UNGA FIRST COMMITTEE (UNFC): TRENDS AND ANALYSIS )

C O N F I D E N T I A L GENEVA 001048 E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/03/2018 TAGS: PARM CDG SUBJECT: UNGA FIRST COMMITTEE (UNFC): TRENDS AND ANALYSIS ) NUKES CAN WAIT REF: GENEVA 1031 ¶1. (C) Summary: The 63rd UNGA First Committee (First Committee) offered few surprises and, as the last one before a new US administration, saw considerable hesitation among nations about taking new initiatives on nuclear issues. One diplomat characterized it as "flat." While movement on big nuclear issues appeared to wait for a new US President, it was clear the world was not willing to wait to push forward on conventional weapons. The P5 showed little solidarity or transparency in communication amongst themselves as alliances shifted issue by issue. The most contentious issue of the session was pushed by a US ally while strongly opposed by the US -- a draft resolution on an Arms Trade Treaty (ATT). By pushing the ATT resolution, the UK not only undermined the unitary status of recommendations by a UN group of governmental experts (GGE),but also opened the door to the possibility of a majority vote approach (read "Cluster Munitions (Oslo) Convention") within the UN framework to future arms control treaties. Conventional weapons, and small arms and light weapons in particular, continued to get major attention from the non-aligned community and many EU countries, with growing support for linking disarmament and development strategies as a way to address problems in the developing world. Other issues of note included a continued move by some delegations to use First Committee as a vehicle to gain funding for pet projects, a move by India (in the wake of the Nuclear Suppliers Group,s (NSG) decision on the US-India civil nuclear cooperation deal) to shift away from its traditional resolution criticizing restrictions on dual-use trade, and the quick capitulation by the EU bloc to Russian entreaties on space resolutions. The results of action on a US-sponsored resolution on compliance with arms control and nonproliferation agreements are described in Reftel. End Comment Waiting for a New Administration for Nuclear Issues, but Forging Ahead on Conventional -------------- ¶2. (C) The First Committee this year saw no serious new initiatives on nuclear disarmament, and debate on the issue was relatively tame. Characterized as "flat" by the Canadian Ambassador, the general perception was that there was no progress to be made as the world waited for a new US Administration. In the thematic debates delegations stuck to traditional positions, while the voting saw no changes in positions. ¶3. (C) NGOs and delegations, however used side events to keep a focus on some key nuclear disarmament issues, including a major event organized by the East West Institute. Scheduled parallel to First Committee, it featured prominent speakers such as the UN Secretary General and former US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger. That event generated considerable interest and many considered it the highlight of the month,s discussion on nuclear disarmament. In the end it was essentially a scene-setter for what many hope will come in ¶2009. ¶4. (C) While waiting for a new US Administration,s views on key nuclear issues, the world was clearly intent on plowing ahead on conventional weapons and small arms. Several resolutions highlighted new approaches to existing issues, or introduced entirely new issues altogether. Japan, as this year,s author of the annual omnibus resolution on the UN Programme of Action on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons, used the resolution to schedule a series of UN meetings on the issue through 2012. The US was the sole negative vote in the final tally. The UK aggressively pushed its resolution on the ATT, and "won" the floor vote, despite heavy engagement by senior Department officials urging the UK to edit the text so the US could support it (see para 10). Australia and the Republic of Korea (RoK) authored a new resolution on illicit brokering for both conventional arms and technology used for weapons of mass destruction. The US supported the resolution, even thought it was concerned that it could start a process leading to negotiation of an international instrument on brokering*something that could undercut the strong national position of the US on brokering. P5 Unity Hard to Find ) De-Alerting again draws attention -------------- ¶5. (C) The P5 met regularly and outlined their official positions on numerous resolutions, including nuclear disarmament, "de-alerting" of nuclear forces, nuclear weapons free zones, and arms control and confidence-building measures for outer space. Unity, however, was a scarce commodity. Transparency was also at a minimum, while alliances shifted from issue to issue. The resolution on "de-alerting" saw a semblance of joint action with the P3 (US, UK, and France) making a joint explanation of vote (EOV) and abstentions by Russia and China. The more common scenario was an inscrutable China, Russia tirelessly working behind the scenes against US interests, and the US seeking to hold (with greater success this year than in 2007) its "P3 allies" together as a block. Most issues found the P5 hopelessly divided, from the ATT resolution where the US "no" was joined by Chinese and Russian abstentions, to space where the US voted alone, to nuclear weapons free zones which showed yet another alignment. "De-alerting Fails to Undermine NATO Solidarity/EU Capitulates on Space -------------- ¶6. (C) The sponsors of the resolution on de-alerting of nuclear weapons, lead this year by Switzerland, made it clear from the start that their goal this First Committee was to whittle away at the "abstentions" among NATO allies to increase the "yes" vote. They launched a concerted effort to divide the P5 and persuade U.S. allies to support the resolution. The effort failed, with Belgium as the only NATO ally that shifted to a "yes" vote. It did so with an EOV that helped assuage US concerns. Lithuania up to the last minute wanted to join the P3 and vote "no", urged that way by strong recommendations from its NATO Mission, but in the end "abstained" as it felt the costs for such a small state to join the P3 against the other EU members would be too great. In the end, a strong appeal by the U.S. to NATO capitals and in NATO headquarters kept the result similar to last year,s (134-3(U.S.)