JCIC-XXXII: HEADS OF DELEGATION MEETING ON

S E C R E T GENEVA 000572 DEPT FOR T, VCI AND EUR/PRA DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24 CIA FOR WINPAC JCS FOR J5/DDGSA SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP DTRA FOR OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR NSC FOR LUTI DIA FOR LEA E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/23/2018 TAGS: KACT PARM START JCIC INF US RS UP BO KZ SUBJECT: JCIC-XXXII: HEADS OF DELEGATION MEETING ON UKRAINIAN SS-24 ELIMINATIONS, SS-27 RVOSI PROCEDURES, AND COURTLAND MISSILE ASSEMBLY FACILITY, JULY 18, 2008 REF: ANC/STR 07-614/17 ON AUGUST 26 2007 Classified By: Jerry A. Taylor, United States Representative to the Join/t Compliance and Inspection Commission. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d). ¶1. (U) This is JCIC-XXXII-008. ¶2. (U) Meeting Date: July 18, 2008 Time: 10:30 A.M. - 12:30 P.M. Place: U.S. Mission, Geneva -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶3. (S) A Heads of Delegation (HOD) Meeting was held at the U.S. Mission in Geneva, Switzerland on July 18, 2008 to discuss Ukrainian SS-24 eliminations, covers used during SS-27 Reentry Vehicle On-Site Inspections (RVOSIs),and Russian concerns regarding the U.S. Courtland SLBM Production Facility. All Parties except Kazakhstan were represented. On the Ukrainian SS-24 elimination issue, Ukraine agreed with the U.S. proposal to develop a JCIC Joint Statement and a JCIC agreement to incorporate into the Treaty both the current Ukrainian practice of burning out residual fuel from the motor cases after conducting propellant washout, as well as the Ukrainian proposal to drill a total of four holes, each no less than 80mm in diameter, in two diametrically opposed groups, through the cylindrical portion of each case near the bottom of the motor case. ¶4. (S) On the issue of SS-27 RVOSI, the U.S. Delegation restated its concern that the large covers used during SS-27 RVOSIs did not allow inspectors to determine that the number of reentry vehicles (RVs) present did not exceed the one warhead attributed to the SS-27 ICBM. Russia replied that it was looking for ways to address U.S. concerns, and reiterated that all SS-27 ICBMs contain no more than one reentry vehicle. On the issue of the Courtland Missile Assembly Facility, the Russian Federation reiterated its concerns and the U.S. again provided clarification. -------------- UKRAINIAN SS-24 ELIMINATIONS -------------- ¶5. (S) Taylor opened the Heads of Delegation Meeting on July 18, 2008 and stated that the United Stated had carefully considered Ukraine's SS-24 elimination proposal and also had studied the Ukrainian water washout procedures. Taylor stated that it was the understanding of the United States that, following propellant washout, residual propellant was burned out of the motor casing. He stated that, if the Parties were to reach agreement on this issue, the United States required that the propellant burnout procedure would always be used in conjunction with the washout and that the proposed drilling of four 80mm holes in the motor casing would also be a mandatory part of the elimination. With that in mind, the U.S. tabled a draft JCIC Agreement and a draft JCIC Joint Statement, which would incorporate into the Treaty the current Ukrainian practice of burning out residual fuel from the motor cases after propellant washout, and the Ukrainian proposal to drill a total of four holes (in two diametrically opposite groups),each no less than 80mm in diameter, through the cylindrical portion of each case near the bottom of the motor case (Ref A). Taylor also urged Ukraine to issue a policy statement committing to inform the U.S. in advance if any of the rocket motor cases eliminated with these procedures was to be exported or removed from the territory of Ukraine. ¶6. (S) Shevtsov thanked the U.S. for providing the two documents. He stated that the U.S. approach differed slightly in form from that discussed in previous sessions, and added that the substance of the U.S proposal still