TAYLOR/ANTONOV MEETING, NOVEMBER 12, 2008

S E C R E T GENEVA 000968 DEPT FOR T, VCI AND EUR/PRA DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24 CIA FOR WINPAC JCS FOR J5/DDGSA SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR NSC FOR HAYES DIA FOR LEA E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/17/2018 TAGS: KACT PARM START JCIC INF US RS UP BO KZ PGOV, PREL, JA, MOPS SUBJECT: TAYLOR/ANTONOV MEETING, NOVEMBER 12, 2008 REF: 07 BERLIN 000750 Classified By: Jerry A. Taylor, United States Representative to the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission. Reasons: 1.5(b) and (d). ¶1. (U) Meeting Date: November 12, 2008 Time: 3:15 P.M. - 4:05 P.M. Place: Russian Mission, Geneva, Switzerland -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶2. (S) At the request of the Russian Federation, Taylor and Kuehne met with Antonov, Buzhinskiy, and Koshelev at the Russian Mission to address Russian questions regarding a post-START agreement. Antonov, after commenting on that days CCW meeting in Geneva, questioned whether it would be useful for the Russian side to meet again with the United States prior to the change of administration since the U.S. and Russian views were so far apart with respect to a post-START agreement. Antonov lamented that the United States had not taken into consideration any of the Russian ideas from over a year ago. Buzhinskiy stated that he didn't see value in trying to work a common text when there remained fundamental disagreement on the basis of any agreement. Taylor stated that in his opinion, for Russia's most current views to be accurately conveyed to the next administration, Russia would do well to meet again with the United States on this issue and to provide a written response to the U.S.-provided draft treaty text. Antonov also inquired as to the possibility of extending the START Treaty for a period of less than 5 years. Taylor explained that any proposal to extend START for less than 5 years would require U.S. Senate advice and consent. -------------- WHY MEET AGAIN? -------------- ¶3. (S) Antonov opened the meeting by introducing Buzhinskiy, whom Antonov stated had been with him all day at their meetings regarding CCW. (Note: The Russian Federation had stated earlier that only Antonov and Koshelev would be present at the meeting with Taylor. End Note.) Antonov observed that the meetings on CCW that day had failed because the Europeans had not supported the U.S. position, which the Russian Federation had been prepared to support. Now the Russian Federation would have to reexamine its position and try to find a means to bridge the differences between the United States and Europe. Antonov stated that the Russian Federation now wanted to be closer to the European position. ¶4. (S) On post-START, Antonov stated that he was disappointed with the U.S. draft treaty text. He stated that the draft text included only U.S. ideas and had ignored all of the Russian ideas. Antonov humorously observed that while Buzhinskiy might be more flexible on the content of the draft treaty, he was not. Taylor responded that the U.S. draft treaty text had included some ideas that the Russians and the U.S. had agreed on, such as data exchanges, notifications, visits and definitions. Taylor acknowledged that the U.S. draft was based on a Moscow Treaty approach, rather than the Russian desire to more closely follow a START approach. Antonov asked rhetorically if the United States believed everything in a Cold War treaty was bad, and stated that he believed this attitude would change after the Obama Administration took office. ¶5. (S) Antonov stated that he was not persuaded that now was the time to meet for discussions on a post-START agreement, and asked whether the United States and Russia shouldn't wait to convene the next meeting on this subject until after January 21, 2009. Antonov added that he expected the Obama team to be more flexible toward the Russian ideas. Taylor responded that the Bush Administration still represents the U.S. Government and that there was an interest in Washington to see what the Russian views were regarding the draft treaty and to move forward on a post-START agreement. Antonov stated that Russia had already provided its views last year in Berlin (Ref),and that these views represented Russia's minimum requests. Antonov stated that he didn't know what to do now since he didn't know how to deal with the current Administration. A new era under Obama could present new opportunities; after all, Obama had stated that he wanted to make the world free of nuclear weapons. Taylor observed that both Russia and the Untied States had already signed up to the NPT and its commitment to work toward nuclear disarmament. Antonov countered that the world community expected further cuts in nuclear weapons; he couldn't see beyond START without there being agreement to some decrease in the number of U.S. and Russian nuclear weapons. -------------- NEED TO NEGOTIATE -------------- ¶6. (S) Taylor stated if Russia desired to move forward on post-START, then there had to be a negotiation. In the normal course of negotiations, there should be a counter-proposal to the U.S. draft treaty text. After all, the United States had begun this process by accepting the Russian proposal to have a legally binding treaty, and had provided accordingly a draft treaty text. Antonov dismissed Taylor's assertion and observed that the U.S. knew it would be impossible to achieve agreement without a legal document. Taylor observed that the United States and Russia had, in fact, already accomplished significant results in their military-to-military exchanges, none of which were based on legally binding agreements. ¶7. (S) Buzhinskiy stated that his experience was that two parties needed a common basis in order to have a successful negotiation. At present, the United States and Russia did not have a common basis for post-START. In 2001, the United States and Russia did not have to agree on operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads as the basis for the Moscow Treaty since the parties already had the START Treaty as their basis. Without START as the basis, we can't keep the Moscow Treaty concept in which one side has the potential for 5000 warheads but only declares 1700 deployed nuclear warheads. ¶8. (S) Antonov again asked what purpose there would be in having a meeting with the current Administration. Taylor responded that a meeting would provide an opportunity for the United States and Russia to understand more clearly the position of the other. Kuehne added that any update to the Russian position would be included in briefings on the subject that would be provided during the transition to the new administration. Antonov observed that former DFM Kislyak might have been more willing to have experts meet to discuss the issues, but Antonov wanted to know if there was any chance for a dramatic change in the U.S. position. (Note: Antonov displayed a skeptical tone in describing Kislyak's willingness to hold meetings. End note.) Taylor responded that he couldn't say what the new Administration's response would be to a Russian proposal. Antonov acknowledged that there was no way to know if the Obama Administration would support or reject the Russian proposal. -------------- WHAT DO WE SAY ABOUT EXTENDING START? -------------- ¶9. (S) Antonov stated that he hoped the United States and Russia had a unified position with respect to extending the START Treaty. He did not want Russia to be singled out for blame for not wanting to extend START. Taylor stated that like Russia, the United States did not want to extend START in its current form. However, it was important to note that the United States was not looking for a decision on extending START as a result of the meeting in the JCIC next week. Antonov stated that perhaps the United States and Russia should simply repeat the relevant part of the Sochi statement in which we said we would seek a post-START agreement. Taylor responded that he did not believe it appropriate to bring up in a multilateral JCIC discussion the bilateral work of the U.S. and Russia regarding a post-START agreement. The purpose of the meeting was to meet the minimum requirement of START Article XVII to consider extending START. There was no requirement to reach a decision at this time. ¶10. (S) Antonov asked if it were possible to extend the START Treaty for less than a 5-year period. He had heard some speculation that the Treaty could be extended for one year while the United States and Russia negotiated a new agreement. Taylor responded that it was possible to extend the Treaty for less than 5 years, but such an extension would have to be agreed by all five parties and, for the United States, would have to be sent to the U.S. Senate for advice and consent. ¶11. (U) Delegation lists: U.S. Delegation Mr. Taylor Mr. Kuehne Russian Delegation Mr. Antonov Gen Buzhinskiy Mr. Koshelev ¶12. (U) Taylor sends. TICHENOR NNNN End Cable Text