JCIC-XXXII: WORKING GROUP MEETING ON DROVYANAYA

S E C R E T GENEVA 000585 DEPT FOR T, VCI AND EUR/PRA DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24 CIA FOR WINPAC JCS FOR J5/DDGSA SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP DTRA FOR OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR NSC FOR LUTI DIA FOR LEA E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/23/2018 TAGS: KACT PARM START JCIC INF US RS UP BO KZ SUBJECT: JCIC-XXXII: WORKING GROUP MEETING ON DROVYANAYA SITE DIAGRAM AND MM III RVOSI ISSUES, JULY 18, 2008 REF: A. GENEVA 0565 (JCIC-XXXII-005) ¶B. 07 GENEVA 2570 (JCIC-XXXI-028) Classified By: Jerry A. Taylor, United States Representative to the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d). ¶1. (U) This is JCIC-XXXII-009. ¶2. (U) Meeting Date: July 18, 2008 Time: 3:30 - 5:10 P.M. Place: U.S. Mission, Geneva -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶3. (S) A Working Group (WG) Meeting was held at the U.S. Mission on July 18, 2008, to discuss Russian-proposed changes to the Site Diagram of Drovyanaya former Silo ICBM Base and Russian concerns with Minuteman III (MM III) reentry vehicle on-site inspection (RVOSI) procedures. The United States, Russia, Kazakhstan and Ukraine were represented. The Kazakhstani Representative said he had just arrived in Geneva, but was ready to begin work in the JCIC. ¶4. (S) The Russian Delegation gave a slide presentation explaining the changes proposed to the site diagram for Drovyanaya. They provided a new site diagram, dated July 17 2008, that removed the silo training launcher that was erroneously placed on the site diagram provided to the U.S. through diplomatic channels in April 2008, and highlighted the differences in boundary locations from the site diagram. (Begin comment: The Russian-proposed Joint Statement was e-mailed to State/VCI/SI. There was no reporting cable. End comment.). ¶5. (S) The Russian Delegation also presented its concerns regarding the possibility of a one-time demonstration of the inside of the lower portion of the MM III front section. The U.S. Delegation listened to, and sought clarification of, those concerns. The U.S. Delegation responded by reiterating the U.S. position that any such demonstration would not result in additional procedures for use during MM III RVOSIs. The Russians would not guarantee that a satisfactory outcome to such a demonstration would alleviate their concerns regarding the space in the lower portion of the front section. -------------- DROVYANAYA SITE DIAGRAM -------------- ¶6. (S) Couch opened the Working Group (WG) meeting by welcoming everyone and recognizing the representative from Kazakhstan, Colonel Akhmetalin, since this was the first meeting he had been able to attend. Couch outlined the WG's agenda and turned over a Delegation paper with questions concerning the changes to the Drovyanaya site diagram that had been asked at the HOD meeting on Drovyanaya.(Ref A). The text of the U.S. Delegation Paper follows. Begin text: JCIC-XXXII U.S. Delegation Paper July 17, 2008 Clarification questions posed to the Russian Federation regarding the revised Site Diagram for Drovyanaya former Silo ICBM Base 1) The proposed boundaries of the formerly declared facility depicted on the revised site diagram would significantly reduce the inspectable area beyond what was discussed during JCIC-XXXI. The U.S. seeks to better understand why the proposed boundary changes that were not discussed during the previous session are necessary for the formerly declared facility. 2) It is our understanding that the silo training launcher associated with the Drovyanaya Silo ICBM Base was explosively destroyed and officially eliminated in accordance with the START Treaty on August 25, 1995. While subparagraph 9(b) (iii) of Annex J of the Memorandum of Understanding requires that silo training launchers be shown on the site diagram of the facility at which they are declared, it is not clear why the Russian Federation depicted the location of the former silo training launcher on the revised site diagram since it was not reflected on the last agreed site diagram for the facility and it had previously been eliminated and no longer declared as IOI. End text. ¶7. (S) Ryzhkov thanked the U.S. Delegation for its draft S-Series Joint Statement and provided the other Parties with the new site diagram, dated July 17, 2008, with the reduced boundary and the absence of the previously-eliminated silo training launcher. Ryzhkov reiterated that Russia did not intend to use the area excluded from this diagram for activities inconsistent with the Treaty. Ryzhkov clarified the reasons for the difference in size of the excluded area from what was discussed during JCIC-XXXI by saying that the Russian Federation only recently made final decisions about the area to be excluded. The text of the U.S.