JCIC-XXXII: U.S. CLOSING PLENARY STATEMENT, JULY

S E C R E T GENEVA 000603 DEPT FOR T, VCI AND EUR/PRA DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24 CIA FOR WINPAC JCS FOR J5/DDGSA SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP DTRA FOR OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR NSC FOR LUTI DIA FOR LEA E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/25/2018 TAGS: KACT PARM START JCIC INF US RS UP BO KZ SUBJECT: JCIC-XXXII: U.S. CLOSING PLENARY STATEMENT, JULY 24, 2008 Classified By: Jerry A. Taylor, United States Representative to the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d). ¶1. (U) This is JCIC-XXXII-020. . (U) Paragraph 3 below contains the text of the U.S. statement that was delivered at the closing plenary meeting of the Thirty-second Session of the START Treaty's Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission (JCIC),held at the Russian Mission on July 24, 2008. The unclassified attachments, referred to in this closing statement, will be sent septel. ¶3. (S) Begin text: STATEMENT BY THE UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE TO THE JOINT COMPLIANCE AND INSPECTION COMMISSION AT THE CLOSING PLENARY MEETING OF THE THIRTY-SECOND SESSION July 24, 2008 The U.S. Delegation joins with the Representatives of the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine in closing the Thirty-second session of the START Treaty's Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission. I This has again been a productive session despite the short duration and compressed work schedule. During our opening meeting, the U.S. Delegation indicated that, after nearly six years of discussion on Ukrainian proposals to eliminate SS-24 solid rocket motor cases and remove them from START accountability in a manner that would permit their reuse in a civilian capacity, the Parties were close to resolution of that issue. As an additional element of the resolution of elimination of SS-24 solid rocket motor cases, Ukraine has made a unilateral statement committing Ukraine not to transfer those eliminated cases beyond its national territory. The U.S. Delegation also indicated that, after some additional clarification of Russian-proposed changes to the Drovyanaya ICBM Base for Silo Launchers of ICBMs site diagram, the United States was prepared to complete the S-Series Joint Statement on Drovyanaya. I am pleased to acknowledge that both of these issues have been resolved. These successes are indicative of our Governments' commitment and ability to work together constructively, during the intersessional period, in concert with the business-like maner in which we approach these issues here in Geneva. II TheUnited States continues to be extremely concerned regarding the use of very large covers on missilefront sections during SS-27 Silo and road-mobileICBM reentry vehicle on-site inspections (RVOSIs). The use of these large covers prohibits our inspectors from ascertaining that the front section contains no more reentry vehicles than the one warhead attributed to these missiles. We understand that the Russian Federation is studying how to resolve this issue and we look forward to its solution. III The U.S. Delegation welcomes the changes that have been made to the SS-25 elimination procedures beginning in 2008. To date, 28 SS-25 ICBMs have been eliminated. However, the United States still has concerns with the 109 SS-25 ICBMs which the Russian Federation has removed from accountability, but that the U.S. does not consider to have been eliminated. Until all elements of those remaining 109 missiles are eliminated, the United States cannot consider those ICBMs to have been eliminated under the Treaty. The United States understands that the Russian Federation is studying how to resolve this issue and looks forward to a satisfactory resolution soon. IV The Parties again discussed Russian concerns about Minuteman III RVOSI. The U.S. Delegation understands that the Russian Federation cannot commit to resolution of the issue until a demonstration of the interior space under the lower portion of the front section has been conducted. However, if the United States were to commit to such a demonstration, the Russian Federation must understand that any additional procedures that may be used during such a demonstration would not be incorporated into the existing Minuteman III RVOSI procedures. The United States would expect that inspectors would be satisfied with the results of the demonstration and determine that additional procedures would not be necessary for any follow-on RVOSI of MM III. V The Parties also discussed Russian concerns with the Courtland Missile Assembly Facility. The U.S. Delegation provided explanations and answers to the Russian Aide-Memoire of March 28, 2008. The U.S. Delegation stresses that there will be no new production of Trident I first stages at