corresponded to Ukraine's vision. Ukraine agreed with the U.S. proposal and promised to provide a Ukrainian-proposed joint draft text in the afternoon session. Regarding the U.S. request to issue a policy statement to inform the U.S. in advance if any eliminated rocket motors were to be exported, Shevtsov replied that these motors were subject to national export controls, that Ukraine did not have licenses for sending them abroad, and that Ukraine would provide a policy statement. Ponamarev added that Belarus would not provide any obstacles to the process if the U.S. and Ukraine agreed. Koshelev confirmed that the proposed method of elimination was a technically feasible method (Begin comment: He did not specify if he meant a feasible means to render inoperable, or a feasible means to eliminate under the Treaty. End comment.),and asked that Russia be allowed time to read the U.S.-provided documents and advise its legal representatives. -------------- SS-27 RVOSI -------------- ¶7. (S) Taylor restated U.S. concerns that the covers used by the Russians during SS-27 RVOSIs did not allow U.S. inspectors to determine that the number of reentry vehicles (RVs) present did not exceed the one warhead attributed to the SS-27 ICBM. He stated that U.S. concerns had been heightened by several specific facts pertaining to the SS-27. First, Russian press accounts continued to indicate that Russia planned to equip the SS-27 with multiple warheads. Taylor cited a Russian television program from February, 2008, in which SS-27 designer Yuriy Solomonov stated that the first launch of an SS-27 with multiple warheads had already occurred. Taylor acknowledged that the U.S. understood that not all press reporting was accurate, but added that there must be some credibility to statements by the chief designer of the SS-27, as well as previous statements by the Chief of the General Staff and commander of the Strategic Rocket Forces. Second, Taylor pointed out that the SS-25 had been flight-tested with a substantially lighter RV, which increased U.S. concerns regarding the number of RVs deployed on both the silo-based and mobile versions of the SS-27 variant of the SS-25 ICBM, and stated that these concerns were amplified by similarities between the SS-27 and the prototype RS-24, which had been flight-tested with multiple RVs. ¶8. (S) Taylor added that it was particularly troubling that Russia continued to use very large RV covers over the front section during RVOSIs on both the road-mobile and silo-based version of the SS-27. He stated the U.S. believed the responsibility for proposing solutions that would resolve U.S. concerns rested with the Russian Federation, because it was the obligation of the inspected Party not to hamper the inspecting Party's ability to determine that the front section contained no more RVs than the number of warheads attributed to missiles of that type, but also because only Russia understood the sensitivities involved with its system. Taylor repeated the U.S. readiness to work seriously and in good faith with the Russian Federation to resolve this issue to the satisfaction of both sides, and stated that the United States would be willing to explore possible SS-27 RVOSI solutions that took into account whatever sensitivities led to the use of overly large covers. He concluded by stating that if the Russian Federation believed a demonstration of new SS-27 RVOSI procedures beyond those already employed could help resolve these concerns, then the U.S. believed direct involvement of JCIC delegation members in a demonstration could facilitate the discussion of Russian-proposed solutions to U.S. concerns. -------------- DON'T PAY ANY ATTENTION TO SOLOMONOV -------------- ¶9. (S) Koshelev responded, stating he understood that the U.S. closely followed the Russian press, but remarked that when high-level officials made comments to the press, they often had a political motivation and were seeking to achieve a desired result. Ryzhkov later added that Russian journalists were not experts and often referred