ARGENTINA: SCENESETTER FOR FBI DEPUTY DIRECTOR

UNCLAS E F T O BUENOS AIRES 000648 NOFORN SENSITIVE SIPDIS C O R R E C T E D COPY -- CORRECTING PARA 8 MARKING FOR FBI DEPUTY DIRECTOR JOHN PISTOLE FROM AMBASSADOR TONY WAYNE E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM PTER SNAR ECON EFIN BEXP AR SUBJECT: ARGENTINA: SCENESETTER FOR FBI DEPUTY DIRECTOR JOHN PISTOLE ¶1. (U) This telegram is sensitive but unclassified, and not for Internet distribution. -------------- Introduction -------------- ¶2. (SBU) On behalf of Embassy Buenos Aires, I warmly welcome your May 21-22 visit to Argentina. We are looking to build on an already positive bilateral relationship with the five-month-old administration of President Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner (CFK). However, the CFK administration is going through a serious domestic crisis with the agricultural sector and its popularity has fallen. This follows its seven week crisis which is over the Miami court case which we successfully overcame. ¶3. (SBU) Current significant areas of mutual interest and cooperation include counter-terrorism, counter-narcotics, international crime and regional stability, but also science and technology, education and cultural exchanges and, of course, promoting economic and commercial interests. Our overall priority objective in Argentina is to keep chipping away at the very high levels of anti-Americanism of Argentines by reaching out to Argentine society as well as the government, with a special focus on youth. We have also put priority on helping to strenghthen Argentina's judicial and law enforcement system. It is based in part on our model but is not as independent as it was designed to be and suffers many ineffeciencies and a tremendous backlog. During this visit, you will meet with the the President, Minister of Justice and Security, the Deputy Director of Argentina's Intelligence Service and the Chief of the Argentine Federal Police. You will also visit the Argentine-Israeli Mutual Association, site of the 1994 terrorist bombing, and its directors. We are looking forward to meeting with you during your time in Argentina and US and to discussing US international law enforcement priorities. End Introduction. -------------- A Recent Bilateral Low Point -------------- ¶4. (SBU) In December, two days after Cristina Fernandez de Kircher's (CFK) inauguration, the GoA misinterpreted and over-reacted to news reports concerning a federal case in Miami against some Venezuelans and an Uruguayan who were ;arrested on charges of operating and conspiring to operate in the United Staes as agents of the Venezuelan government without notifying the Attorney General as required by law. During the proceedings in Miami, allegations surfaced that undeclared cash brought into Buenos Aires in August 2007 from Venezuela had been destined for a presidential campaign. The statements were not made by the USG, but rather by one of those arrested. They were misinterpreted here as reflecting the USG's views because of initial presentation and reporting out of Miami. ¶5. (SBU) CFK reacted angrily to the implication that she had been the intended recipient of the cash that was intercepted by GoA officials. She publicly interpreted the Miami arrests as directed against her government and characterized the case as a "garbage operation." Her ministers and the Argentine Congress made similar statements. However, the rhetoric gradually subsided as key members of the team slowly absorbed our explanation and concluded it was not in their interest to be cutoff from the USG. (However the case clearly remains very sensitive and its revelation could easily reopen old wounds. They still have an ongoing investigation and an extradition request for Antonini Wilson over the $800,000 in cash discovered here.) We normalized the relationship with a great deal of behind the scenes work. A new beginning occurred on January 31, when I met with CFK. We agreed at that meeting to put the case aside and to work to strengthen bilateral cooperation. Since that time, there have been several important visits by U.S. officials to Buenos Aires, most notably the April 10-11 visit by WHA Assistant Secretary Shannon, the May 6-7 visit by Southcom Commander's Adm. Stavridis, and the March 5-6 visit by the FBI's Tom Fuentes. -------------- A Government Against the Ropes -------------- ¶6. (SBU) Without consultation, a GoA decree issued March 11 that increased export taxes on Argentina's main agricultural export crops. This precipitated the worst political crisis of either Kirchner administration since 2003. Argentina's four principal agricultural organizations showed rare unity in organizing production stoppages and blockades of Argentina's transport infrastructure for twenty days, leading