JCIC-XXXIII: (U) HEADS OF DELEGATION MEETING ON

S E C R E T GENEVA 001005 DEPT FOR T, VCI AND EUR/PRA DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24 CIA FOR WINPAC JCS FOR J5/DDGSA SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR NSC FOR HAYES DIA FOR LEA E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/17/2018 TAGS: KACT PARM START JCIC INF US RS UP BO KZ SUBJECT: JCIC-XXXIII: (U) HEADS OF DELEGATION MEETING ON THE B-1 HEAVY BOMBER CONVERSION AND BASING OF U.S. HEAVY BOMBERS, NOVEMBER 19, 2008 REF: A. GENEVA 0590 (JCIC-XXXII-013) ¶B. STATE 120346 (JCIC-XXXIII-GUIDANCE-001) Classified By: Jerry A. Taylor, United States Representative to the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission. Reasons: 1.5(b) and (d). ¶1. (U) This is JCIC-XXXIII-017. ¶2. (U) Meeting Date: November 19, 2008 Time: 10:30 A.M. - 11:40 A.M. Place: Russian Mission, Geneva -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶3. (S) A Heads of Delegation (HOD) Meeting was held at the U.S. Mission on November 19, 2008, to discuss the B-1 heavy bomber conversion and basing of U.S. heavy bombers. All Parties were represented. ¶4. (S) The U.S. and Russian sides presented their respective views regarding the conversion of the B-1B from a heavy bomber equipped for nuclear armaments other than long range nuclear air launched cruise missiles (LRNAs) into a heavy bomber equipped for non-nuclear armaments. The U.S. Delegation explained the U.S. view was that the conversion should render the aircraft incapable of carrying nuclear armaments so that such armaments could not be operationally deployed. In contrast, the Russian Delegation explained the Russian view that the conversion of the B-1 heavy bomber was grounded in the irreversibility of the conversion process. The U.S. Delegation proposed a draft JCIC Joint Statement that would facilitate understanding of the term "incapable of carrying" as used in Paragraphs 10 and 11 of Section VI of the Conversion or Elimination (CorE) Protocol. The Russians stated that they would study the document. -------------- YOU'RE NOT LISTENING -------------- ¶5. (S) Koshelev opened the HOD Meeting on November 19, 2008, at the U.S. Mission and stated that the issue of conversion of the B-1 heavy bomber was discussed in detail at the last JCIC session (Ref A),and Russian concerns had been stated in a October 23, 2008, aide-memoir (Ref B). Russia continued to have concerns about the U.S. process to convert the B-1 to a heavy bomber equipped for non-nuclear armaments in terms of both its sufficiency and ensuring the irreversibility of the conversion. Additionally, the Russian Federation view of the U.S. interpretation of the word "carry" was not supported by the provisions of the Treaty. The use of the phrase "operational deployment of nuclear armaments" by the United States meant applying a new concept or definition that was not provided for in the Treaty instead of the clear requirement of the Treaty that "all weapons bays equipped to carry nuclear armaments be modified so as to render them incapable of carrying nuclear armaments." -------------- -------------- INSPECTORS CONFIRMED, BUT THEY WEREN'T SUPPOSE TO -------------- -------------- ¶6. (S) Koshelev stated that the distinguishability exhibition provided for in Paragraph 12 of Article XI of the Treaty was one of the obligatory elements of the Treaty. However, the conduct of an exhibition was insufficient to consider the change in the status, and that a Russian inspection team did not have the power to assess the sufficiency of the differences presented by the United States. The inspectors participating in this exhibition could only state in the inspection report what they saw and what was specified in the relevant Format 90 notification of what was converted. As a result of Russian Federation analysis of the conversion inspection and exhibition at Dyess Air Force Base in February 2008, the Russian Federation in accordance with the 17th Agreed Statement believed that the distinguishing features presented by the United States and declared as having been converted for non-nuclear armaments were not sufficient to put it into this