GUESS WHO'S COMING TO DINNER? PART II: QADHAFI

C O N F I D E N T I A L FREETOWN 000604 SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR AF/FO, AF/W, AF/RSA E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/29/2018 TAGS: PGOV PREL LY SL SUBJECT: GUESS WHO'S COMING TO DINNER? PART II: QADHAFI REF: FREETOWN 602 Classified By: Ambassador June Carter Perry for reasons 1/4 (b/d) ¶1. (C) Summary: Per reftel, on December 29 the Ministry of Foreign Affairs confirmed that Libyan leader Muammar Qadhafi will visit Sierra Leone from December 30 through January 2. Though his intentions have yet to be shared with the Government of Sierra Leone (GoSL),officials believe the purpose of his visit is to meet with Captain Moussa Camara, leader of the Guinean junta. Qadhafi and his team are not President Koroma's invited guests - the GoSL was apparently informed in writing of the visit after Qadhafi's advance team had already left Libya, though the two countries have a cordial bilateral relationship. Given that GoSL representatives have recently bemoaned the challenges of being a tiny country, forced into supporting the interests of those that are larger and more powerful, Qadhafi's arrival with no warning and no statement of purpose is yet another example of Sierra Leone's vulnerability to external pressure. Acknowledging that they cannot deny Qadhafi, the GoSL is now trying to assert its sovereignty by insisting that Qadhafi meet Koroma in-person, and Camara's entourage leave their weapons at the border. Beyond these measures, which can not be enforced, Sierra Leone must sit back and play the role of gracious, if somewhat unwilling, host. End Summary. -------------- UNINVITED BUT NOT WHOLLY UNWELCOME -------------- ¶2. (C) At a December 29 meeting with the international community, Foreign Minister Zainab Bangura confirmed BBC reports that Libya is sending a delegation, including Qadhafi, to Sierra Leone. According to Bangura, she received a call on the morning of December 28, informing her of the visit; a diplomatic note arrived four hours later announcing it. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs was also told that an advance team of approximately 84 people was already enroute. The GoSL held an emergency, internal meeting, and later met with the Libyan advance team, but received no further information about the purpose of the Qadhafi visit. The unspoken understanding is that Sierra Leone is providing a safe haven for a meeting between Qadhafi and Camara, which will likely take place near the Guinean border in Kambia. ¶3. (C) Bangura inferred that Qadhafi's original intent was to travel directly to Kambia, bypassing the capitol altogether. He will now make a stopover in Freetown, at the GoSL's insistence, to meet with Koroma. Besides getting a stronger handle on Qadhafi's purpose for meeting Camara, Koroma will likely also use the opportunity to press for further support from the Libyan government. ¶4. (C) The GoSL is in regular contact with ECOWAS Executive Secretary Dr. Mohamed Ibn Chambas, and is expressing concerns about Qadhafi engaging in parallel-track negotiations with Camara. Even in the face of these concerns, the GoSL is resignedly pragmatic about the situation, with Bangura saying "if you say no to Qadhafi, you create an enemy." That same resignation applies to putting control measures on the arrangements; while every Libyan gun brought into the country to protect Qadhafi will be registered, and Camara told that his delegation must leave their arms at the border, Sierra Leone is virtually powerless to enforce this for fear of alienating current and potential allies. The Sierra Leoneans are well-aware that they have no control over the proceedings, and are focusing on battles they can win, such as pushing for the bilateral meeting between the Libyan leader and their own. -------------- COMMENT -------------- ¶5. (C) Sierra Leone is in an unenviable geographic position relative to Guinea, making it the ideal place for those interested in bilateral discussions with Camara to visit. Despite the security risk this poses to Sierra Leone, allowing a coup leader to enter their territory knowing that violence could very well follow him, the GoSL had no opportunity to say no to hosting a Guinean-Libyan summit and has no power to insist on a change of venue, inclusion in the discussions, or even having the content of those discussions shared with them after the fact. This is likely frustrating for a country trying to evolve into a regional leader - had Libya requested that Sierra Leone broker a discussion with Camara, the summit would represent an opportunity for Sierra Leone to push its own agenda while promoting itself as a political and diplomatic leader. End Comment. PERRY