BOTSWANA PRESENTS ITS REQUEST LIST FOR MILITARY

S E C R E T GABORONE 000577 DEPARTMENT FOR AF, AF/EX, AF/RSA, AND AF/S ALSO PASS TO IBB E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/15/2018 TAGS: PREL PGOV PINR PREF MARR MASS MCAP ASEC BC ZI SUBJECT: BOTSWANA PRESENTS ITS REQUEST LIST FOR MILITARY ASSISTANCE, AND A TACIT APPEAL FOR PARTNERSHIP REF: A. GABORONE 566 ¶B. GABORONE 554 (NOTAL) ¶C. GABORONE 552 ¶D. GABORONE 548 (NOTAL) ¶E. GABORONE 547 ¶F. GABORONE 239 ¶G. GABORONE 225 ¶H. 07 GABORONE 298 Classified By: CDA Philip R. Drouin; Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (S) This is an action request; please see paragraph 10. ¶2. (S) Summary: The GOB, through the Botswana Defence Force (BDF) has provided July 14 to this Mission a list of the specific request for security assistance in the form of military hardware and equipment, as first elicited by the GOB Minister for Defence, Justice, and Security in a July 8 meeting with the Charge. The list is for nine key items (noted below, para. 4) ranging from helmets and flak jackets on one end of the continuum up to helicopter gunships on the other, which the BDF has said it "requires" due to the current heightened tensions with Zimbabwe. The list of items is not prioritized, nor does it include the number of items required. When asked about the desired quantities, our senior BDF interlocutor replied that they preferred to establish what items the United States would be willing to provide and then would discuss the actual quantities required. This Mission believes this formal GOB/BDF request and list to be less a request for emergency assistance and more an attempt by the Government of Botswana to gauge the USG response to their recent very public and resolute stance against Zimbabwe. We also believe the GOB is seeking to move the existing bilateral security relationship to a new and elevated level of partnership. The GOB is likely probing for the level of the U.S. commitment based on the type and cost of the equipment that the USG might be willing to provide. Botswana President Ian Khama, who since his April 1 inauguration has been increasingly focusing on Zimbabwe, genuinely appears to be seeking a much deeper security partnership with the United States. That said, this Mission is mindful of how a closer USG-GOB security relationship, with possible provision of new arms and and equipment, might impact our ongoing diplomacy in Southern Africa and beyond. Post believes we should examine ways to enhance institutional ties and other support for the GOB and the BDF where appropriate, but also in a manner that will not harm overriding U.S. interests in Africa. End Summary. ¶3. (S) This Mission's outgoing Office of Defense Cooperation (ODC) Chief LTC Jones and Bilateral Affairs Officer MAJ Shinn met July 14 with Major General Tlhokwane, the Deputy Commander of the Botswana Defence Force concerning Botswana's request for military assistance from the United States (Refs A and B). MG Tlhokwane provided a list of nine items he said were "required by the BDF" due to the current heightened tensions with Zimbabwe. The list of items is not prioritized, nor does it include the number of items required. When asked about the quantities required, MG Tlhokwane replied that they preferred to establish what items the United States would be willing to provide and then discuss the quantities required. With one exception the request is for a type of item or system rather than a specific item or system. When asked what systems the BDF needed more urgently or even desired (such as TOW missiles or Stinger missiles),MG Tlhokwane replied that they preferred to allow the United States to determine what systems or items the USG is willing to provide. MG Tlhokwane stated that Botswana would like the United States "to provide the items to Botswana" (i.e., grant),but would discuss purchasing the items themselves if necessary. The BDF provided only the list itself without any explanation as to why these particular items were an urgent necessity. 4.(C) The GOB/BDF request is organized according to the command that requested the system and reads as follows: Defence Logistics Command -- Field Hospital (Level 1) Ground Forces Command -- Combat Helmets -- Flak Jackets (7.62mm protection) -- Global Positioning Systems -- Anti-Tank Missiles -- Short Range Air Defence System -- Air Boats Air Arm -- F5 Under-wing tank system -- Helicopter Gunships ¶5. (S) Comment: The BDF has very limited anti-tank and anti-aircraft capabilities. Their basic air defense system is the SA-7 and their primary anti-tank weapon is the SK-105 self-propelled gun system, which has been very unreliable in Botswana's desert and dry savanna environment. The requests for anti-tank missiles and a short range air defense system make sense in the context of the current situation as Zimbabwe has more numerous and more advanced tanks and aircraft in their inventory than Botswana. The F5 under-wing tanks also support potential operations on the border with Zimbabwe as the F5s must operate from Thebephatswa Airbase located in southern Botswana northwest of Molepolole (and Gaborone),and would have limited operational endurance in the border region. The other requirements seem to be requests for items that the BDF already has, with the exception of the helicopter gunships which would represent the introduction of a new capability into the BDF. Helicopter gunships would require extensive crew training and would not meet an immediate need. ¶6. (S) When asked if the BDF had any information about Zimbabwe that could be used to support this request, MG Tlhokwane replied that they had limited intelligence on Zimbabwe but believed that military forces had been deployed into the border region. He stated that in the last week to two weeks they had seen a significant drop in the number of Zimbabweans crossing the border into Botswana. He stated that Botswana had chosen to have those reports and raw data