JCIC-XXXII: TAYLOR/KOSHELEV LUNCH, JULY 15, 2008

S E C R E T GENEVA 000562 DEPT FOR T, VCI AND EUR/PRA DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24 CIA FOR WINPAC JCS FOR J5/DDGSA SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP DTRA FOR OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR NSC FOR LUTI DIA FOR LEA E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/22/2018 TAGS: KACT PARM START JCIC INF US RS UP BO KZ SUBJECT: JCIC-XXXII: TAYLOR/KOSHELEV LUNCH, JULY 15, 2008 Classified By: Jerry A. Taylor, United States Representative to the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d). ¶1. (U) This is JCIC-XXXII-004. ¶2. (U) Meeting Date: July 15, 2008 Time: 1:00 - 2:15 P.M. Place: Restaurant Le Creux-de-Genthod Participants: U.S. Russia Mr. Taylor Mr. Koshelev ¶3. (S) U.S. JCIC Representative Taylor hosted a lunch for Russian JCIC Representative Koshelev on July 15, 2008, prior to the opening of BIC-IX and JCIC-XXXII, scheduled to begin on July 16 and 17, 2008, respectively. ¶4. (S) Taylor welcomed Koshelev to Geneva and said he looked forward to a very productive JCIC session. Koshelev agreed with Taylor's proposal to dispense with an opening plenary meeting and the requisite opening statements. He said he had earlier talked with the Belarusian Representative who agreed with the approach, but he had not discussed this with the Ukrainian and Kazakhstani Representatives. ¶5. (S) Taylor stated that, with respect to the two issues the U.S. had placed on the agenda (SS-24 solid rocket motor (SRM) Elimination Procedures and changes to the Drovyanaya Site Diagram),the U.S. was ready to conclude these issues. Koshelev thanked Taylor for the U.S. willingness to conclude an S-Series Joint Statement on the Drovyanaya Site Diagram issue. With regard to the SS-24 SRM Elimination issue, it was Russia's position that whatever the U.S. and Ukraine could work out would be agreeable to Russia. Russia would not stand in the way of success on this issue. Koshelev said the two primary issues which Russia was concerned about were the obligatory discussion of whether the START Treaty should be extended and Votkinsk and POE closures. They were the driving issues for the meeting in Geneva. Koshelev wondered what means the U.S. envisioned to record the Parties' positions regarding the requirements of Article XVII. Taylor offered that he had not considered a particular form for recording the results of such a discussion and he would be interested in what Koshelev had to offer in this regard. ¶6. (S) With regard to Article XVII, Taylor noted that one reason a document would be needed would be for political reasons so that others outside the Treaty might know and understand the outcome of the discussions. The only requirement spelled out in the Treaty was that the Parties meet no later than one year prior to the expiration of the Treaty. Taylor said he believed that date to be December 4, ¶2008. ¶7. (S) Koshelev stated that it had been very difficult to convince his superiors that the Parties should meet in the JCIC. It was only at the point where he introduced the issue of the obligation for the Parties to meet regarding Article XVII were his bosses agreeable to the meeting. Something the Parties should consider is where and when to meet in the BIC, as the possibility of the START meetings in Geneva would expire with the Treaty. It would be more economical to meet in capitals. Taylor offered that the Treaty provided for the Parties to agree to meet in a different location, Geneva was well-suited for our meetings as the Embassies were not as well-prepared to accept delegations for one week or two weeks of work, as this would place an undue burden on their facilities. As for the BIC, this was a different story. Meeting in capitals for a one- or two-day conference was certainly a possibility, one in fact which Taylor had discussed in the past with Mr. Boryak. ¶8. (S) Koshelev said the Parties should consider how to formalize the meeting schedule of the BIC, as the mechanism of the START Treaty might not possibly be available to link the meetings of the BIC. Meeting in capitals on a regular basis would facilitate the exchange of information. ¶9. (S) Koshelev asked how the election would affect our work in the BIC and JCIC. Some time ago, a delegation of high-ranking officials from a previous administration had visited Moscow and had told several officials, Koshelev being among them, that Moscow should just wait until after the election and a "better deal" could be obtained. Koshelev would not elaborate on what "better deal" meant, but was curious regarding an assessment of future arms control work. Taylor opined that, while he did not have any direct knowledge of future plans regarding the START and Moscow Treaties, he believed that both the Republican and Democratic candidates would likely have a different approach based on what he had read from both Party's web sites. Asked whether he thought a post-START agreement could be finished during President Bush's term, Taylor said that he was hopeful. . ¶10. (S) Koshelev told Taylor that Mr. Faircloth, the Director of the On-Site Directorate of DTRA, had visited Moscow recently and had mentioned the need to begin planning for the possible shut down of Votkinsk and the POEs should the START Treaty not be extended. Taylor informed Koshelev that he had visited with Mr. Faircloth during the recent Votkinsk 20th Year Celebration and Mr. Faircloth had informed him that preliminary planning was beginning on a contingency basis. Taylor did not have any details as this process had just begun. Koshelev offered that Russia wanted to raise this in the JCIC as a way of "brain-storming" the issue. In that way, Russia hoped to understand as much about what needed to be done as it could in advance. Koshelev said that he felt there would need to be a good deal of work done on this as there were several considerations with regard to equipment at Votkinsk and the POEs that would need to be secured and removed by the Parties. This would not just happen on its own accord. There was the consideration that the Treaty permitted the inspecting Party the right to conduct continuous monitoring up until midnight on the last day of the Treaty, but that the monitors ceased to have any rights after that time. Without proper planning, this could present problems for both the U.S. and Russia. ¶11. (U) Documents exchanged. None. ¶12. (U) Taylor sends. TICHENOR NNNN End Cable Text