to all mobile missiles as "Topol." In contrast, the Russian JCIC delegation was authorized to make official statements and Koshelev reaffirmed that all SS-27 do not have more than one reentry vehicle. Koshelev then repeated the Russian position that neither the size of RVs or covers was limited by the START Treaty, and stated that the size of the cover was determined by the design features of the missile front section. He recalled that Russia had chosen not to use a hard cover for RVOSIs. He stated that SS-27 RVOSI was a sensitive issue, but Russia was looking for ways to address U.S. concerns and find an acceptable solution. He added Russia was looking to remove this issue from the JCIC agenda. Ryzhkov concluded by adding that the similarities between Russian mobile missiles was natural because some technology from older Russian missiles was used in newer ones, and stated that U.S. concerns regarding the number of RVs on the SS-27 could be resolved through telemetry, which showed that the SS-27 had never released more than one RV. -------------- KOSHELEV-TAYLOR SIDE-BAR ON START EXTENSION -------------- ¶10. (S) During a short break, Koshelev proposed to Taylor a meeting of U.S. and Russian lawyers to discuss the question of whether and how to record the holding of the Article XVII meeting (to consider whether to extend START),explaining that it was a START obligation to hold such a meeting and that there could be questions raised as to whether such a meeting was ever held. He also commented that the Parties needed to decide at what level such a meeting should be held (i.e. at the JCIC or higher),given its political importance. Brown indicated that in his view there was no Treaty requirement that there be any document certifying that such a meeting was held, but recognized that there might be political reasons to do so, and added that the lawyers should be able to implement whatever the Parties decided to do in terms of documentation. Koshelev said he thought that Belarus wanted a statement about START extension to include the retention of some START provisions after START expiration, but stated that he would prefer something simpler, maybe just a joint statement that such a meeting was held. Taylor said the whole subject of the meeting to consider START extension, which was raised by the Russian side, would be in a later meeting during this session, and that Koshelev's comments about the political aspects of recognizing that the Article XVII meeting had in fact been held, as required by the Treaty, were understandable. -------------- COURTLAND ENCORE -------------- ¶11. (S) The last item on the agenda was the Courtland Missile Assembly Facility. This item was placed on the agenda by the Russian Federation so Taylor turned the meeting over to Koshelev. Koshelev said that the Russian Federation had expressed its concerns about what was to be produced at this facility in its March 28, 2008 aide-memoire. He stated that the declaration of this U.S. facility (Ref B) by reference A does not correspond to the definition of a Production Facility in the START Treaty. The U.S. notification stated that there was no intention to produce first-stage motors and that target vehicles would be assembled using Trident I first-stage motors. Koshelev reiterated the questions in the Russian aide-memoire and asked: What was the status of the facility? What would be the new product subject to START production at Courtland? What were the technical characteristics of the new product? He stated that this facility was new, subject to START and further inquired into how the U.S. was going to monitor and track the new product, where would it be deployed, and which launcher would it be loaded. ¶12. (S) Taylor thanked Koshelev for his comments and stated that: -- The United States had reviewed the Russian Federation's aide-memoire of March 28, 2008, "On the U.S. Side's Declaration of a Production Facility for ICBMs or SLBMs or First Stages of ICBMs or SLBMs under the START Treaty." The United States assured the Russian Federation