Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08GABORONE961
2008-11-04 12:55:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Gaborone
Cable title:  

SADC COUNSELS "PATIENCE" ON ZIMBABWE

Tags:  PREL ETRD ZI CO BC 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 GABORONE 000961 

SIPDIS

ADDIS FOR USAU
PARIS, LONDON FOR AFRICA WATCHERS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/03/2018
TAGS: PREL ETRD ZI CO BC
SUBJECT: SADC COUNSELS "PATIENCE" ON ZIMBABWE

Classified By: DCM Philip R. Drouin; Reasons 1.4 (B) and (D).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 GABORONE 000961

SIPDIS

ADDIS FOR USAU
PARIS, LONDON FOR AFRICA WATCHERS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/03/2018
TAGS: PREL ETRD ZI CO BC
SUBJECT: SADC COUNSELS "PATIENCE" ON ZIMBABWE

Classified By: DCM Philip R. Drouin; Reasons 1.4 (B) and (D).


1. (C) SUMMARY. SADC Executive Secretary Tomaz Salomao
briefed diplomats October 31 on regional economic
integration, violence in the Democratic Republic of Congo,
and the Zimbabwe power-sharing negotiations. He advised that
all three parties in Zimbabwe are happy with mediator Thabo
Mbeki and said that the participants should be commended for
the progress made in negotiations thus far. Salomao claimed
that the only remaining point of contention was control of
the Home Affairs Ministry, and he expected that issue to be
resolved "soon." He counseled the foreign diplomats to
remain "patient" as the negotiations continue, but declined
to disclose where or when the planned SADC extraordinary
summit would take place. The Executive Secretary's briefing
jarred with reality and made it seem that the SADC
Secretariat is either unwilling or unable to be an honest
broker working for positive change in Zimbabwe. END SUMMARY.


2. (C) The Executive Secretary of the Southern African
Development Community (SADC) Dr. Tomaz Salomao invited
diplomatic missions in Gaborone to a briefing on October 31.
Pol/Econ Chief represented the U.S. Mission, and diplomats
from the UK, France, Germany, the European Union, Russia,
China, India, Brazil, Kenya, Namibia, Zambia and Zimbabwe
also attended. Secretary Salomao explained that he had
convoked the diplomatic corps to provide them with an update
on recent events in the region, including the Kampala meeting
on economic integration October 22, the SADC troika meeting
October 20 in Mbabane, and the October 27 SADC troika meeting
in Harare. It was clear, however, that the Zimbabwe
negotiations were of greatest interest to participants, and
the bulk of the meeting focused on Zimbabwe.

--------------
Economic Integration, DRC Violence
--------------

3. (U) Salomao was pleased to report that the heads of SADC,
the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA),
and the East African Community (EAC) met in Kampala October
22 and decided all three organizations should work together
on creation of a Free Trade Area for eastern and southern

Africa. In six months, the troikas from all three regional
economic groupings will meet to sign an agreement on the way
forward (including a specific timetable) for implementation
of this FTA. He also pledged that the groupings will work to
increase the free movement of goods and people amongst
themselves and that they will move forward to implement the
Yamoussoukro declaration on air transportation.


4. (U) The Executive Secretary said that the main purpose for
the October 20 SADC troika meeting in Mbabane was the
worsening situation in the eastern Democratic Republic of
Congo (DRC). SADC's goal in Mbabane was to inform member
states about the violence in eastern Congo and to ask them to
support diplomatic and humanitarian efforts to resolve the
crisis. In Mbabane, SADC leaders agreed to seek out leaders
from the Great Lakes region to discuss the DRC, launch an
appeal to the international community for additional
humanitarian assistance, and send a strong message to the
United Nations that SADC is unhappy with MONUC's performance.
Salomao noted that over 1.6 million people needed
humanitarian assistance in eastern Congo, and said the
situation worsens each day. He said that MONUC's performance
had improved since October 29 and that the UN was "finally
trying to bring the fighting under control," but questioned
why it took MONUC "so long" to act. He noted that SADC
leaders met with the Presidents of Rwanda, Uganda, Kenya,
Tanzania and African Union Chairman Ping on the margins of
the October 22 Kampala meeting to discuss the situation in
eastern Congo, and subsequently South African President
Motlanthe traveled to the DRC October 30 to continue assesing
the situation and working toward a solution to the
hostilities.

