JCIC-XXXIII: (U) HEADS OF DELEGATION MEETING ON

S E C R E T GENEVA 000976 DEPT FOR T, VCI AND EUR/PRA DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24 CIA FOR WINPAC JCS FOR J5/DDGSA SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR NSC FOR HAYES DIA FOR LEA E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/17/2018 TAGS: KACT PARM START JCIC INF US RS UP BO KZ SUBJECT: JCIC-XXXIII: (U) HEADS OF DELEGATION MEETING ON SS-27 RVOSI AND MM III RVOSI, NOVEMBER 14, 2008 Classified By: Jerry A. Taylor, United States Representative to the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission. Reasons: 1.5(b) and (d). ¶1. (U) This is JCIC-XXXIII-010. ¶2. (U) Meeting Date: November 14, 2008 Time: 10:30 A.M. - 11:30 A.M. Place: Russian Mission, Geneva -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶3. (S) A Heads of Delegation (HOD) meeting was held at the Russian Mission on November 14, 2008, to discuss the SS-27 Reentry Vehicle On-site Inspection (RVOSI) and Minuteman III (MM III) RVOSI procedures. All Parties were represented. ¶4. (S) The U.S. Delegation stated that the United States remained concerned that the covers used during SS-27 RVOSIs did not allow inspectors to determine that the number of reentry vehicles (RVs) present did not exceed the one warhead attributed to the SS-27 ICBM. Additionally, these concerns had been heightened by press accounts inside Russia that continued to indicate that Russia is planning to deploy the SS-27 with multiple warheads and the similarities between the SS-27 attributed with a single warhead and the prototype RS-24 that has been flight tested with multiple RVs. ¶5. (S) The Russian Delegation stated that the mass media sometimes confused issues because it did not have all the facts and that the Russian Federation had no intention of deploying the SS-27 with more warheads than the number with which it is attributed. ¶6. (S) On the issue of MMIII RVOSI, the Russian Delegation stated there were four main points of the Russian side's position regarding a one-time demonstration of the MM III ICBM front section: 1) the Russian side was interested in a one-time demonstration of the Minuteman III ICBM front section in order to ascertain that the space inside the lower portion of the missile front section could not contain items commensurate with reentry vehicles and was prepared to participate in this event; 2) in the Russian side's view, it did not appear possible to resolve this concern without holding a one-time demonstration; 3) the mere fact of conducting a demonstration, without analyzing its results, could not guarantee resolution of the problem; and 4) based on the results of the demonstration, the Russian side was also prepared to consider the U.S. position that any additional devices (for example, mirror-type devices) used during the demonstration would not be used in future inspections. -------------- SS-27 - OPEN PRESS IS GOOD -------------- ¶7. (S) Taylor opened the HOD Meeting at the Russian Mission on November 14, 2008, and stated that the United States remained concerned that the covers used during SS-27 RVOSIs did not allow inspectors to determine that the number of RVs present did not exceed the one warhead attributed to the SS-27 ICBM. These concerns had been heightened by specific facts pertaining to the SS-27. First, press accounts inside Russia continued to indicate that Russia was planning to deploy the SS-27 with multiple warheads. Second, the United States saw similarities between the SS-27 attributed with a single warhead and the prototype RS-24 that had been flight tested with multiple RVs. Furthermore, the SS-27 was a variant of the SS-25 which had been flight-tested with a substantially lighter RV. Taylor stated that although Russian press had also reported that the SS-27 was deployed with only one RV, Russia had maintained its practice of using a very large cover on the front section during all road mobile and silo-based SS-27 RVOSIs. This cover prevented U.S. inspectors from exercising their treaty right to confirm that these missiles contained no more reentry vehicles than the number of warheads attributed to them. All of this increased U.S. concerns regarding the number of RVs deployed on both the silo-based and road-mobile versions of the SS-27 ICBM. -------------- YOUR SYSTEM, YOUR RESPONSIBILITY -------------- ¶8. (S) Taylor said that the United States believed that the responsibility for proposing solutions that would resolve U.S. concerns rested with the Russian Federation, not only because it was the obligation of the inspected Party not to hamper the inspecting Party in ascertaining that the front section contained no more RVs than the number of warheads attributed to missiles of that type, but also because Russia, not the United States, understood the sensitivities involved with the SS-27 system. The United States remained prepared to work seriously, and in good faith, with the Russian Federation to resolve this issue to the satisfaction of both sides and would be willing to explore