Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08GABORONE961
2008-11-04 12:55:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Gaborone
Cable title:  

SADC COUNSELS "PATIENCE" ON ZIMBABWE

Tags:  PREL ETRD ZI CO BC 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 GABORONE 000961 

SIPDIS

ADDIS FOR USAU
PARIS, LONDON FOR AFRICA WATCHERS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/03/2018
TAGS: PREL ETRD ZI CO BC
SUBJECT: SADC COUNSELS "PATIENCE" ON ZIMBABWE

Classified By: DCM Philip R. Drouin; Reasons 1.4 (B) and (D).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 GABORONE 000961 SIPDIS ADDIS FOR USAU PARIS, LONDON FOR AFRICA WATCHERS E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/03/2018 TAGS: PREL ETRD ZI CO BC SUBJECT: SADC COUNSELS "PATIENCE" ON ZIMBABWE Classified By: DCM Philip R. Drouin; Reasons 1.4 (B) and (D). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY. SADC Executive Secretary Tomaz Salomao briefed diplomats October 31 on regional economic integration, violence in the Democratic Republic of Congo, and the Zimbabwe power-sharing negotiations. He advised that all three parties in Zimbabwe are happy with mediator Thabo Mbeki and said that the participants should be commended for the progress made in negotiations thus far. Salomao claimed that the only remaining point of contention was control of the Home Affairs Ministry, and he expected that issue to be resolved "soon." He counseled the foreign diplomats to remain "patient" as the negotiations continue, but declined to disclose where or when the planned SADC extraordinary summit would take place. The Executive Secretary's briefing jarred with reality and made it seem that the SADC Secretariat is either unwilling or unable to be an honest broker working for positive change in Zimbabwe. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (C) The Executive Secretary of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) Dr. Tomaz Salomao invited diplomatic missions in Gaborone to a briefing on October 31. Pol/Econ Chief represented the U.S. Mission, and diplomats from the UK, France, Germany, the European Union, Russia, China, India, Brazil, Kenya, Namibia, Zambia and Zimbabwe also attended. Secretary Salomao explained that he had convoked the diplomatic corps to provide them with an update on recent events in the region, including the Kampala meeting on economic integration October 22, the SADC troika meeting October 20 in Mbabane, and the October 27 SADC troika meeting in Harare. It was clear, however, that the Zimbabwe negotiations were of greatest interest to participants, and the bulk of the meeting focused on Zimbabwe. -------------- Economic Integration, DRC Violence -------------- ¶3. (U) Salomao was pleased to report that the heads of SADC, the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), and the East African Community (EAC) met in Kampala October 22 and decided all three organizations should work together on creation of a Free Trade Area for eastern and southern Africa. In six months, the troikas from all three regional economic groupings will meet to sign an agreement on the way forward (including a specific timetable)
for implementation of this FTA. He also pledged that the groupings will work to increase the free movement of goods and people amongst themselves and that they will move forward to implement the Yamoussoukro declaration on air transportation. ¶4. (U) The Executive Secretary said that the main purpose for the October 20 SADC troika meeting in Mbabane was the worsening situation in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). SADC's goal in Mbabane was to inform member states about the violence in eastern Congo and to ask them to support diplomatic and humanitarian efforts to resolve the crisis. In Mbabane, SADC leaders agreed to seek out leaders from the Great Lakes region to discuss the DRC, launch an appeal to the international community for additional humanitarian assistance, and send a strong message to the United Nations that SADC is unhappy with MONUC's performance. Salomao noted that over 1.6 million people needed humanitarian assistance in eastern Congo, and said the situation worsens each day. He said that MONUC's performance had improved since October 29 and that the UN was "finally trying to bring the fighting under control," but questioned why it took MONUC "so long" to act. He noted that SADC leaders met with the Presidents of Rwanda, Uganda, Kenya, Tanzania and African Union Chairman Ping on the margins of the October 22 Kampala meeting to discuss the situation in eastern Congo, and subsequently South African President Motlanthe traveled to the DRC October 30 to continue assesing the situation and working toward a solution to the hostilities. -------------- Zimbabwe Through Rose-Colored Glasses -------------- ¶5. (C) Salomao told the assembled diplomats that SADC had GABORONE 00000961 002 OF 003 wanted to take advantage of the Mbabane meeting to discuss the Zimbabwe negotiations, but this was impossible since Prime Minister-designate Morgan Tsvangirai could not attend the summit for "technical reasons." (Note: Salomao did not