JCIC-XXXIII: (U) U.S OPENING PLENARY STATEMENT,

C O N F I D E N T I A L GENEVA 000960 DEPT FOR T, VCI AND EUR/PRA DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24 CIA FOR WINPAC JCS FOR J5/DDGSA SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR NSC FOR HAYES DIA FOR LEA E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/17/2018 TAGS: KACT PARM START JCIC INF US RS UP BO KZ SUBJECT: JCIC-XXXIII: (U) U.S OPENING PLENARY STATEMENT, NOVEMBER 13, 2008 Classified By: Jerry A. Taylor, United States Representative to the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d). ¶1. (U) This is JCIC-XXXIII-004. ¶2. (U) At paragraph 3 below is the text of the U.S. Statement that was deliverd at the Opening Plenary Meeting of the Thirty-third Session of the START Treaty's Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission (JCIC),held at the U.S. Mission on November 13, 2008. ¶3. (C) Begin text: STATEMENT BY THE UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE TO THE JOINT COMPLIANCE AND INSPECTION COMMISSION AT THE OPENING PLENARY MEETING OF THE THIRTY-THIRD SESSION November 13, 2008 The United States delegation is pleased to join with representatives of the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine in opening this thirty-third session of the START Treaty's Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission. I The United States continues to have serious concerns regarding the conduct of reentry vehicle inspections (RVOSIs) of the SS-27 ICBM, in both the silo launcher configuration and the road-mobile configuration. During the most recent SS-27 RVOSI inspection, conducted in August 2008 at the Tatishchevo ICBM Base, U.S. inspectors experienced problems with the SS-27 RV cover similar to those encountered and subsequently solved with SS-25 RVOSI. Solution to the SS-25 RVOSI issue came as a result of our mutual hard work and cooperative approach. The U.S. delegation hopes that our discussions on the SS-27 RVOSI issue will likewise lead to resolution of this issue in the very near future. II During JCIC-XXXII, the Parties held in-depth discussions about the conversion of the B-1B heavy bomber equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear air launched cruise missiles to a heavy bomber equipped for non-nuclear armaments. To date, 19 B-1 heavy bombers have been converted to heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments. Russian inspectors, however, continue to question whether the conversion procedures used by the United States are consistent with paragraph 11 of Section VI of the Conversion or Elimination Protocol. In October 2008, the Russian Federation conveyed an aide-memoire on this issue in which it reiterated the view that any such conversion must be irreversible. Moreover, the Russian Federation asserts in its aide-memoire that the B-1 heavy bombers continue to be capable of "carrying" nuclear armaments and that the distinguishing features demonstrated by the United States are insufficient to categorize the converted heavy bombers as heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments. The United States does not share the view expressed in the aide-memoire, and the U.S. delegation will provide the U.S. views during this session. III The United States notes that, beginning in 2008, and in keeping with the Russian Federation's statements delivered during the closing plenary meeting of JCIC-XXXI, the Russian Federation changed its elimination procedures for SS-25 ICBMs by also beginning to eliminate the entire self-contained dispensing mechanism (SCDM) associated with it. The United States welcomes this change in procedure and concurs with Russia's declaration that these ICBMs can be removed from accountability. However, to remove this issue from the JCIC agenda, we must address the elimination of the SCDMs associated with the first 109 SS-25 ICBMs to undergo the elimination process. As each of the 109 SCDMs is eliminated - the remaining step of the SS-25 ICBM elimination process - its associated SS-25 ICBM can be removed from accountability. The U.S. delegation awaits Russia's planned schedule as to when this will be accomplished in order to remove this issue from the JCIC agenda. IV Article XVII of the Treaty requires that, no later than one year before the expiration of the 15-year period, the Parties meet to consider the question of whether the START Treaty will be extended. This issue was briefly discussed during JCIC-XXXII, and the Parties noted that the exact format, timing, level of representation and the terms of the meeting would be agreed to via diplomatic channels. Therefore, the United States has placed on the agenda for JCIC-XXXIII this issue to satisfy the Article XVII requirement to meet to consider whether to extend START. The United States looks forward to discussing this issue with the Parties; however, it should be noted that the Treaty does not require the Parties to make a decision about START extension at this meeting. Moreover, the United States does not expect such a decision to be reached at this meeting. V As we look to the future, it is only prudent that the Parties begin to prepare for the closing of the portal monitoring facility at Votkinsk. With this in mind, the United States listened to the Russian delegation's concerns expressed during JCIC-XXXII and developed a proposal which was communicated through diplomatic channels in October 2008. The U.S. delegation looks forward to discussing this in a working group format during this session. VI In closing, I welcome our Treaty partners to the thirty-third session of the JCIC.The U.S. delegation looks forward to working with our Treaty partners to fulfill the mission of this Commission -- to discuss and resolve questions about Treaty implementation and compliance issues. Thank you. ¶4. (U) Taylor sends. TICHENOR NNNN End Cable Text