JCIC-XXXIII: WG MEETING ON MM III RVOSI, NOVEMBER

S E C R E T GENEVA 001004 DEPT FOR T, VCI AND EUR/PRA DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24 CIA FOR WINPAC JCS FOR J5/DDGSA SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR NSC FOR HAYES DIA FOR LEA E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/17/2018 TAGS: KACT PARM START JCIC INF US RS UP BO KZ SUBJECT: JCIC-XXXIII: WG MEETING ON MM III RVOSI, NOVEMBER 18, 2008 REF: A. GENEVA 0976 (JCIC-XXXIII-010) ¶B. GENEVA 2551 (JCIC-XXXI-011) ¶C. STATE 120343 (JCIC-XXXIII-GUIDANCE-002) Classified By: Jerry A. Taylor, United States Representative to the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission. Reasons: 1.5(b) and (d). ¶1. (U) This is JCIC-XXXIII-016. ¶2. (U) Meeting Date: November 18, 2008 Time: 15:30 P.M. - 16:30 P.M. Place: Russian Mission, Geneva -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶3. (S) A Working Group (WG) Meeting was held at the Russian Mission on November 18, 2008, to explore the possibility of conducting a one-time Minuteman III (MM III) demonstration to resolve Russian concerns over the number of reentry vehicles loaded on MM-III ICBMs. All Parties were represented. ¶4. (S) The Parties discussed the Russian Delegation's four main points introduced at the previous meeting on MM III RVOSI regarding the potential demonstration of the MM III ICBM front section (Ref A). The meeting concluded with the United States agreeing to study the problem and respond to the Parties on the results during the intersessional period. -------------- PLEASE CLARIFY YOUR CONCERNS AGAIN -------------- ¶5. (S) Ryzhkov opened the Working Group (WG) Meeting at the Russian Mission on November 19, 2008, and turned the floor over to Kuehne. Kuehne said that the purpose of this WG was to determine what the Russian Federation expected to see and to explore the organizational, procedural, and technical possibilities for a MM III front section demonstration. He noted that the details of the proposed demonstration had to be "checklist perfect" because of the seriousness of working around nuclear weapon systems. He said that the United States wanted to be sure it fully understood Russia's concerns on the issue. Kuehne said the U.S. Delegation had received the Russian Paper with its four main points on a one-time demonstration of a front section of MM III. Begin text of Russian Paper on One-Time Demonstration of the MM Front Section: Official Translation JCIC-XXXIII November 17, 2008 Main Points of the Russian Side's Position Regarding a One-time Demonstration of the Minuteman III ICBM Front Section ¶1. The Russian side is interested in a one-time demonstration of the Minuteman III ICBM front section in order to ascertain that the space inside the lower portion of the missile front section cannot contain items commensurate with reentry vehicles. We are prepared to participate in this event. ¶2. In the Russian side's view, it does not appear possible to resolve this concern without holding a one-time demonstration. ¶3. The mere fact of conducting a demonstration, without analyzing its results, cannot guarantee resolution of the problem. The U.S. side acted in a similar fashion with respect to the demonstration of the front section of the SS-25 ICBM at Vypolzovo ICBM Base. ¶4. Based on the results of the demonstration, the Russian side is also prepared to consider the U.S. position that any additional devices (for example, mirror-type devices) used during the demonstration will not be used in future inspections. The Russian side requests clarification of the U.S. plans to arrange a one-time demonstration of the Minuteman III ICBM front section. We express our readiness to further discuss any issues in order to move forward on resolving this problem. We are also prepared to take part in further discussion of this issue in the working group format, so as to consider in detail, with the participation of experts--and if possible reach agreement on--the procedural, technical, and organizational aspects. End text. ¶6. (S) Kuehne noted that organizationally, the Parties had conducted demonstrations before and the United States envisioned, but was not wedded to, the one-time MM III demonstration being part of a normal RVOSI. He asked the Russian side for its thoughts. -------------- WANTS HIS CAKE AND EAT IT TOO -------------- ¶7. (S) Ryzhkov said that the MM III demonstration should be separate from a regular RVOSI since demonstration activities were different from inspection activities and he did not want to forfeit one of Russia's quota inspections. Additionally, the other Parties wanted to participate in the demonstration which could affect the flow of subsequent inspections, i.e., sequential inspections. Ryzhkov said the Russian Federation would have to think about and remain flexible on this aspect of the demonstration. ¶8. (S) Kuehne noted that START inspections were limited to ten people, as had been the case for past demonstrations. He asked Ryzhkov how many