to nationwide shortages of such staples as beef, chicken, dairy products, and vegetables. There were massive protests in support of the strike in the countryside and in Buenos Aires. The GoA-organized counter-protests in Buenos Aires, including one attended by an estimated 100,000 individuals. On April 2, agricultural producers decided to lift the strike for thirty days and hold discussions with the GoA. The parties continued to negotiate but with little progress on the main issue of export taxes. On May 7, the farm groups decided to continue their protests, this time without major roadblocks and promises not to provoke shortages of foodstuff. The GoA's public perspective is that the truce and ongoing negotiations are a victory for the government, and validates CFK's hard line. Most analysts, however, consider the dispute to be a setback for the government, with the vital agricultural sector more united than at any time in a century. During this period the popularity of the government and the President has continued to drop and is now somewhere in the 30-40% range according to various polls. This drop is fueled not just by the agricultural problems but also by soaring inflation/prices. ¶7. (SBU/NF) We provide the preceding information to you in order that you may have some context for the state the GoA finds itself as you embark on your bilateral discussions. -------------- What We're Doing on Issues of Interest -------------- ¶8. (SBU) Anti-Americanism: The greatest overall challenge we face in Argentina is the high level of anti-Americanism in the Argentine public. Argentina consistently registers the highest levels of anti-Americanism in the hemisphere in public opinion polls. Working to change these perceptions is the Embassy's highest priority. Yet, overall, Argentina maintains positive political relations with the United States, but one of the major tasks facing the Embassy is forging relationships of trust with a government that has been largely inward-focused and intent on maintaining an image as independent from our country. In lobbying the GOA, it can be counter-productive to push an issue too aggressively and especially in public. Argentine officials react very negatively to perceived affronts to their sovereignty, often winning public support for their strong reactions. Shut off from other sources of international financing, the GOA has turned to Hugo Chavez to place large bond issues. This financial dependence has increased given recent events on the economic scene. ¶9. (SBU) Argentina, nevertheless, holds Major Non-NATO Ally status and cooperates in regional security, counter-terrorism, drug interdiction, nonproliferation and in contributing troops to U.N. peacekeeping missions. The GoA has been a strong international voice on arms control and nonproliferation issues. In the IAEA, the GoA has voted to refer Iran's noncompliance to the UNSC. The GoA has also endorsed the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) and the Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI). Just this last week, Argentina hosted with US a gathering of all OAS States to better implement UN resolution 1540 and at keeping WMD from terrorists. It is under the banner of science that the USG and Argentina have realized some of the best examples of bilateral cooperation and we have a long history of aerospace cooperation with Argentina. ¶10. (SBU) Terrorism: Former President Nestor Kirchner's administration strongly supported counter-terrorism policies during his time in office, and his wife and successor Christina Fernandez de Kirchner has continued the cooperation. Argentina was itself a victim of international terrorist attacks in the 1990s and has been a cooperative partner in countering terrorism, especially in the Tri-border Area. On November 7, 2007, Argentina succeeded in getting Interpol's General Assembly vote to issue international capture notices for five current and former Iranian officials and one Lebanese Hizballah member(who was reportedly killed in Syria February 13) wanted in connection with the 1994 terrorist bombing of the Buenos Aires Jewish Community Center (AMIA). ¶11. (SBU) Argentina cooperates with the United Nations, the OAS, its neighbors, and the United States o a number of counterterrorism initiatives. The Embassy and USG agencies worked with the GoA to pass comprehensive antiterrorism, money laundering, and terrorism finance legislation to strengthen local enforcement efforts. We assist the GoA in capacity-building in the Financial Intelligence Unit, within the restraints created by Brooke Amendment sanctions, to build capacity of Argentine law enforcement forces, and work closely with the Argentine military on modernization, increasing interoperability, and training and education focused on