possible SS-27 RVOSI solutions that took into account whatever sensitive know-how exists on that system that has led to the use of overly large covers. -------------- SS-27 RVOSI - AND THE NUMBER SHALL BE ONE -------------- ¶9. (S) Kashirin repeated that Russia had no intention of deploying the SS-27 with more warheads than what it was attributed with, which was one. The United States could check the Russian-provided telemetry for SS-27 flight tests to confirm this position and validate that Russia was not violating the Treaty. Missile experts could determine through telemetry that the SS-25 and SS-27 had only one reentry vehicle and that the RS-24 was MIRVd. Further complicating the issue was that it was difficult to get funds to construct a new cover for use during RVOSIs at this stage in START. Kashirin said that he was working with experts in Moscow to find steps to resolve U.S. concerns. However, he was encountering the same difficulties he encountered when developing the Vypolzovo demonstration. -------------- SS-27 RVOSI - MASS MEDIA JUST CAUSES PROBLEMS -------------- ¶10. (S) Kashirin stated that the press and mass media are to blame for the confusion with Russian SS-27 RVOSI procedures. The press and mass media that covered missile development sometimes mistakenly called all missiles Topol. The same situation existed when the U.S. press published incorrect facts concerning missile flights out of Plesetsk Test Range or Baikanour Space Launch Facility. -------------- CAN'T BLAME THE PRESS FOR THIS MESS -------------- ¶11. (S) Taylor appreciated the predicament that both sides found themselves in as START got closer to expiration. However, limited funding did not relieve the obligation to meet the requirements of the Treaty. He could also appreciate that our press took liberties, and that this created problems by having insufficient information. Concerns raised by press reports could be understandable, but taking into consideration all of the other sources of information available is what created the U.S. concern. ¶12. (S) Taylor said he appreciated all of the effort and time taken to conduct the Vypolzovo SS-25 demonstration. That demonstration and others such as the Trident RVOSI and Tridents in containers demonstrations showed the effort needed to resolve an issue. Taylor asked Kashirin if it was an accurate statement to say that the Russian Federation continued to work to resolve this issue. ¶13. (S) Kashirin added the SS-18 RVOSI demonstration to the list of successful demonstrations and confirmed that Russia was continuing to work to resolve the SS-27 RVOSI issue. -------------- MM III's BIG FOUR -------------- ¶14. (S) Kashirin said that as a result of the Russian Delegation describing Russian MM III RVOSI concerns in detail at the last session, the Parties could now work out the details of the demonstration. He said that there were four main points of the Russian side's position regarding a one-time demonstration of the MM III ICBM front section: 1) the Russian side was interested in a one-time demonstration of the Minuteman III ICBM front section in order to ascertain that the space inside the lower portion of the missile front section could not contain items commensurate with reentry vehicles and was prepared to participate in this event; 2) in the Russian side's view, it did not appear possible to resolve this concern without holding a one-time demonstration; 3) the mere fact of conducting a demonstration, without analyzing its results, could not guarantee resolution of the problem; and 4) based on the results of the demonstration, the Russian side was also prepared to consider the U.S. position that any additional devices (for example, mirror-type devices) used during the demonstration would not be used in future inspections. ¶15. (S) Kashirin requested clarification of the U.S. plans to arrange a one-time demonstration and expressed readiness to further discuss any issues in order to move forward on resolving this problem. He said the Russian Delegation was also prepared to take part in further discussion of this issue in the working group format, so as to consider in detail, with the participation of experts, and if possible reach agreement on, the procedural, technical, and organizational aspects. ¶16. (S) Taylor ended the meeting by stating that it would be helpful if the Russian Delegation provided these four points in writing so that the United States could fully understand Russian concerns, to which Kashirin agreed. ¶17. (U) Documents Exchanged: None ¶18. (U) Participants: U.S. Mr. Taylor Mr. Brown Lt Col Comeau Mr. DeNinno Mr. Dunn Maj Edinger Mr. Fortier Mr. Hanchett Mr. Johnston Mr. Kuehne Mr. Miller LTC Oppenheim CDR Rust Mr. Smith Col Summers Mr. Yaguchi Mr. French (Int) BELARUS Mr. Ponomarev KAZAKHSTAN Col Akhmetalin Mr. Kasenov Mr. Torekeldi RUSSIA Mr. Kashirin Col Ryzhkov Capt(1st Rank) Kuz'min Col Novikov Mr. Bolotov Ms. Sorokina Col Zaytsev Mr. Gusev (Int) UKRAINE Dr. Shevtsov Mr. Bondarenko ¶19. (U) Taylor sends. TICHENOR NNNN End Cable Text