-proposed S-Series Joint Statement on Drovyanaya follows. Begin text: JCIC-XXXII U.S.-Proposed Text July 18, 2008 JOINT COMPLIANCE AND INSPECTION COMMISSION JOINT STATEMENT NUMBER S-(BLANK) ON CHANGES TO THE BOUNDARY OF DROVYANAYA ICBM BASE FOR SILO LAUNCHERS OF ICBMS The Parties, referring to paragraph 19 of Annex J to the Memorandum of Understanding on the Establishment of the Data Base Relating to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, taking into account the information provided in Annex A to this Joint Statement with respect to the Drovyanaya ICBM Base for Silo Launchers of ICBMs, agree on the following: (1) The new boundary of the Drovyanaya ICBM Base for Silo Launchers of ICBMs shall be the boundary shown on the site diagram of the maintenance facility of the base dated April 6, 2008, which is attached as Annex B to this Joint Statement. (2) The portions of the Drovyanaya ICBM Base for Silo Launchers of ICBMs to be excluded, pursuant to this Joint Statement, from within the boundary shown on the existing site diagram of the maintenance facility dated May 29, 1995, shall not be subject to inspection unless such portions are included within the boundary of any inspection site. (3) The changes to the boundary of the Drovyanaya ICBM Base for Silo Launchers of ICBMs shall become effective on the date specified in the notification provided by the Russian Federation in accordance with paragraph 19 of Section I of the Protocol on Notifications Relating to the Treaty, or the date such notification is provided by the Russian Federation, or the date of entry into force of this Joint Statement, whichever is latest. ............... (United States of America) ............... (Republic of Belarus ............... (Republic of Kazakhstan) ............... (Russian Federation) ............... (Ukraine) ANNEX A INFORMATION PROVIDED BY THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION ON CHANGES TO THE BOUNDARY OF THE DROVYANAYA ICBM BASE FOR SILO LAUNCHERS OF ICBMS The Russian Federation: (1) pursuant to subparagraph 19(a) of Annex J to the Memorandum of Understanding on the Establishment of the Data Base Relating to the Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the Memorandum of Understanding, declares that the requirements set forth in the first sentence of paragraph 2 of Section IX of the Protocol on Procedures Governing the Conversion or Elimination of the Items Subject to the Treaty have been met with respect to the portions of the Drovyanaya ICBM Base for Silo Launchers of ICBMs to be excluded from within the boundary shown on the existing site diagram of the facility dated May 29, 1995; (2) pursuant to subparagraph 19(b) of Annex J to the Memorandum of Understanding, states that all structures that were ever shown within the boundaries shown on the existing site diagram of the Drovyanaya ICBM Base for Silo Launchers of ICBMs dated May 29, 1995, pursuant to subparagraph 9(b)(iii) or 9(b)(iv) of Annex J to the Memorandum of Understanding and that will be excluded from within the boundary of this facility pursuant to this Joint Statement, will remain unchanged but will no longer be used for items of inspection as of April 6, 2008. End text. -------------- NOW YOU SEE IT, NOW YOU DON'T -------------- ¶8. (S) Kuz'min gave a slide presentation on the changes to the site diagram. The first slide showed the site diagram from May 29, 1995, then overlaid the new boundaries with shading to indicate the area to be excluded. The new site diagram no longer showed the silo training launcher that was eliminated in August 1995. The next several slides showed photographs from the areas to be excluded showing empty spaces or abandoned buildings. The slide indicated the places from which the photographs were taken and the direction of the camera. (Begin comment: the 1995 site diagram shown by Kuz'min had a silo training launcher depicted on it. The actual May 29, 1995 approved Drovyanaya site diagram did not have a silo training launcher depicted on it. End comment.) ¶9. (S) Fortier asked whether there was a fence line that indicated the new boundary and Kuz'min answered that fences exist around areas previously