|08GENEVA1000||2008-11-21 13:06:00||CONFIDENTIAL||US Mission Geneva|
O 211306Z NOV 08 FM USMISSION GENEVA TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7537 CIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE DIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE SECDEF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE USMISSION USNATO IMMEDIATE DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE DTRA ALEX WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE DTRA-OSES DARMSTADT GE IMMEDIATE CNO WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE DIRSSP WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE INFO AMEMBASSY ASTANA PRIORITY AMEMBASSY KYIV PRIORITY AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY
1. (U) This is JCIC-XXXIII-025.
2. (U) At Paragraph 3 below is the text of the U.S.
Statement that was delivered at the Closing Plenary Meeting
of the Thirty-third Session of the START Treaty's Joint
Compliance and Inspection Commission (JCIC), held at the U.S.
Mission on November 21, 2008.
3. (S) Begin text:
BY THE UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE TO
THE JOINT COMPLIANCE AND INSPECTION COMMISSION
AT THE CLOSING PLENARY MEETING
OF THE THIRTY-THIRD SESSION
November 21, 2008
The U.S. Delegation joins with the Representatives of
the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the
Russian Federation, and Ukraine in closing the Thirty-third
session of the START Treaty's Joint Compliance and Inspection
The progress we continue to make toward resolving
issues on the Commission's agenda is indicative of our
Governments' commitment and ability to work together
constructively during the intersessional period, in concert
with the business-like manner in which we approach these
issues here in Geneva. The United States appreciates the
work of our colleagues in this regard. Some issues, however,
will require sustained - and perhaps renewed - effort to
The United States continues to be extremely concerned
regarding the use of very large covers on missile front
sections during SS-27 silo and road-mobile ICBM reentry
vehicle on-site inspections (RVOSIs). The use of these large
covers prohibits our inspectors from ascertaining that the
front section contains no more reentry vehicles than the one
warhead attributed to these missiles. We urge the Russian
Federation to work to resolve this issue as soon as possible.
The U.S. remains concerned with respect to the Russian
intention to declare the RS-24 prototype ICBM as a new type.
The U.S. reiterates its request that the Russian Federation
provide a clear explanation of the START Treaty basis for
declaring the RS-24 as a new type based on the existing type
of missile, the SS-25, rather than the SS-27, which is a
declared variant of the SS-25.
With respect to the stated Russian concerns regarding
Minuteman III RVOSIs, the Delegations had a useful exchange
of views on notional procedures and technical aspects of a
possible one-time demonstration of the lower portion of a
Minuteman III missile front section. The United States will
study the feasibility of conducting such a demonstration and
will communicate a proposal to the other Parties.
The Parties again discussed Russian concerns with the
Courtland Missile Assembly Facility, including those
elaborated in the Russian Aide-memoire of October 20, 2008.
The United States emphasizes that the Trident I SLBM first
stage motors are brought to Courtland to undergo activities
that are consistent with work done at production facilities,
including stage assembly. The technical information required
by Joint Statements 21 and 31 for ICBMs or SLBMs used to
deliver objects into the upper atmosphere or space, will be
provided to the other Parties at the appropriate time. The
U.S. emphasizes that, in accordance with paragraph 3(a) of
Article III, any Trident I SLBM first-stage remains
accountable as a Trident I SLBM and, therefore, would be
subject to all the relevant provisions of the START Treaty as
a Trident I SLBM.
Russian concerns with the conversion of the B-1 heavy
bomber equipped for nuclear armaments other that long-range
nuclear ALCMs to a heavy bomber equipped for non-nuclear
armaments were again discussed at this session. The United
States believes that the fundamental cause for the
differences of views on this issue is that there is not a
common understanding regarding the meaning of the phrase
"incapable of carrying nuclear armaments." Accordingly, the
United States has proposed a draft JCIC Joint Statement that
if agreed would record the Parties' common understanding of
that phrase. We were encouraged by the discussions of this
issue by our experts, and urge the Parties to continue to
study the U.S. proposed text and to communicate their views
in diplomatic channels during the intersessional period.
The United States appreciated hearing the views of the
other START Treaty Parties as we begin to consider the
extension of the Treaty in accordance with Article XVII. Our
meeting on November 17 fulfilled the requirements of the
Treaty to meet to consider this issue prior to December 5,
2008. The United States, Belarus, Kazakhstan, the Russian
Federation, and Ukraine will continue discussion of this
issue, noting that a decision on this issue can be made up
until the date of expiration of the Treaty on December 5,
With respect to the closing of the Votkinsk Portal
Monitoring Facility, the Parties held extremely productive
discussions regarding the U.S.-proposed draft documents
relating to the closing of that facility. The United States
notes that there are many logistical issues that must be
resolved and that those details must be worked together with
the other Parties. We are encouraged by the positive
discussions we have had on the draft documents and look
forward to receiving substantive comments on these texts
through diplomatic channels as soon as possible.
The United States notes the concerns expressed by the
Russian Federation relating to the U.S.-declared conversion
of 50 Peacekeeper silo launchers to Minuteman III silo
launchers. The United States will study the Russian concerns
and will respond as appropriate.
The United States notes the explanation provided by
Ukraine regarding its proposal that the Parties consider the
possibility of concluding a JCIC Agreement that would
re-establish, as of December 2009, the types of former ICBMs
listed in Article III, paragraph 10(c), and will study the
The United States notes the concerns expressed by the
Russian Delegation with respect to a number of heavy bombers
located at the Davis-Monthan Conversion or Elimination
Facility. The United States would like to inform the other
Parties that there are a number of heavy bombers undergoing
aging and surveillance activities at the Davis-Monthan
Conversion or Elimination Facility. As a result of these
activities, these heavy bombers are in various stages of
disassembly. These heavy bombers remain accountable under
the Treaty and are subject to inspection, as provided for in
the Tenth Agreed Statement. The United States assures the
other Parties that if a decision is made to eliminate these
heavy bombers in the future their elimination shall be
conducted in accordance with the provisions of Section VI of
the Conversion or Elimination Protocol, including all
The United States has attached this unilateral
statement as an unclassified Annex to this plenary statement.
We once again encourage our Treaty partners to
communicate through diplomatic channels their views on agenda
items, as well as any related information in support of those
views, well in advance of our next JCIC session.
Thank you all for your work here in Geneva. I look
forward to continuing to work together during the
Once again, I'd like to thank our translators and
interpreters for their exceptional work. Without them, we
could not function.
Have a safe journey home.
4. (U) Taylor sends.
End Cable Text