JCIC-XXXII: HEADS OF DELEGATION MEETING ON

S E C R E T GENEVA 000592 DEPT FOR T, VCI AND EUR/PRA DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24 CIA FOR WINPAC JCS FOR J5/DDGSA SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP DTRA FOR OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR NSC FOR LUTI DIA FOR LEA E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/25/2018 TAGS: KACT PARM START JCIC INF US RS UP BO KZ SUBJECT: JCIC-XXXII: HEADS OF DELEGATION MEETING ON CLOSING VOTKINSK AND POE'S ON START EXPIRATION, JULY 17, 2008 REF: A. STATE 60792 (RNC/STR 08-154/135) ¶B. 01 STATE 37656 Classified By: Jerry A. Taylor, United States Representative to the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d). ¶1. (U) This is JCIC-XXXII-006. ¶2. (U) Meeting Date: July 17, 2008 Time: 3:30 - 4:20 P.M. Place: Russian Mission, Geneva -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶3. (S) A Heads of Delegation (HOD) Meeting was held at the Russian Mission on July 17, 2008. Representatives from the U.S., Belarus, Russia and Ukraine were present. Kazakhstan was not represented. The Russian Delegation initiated the first JCIC discussion on procedures that will be required to terminate continuous monitoring activities at the Votkinsk Production Facility and the closure of Points of Entry (POE) should START expire in December 2009. The U.S. and Russian Delegations agreed to discuss questions concerning the completion of continuous monitoring activities at the Votkinsk Production Facility in a bilateral working group. All Parties present agreed that it will be necessary to further discuss procedures for closing POEs in all countries in the event of START expiration. The second topic raised by the Russian Delegation was that, beginning in January 2008, Russia had implemented the new SS-25 ICBM elimination procedures, which included the elimination of the casing of the self-contained dispensing mechanism (SCDM). Russia is still considering how to resolve the question associated with SS-25 SCDM casings that were not included in elimination procedures prior to 2008. The U.S. Delegation said that, since the casings were not present or eliminated, the U.S. did not consider SS-25 ICBMs presented for elimination prior to 2008 to be completely eliminated in accordance with the Conversion or Elimination (C or E) Protocol. -------------- WHEN START STOPS -------------- ¶4. (S) Koshelev opened the first JCIC discussion on procedures required to complete continuous monitoring activities at the Votkinsk Production Facility should START expire in December 2009. Koshelev said the Russian Federation realized that terminating continuous monitoring activities at Votkinsk was a complex process which would take time to plan and that is why the Russian Federation proposed it be put on the JCIC agenda. Koshelev stated that it would be necessary to resolve questions regarding the itemization of assets, as well as funding and legal matters. Moreover, the Russian Federation recommended creating a joint document that may require authorization at the executive level outlining agreed upon procedures for the termination of continuous monitoring activities at the Votkinsk Production Facility. Koshelev remarked that experience could be drawn from procedures used to close Russian continuous monitoring activities at the U.S. Missile Production Facility in Magna, Utah in 2001, following the end of the INF inspection regime. ¶5. (S) Koshelev mentioned that Mr. Faircloth, Director of the On-site Inspection Directorate, Dfense Threat Reduction Agency, discussed the isse of terminating continuous monitoring activitie at Votkinsk with the head of the Russian Nuclea Risk Reduction Center (NRRC) on July 02, ¶2008. Koshelev noted that Mr. Faircloth informed the Rusian NRRC chief of U.S. plans to transfer some U.. assets and equipment located at the Votkinsk Poduction Facility to Russia free of charge. Rusia did the same in 2001 upon terminating its activities in Mgna. ¶6. (S) Koshelev mentioned thatanother issue for consideration, in connection wth the expiration of START, was the proper closue of POEs and removal of POE associated equipmen such as Radiation Detection Equipment (RDE) from the territory of the Russian Federation. ¶7. (S Taylor responded with the United States' view tha, if the START Treaty expires and there are no fllow-on agreements regarding the right to maintain continuous monitoringat Votkinsk, the Unitd States would expect to case continuous monitoring at Votkinsk and to remov all personnel and related equipment prior to theexpiration of the Treaty. The United States woud, of course, be open to working with the Russia Federation to reach agreement on suitable meansto commemorate the ending of over 20 years of cotinuous monitoring at Votkinsk ¶8. (S) Taylor adressed all Parties present stating that the expiation of the START Treaty would end the use of POE for START purposes, unless a separate agreement were to be reached with respect to the establishment and use of POEs. The United States would expect to remove any equipment currently stored at those POEs and would expect the other Parties to do likewise. ¶9. (S) Taylor explained to the Parties that the United States was still in the early stages of planning for POE closures and the termination of continuous monitoring activities at Votkinsk, in the event of START expiration and that he had no further information available to relay. ¶10. (S) All Parties present agreed that, taking into consideration the potential expiration of START, the proper closures of POEs and accountability of equipment is a subject that needs to discussed in more detail in the future. The U.S. and Russia agreed to move the discussion about the completion of continuous monitoring activities at the Votkinsk Production Facility to a bilateral working group. -------------- SHOW ME THE SS-25 SCDM CASINGS -------------- ¶11. (S) Koshelev stated that, in January 2008, Russia began implementation of the new SS-25 elimination procedures in accordance with the closing plenary at JCIC-XXXI, which allowed U.S. inspectors the opportunity to inspect SS-25 SCDM casings that were to be eliminated. Koshelev noted that 28 SS-25 ICBMs had been eliminated since January 2008. ¶12. (S) Koshelev remarked that Russian experts were still determining how the question of SS-25 SCDM casings, not considered to be eliminated prior to 2008, would be resolved. He concluded by saying that all Parties would be informed once the Russian Federation had determined how it could proceed when it was ready to resolve this issue. ¶13. (S) Taylor responded by acknowledging the Russian Federation's cooperation in bringing SS-25 ICBM elimination procedures into compliance with the Treaty by exhibiting the "full set of elements" for the SS-25, "including the hull of the instrument compartments." Since January 2008, 28 SS-25 ICBMs, including their entire self-contained dispensing mechanisms, have been eliminated. Taylor remarked that Washington concured with the removal of these missiles from accountability and concluded by saying that the U.S. looked forward to receiving information on the casings that had not been completely eliminated. ¶14. (U) Documents exchanged. None. ¶15. (U) Participants: U.S. Mr. Taylor Ms. Bosco Lt Col Comeau Mr. Couch Mr. DeNinno Mr. Dunn Mr. Fortier Maj Gondol Mr. Johnston Mr. Tessier Mr. Vogel Mr. Yaguchi Mr. Smith Mr. Brown Mr. Edinger Dr. Hopkins (Int) BELARUS Mr. Ponamarev RUSSIA Mr. Koshelev Mr. Shevchenko Mr. Kashirin CAPT(1st Rank) Kuz'min Mr. Lapshin Col Novikov Col Ryzhkov Mr. Serov Mr. Smirnoff Ms. Sorokina Col Zaytsev Ms. Komshilova (Int) UKRAINE Dr. Shevtsov Mr. Bodarenko MGen. Fedetov Mr. Demidenko ¶16. (U) Taylor sends. TICHENOR NNNN End Cable Text