discussed and a fence would be established along the portion of the site proposed to be reduced. ¶10. (S) Couch stated that the U.S. could accept the new site diagram and was ready to move it into the Conforming Working Group. ¶11. (S) Ryzhkov presented the U.S. Delegation with an updated draft of the Russian-proposed S-Series Joint Statement, indicating that there were two words the Russian Delegation added to the text that did not change the substance of the document. Kuz'min indicated he would address these changes in the Conforming Working Group. -------------- MM III RVOSI CONCERNS -------------- ¶12. (S) Ryzhkov began the discussion on Minuteman III RVOSI by highlighting the importance of this issue and welcomed the U.S. Delegation's desire to resolve it. Ryzhkov began by responding to the questions contained in the U.S. Delegation paper from December 2007 (Ref B) that stated the ability to inspect the underside of the MM III front section would resolve Russian concerns. ¶13. (S) Russia would agree with the United States conducting a demonstration at a specially-allocated site, but believed it was better to approximate actual RVOSI procedures. Such a demonstration should follow the Inspection Protocol, Annex 3 procedures for conducting an RVOSI. -------------- MIRROR, MIRROR ON THE WALL -------------- ¶14. (S) Ryzhkov stated that the Russian Delegation was surprised by the U.S. question about indirect viewing. Russia would prefer a direct method of examination of the underside of the front section but would accept an indirect method, perhaps using a mirror-like device. Ryzhkov referred to previous demonstrations (e.g., King's Bay, Vypolzovo) that alleviated concerns of each side and stated THAT, if the demonstration satisfied Russian concerns, this issue would be closed. However, Ryzhkov would not state unequivocally that a one-time viewing would allay Russia's concerns because the procedures to be used during that viewing had not yet been determined. ¶15. (S) Couch stated that the U.S. wanted to resolve this issue, but was very concerned about any change in procedures with respect to nuclear weapons. Couch used a photograph of the MM III front section suspended in the silo that had been presented during JCIC-XXXI and asked whether Russian concerns would be satisfied by seeing if RVs could be placed in the lower portion of the front section in a rear-facing or horizontal configuration. (Begin comment: After asking that question, Zaytsev nodded his head firmly. End comment.) ¶16. (S) Ryzhkov stated that Russia had wanted to know for a long time whether the volume and engineering of the space inside the lower portion of the MM III front section was capable of being equipped with reentry vehicles. ¶17. (S) Couch assured the Russian Delegation that the U.S. wanted to resolve this issue, but needed to ensure that any demonstration could be done in a safe and secure way that satisfied Russian concerns. Couch reiterated the U.S. position that any demonstration would not lead to new procedures to be used during future RVOSIs. -------------- THE GIFT THAT KEEPS ON GIVING -------------- ¶18. (S) Ryzhkov responded that it was up to the United States to structure a demonstration, and outlined Russian thinking about a demonstration's relationship to future inspections. He opined that, during future inspections, Russian inspectors would need to see the front section as it was during the demonstration. To ensure this was the case, the U.S. would need to identify a distinguishing element on the front section, preferably inside the lower portion of the front section, that Russian inspectors could see either directly, or indirectly, with a mirror-like device. Ryzhkov added that if the demonstration showed no need for additional procedures, Russia would not insist on any. ¶19. (S) Smith stated that the essence of the discussion was the volume of space inside the lower portion of the front section. The U.S. hope was that any demonstration would show that the volume was inadequate to contain additional RVs. Smith explained that the U.S. goal was to satisfy Russian concerns without adding to existing RVOSI procedures, and any talk of mirrors or distinguishing elements would lead to additional procedures which the U.S. hoped to avoid. Smith asked, if the U.S. could demonstrate that the volume of space beneath the front section was unable to contain additional RVs, would that satisfy Russian concerns? ¶20. (S) Ryzhkov referenced the SS-25 RVOSI demonstration at Vypolzovo stating