civilian control, respect for human rights, defense resource management, strategic planning, and science and technology. Argentina has a leading role in the OAS Inter-American Committee Against Terrorism (CICTE),established on Argentina,s initiative in the 1990s. Argentina has been a member of the Egmont Group since July 2003, and has ratified all of the 12 international counter-terrorism conventions and has been an active participant in the 3 plus 1 TBA counterterrorism mechanism, which just met in Asuncion Paraguay in January. The GOA and the USG have a Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty that entered into force in 1993, and an extradition treaty that entered into force in 2000. ¶12. (SBU) International Crime and Drugs: Argentina is a transshipment and destination point for narcotics emanating largely from Colombia, Peru, Bolivia, and Paraguay. Argentina, with its large chemical and pharmaceutical industries, is also a major source and destination for precursor chemicals. Argentine law enforcement agencies cooperate closely with their USG counterparts on drug interdiction efforts, fugitive arrests and information sharing, which has resulted in increased enforcement. This Mission is focused on institutional capacity-building and expanding training opportunities for law enforcement officials, prosecutors and judges in order to improve internal security and decrease international drug and criminal activity in Argentina. In the area or anti-money laundering and counter-terrorism finance, the Mission is working through diplomatic channels and via bilateral technical assistance and training programs to encourage Argentine law enforcement and regulatory bodies to enforce existing laws and regulations more aggressively. Justice Minister Fernandez has just announced that he wants to put top priority on attacking drug traffickers and less priority on arresting individual users. The Supreme Court President is working hard to increase judicial independence and efficiency. He will be in Washington meeting with colleagues during your visit. ¶13. (SBU) Human Trafficking (TIP): Argentina is on the USG's Tier-2 Watchlist for lack of progress in providing greater assistance to victims and curbing official complicity in trafficking at the provincial level. However, the legislature recently passed fairly comprehensive anti-TIP legislation that makes TIP-related violations a federal crime. Argentina is a source, transit, and destination country for men, women, and children trafficked for the purposes of commercial sexual exploitation and forced labor. According to the International Organization for Migration, 80 percent of trafficking victims in Argentina are Argentine, most ofwhom are trafficked for the purpose of sexual exploitation. Bolivians and Peruvians are trafficked into the country for forced labor in sweatshops and agriculture. Argentine efforts to combat trafficking have focused on prevention and training of security and government officials. One of our key goals this year is to support a vigorous GoA implementation of the law and prosecution. Minister Fernandez is in charge of implementation for the executive branch. A number of NGOs have criticized this new law as weak on the issue of adult "consent." ¶14. (SBU) Democracy and Rule of Law: We work with the GoA, media, and civil society to strengthen democratic institutions, fight corruption and reinforce civilian control of the military. We promote key reform efforts such as ending the election of representatives by party slate lists, increasing governmental transparency, and limiting public corruption and strengthening the political independence of the judicial branch. While it does not side with us on every issue, we continue to cultivate the GoA as a cooperative partner in multilateral fora, and seek Argentina's cooperation in the defense of democracy and the observance of human rights in countries like Cuba, Venezuela, and Bolivia, as well as UN peacekeeping in Haiti. ¶15. (SBU) Human Rights: The Government of Argentina generally respects the human rights and fundamental freedoms of its citizens. The Kirchner government's human rights policy focuses on seeking justice for the human rights violations committed during the 1976-83 military dictatorship, which resulted in the disappearance of between 11,000-30,000 leftist guerrillas and political dissidents. It does not, however, focus on bringing to justice armed guerrilla groups who also committed human rights abuses during the same period, known as "the Dirty War", albeit on a much smaller scale. To date, the courts have convicted three former officials of the military regime, including a military chaplain. We recently returned one person sought here for human rights violations and another individual remains