHS, USCG, DEA, DoJ or DoD would help CARICOM institutionalize its new fourth pillar of Security, and reinforce U.S. partnership objectives for the region. Post will offer additional ideas once ASYG Green returns and we can gain further insight into the Secretariat's plans for dealing with its new mandate. End Comment. WILLIAMS