that, during the demonstration, the U.S. made suggestions about the procedures to Russia, based on the demonstration itself, and Russia incorporated those suggestions into the finally agreed-on procedures because they made sense. ¶21. (S) Smith responded that the U.S. questions were never intended to lead to new procedures. (Begin comment: Ryzhkov was becoming visibly frustrated. End comment.) -------------- MAYBE, JUST MAYBE -------------- ¶22. (S) Ryzhkov stated that this was the fourth time the U.S. Delegation pushed for a direct answer as to whether or not a demonstration of the space beneath the front section would resolve Russian concerns, but the Russian Federation could not provide an answer until after the demonstration was conducted. He urged the U.S. to conduct the demonstration and then the answer would be known. ¶23. (S) Couch asked Ryzhkov to elaborate on the idea of a distinguishing element to be used during future RVOSIs. Smith asked whether such an element needed to be within the space of the lower portion of the front section or if it could be an element normally seen outside of that space during current procedures. ¶24. (S) Ryzhkov pointed out that the Russian idea was that the element should be within the lower portion of the front section, and it could be an element that could be seen with a mirror. Ryzhkov stated "if you can persuade us otherwise, go ahead." ¶25. (S) Couch attempted to re-verify the Russian position that a successful demonstration would not require new procedures and that use of a mirror would be for the demonstration only. Ryzhkov responded maybe or maybe not. -------------- THE ANSWER IS UNDER THE NAPKIN -------------- ¶26. (S) Ryzhkov built a small model of the MM III front section using a napkin, his pen and a water glass. To demonstrate what Russia is concerned about he raised it up to look underneath, and said they wanted to see what was covered. ¶27. (S) Both delegations agreed each now clearly understood the other's position on this issue and Couch concluded the session stating the U.S. would study Russian concerns and respond at a later time. -------------- SIDE-BAR DISCUSSION ON RUSSIAN DECLARATION OF FORCE MAJEURE -------------- ¶28. (S) Smith conducted a short side-bar discussion with Ryzhkov and Kuz'min after the meeting concerning the Russian declaration of force majeure which resulted in the cancellation, at the point of entry (POE),of an RVOSI which was to be conducted at the Tatishchevo ICBM Base in the Russian Federation. Smith asked Ryzhkov whether he had any additional information regarding the reason for the force majeure declaration. Ryzhkov stated that the big secret was a visit by the President of Russia to Tatishchevo that day and there were extreme security concerns. He also noted that force majeure can be declared for reasons other than natural disasters. Smith advised Ryzhkov that the Russian inspection team chief, Colonel Petrov, who conducted an inspection ten days later in the U.S., had informed the U.S. escorts that the situation at Tatishchevo had been of short duration and if the U.S. inspection team had declared another inspection site and, after that inspection, had requested to go to Tatishchevo they would have been able to conduct the inspection. Smith asked, if that was the case, why couldn't the Russian escort exhibit some flexibility and allow the U.S inspection team to stay at the POE one more day and then conduct the inspection rather than making them return to the Unites States? Ryzhkov replied that, at the time, the Russian escorts did not know how long the restrictions would be in place at the site but that, currently, Tatishchevo was available for inspection at any time and U.S. inspection teams were welcome there. ¶29. (U) Documents exchanged. - U.S.: -- United States Delegation Paper on Questions For Clarification on Drovyanaya Site Diagram Changes, July 17 ¶2008. - Russia: -- Site Diagram Drovyanaya, July 17 2008; and -- Draft JCIC S-Series Joint Statement On Changes To The Boundary Of Drovyanaya ICBM Base For Silo Launchers Of ICBMs, July 18, 2008. ¶30. (U) Participants: U.S. Mr. Couch Ms. Bosco Mr. Brown Lt Col Comeau Mr. DeNinno Mr. Dunn Maj Edinger Mr. Fortier Maj Gondol Mr. Hanchett Mr. Johnston LTC Oppenheim Mr. Smith Mr. Tessier Mr. Vogel Mr. Yaguchi Mr. French (Int) KAZAKHSTAN Col Akhmetalin RUSSIA Col Ryzhkov Capt(1st Rank) Kuz'min Col Novikov Col Zaytsev Mr. Avdeyev (Int) Ms. Yevarovskaya (Int) UKRAINE Dr. Shevtsov ¶31. (U) Taylor sends. TICHENOR NNNN End Cable Text