FIRST RAFT OF UPR RESOLUTIONS OFFERS VANTAGE POINT

C O N F I D E N T I A L GENEVA 000489

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/25/2018
TAGS: PHUM UNHRC
SUBJECT: FIRST RAFT OF UPR RESOLUTIONS OFFERS VANTAGE POINT
FOR INITIAL EVALUATION

REF: A) GENEVA 96 B) GENEVA 107 C) GENEVA 311

Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Mark Storella. Reasons: 1.4 (b/
d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: The Human Rights Council (HRC) completed its
first experience with one of its key innovations, the
Universal Periodic Review (UPR) mechanism, in its June 2008
Eighth Session. The Council adopted consensus resolutions on
each of the 32 UPR reviews conducted so far. There was
significant variety in how States under Review (SuRs)
approached HRC action on their UPR reviews, from legalistic
layouts of all voluntary commitments they would undertake in
response to UPR recommendations to perfunctory restatements
of the idealistic assertions they had made in the initial
review session. Most importantly, the session helped clarify
the ground rules for civil society participation. The debate
on non-governmental organization (NGO) participation raised
the usual regional tensions in the HRC. NGOs themselves
showed positive signs of deliberate strategizing on how best
to wield their limited influence. However, renewed attacks on
their scope of action demonstrated that states wishing to
safeguard the essential participation of NGOs in the process
will have to be highly vigilant in future UPR reviews. END
SUMMARY.

LAST CALL FOR RESPONSES TO REVIEWS
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2. (U) The second week of the HRC's Eighth Session took up
the final adoption of resolutions on the reports from the UPR
working groups (WGs) of April and May, 2008. (Septel will
discuss other aspects of that session.) The session offered
an opportunity for SuRs to provide reactions to their UPR
reviews and for the Council to evaluate the effectiveness of
UPR so far. Many SuRs came back to the Council with more
detail on which recommendations from fellow states they could
agree to follow, with many (including France, UK, and
Morocco) declaring their intention to reconsider significant
portions of their national laws and treaty accessions. The
majority of SuRs, however, did not add much information, and
most did not send high level delegations (as they had done in
the initial stage of the review).


3. (C) Other states intervened mostly to praise commitment
implementation already begun by SuRs, though a few, notably
Belgium, did not hesitate to point out interventions made
during the earlier WG phase which the SuRs had ignored or
brushed over (see reftel B). Our conversations with allies
revealed that many capitals had been preoccupied with other
issues at the Eighth Session or, in the case of the UK and
France, by their own UPR. Therefore they had not focused on
follow-up critique. Where the SuRs were European or Latin
American, there were very few if any interventions from the
floor, whereas, for SuRs from the African Group (AG) or the

Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC),a slew of
interventions praised the SuR's cooperation. Many of our
interlocutors noted that such a pattern demonstrated that the
AG and OIC have a coordinated, strategic approach to
supporting each other in UPR. The Western Europe and Other
Group (WEOG) did not really discuss UPR strategically in
meetings and so had no coordinated strategy. The cookie
cutter resolutions (see reftel A for other debates on UPR
documents) created to adopt each report and any further
contributions from these final discussions were adopted by
consensus in all cases.

DEFINING A USEFUL SPACE FOR NGOS--OR NOT?
--------------


4. (U) Under UPR rules, NGOs were to be allowed to speak only
in this plenary phase of the process (see reftel C). Hence,
the first few reviews, as well as those of OIC countries
considered later in the week, became a battleground for
competing interpretations of the role NGOs should play. WEOG
countries and other U.S. allies supported free rein for the
NGOs and argued that the Institution Building text (which had
established the modalities for UPR last year) spoke of
"general debate." The AG and OIC also cited the IB text to
claim this final discussion had been limited to WG outcome
documents, and that, therefore, NGOs should not be permitted
to bring up any issues not mentioned in the outcome document
(e.g. criticism of an SuR that had not been previously
mentioned). Council President Doru Costea resolved the
question by saying that NGOs must base their remarks on the
outcome document, but otherwise could otherwise comment
freely.


5. (SBU) This led quick-thinking NGOs to carefully couch
their remarks on additional issues or recommendations in the
context of the outcome document, even if the connection was
sometimes contrived. In several NGO brainstorming sessions
on the margins of the Council session, an evident desire to
weigh in as much as possible in the UPR process led to
interesting strategizing. There was broad concern that the
NGO source document compiled by the Office of the High
Commissioner on Human Rights (OHCHR) prior to the WG meeting
(reftel B) did not clearly feed into the document finally
considered and adopted by the UPR working group. NGOs from
Asia, especially, helped each other strategize about focused
lobbying to ensure that their concerns were raised by states.
The other NGO priority was to ensure that civil society
representatives had a good outcome document to refer to when
addressing the HRC session adopting the report by resolution.

COMMENT
--------------


6. (C) The fireworks of the initial sessions of UPR seem to
have largely died down as procedures became more finalized.

Upcoming sessions will show the extent to which lessons
learned will result in stronger, more focused reviews. Most
encouragingly, despite clear efforts on the part of countries
that seek to water down the impact of the new UPR process,
NGOs are fully engaged to take advantage of whatever options
are left open to them. Defense on the floor from WEOG
countries, as well as the compromise judgment call by
President Costea, preserved a piece of invaluable NGO input
to the UPR process. However, the fact that NGOs remain
beholden to states for attention to their cause means that
future iterations of UPR discussions will require staunch
defense from those seeking to ensure that NGOs retain a
significant voice in the UPR exercise.
TICHENOR