this facility. The U.S. Delegation also stresses that the Trident I first stages that are assembled into target vehicles supporting U.S. Missile Defense programs remain accountable under the Treaty and subject to the Treaty's provisions. VI Russian concerns with the conversion of the B-1 heavy bomber equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs to a heavy bomber equipped for non-nuclear armaments was discussed at this session, as was the issue of the basing of these converted B-1 heavy bombers. The U.S. Delegation notes that the distinguishing features for the converted heavy bombers were confirmed by Russian, Ukrainian and Belarusian inspectors. Concerns with the conversion, as expressed by the Russian Delegation, include that the items removed from the aircraft to make it incapable of carrying nuclear armaments were not demonstrated to the Russian inspectors, Russian inspectors cannot confirm that the aircraft is no longer capable of carrying nuclear armaments, and have concerns that the conversion is not "irreversible." The U.S. Delegation reemphasizes that the conversion procedures used by the U.S. render the converted B-1 heavy bombers incapable of carrying nuclear armaments in accordance with paragraph 11 of Section VI of the Conversion or Elimination Protocol. The U.S. also points out that there is no Treaty obligation to demonstrate the items removed during the conversion process. Additionally, the phrase "incapable of carrying," in its ordinary meaning, as well as in the context of the Conversion or Elimination Protocol, means that, with respect to the modifications carried out on the pylon attachment joints and in the weapons bay, the converted B-1 heavy bomber is no longer capable of, or suited for, the operational deployment of nuclear armaments. It is clear, in both Russian and English language texts that the phrase "carrying nuclear armaments" does not mean simply the ability to load or hold an object the size and weight of a nuclear weapon. The criterion of capability or suitability to support the operational use of the nuclear armaments, as being inherent in the phrase "incapable of carrying nuclear armaments," is consistent with the meaning of "carry" as used in the START Treaty. Furthermore, the U.S. Delegation stresses that there are no Treaty provisions that give the other Parties the right to seek agreement on the conversion procedures. Conversion procedures are at the discretion of the Party conducting the conversion. What is relevant to the inspection regime is the recognition of the distinguishing features declared by the inspected Party, as well as the confirmation by the inspecting Party of the requirements for conversion. Regarding the basing of the converted heavy bombers, the U.S. Delegation stresses that, for Treaty accountability, these heavy bombers are attributed to the Davis-Monthan Conversion or Elimination Facility in the MOU. Converted B-1s located at facilities other than Davis-Monthan will be there in a "visiting" status. VII The United States appreciated hearing the views of the other START Treaty Parties regarding the issue of meeting to consider the extension of the Treaty in accordance with Article XVII. As was made clear by the Parties, this is an important issue that will require consideration by capitals. The United States looks forward to working with its Treaty partners on this matter during the intersessional period. VIII With the expectation that the START Treaty will expire in December 2009, the Parties initiated discussion of the activities and the planning that will be required for closing of the Votkinsk Portal Monitoring Facility and the various Points of Entry related to the START Treaty. The United States is aware that much work needs to be done to efficiently and effectively close those locations. The U.S. Delegation agrees that there are many logistical issues that must be resolved and that those details must be worked together with our Treaty partners. We also note that this planning must take into account that the United States expects to exercise its Treaty inspection and monitoring rights until the expiration of the START Treaty. IX We once again strongly encourage our Treaty partners to communicate, through diplomatic channels, their views on agenda items, as well as any related information in support of those views well in advance of our next JCIC session. As we continue to learn, communication and dialogue in advance of a session are key to enhancing our chances of success when we meet here in Geneva. X Thank you all for your work here in Geneva. I look forward to continuing to work together during the intersessional period. Once again, I would like to thank our translators and interpreters for their exceptional work. Without them, we could not function. Have a safe journey home. End text. ¶4. (U) Taylor sends. TICHENOR NNNN End Cable Text