OIC POWER PLAY DOMINATES HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL \

2008-04-04 15:26:00 08GENEVA256 US Mission Geneva CONFIDENTIAL 07USMISSIONGENEVA2626 VZCZCXYZ0011\ PP RUEHWEB\ \ DE RUEHGV #0256/01 0951526\ ZNY CCCCC ZZH\ P 041526Z APR 08\ FM USMISSION GENEVA\ TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6298\ INFO RUEHZJ/HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL COLLECTIVE\ RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 2706\ RUEHFR/UNESCO PARIS FR 0008\ C O N F I D E N T I A L GENEVA 000256 \ \ SIPDIS \ \ SIPDIS \ \ E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/01/2018 \ TAGS: PHUM PREL UNHRC SUBJECT: OIC POWER PLAY DOMINATES HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL \ SEVENTH SESSION \ \ REF: 07 GENEVA 2626 \ \ Classified By: Ambassador Warren W. Tichenor. Reasons: 1.4 (b/d). \ \ ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: The seventh session of the Human Rights \ Council, which ran March 3-28 with an April 1 extension, \ highlighted the power of the Organization of the Islamic \ Conference (OIC) in that still evolving body. The session's \ defining moment came in the closing minutes of its last \ scheduled day of work, when the OIC and its allies rammed \ through amendments that subverted the Freedom of Expression \ resolution. This culminated relentless OIC efforts \ throughout the session to press its interests, which \ generally undermine the promotion and protection of human \ rights. The results included, inter alia, the passage of a \ resolution on defamation of religions, and the Council's \ by-now customarily unbalanced approach to Israel. On the \ positive side, the Council preserved some important country \ mandates, and provided the forum for a discussion of China's \ behavior in Tibet. The balance sheet, however, continued to \ favor the OIC and its allies. As several like-minded \ ambassadors agreed in an April 2 meeting with Ambassador \ Tichenor, the seventh session raises deep concerns about the \ Council's future direction and strongly argues for more \ active and more effective coordination among like-minded \ states. END SUMMARY. \ \ AN OIC TRIUMPH \ -------------- \ \ ¶2. (SBU) OIC efforts to amend -- and in effect subvert -- the \ Freedom of Expression resolution had been a dominant subtext \ throughout the Council's seventh regular session. With \ support from the U.S., the EU and others, Canada, as chief \ sponsor, had sought to fend off an OIC amendment that would \ instruct the Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression to \ report on "instances in which the abuse of the right of \ freedom of expression constitutes an act of racial or \ religious discrimination." The OIC, taking advantage of its \ internal discipline, had held firm throughout. China, \
apparently angered by criticism during the Council's March 25 \ meeting of its behavior in Tibet, floated its own killer \ amendments two days before the vote. Canada rejected these \ as having been raised too late in the game. \ \ ¶3. (U) The decisive action on the freedom of expression \ resolution and its amendments came on the session's last day. \ We had joined Canada and others in efforts to sway moderate \ OIC members, but these had fallen short. Meanwhile, Canada \ had sought to find compromise language that would avoid the \ OIC amendment. When those efforts failed, and with the \ session having been extended beyond its scheduled 6pm closing \ time, the OIC called for a vote on its amendment, which \ passed (27-17-3). The U.S., Canada, the EU and others \ dropped their co-sponsorship. With the momentum clearly \ favoring the OIC and its allies, CUBA then pulled an \ unexpected move, proposing an oral amendment underscoring \ "the importance for all forms of media to report and to \ deliver information in a fair and impartial manner." That \ amendment passed (29-15-3). Canada and the EU failed in last \ minute procedural efforts to head off the fully amended \ resolution, which then passed (32-0-15). \ \ ¶4. (C) The Ambassador's April 2 meeting with like-minded \ ambassadors to take stock of the session provided additional \ insights into the dynamics behind the last-minute \ maneuvering. Canada's ambassador expressed frustration at \ the African Group's solidarity with the OIC. Madagascar and \ Angola, for instance, had expressed discomfort with the \ amendment in conversations with the Canadians but had \ eventually been pressured into voting for it. The OIC had \ also exerted immense pressure on others during the end game, \ he reported; Bosnia and Herzegovina, for instance, had been \ pressed hard, although it had ended up voting against the \ amendment. Both the Canadian and Danish ambassadors \ expressed particular resentment toward China: though the \ Chinese had ostensibly kept their promise, made on the \ session's last day, not to put forth an oral amendment, they \ had clearly struck a deal for CUBA to do so. \ \ ¶5. (U) In an April 1 extension of the seventh session to \ allow for closing statements, several OIC members defended \ the newly amended resolution. Pakistan argued that the OIC \ amendment had done nothing beyond providing an "add-on" that \ made the resolution more "comprehensive and holistic," in \ order to protect the stability of multicultural societies. \ Sri Lanka echoed that theme and expressed hope that the \ decisions on the freedom of expression mandate would not \ leave the Council as a "house divided." The U.S. was among \ several delegations that sharply criticized the amendments. \ \ \ ¶6. (U) The OIC had scored an earlier victory with adoption of \ a resolution on defamation of religions (21-10-14). It also \ succeeded in rescheduling the Item 7 discussion of the \ Occupied Palestinian Territories to early in the Council \ session in order more quickly to condemn Israel's response to \ rocket attacks from Gaza. In addition to the resolution \ passed on that occasion, the Council also passed three other \ anti-Israel resolutions. One of these, on Israeli \ settlements, passed 46-1-0, with only Canada voting against \ it. \ \ MODEST SUCCESS ON COUNTRY MANDATES, OHCHR UNDER ATTACK \ -------------- -------------- \ \ ¶7. (U) In recent months, the OIC and its allies had continued \ their criticism of country mandates, arguing that they had \ become unnecessary particularly given the imminent start of \ the Universal Periodic Review mechanism. The seventh session \ saw two important casualties: the mandate of the Democratic \ Republic of the Congo was eliminated, to be replaced with a \ far weaker arrangement for monitoring the situation on the \ ground in the DRC, and the Council passed a weak resolution \ on Sudan. Nonetheless, two important country mandates, on \ Burma and the DPRK, were adopted (the former by consensus and \ the latter by a vote of 27-7-18). \ \ ¶8. (SBU) At the session, new appointments were made to fill a \ number of special procedures mandates. This followed a \ difficult and highly politicized process that drew complaints \ from many delegations about lack of transparency. In the \ end, two AmCits were selected, both of whose records suggest \ they will not address their mandate responsibilities \ even-handedly; none of the USG nominees for mandates was \ selected. In the April 1 session, Egypt, Russia, Algeria and \ others sought to undercut the principle under which mandate \ holders are extended, with little review, for a second \ three-year term if they perform well in their first term; the \ EU and others resisted this effort, seeing it as a ploy to \ impose pressure on mandate holders who prove overly \ independent. \ \ ¶9. (SBU) Meanwhile, a resolution criticizing the Office of \ the High Commissioner for Human Rights for failing to ensure \ balance in its hiring of staff was adopted 34-10-3, playing \ into the hands of those seeking to whittle away at the \ independence of the OHCHR. By most accounts, we are likely \ to see more such resolutions criticizing the OHCHR in future \ sessions. High Commissioner Louise Arbour also came under \ attack at various points throughout the session, including in \ the aftermath of the report she presented to the Council, \ during which she also announced that she would step down from \ that post at the end of her term in June. \ \ TIBET ON THE AGENDA \ -------------- \ \ ¶10. (C) On the positive side, the Council session proved an \ opportunity to shed light on China's reaction to protests in \ Tibet. Slovenia (on behalf of the EU),Switzerland and \ Australia joined the U.S. in raising concerns about the \ issue, as did a number of NGOs, generally in harsher terms. \ China's delegation, supported by a few others, repeatedly \ raised procedural objections on the grounds that the \ discussion was taking place under Item 8 (Vienna \ Declaration),which should not address country situations. \ In response to the objections, Council President Costea took \ a middle ground, urging speakers to address the Vienna \ Declaration and its implementation but allowing all but one \ NGO speaker to speak about Tibet. Switzerland is among \ several countries planning to write Costea to underscore its \ view that country situations may be addressed under Item 8. \ In the view of many, China's repeated objections only played \ into the hands of those criticizing it for seeking to squash \ dialogue on the subject. \ \ COORDINATION WITH THE EU: SOMEWHAT IMPROVED \ -------------- \ \ ¶11. (C) As noted reftel, the Council's last session, in \ December, had been plagued by a reluctance of the Portuguese \ EU presidency to coordinate with potential allies, including \ the U.S. Prior to the seventh session, Ambassador Tichenor, \ supported by other ambassadors, had highlighted to the \ incoming Slovenian presidency in the Council the importance \ of better coordination, and the Slovenians appeared genuinely \ committed to improving matters. In practice, the EU's record \ in the seventh session proved mixed. In a number of cases, \ including on coordination with the Latin American regional \ group (GRULAC) on a resolution on the rights of the child, \ \ the EU continued its weak coordination with other interested \ delegations, and on a number of resolutions, it often failed \ to keep the U.S. and other allied delegations properly \ informed. In other instances, however, it communicated and \ coordinated well, both through direct contact between \ Slovenian delegates and their counterparts and through EU \ burden-sharing of those responsibilities. In perhaps the \ best example of coordination, the EU brought the U.S. and \ Australian delegations into its last-minute negotiations with \ ASEAN on the Burma resolution, and later acknowledged that \ this had strengthened its position. \ \ COMMENT \ -------------- \ \ ¶12. (C) Burma was among a number of issues where U.S. \ engagement proved important. Another was Mexico's resolution \ on counter-terrorism: while Mexico sought to be \ accommodating, it did so at least in part because the U.S. \ made clear its desire to be actively involved in hammering \ out acceptable language. Similarly, U.S. engagement both in \ the run-up to the session and during the session itself \ shaped the Maldives' resolution on climate change. In these \ cases and others, the primary sponsors' willingness to \ cooperate with the U.S. proved fundamental -- and \ encouraging. \ \ ¶13. (C) Despite a few bright spots, however, the seventh \ session has been deeply troubling. The OIC appears to have \ further strengthened its internal discipline, and the \ statements of its leading delegations, notably Pakistan and \ Egypt, became more aggressive. We also have been \ particularly struck by the increasing aggressiveness of the \ Sri Lankan PermRep. The OIC and its allies also appear to \ have coordinated well in their lobbying on the floor of the \ Council. Meanwhile, the EU and its allies are not only \ outnumbered but have at times been reluctant to challenge the \ OIC directly. Several ambassadors expressed deep concern in \ our April 2 stock-taking session, stressing that U.S. \ membership in the Council could be pivotal and arguing that a \ new long-term strategic approach might be needed; Slovenia's \ ambassador said his delegation was drafting a concept paper, \ initially for EU consideration. From our perspective, it \ will be difficult to reverse the dynamic of an ascendant OIC \ in the Council, making cooperation among states that share \ our human rights goals all the more essential. \ TICHENOR \