people he envisaged for the demonstration. ¶9. (S) Ryzhkov believed that ten people should be sufficient for a demonstration and noted that the Russian Federation organized demonstrations in the past using that number. Kuehne agreed that more than ten people would make crowd control difficult and people may not see what they needed to see if the crowd was too large. Ryzhkov said that he understood the sensitivity of a nuclear facility and the United States would need to determine the procedures for the demonstration based on security, safety, and ability to view the object. ¶10. (S) Kuehne asked what else should be considered regarding organizational aspects of a demonstration. Ryzhkov said it depended on where the demonstration would take place, such as at the RVOSI site or another location. -------------- -------------- MORE FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF REDUNDANCY DEPARTMENT -------------- -------------- ¶11. (S) Kuehne noted that the procedural and technical aspects of the demonstration blended together. He asked the Russian Delegation to clarify what the Russian side considered the "inside lower portion of the missile front section" to be. He used a photograph of the lower portion of the MM III front section that had previously been shown in a MM III RVOSI briefing from JCIC-XXXI (Ref B). Ryzhkov confirmed that it was important for the demonstration to show the portion underneath the front section. ¶12. (S) Kuehne said that the points provided in the Russian document (Ref A) included a comment about a "mirror-type device." He asked Ryzhkov to explain what was meant by that phrase and to determine the size of such a device. Ryzhkov said that the idea of using a mirror was merely a suggestion. He said the principle was simple; there needed to be enough of a view to ascertain that the space inside the lower portion of the front section did not contain reentry vehicles. ¶13. (S) Kuehne asked Ryzhkov whether shrouding portions of the underside of the front section would be a problem. Ryzhkov noted that he could not give a proper answer to the question. He highlighted the principles of the demonstration included a random choice of ICBM base, random choice of launch site (silo),and that any shrouding should not be large enough to cover a warhead. He said that small items that were shrouded would not be a problem. ¶14. (S) Ryzhkov said that Russia provided suggestions to address the conduct of this demonstration and would analyze the results of the demonstration before it provided a response as to its success. This would be similar to the work done by the United States after Russia provided a demonstration of SS-25 RVOSI procedures at Vypolzovo. -------------- IT'S YOUR PROBLEM SO YOU FIX IT -------------- ¶15. (S) Ryzhkov said that it was up to the inspected Party to show that an item of inspection did not contain more reentry vehicles than declared for the system. He said it was up to the United States to determine the demonstration procedures and present options at the JCIC. Russia merely stated there was a problem; inspectors were not able to view the lower portion of the MM III front section and confirm it didn't contain reentry vehicles. He suggested that the United States could organize the demonstration similar to the Peacekeeper front section inspection or use devices similar to those used in previous demonstrations. ¶16. (S) Kuehne told Ryzhkov that he was trying to determine what device would be acceptable if a direct viewing was not possible. He wanted to know whether a video camera would be acceptable even though it was not on the inspection list. Ryzhkov said a camera might be more interesting but the Russian side was not stuck on particular equipment or items on the Treaty list. He returned to his point that the objective was to randomly select a missile to determine it did not contain more reentry vehicles than declared. ¶17. (S) Kuehne said that demonstrations are usually scheduled. He said it would be expensive to have all three ICBM bases standing by for a visit. He said that perhaps it would be better to have the United States select a base and Russian inspectors select the launcher so as to minimize the disruption to the base. Ryzhkov said this could be proposed and discussed at the JCIC. ¶18. (S) Kuehne said that the United States would study the problem and determine a proposal. He said that after review, it could be possible that a demonstration may not be possible or a completely different approach could be discovered. The ball was in the U.S.'s court. ¶19. (U) Documents Exchanged: None ¶20. (U) Participants: U.S. Mr. Kuehne Mr. Brown Lt Col Comeau Mr. DeNinno Mr. Dunn Maj Edinger Mr. Hanchett Mr. Johnston Mr. Smith Mr. Vogel Mr. Yaguchi Mr. French (Int) BELARUS Mr. Ponomarev KAZAKHSTAN Col Akhmetalin RUSSIA Col Ryzhkov Capt(1st Rank) Kuz'min Col Novikov Mr. Bolotov Ms. Sorokina Col Zaytsev Mr. Gusev (Int) UKRAINE MGen Fedotov Mr. Makhonin ¶21. (U) Taylor sends. TICHENOR NNNN End Cable Text