and the other Treaty Parties that the declaration of the SLBM production facility, Courtland Missile Assembly Facility, Alabama, was in full compliance with the START Treaty. -- The U.S. declared the Courtland Missile Assembly Facility, Alabama, in accordance with paragraph (10) of section I of the Notification Protocol. The Courtland Missile Assembly Facility, Alabama, was listed in Annex B of the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) as an SLBM production facility. -- As stated in the remarks section of U.S. notification ANC/STR 07-614/17, this facility would assemble target vehicles using the Trident I SLBM first-stage motor. These target vehicles would be for use in testing of the U.S. ballistic missile defense system. This facility would not produce any new Trident I SLBM first stages or any new items subject to the Treaty. -- Any Trident I SLBM first-stage motor that left the Courtland Missile Assembly Facility, Alabama, either as a first-stage motor or as a target vehicle incorporating the first-stage motor of a Trident I SLBM, would remain accountable as a Trident I SLBM in accordance with paragraph 3(a),Article III, of the Treaty and, therefore, would be subject to all the relevant provisions of the START Treaty as a Trident I SLBM. -- The technical data for the Trident I SLBM remained unchanged from that provided in Annex F of the U.S. MOU. -- Upon departure from the Courtland Missile Assembly Facility, Alabama, any target vehicle incorporating the first-stage motor of a Trident I SLBM would be located only at facilities specified in paragraph 9(a),Article IV, of the Treaty. Furthermore, the movement of any target vehicle incorporating the first-stage motor of a Trident I SLBM would be notified in accordance with paragraph 1, Section II of the Notification Protocol. ¶13. (S) Taylor concluded by providing a U.S. Delegation Paper on the U.S. Response to the Russian Federation Aide-Memoire of March 28, 2008, on the U.S. Declaration of an SLBM Production Facility, July 18, 2008. (Begin Comment: The paper contained the points made by Taylor on this issue. End Comment.) Koshelev thanked him and said the Russian Delegation would provide any comments after the paper is studied. ¶14. (U) Documents exchanged. - U.S. -- Draft JCIC Agreement on Elimination Process for ICBMs of Road Mobile Launchers of ICBMs, dated July 18, 2008; -- Draft JCIC Joint Statement on the Destruction of Solid Rocket Motor Cases Located in Ukraine, dated July 18, 2008; and -- U.S. Delegation Paper on the U.S. Response to the Russian Federation Aide-Memoire of March 28, 2008, on the U.S. Declaration of an SLBM Production Facility, July 18, ¶2008. ¶15. (U) Participants: U.S. Mr. Taylor Ms. Bosco Mr. Brown Lt Col Comeau Mr. Couch Mr. DeNinno Mr. Dunn Mr. Edinger Mr. Fortier Maj Gondol Mr. Hanchett Mr. Johnston LTC Oppenheim Mr. Smith Mr. Tessier Mr. Vogel Mr. Yaguchi Dr. Hopkins (Int) BELARUS Mr. Ponamarev RUSSIA Mr. Koshelev Mr. Kashirin CAPT (1 Rank) Kuz'min Mr. Lapshin Col Novikov Col Ryzhkov Mr. Serov Mr. Shevchenko Mr. Smirnov Ms. Sorokina Col Zaytsev Ms. Komshilova (Int) UKRAINE Dr. Shevtsov Mr. Bodarenko MG. Fedetov Mr. Chernayavskiy Mr. Perevezentsev Mr. Demidenko Mr. Dotsenko ¶16. (U) Taylor sends. TICHENOR NNNN End Cable Text Albert J Magnan 07/23/2008 09:10:19 AM From DB/Inbox: Search Results Recipient/Profile Information Cable Recipients: - No Recipients - LMDS Profiles/Office Symbols: AC_AS_C2 AC_AS_C3 AC_AS_C4 AC_AS_C5 AC_AS_C8 AC_AS_C9 AC_CAC_C1 AC_CAC_C2 AC_CAC_C3 AC_CAC_C5 AC_CAC_C6 AC_CAC_C8 AC_CBW_C1 AC_CBW_C2 AC_CBW_C3 AC_DS_C1 AC_DS_C2 AC_ISN_C10 AC_ISN_C14 AC_ISN_C3 AC_RSS_C1 AC_RSS_C2 AC_SCC_C2 AC_SNI_CO AC_ST_C3 AC_SVC_C2 AC_SVC_C3 VC_AS_D1 VC_AS_D4 VC_AS_D7 VC_CAC_C1 VC_CAC_C2 VC_CAC_C3 VC_CAC_C5 VC_CAC_C6 VC_CAC_C8 VC_CCB_D1 VC_CCB_D2 VC_CCB_D4 VC_CCB_D5 VC_CCB_D7 VC_CCB_D8 VC_DS_D1 VC_NA_D1 VC_NA_D2 VC_NRRC_D3 VC_NRRC_D7 VC_SM_D7 VC_SM_D8 VC_SM_D9 VC_SNI_D11 VC_SNI_D12 VC_TA_D1 VC_TA_D10 VC_TA_D2 VC_TA_D3 VC_TA_D5 VC_TA_D8 VC_VO_D3 VC_VO_D7 VC_VO_D9 CableXpress Folders: - No Folders -