(C//NF) NSDD 38 - U.S. DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

C O N F I D E N T I A L FREETOWN 000330 SIPDIS DEPT FOR AF/W AND NSC AFRICA DIRECTORATE E.O. 12958: DECL: 07-08-2018 TAGS: KMRS AODE PINR AMGT SL SUBJECT: (C//NF) NSDD 38 - U.S. DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY STAFFING IN FREETOWN, SIERRA LEONE REF: SECSTATE 68307 Classified By: AMBASSADOR JUNE CARTER PERRY REASON: 1.4(C) ¶1. (C) As Chief of Mission, American Embassy Freetown, I concur with the Defense Intelligence Agency's request to establish an additional position, that of a Operations Non-Commissioned Officer (Ops NCO) in the Defense Attache Office at post and consent to the NSDD 38 agreement. Please see responses to specific questions in reftel. ¶2. (C) Is the need for the proposed staffing change reflected in the most recent MSP? If not, what circumstances have changed to justify the NSDD 38 proposal? (U) In 2001, the Defense Intelligence Agency was approved to establish an office of three personnel to include a Defense and Air Attache in the rank of Lieutenant Colonel (O-5),an Operations Coordinator in the rank of Master Sergeant (E-7), and an Operations Non-Commissioned Officer in the rank of Staff Sergeant (E-6). In 2005, the Defense Intelligence Agency was approved to add a position for a Defense Liaison Officer in the rank of a GS-11/12. During the period of 1999 to 2003, the Defense Intelligence Agency was standing up 20 offices throughout Africa and lacked the manpower to support all positions being filled. Since 2001, due to staffing shortages at the Defense Intelligence Agency and poor conditions in country, which many times were less than ideal for married personnel, the Defense Intelligence Agency simply chose to not staff the position. However, in the past year, both the Defense AttachQ and the Defense Liaison Officer have opted for tours of three and four years each due to much improved conditions which have led the Defense Intelligence Agency and the Chief of Mission to desire and support filling all positions of the Defense AttachQ Office-Freetown, Sierra Leone. Some of the circumstances that support increased staffing of the position include: a. (C) Intelligence Reporting Increase of 200%. In 2008, with the arrival of two extremely, experienced collectors, intelligence reporting increased 100% within the first four months. As of today, reporting is 200% (163 reports) over reporting in 2007 (82 reports) and 300% over reporting in 2006 (40 reports). Having experienced collectors versus first time collectors means the quality and placement of contacts has greatly improved but also resulted in more reporting and more administration and care of contacts. An OPS NCO is desperately needed to assist with the administration of Operating Directives, preparation and management of intelligence reports and contact memorandums. b. (C) Official Entertaining Increase of 200%. In 2008, with the experienced collectors, official entertaining has increased by 200%. This has improved the Defense Attache Office's ability to assess and access well placed contacts, building a portfolio of reliable, ever vigilant sources. The result has been an increase in reporting from 40 reports a year to what we anticipate will be 175 reports in 2008. Each contact requires constant interaction and the production of contact memoranda and intelligence reports. An OPS NCO is desperately needed to assist with managing the contact databank, the recruitment reports, the validation reports, contact memoranda and production of intelligence reports associated with contacts. c. (C) Security Assistance Duties Increasing. In 2008, the Defense AttachQ Office dual-hatted as a Security Assistance Office, is sending host nation military to the United States for the first time after a five year self imposed suspension of International Military Education and Training (IMET). The suspension occurred in 2003 as a result of four host country military students failing to return from training in the United States. The Defense Attache Office plans to send two host country students in 2008 and 15 students in 2009. While sending host country military to the United States has the advantage of building United States influence, it also requires enormous administration: from selection of candidates to pre course screening requirements to fitness training to preparation of military orders and finances to monitoring of students while they are in school. An OPS NCO is therefore needed to assist with managing the processes and paperwork associated with host nation students attending International Military Education and Training courses in the U.S. d. (C) Host Nation Entry into EUCOM/AFRICOM Counter-Narcotic Program. Sierra Leone is a major transshipment zone for illegal drugs moving from Latin America to Europe. In 2008, illegal drugs transiting Sierra Leone's airport and coastal waters have increased substantially so much so that the Maritime Wing, Republic of Sierra Leone, and Ministry of Defense have requested assistance with capacity building in counter narcotics. In 2008, the United States Embassy requested the Maritime Wing, Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces enter the AFRICOM Counter-Narcotics Program. While entry into the AFRICOM Counter-Narcotics program will be helpful to the Maritime Wing, it means addtional work for the Defense AttachQ Office. The Defense Attache Office anticipates having to write yearly counter narcotics plans for training and technical assistance; planning and managing five to ten week long seminars building law enforcement/security