explicitly mention that the GOZ refused to issue Tsvangirai a passport. End Note.) SADC proceeded with the rest of its agenda in Mbabane and scheduled a second troika meeting in Harare October 27. According to Salomao, in Harare he, the troika leaders, and facilitator Thabo Mbeki met with the Tsvangirai and Mutambara MDC factions as well as President Mugabe ("representing the government") from 11am October 27 until 3am October 28. Salomao stated that "contrary to media reports," all three factions are happy with Thabo Mbeki's mediation efforts, and that by October 28, all ministerial portfolios had been agreed on except one, Home Affairs. According to Salomao, at the end of the October 28 meeting, the three parties asked for time to think about the way forward. He said that Mbeki gave them the requested time, but reminded them that delays in finalizing the power-sharing agreement erode public confidence and lengthen humanitarian problems. Salomao commended the parties for the progress they have made in only six weeks since the signing of the power-sharing agreement and said that the mediator continues to work with all parties to resolve the dispute over Home Affairs. Salomao explained that the current challenge for SADC is to improve trust amongst the three parties. He deplored the tactic of "negotiating through the media" and explained that negative public statements have set the negotiations back. ¶6. (C) After Executive Secretary Salomao finished his prepared remarks, the assembled diplomats pressed for additional information on what resolutions there might be for the Home Affairs impasse and asked about the planned SADC Extraordinary Summit to discuss Zimbabwe. Salomao said that SADC was "still consulting" about a date for the summit. (Note: The SADC Organ on Politics, Defence, and Security troika is meeting November 4-5 in Maputo. End Note.) However, he said that SADC is not waiting for the summit to solve Zimbabwe's problems, and explained that facilitator Thabo Mbeki continues to work with the parties behind the scenes. He also claimed that the main purpose for the Extraordinary Summit would not be Zimbabwe but rather the situation in the DRC. With regards to the allocation of the Home Affairs Ministry, Salomao said that SADC had discussed three options with the factions: one party control, rotation, and "co-sharing" the portfolio. Salomao noted vaguely that SADC had made comments and recommendations on all three options, but the final decision would rest with the parties. He again noted the need for patience as the negotiations continued. He mentioned that other outstanding issues remained, including the role of the National Security Council, appointment of governors, appointment of Ambassadors and Permanent Secretaries, and the drafting and passage of "amendment 19" (the constitutional amendment needed to legally implement the power sharing deal),but said that SADC's recommendation was that the parties "don't mislead themselves" by trying to resolve all these issues now. Salomao said that SADC's advice was that the factions should first stand up a government, and then let the coalition government deal with these issues. ¶7. (C) Salomao did acknowledge the humanitarian crisis in Zimbabwe several times, and he admitted that as the negotiations continue, the humanitarian crisis goes on. However, during the question period at the close of the meeting, he made a disturbing reference to drought as the root cause of hunger in Zimbabwe. Salomao said 5 million Zimbabweans require food aid, and that the real problem is that "Zimbabwe needs rain yesterday." He continued saying that if no rains come by November, the humanitarian crisis will escalate into a "real disaster." Disturbingly, he made no reference to other political or structural causes of hunger in Zimbabwe, such as macroeconomic policies or land reform, and certainly the misrule of ZANU-PF. -------------- COMMENT -------------- GABORONE 00000961 003 OF 003 ¶8. (C) The Executive Secretary's briefing jarred with reality and made it seem that the SADC Secretariat is either unwilling or unable to be an honest broker working for positive change in Zimbabwe. During the briefing, the Zimbabwean Ambassador to Botswana Thomas Mandigora sat silently but prominently near the head of the table, at the left hand of Executive Secretary Salomao. The other SADC diplomats in the room (Namibia, Zambia) were silent throughout the meeting. The Government of Botswana was not represented. Salomao's rosy picture of the progress being made in the negotiations and his repeated counsel that the international community should remain "patient" calls into question his credibility and that of the SADC Secretariat. SADC continues to treat Zimbabwe as an ordinary member state, and thus allows its government representatives (in this case the Ambassador, but often Mugabe himself) a seat at the table during discussions of Zimbabwe's problems. How will SADC ever play the role of an honest broker in Zimbabwe if it allows ZANU-PF representatives to listen to and often shape discussions about the way forward? End Comment. NOLAN

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