--------------
Zimbabwe Through Rose-Colored Glasses
--------------

5. (C) Salomao told the assembled diplomats that SADC had

GABORONE 00000961 002 OF 003


wanted to take advantage of the Mbabane meeting to discuss
the Zimbabwe negotiations, but this was impossible since
Prime Minister-designate Morgan Tsvangirai could not attend
the summit for "technical reasons." (Note: Salomao did not
explicitly mention that the GOZ refused to issue Tsvangirai a
passport. End Note.) SADC proceeded with the rest of its
agenda in Mbabane and scheduled a second troika meeting in
Harare October 27. According to Salomao, in Harare he, the
troika leaders, and facilitator Thabo Mbeki met with the
Tsvangirai and Mutambara MDC factions as well as President
Mugabe ("representing the government") from 11am October 27
until 3am October 28. Salomao stated that "contrary to media
reports," all three factions are happy with Thabo Mbeki's
mediation efforts, and that by October 28, all ministerial
portfolios had been agreed on except one, Home Affairs.
According to Salomao, at the end of the October 28 meeting,
the three parties asked for time to think about the way
forward. He said that Mbeki gave them the requested time,
but reminded them that delays in finalizing the power-sharing
agreement erode public confidence and lengthen humanitarian
problems. Salomao commended the parties for the progress
they have made in only six weeks since the signing of the
power-sharing agreement and said that the mediator continues
to work with all parties to resolve the dispute over Home
Affairs. Salomao explained that the current challenge for
SADC is to improve trust amongst the three parties. He
deplored the tactic of "negotiating through the media" and
explained that negative public statements have set the
negotiations back.


6. (C) After Executive Secretary Salomao finished his
prepared remarks, the assembled diplomats pressed for
additional information on what resolutions there might be for
the Home Affairs impasse and asked about the planned SADC
Extraordinary Summit to discuss Zimbabwe. Salomao said that
SADC was "still consulting" about a date for the summit.
(Note: The SADC Organ on Politics, Defence, and Security
troika is meeting November 4-5 in Maputo. End Note.)
However, he said that SADC is not waiting for the summit to
solve Zimbabwe's problems, and explained that facilitator
Thabo Mbeki continues to work with the parties behind the
scenes. He also claimed that the main purpose for the
Extraordinary Summit would not be Zimbabwe but rather the
situation in the DRC. With regards to the allocation of the
Home Affairs Ministry, Salomao said that SADC had discussed
three options with the factions: one party control, rotation,
and "co-sharing" the portfolio. Salomao noted vaguely that
SADC had made comments and recommendations on all three
options, but the final decision would rest with the parties.
He again noted the need for patience as the negotiations
continued. He mentioned that other outstanding issues
remained, including the role of the National Security
Council, appointment of governors, appointment of Ambassadors
and Permanent Secretaries, and the drafting and passage of
"amendment 19" (the constitutional amendment needed to
legally implement the power sharing deal),but said that
SADC's recommendation was that the parties "don't mislead
themselves" by trying to resolve all these issues now.
Salomao said that SADC's advice was that the factions should
first stand up a government, and then let the coalition
government deal with these issues.


7. (C) Salomao did acknowledge the humanitarian crisis in
Zimbabwe several times, and he admitted that as the
negotiations continue, the humanitarian crisis goes on.
However, during the question period at the close of the
meeting, he made a disturbing reference to drought as the
root cause of hunger in Zimbabwe. Salomao said 5 million
Zimbabweans require food aid, and that the real problem is
that "Zimbabwe needs rain yesterday." He continued saying
that if no rains come by November, the humanitarian crisis
will escalate into a "real disaster." Disturbingly, he made
no reference to other political or structural causes of
hunger in Zimbabwe, such as macroeconomic policies or land
reform, and certainly the misrule of ZANU-PF.

--------------
COMMENT
--------------

GABORONE 00000961 003 OF 003



8. (C) The Executive Secretary's briefing jarred with reality
and made it seem that the SADC Secretariat is either
unwilling or unable to be an honest broker working for
positive change in Zimbabwe. During the briefing, the
Zimbabwean Ambassador to Botswana Thomas Mandigora sat
silently but prominently near the head of the table, at the
left hand of Executive Secretary Salomao. The other SADC
diplomats in the room (Namibia, Zambia) were silent
throughout the meeting. The Government of Botswana was not
represented. Salomao's rosy picture of the progress being
made in the negotiations and his repeated counsel that the
international community should remain "patient" calls into
question his credibility and that of the SADC Secretariat.
SADC continues to treat Zimbabwe as an ordinary member state,
and thus allows its government representatives (in this case
the Ambassador, but often Mugabe himself) a seat at the table
during discussions of Zimbabwe's problems. How will SADC
ever play the role of an honest broker in Zimbabwe if it
allows ZANU-PF representatives to listen to and often shape
discussions about the way forward? End Comment.
NOLAN