capacity; design and manage renovations and work projects like a new wharf, a maintenance bay and oversee purchases of equipment and tools. An OPS NCO is desperately needed to assist with the overall management of training activities, oversight of work projects and logistics purchases. e. (C) International Military Advisory Training Team to Sierra Leone Downsizing Footprint. As the British military footprint in Sierra Leone decreases, the Defense Attache Office expects to lose access to large quantities of military order of battle, troop strengths, and troop capabilities that will create conditions for the unit's two collectors having to travel up country more to verify information. At the same time, the British, in downsizing, are reaching out the Defense Attache Office for increased U.S. commitments to engagement and capacity building with the Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces. Some of the engagement/capacity activities include sending 8 Staff Judge Advocates to IMET training over the next two years; sending 8-12 NCOs to enlisted NCO development; and assistance with training of the Standby Force, Economic Community of West Africa States (ECOWAS). Again, while great initiatives, they come with additional work and the need for an OPS NCO to assist with production of intelligence reports designing and managing seminars, selecting and preparing host nation military for schools in the U.S. and managing and caring for increased deployed U.S. personnel. f. (C) EUCOM/AFRICOM Engagement. EUCOM engagement in Sierra Leone has been non existent over the past eight years. With creation of an Africa focused command, increased stability in Sierra Leone and British requests for more U.S. engagement, there is great potential for AFRICOM to host five to ten engagement activities a year in Sierra Leone. Some of the planned engagement activities include military-to-military exchanges in base security, maritime law, military justice, military chaplains to name a few. Each of these military exchanges is months in the planning and takes dedicated military personnel to execute. Again, while great initiatives, they come with the need for manpower that only an OPS NCO can provide. ¶3. (C) If the agency proposes to add staffing based on workload, are there other resources already present at post that are performing or could perform, the functions? (C) While the two collectors' positions are declared intelligence positions, the names of contacts and much of the information provided by contacts which goes into intelligence reporting is classified at the CONFIDENTIAL to TOP SECRET level. Much of the work in gathering information, meeting and maintaining contacts is based on classified training that requires trained, experienced collectors with a TOP SECRET security classification. Unfortunately, there is no way that we can train foreign service nationals to maintain contact databanks, prepare recruitment forms, conduct assessment exercises, write validation reports, contact and meet with contacts and then produce contact memorandums ultimately resulting in intelligence reporting. Many U.S. spouses also do not have the security clearance, background or experience to perform the function. ¶4. (C) Could the function be accomplished through the use of TDY, Foreign National, contract, or other local hire personnel? (C) No, the mission requires trained experienced intelligence collectors with a security clearance of TOP SECRET. Much of the information being gathered is subsequently put into intelligence reports as actionable intelligence again requiring sensitive handling and trained intelligence officers to act on the information. How we collect and gather intelligence especially as to persons recruited, methods and tactics are classified actions requiring a top secret security classification and lengthy courses in collection and preparation of intelligence information. While TDY intelligence personnel could perform the function, the cost of their hotels and per diem month after month are more costly then establishment of a permanent position. ¶5. (C) Identify the specific administrative support, space and funding arrangements that have been made for the increase in staffing. (C) The Defense Attache Office already possesses dedicated space for a Non Commissioned Officer in the Defense AttachQ Office. The space would require installment of a classified Defense Intelligence Agency computer and a classified Department of State computer. The Defense Intelligence Agency would provide the U.S. Embassy the start up costs for a new billet, money to rent a house or apartment and would seek to buy into the furniture pool. The Defense Intelligence Agency would like to have a person in place by 30 September 2008. ¶6. (C) Do the benefits of increasing the staff outweigh the inherent security risks associated with additional personnel? (C) The Defense Intelligence Agency would like to provide an experienced Non-Commissioned Officer in the grade of Staff Sergeant who is well trained in intelligence collection and has received training in force protection, counterintelligence targeting, counter terrorism training and familization with how to remain free of becoming a target for criminal activity or a target for terrorists. The individual would be well-versed in handling weapons in the event the country were to become unstable and the Defense Attache Office were asked to assist with an evacuation. The country's rankings as to terrorist threat and criminal activity make it highly unlikely the person would become a victim of a terrorist attack or a criminal act. PERRY