-32) However, interest in this measure, cited as a possible step toward a world free of nuclear weapons, remains high among U.S. allies. ¶7. (C) The U.S. again was isolated in the First Committee on two resolutions on outer space. Of note was the quick EU capitulation to Russian entreaties to support the Russian resolution on transparency and confidence-building measures for outer space. The resolution included only a passing reference to EU interest in the matter (and no explicit reference to the EU,s proposed code of conduct for outer space). Side events continued to yield discussions in which the Russian/Chinese draft treaty text on preventing the placement of weapons in outer space ("PPWT") was a non-starter compared to the proposed EU Code of Conduct. Nevertheless, outer space issues will continue to play a prominent part in discussions in the CD and future First Committees. Conventional Weapons Grows as Issue/Disarmament and Development Pushed Directly -------------- ¶8. (C) The increase in attention given to conventional weapons continued this year. As evidence of the direct involvement of many countries in problems related to conventional weapons, the section of the "thematic debate" devoted to conventional weapons once again drew over 50 interventions, far more than the other sections. And in contrast to the statements on nuclear weapons, many of which seemed to have been re-cycled from previous speeches on nuclear disarmament, those related to conventional weapons demonstrated individual connections with the problem. For example, African delegations raised concerns about the problems created by land mines or the easy availability of small arms and light weapons (which they called the "developing world,s weapons of mass destruction"). Central American states noted the problems created in their region by landmines, as did South East Asian delegations. After many years in which the US and some other nuclear weapon states stressed the need for the international disarmament machinery to balance its efforts by concentrating on conventional arms, as well as WMD, issues, it is clear that the message has taken hold. ¶9. (C) Emerging from this heightened interest is more support for a linkage between disarmament and development as a policy tool to address poverty, governance and security issues in developing countries. Advocated most vociferously by Switzerland through the Geneva Declaration on Armed Violence, a growing number of countries in the thematic debates and in side events called for action to link the two issues as nations seek to address issues in the developing world, especially countries racked by armed violence. This theme will likely have a growing role in the international debate on conventional weapons in the years ahead. ATT Highlights Widening Division between US and Key Allies on Conventional Weapons -------------- ¶10. (C) The 2008 session of the UNFC highlighted a trend in US-European/Key Allies relations that has been building for several years. Pushed hard by NGOs, the Europeans, including some of our closest allies, and other allies such as Japan, Australia and the RoK, have pursued measures in the field of conventional disarmament without taking account of US defense and domestic concerns. This year the problem got acute attention with the UK proposal to launch a UN process on a proposed ATT. Two years ago, the UK raised this issue for the first time in First Committee, which passed a resolution establishing a GGE that would meet in 2008 to study the issue. While the US voted against that resolution because of concerns that an ATT would either weaken the standards the US and its allies have in this field or, if sufficiently strong, would not include key arms exporters, the measure passed and the US eventually participated in the GGE. The GGE generated a consensus report recommending continued discussions on the issue, but also recommending that future action be decided by consensus. ¶11. (C) Entering this year,s First Committee, the U.S. was prepared to support a resolution on the ATT that accepted the GGE report,s conclusions and provided for a year,s reflection before taking the process further. However, the UK, urged on by NGOs and supporters from across the developing world and continental Europe, pushed aggressively for a draft resolution that called for the establishment of an Open-Ended Working Group (UN-speak for an ad hoc committee open to all members) on an ATT in 2009. Despite U.S. and other GGE members, calls that it operate by consensus, the resolution could allow the group to take action by majority vote. As the UK Ambassador confided to the U.S. Head of Delegation, the UK did not want to "be held hostage to a veto by Pakistan, thus it would not allow the consensus rule to hold." (Comment: Nor did the UK want a U.S. veto. End comment.) The resolution eventually passed 147-2(US)-18, with many abstentions, by delegations that had participated in the GGE. ¶12. (C) The potential damage of this draft resolution is significant. Importantly, the resolution for the first time launches a process within the UN that could lead to negotiations on an arms control treaty not based on the rule of consensus. Despite vehement objections by the China, Russia and the U.S, among others, and direct intervention with the UK by the Secretary and other senior Department officials, the UK pushed the resolution forward with determination. As a UK diplomat said in Geneva shortly after the conclusion of First Committee, "the major accomplishment of this year,s First Committee was the launching of the process on the ATT." ¶13. (C) After similar experiences with anti-personnel landmines and cluster munitions( both of which led to "global" treaties negotiated outside of the UN by majority vote),the ATT story may indicate a widening rift on conventional weapons between the U.S. and its key allies in Europe and Asia, and on the importance of consensus in negotiating arms control agreements. India Shifts on Science and Technology Resolution -------------- ¶14. (C) India made a noticeable shift on a resolution that it has traditionally run on an annual basis, "The role of science and technology in the context of international stability and disarmament." The shift appears to be a direct result of the NSG decision to approve the US-India civil nuclear agreement. Previously, India had used this resolution to criticize international controls on the trade in dual-use technology as hypocritical and biased in favor of developed countries. This year India dropped the previous substantive resolution altogether and proposed a draft decision, simply putting the issue on the UNGA agenda next year. A member of the Indian delegation proudly told a US delegate, "look at what the resolution and the accompanying statement in the Thematic debates do not say," i.e. there was no reference whatsoever to the regimes that govern trade in dual use technology. Budget issues pushed through First Committee -------------- ¶15. (C) At the 2007 First Committee the Nigerian delegation successfully pushed through a resolution that requested funding from the UN general budget to cover operating costs and several new positions in the African UN Centre for Peace and Disarmament. Delegations from Asia and Latin America this year followed up with their own resolutions, despite US objections, to accomplish the same thing for similar centers in their regions. The resulting precedent is that the First Committee has now seen three occasions in the last two years where delegations have successfully used a First Committee vote to get approval for specific budget proposals to be funded from the UN,s regular budget, without prior action in the Fifth (budget) Committee. Rocca sends TICHENOR