collected by their election observers driven to Gaborone by the GOB's Defense Attache to Zimbabwe, as during the March elections documents had disappeared from the suitcases of Botswana's observers when passing through Zimbabwean customs on the way home. On arrival in Botswana the GOB's Harare-accredited Defense Attache reported that he had passed through a number of roadblocks along the main road back to Botswana. The BDF apparently believes that the Zimbabwean military is now being used, since the June 27 run-off, to keep Zimbabweans at home in Zimbabwe and prevent (or at least impede) their travel externally. The ODC Chief observed during an early July visit to Francistown that the hustle and bustle and commercial activity so prevalent in Botswana's second city in recent months seemed much more muted now than of late. ¶7. (S) Comment: MG Tlhokwane briefly showed the ODC Chief the list of requirements submitted by the BDF component commands containing over 50 different items which the BDF Staff had pared down to the current list of nine items. The page the ODC chief saw contained mostly weapons systems. The BDF has long experience in security assistance and a large number of U.S. War College and Staff College graduates. The ODC Chief believes they perceive a general reluctance on the part of the USG to provide weapons to African nations and are familiar with the USG's reluctance to provide capabilities into a region in order to avoid spurring regional arms races. The ODC Chief also believes the BDF senior staff has deliberately crafted this request list to include a number of non-lethal items so that the USG will be able to support at least a part of the request. Such items might include combat helmets and flak jackets with appropriate dual-use applications to peacekeeping and peace support operations. ¶8. (S) Comment Continued: Mindful of Minister of Defence, Justice, and Security Seretse's initial July 8 demarche to the Charge (Ref B),and our subsequent discussions and "due diligence" locally since that meeting (Ref A),this Mission believes this formal GOB/BDF request and list to be less a request for emergency assistance and more an attempt by the GOB to gauge the USG response to their recent very public and resolute stance against Zimbabwe (Refs C and E). We also believe the GOB is seeking to move the existing bilateral security relationship to a new, more solid, and elevated level of partnership. The GOB is likely probing to discern the level of the U.S. commitment based on the type and cost of the equipment that the USG might be willing to consider providing, with helmets and flak vests at one end of the spectrum and helicopter gunships at the other. While it is not yet completely clear to post at what level decisions in this area are being made, our best guess is that it is highly likely that President Khama directed Minister Seretse to make the initial July 8 formal, general request for military assistance (Ref B). Our sense, however, is that the President (and a one-time BDF Commander) might not be aware of what specific items are on the final request as prepared by senior BDF staff and presented by MG Tlhokwane at the ODC Chief's farewell call (LTC Jones departed post ert PCS July 15). End General Comment. ¶9. (S) Charge's Comment: We all recognize and are encouraged that Botswana has taken a principled and most helpful position on Zimbabwe in recent months, but especially coming to the fore in past weeks around the time of Zimbabwe's flawed June 27 run-off election. Having served as DCM at and seen this Mission for the past two years, I note that former Ambassador Canavan and many of us here have long advocated to senior-most GOB officials that democratic and middle income Botswana should step up and assert itself in international fora like the UN, the AU, and in SADC, so as to stand with like-minded states in the Community of Democracies to promote democracy and human rights on difficult and sometimes defining issues -- namely Zimbabwe. We have also urged the GOB to take a leadership role on issues of import for regional security and stability. These two keystone objectives are elaborated as our first two goals in the FY2010 Mission Strategic Plan for the U.S. Mission to Botswana. President Ian Khama has now been in office in Gaborone for just over 100 days, but we have clearly seen a sea change in the GOB's approach on pivotal issues like Zimbabwe. Just prior to his April 1 inauguration, we had reported that Khama remained a difficult read, holding his cards as then-Vice President close to his vest (Ref G). Since assuming office, we have witnessed how Zimbabwe has increasingly consumed the lion's share of his focus (Ref F). He has shown us a number of his cards by now, to be sure, but the one he seems to be holding with an anxious interest to play is for Botswana to seek a much deeper security partnership with the United States. An early advocate of AFRICOM to be sure (Ref H),President Khama's apparent desire to expand bilateral defense cooperation should therefore not surprise us. That said, this Mission remains fully mindful of how a much closer USG-GOB security relationship, with our possible provision of new and sophisticated materiel, might play in this neighborhood and beyond and impact our diplomacy just now. Post thus believes we should look for ways to enhance further our institutional ties and other support for the GOB and the BDF where appropriate, but also in measures that will not harm overriding U.S. interests in Africa. End Charge's Comment. ¶10. (S) Action Requested: Pursuant to Ref B (Notal),post requests guidance and instruction on the appropriate USG response to this GOB/BDF request list and general demarche on possible military assistance from the United States, in a manner that might serve to bolster our already strong bilateral relationship and demonstrate U.S. solidarity for Botswana's, and President Khama's, resolve on Zimbabwe. Thanks and regards. DROUIN