category. -------------- -------------- TO BE OR NOT TO BE, SEE THE DEFINITION FOR AIR BASE -------------- -------------- ¶7. (S) Koshelev reiterated the Russian Federation concern about basing heavy bombers of different categories at the same base, which conflicted with the requirements of Paragraph 23 of Article V. While the Russian Federation did not have an issue with the presence of aircraft at Davis Monthan (DM),it did not include deployment of the B-1 at DM. -------------- WHAT WE HAVE HERE IS A FAILURE TO COMMUNICATE -------------- ¶8. (S) Taylor stated that the Treaty provided for the conversion of a heavy bomber equipped for nuclear armaments into a heavy bomber equipped for non-nuclear armaments. The Treaty also contained a definition for a heavy bomber equipped for non-nuclear armaments. The implication of these provisions was that the Treaty clearly allowed for a converted heavy bomber to operationally deploy non-nuclear armament. ¶9. (S) Koshelev responded by stating that the Russian Federation experts focused on the definition of "irreversibility," but asked whether this was an issue better left for the experts to discuss within a working group. ¶10. (S) Taylor said that the Russian Federation should focus on what the Treaty term "incapable of carrying" means with regard to a converted heavy bomber. Taylor opined that following the Russian Federation logic, a Boeing 737 was capable of carrying a nuclear armament, and would need to be captured under the Treaty even though it had no way of operationally deploying the weapon. ¶11. (S) Taylor stated that it was clear that the United States and the Russian Federation did not have the same understanding on the term "incapable of carrying." The method used for establishing a common understanding of Treaty terms has been through the use of a JCIC Joint Statement. While working groups were helpful, the focus must be on developing a mutual understanding about the term "incapable of carrying." Taylor provided the other parties with a draft JCIC Joint Statement on the term "incapable of carrying." ¶12. (S) Begin text of U.S.-Proposed Joint Statement: JCIC-XXXIII U.S. Proposed Text November 19,2008 JOINT COMPLIANCE AND INSPECTION COMMISSION JOINT STATEMENT NUMBER ON THE CONVERSION OF A HEAVY BOMBER SO THAT IT IS NO LONGER EQUIPPED FOR NUCLEAR ARMAMENTS With respect to the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, the Parties understand the expression, "incapable of carrying nuclear armaments," as used in paragraph 11 of Section VI of the Protocol on Procedures Governing the Conversion or Elimination of the Items Subject to the Treaty, to mean that, for modifications to convert a heavy bomber so that it is no longer equipped for nuclear armaments, all weapons bays equipped to carry nuclear armaments shall be modified, and all external attachment joints for nuclear armaments and external attachment joints for pylons for nuclear armaments shall be modified or removed, so that they are no longer usable for the operational deployment of nuclear armaments. (United States of America) (Republic of Belarus (Republic of Kazakhstan) (Russian Federation) (Ukraine) End text. ¶13. (S) Koshelev thanked Taylor for the draft JCIC Joint Statement and stated that Russia would take this back for analysis. After taking a short break, Koshelev stated that the Russian Federation also had a presentation on the topic and would provide it during a working group in the coming days. ¶14. (U) Documents Exchanged: U.S.: U.S.-Proposed JCIC Joint Statement On The Conversion Of A Heavy Bomber So That It Is No Longer Equipped for Nuclear Armaments, dated November 19, 2008. ¶15. (U) Participants: U.S. Mr. Taylor Ms. Bosco Mr. Brown Lt Col Comeau Mr. DeNinno Mr. Dunn Maj Edinger Mr. Fortier Mr. Hanchett Mr. Johnston Mr. Kuehne Mrs. Nash CDR Rust Mr. Smith Mr. Vogel Mr. Yaguchi Ms. Gross (Int) BELARUS Mr. Ugorich KAZAKHSTAN Col Akhmetalin Mr. Kasenov RUSSIA Mr. Koshelev Mr. Artem'yev Mr. Bolotov Mr. Kashirin Ms. Kotkova Capt(1st Rank) Kuz'min Col Novikov Col Ryzhkov Mr. Serov Ms. Sorokina Mr. Gusev (Int) UKRAINE Dr. Shevtsov Mr. Bondarenko ¶16. (U) Taylor sends. TICHENOR NNNN End Cable Text