NDJAMENA 006: DAS SWAN MEETING WITH PRESIDENT DEBY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 FEST TWO 000014 SIPDIS SIPDIS PARIS AND LONDON FOR AFRICA WATCHERS E.O. 12958: DECL: 2/27/2018 TAGS: PREL PREF PGOV PHUM SU CD SUBJECT: NDJAMENA 006: DAS SWAN MEETING WITH PRESIDENT DEBY FEST TWO 00000014 001.2 OF 002 CLASSIFIED BY: LucyTamlyn, Deputy Chief of Mission , U.S. Embassy N'Djamena , State Department . REASON: 1.4 (b),(d) CLASSIFIED BY: Lucy Tamlyn, Deputy Chief of Mission, U.S. Embassy N'Djamena State Department . REASON: 1.4 (b),(d) ¶1. (C) Summary. In discussions with the President of Chad and other GOC officials, Deputy Assistant Secretary Swan stressed that the time was ripe for moving forward on internal political dialogue and expressed USG support for regional initiatives to end the cycle of violence in Chad. President Deby warned that a new rebel attack was expected in less than three weeks and raised the issue of a UN Security Council resolution directed against Sudan. President Deby said that the Sudanese intention was to "create a new Arab state in central Africa." Possibly as a result of international pressure, former President Lol Mahamat Choa was moved from prison to house arrest on February 26. End summary. ¶2. (SBU) James Swan, Deputy Assistant Secretary (DAS) for Central African Affairs met with Chadian President Idriss Deby Itno on February 26 to express support for the Government of Chad in the face of externally-supported rebel attacks and to highlight the importance of continuing to work on the August 13 2007 political agreements, as well working with regional structures with a view to ending the recurring cycles of violence which have wracked Chad and the region. The Ambassador and DCM (notetaker) attended. The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Moussa Outman (with whom DAS Swan had met earlier in the day),Presidential Adviser for Foreign Affairs Youssef Saleh Abbas and Djimranjor Dadnadji (Presidency Secretary) participated on the Chadian side. SIPDIS ¶3. (SBU) DAS Swan opened by recalling the importance of the U.S./Chadian partnership and explaining that his presence in Chad was the result of the Chadian Ambassador's request to Assistant Secretary Frazer for a sign of U.S. support for the regime and to discuss initiatives to secure a durable peace and democratic reforms. He expressed his condolences for the loss of civilian life during the battles of February 2-3 in N'Djamena, and thanked the President for actions to protect American citizens and U.S. government property in N'Djamena. DAS Swan detailed the diplomatic efforts that the U.S. had taken to support Chad, including backing the UN Security Council Presidential statement and demarching other capitals on the need to put pressure on Sudan to cease supporting Chadian rebels. He called attention to upcoming USG visitors in support of assistance to refugees and Chadian IDPs. He also noted strong U.S. support for the rapid deployment of EUFOR, including a financial contribution for MINURCAT police training. ¶4. (C) Having underscored USG support for the regime, DAS Swan stated that that it was also an opportune time for President Deby to put in place political reform. He called on the President to make progress on the August 13, 2007 political agreement and to create a "political space" for political parties and civil society. He expressed hope that the State of Emergency would be kept short. Concerning those political leaders in detention or in unknown circumstances, DAS Swan asked that the Government ensure the effective and transparent functioning of the proposed Commission of Inquiry. ¶5. (C) Turning to the regional situation, DAS Swan noted USG desire to see a regional security structure which would put an end to the cycles of violence in the region. He noted that such a structure would necessarily contain a bilateral aspect, and hoped that Chad and Sudan would continue to try to resolve their bilateral differences. Regional efforts had already been launched by the AU and the CEEAC. He assured President Deby that the United States would like to support these African initiatives but asked for his view on their prospects. Swan stressed that in any agreement Sudan would need to commit to stop supporting Chadian rebels; at the same time, the Government of Chad also needed to stop supporting Darfur rebels. He acknowledged that Sudan's role was greater than Chad's in this respect, but cautioned that each side needed to make efforts. He welcomed any ideas from President Deby on next steps. ¶6. (C) President Deby expressed his appreciation to DAS Swan for the visit. On suggestions for "next steps" he answered bluntly, "we are expecting more aggression from Sudan in the coming days FEST TWO 00000014 002.2 OF 002 -- in one, two, but no more than three weeks." He explained that the conflict in Darfur had "contaminated" Chad. He had met Sudanese President Bechir numerous times, and had signed the Tripoli accord; Sudan might appear to be cooperative, but in actuality it never did what it promised. He thanked the United States for support at the United Nations. He hoped that the Presidential Statement would be turned into a UN Security Council resolution stating clearly that Chad was being crushed by a powerful neighbor. He noted that on February 3, Sudanese state TV had announced "we are going to create a new Arab state in Central Africa." ¶7. (C) Turning to regional initiatives to resolve the crisis, President Deby explained that Senegalese President Wade had invited him and President Bechir to Dakar on March 3. This was a personal initiative on Wade's part and not under the aegis of the African Union. President Deby had asked to have this postponed until March 13. He did not appear enthusiastic about the visit. "We'll sign and see" he explained. He called the AU's efforts "the ostrich policy" for failing to identify Sudanese aggression. He doubted it would yield much. He also noted the "Congolese-Libyan" mediation mandated by the AU to address the internal rebellion and said Chad had called for a CEEAC heads of state summit in the coming weeks. ¶8. (C) Turning to the situation of Chadian political leaders, President Deby explained that former President Lol Mahamat Choa had been picked up by the army. The Commission of Inquiry would shed light on the actual details of the arrest. He welcomed international participation in the Commission of Inquiry. He noted that Choa had now been transferred from jail to a more comfortable house arrest, and that his situation was "in the hands of justice." Concerning other members of the political opposition he remarked that, if it turned out that they were among those that had "formed a government" with the rebels, then they were pure and simply "Sudanese mercenaries." Concerning the State of Emergency, he noted that governmental institutions needed time to start working again. For 48 hours rebels had controlled parts of the city. The damage had been extensive - institutions such as the National Assembly and the Supreme Court were totally sacked. Under the constitution, after 15 days the State of Emergency could be extended only by the National Assembly; he expected an extension of an additional 15 days (noting ruefully that the parliamentarians would need to find a place to meet first). Turning to the August 13 agreement, he stressed that the government accorded great importance to the agreement. He noted that some rebel leaders had taken advantage of the invitation therein to return to legitimacy; others had not. Nonetheless, the Government would continue to implement it. COMMENT: ¶9. (C) President Deby's comments regarding the internal political situation generally responded to USG concerns. The President appeared to appreciate the visit, but his primary interest was in alerting to the possibility of renewed rebel attacks and requesting international support against Sudan. We have learned from other sources that the Wade initiative involves bringing together the political movements and the armed movements in the same location, for talks in two tracks. For now, there is not an agreed diplomatic track for Khartoum and N'Djamena to resolve their differences. NIGRO