in Florida. The Argentines also remain concerned of these citizens (Soldano) on death row in Texas. President CFK has also been preoccupied with the fate of Columbian hostage, Ingrid Bettancourt, lobbying Uribe and others to work for her release. Argentina is a strong international advocate for human rights and the USG and GOA generally cooperate on human rights issues in international and regional fora. -------------- Background: Political Landscape -------------- ¶16. (SBU) Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner (CFK) took office on December 10, 2007, receiving th presidential sash from her husband, Nestor Kirchner. He completed his four-and-a-half-year term as the most popular Argentine President since the return to democracy in 1983. CFK has a long history in politics, having served in the Chamber of Deputies and most recently in the Senate. She won the October 28 election with 45% of the vote over a divided and largely ineffective opposition, and she enjoys a strong majority in both houses of Congress. Having campaigned on the seemingly contradictory themes of change and continuity, she has retained most of her husband's cabinet. Apart from the agricultural dispute, CFK's major policy challenges will be to contain inflation, attract and boost investment -- particularly in Argentina's energy sector -- and to restore a sense of law and order to an electorate increasingly concerned about crime and security. In spite of her pique over the Antonini Wilson case, CFK has also made clear that she would like to improve relations with the United States and sees the benefit for Argentina of good ties, especially in the economy and higher education. -------------- Background: Economic and Commercial Landscape -------------- ¶17. (U) Following the 2001-2002 economic crisis, 2003-2006 real GDP growth averaged over 8%, and Argentina's GDP in 2007 grew at an estimated rate of 8.5% to $255 billion, roughly $6,500 per capita. This impressive economic recovery has also led to improvements in keysocio-economic indicators, with unemployment down from a peak of over 20% in 2002 to 8.8% during the third quarter of 2007 and poverty levels down from a post-crisis high of over 50% to a (still-worrisome) 25% range. The five-year-long economic recovery can be attributed to a number of factors, including a post-crisis move to a flexible exchange rate regime, sustained global and regional growth during this period, the government's efforts to boost domestic aggregate demand via monetary, fiscal, and income distribution policies, and favorable international commodity price trends. ¶18. (SBU) While the accumulation of a substantial foreign exchange reserve cushion (over $50 billion as of May 2008) and expanded tax collections have helped insulate Argentina's economy from external shocks, the Central Bank's policy of maintaining an undervalued exchange rate and negative real interest rates has contributed to substantial inflationary pressures. Private sector analysts estimate that "true" 2007 inflation was in the 17-20% range, while the government's official 2007 inflation number was 8.5%. Inflation levels in the first four months of 2008 are estimated by independent economists in the 25% range but we reported as much lower by the government. There is ongoing public debate about inflation measures. To help control inflation, the government largely froze key public utility tariff rates since 2002 and, since 2005, has negotiated price stabilization agreements on a sizable basket of essential consumer goods. The combination of Argentina's undervalued currency and high global commodity prices have lifted Argentine exports to a record $55.4 billion in 2007. Major 2007 Argentine export markets were Mercosur (22%),the EU (18%) and NAFTA (11%). Argentine 2007 imports totaled $44.8 billion, with the major suppliers Mercosur (36%),the EU (17%) and NAFTA (16%). Total U.S.-Argentina two-way trade in 2007 totaled $9.5 billion. Imports from the U.S. largely comprise intermediate capital goods which have contributed to improvements in domestic productive capacity. ¶19. (U) Over 450 U.S. companies are currently operating in Argentina and employ over 150,000 Argentine workers. U.S. investment in Argentina is concentrated in the manufacturing, information, and financial sectors. Other major sources of investment include Spain, Chile, Italy, France, Canada, Japan, and Brazil. U.S. investment in Argentina is concentrated in the manufacturing, information, and financial sectors. A range of economic experts have identified challenges to sustaining high levels of economic growth in the future, including: capacity constraints; the need for substantial new investment in primary infrastructure; potential energy shortages in the face of high growth and domestic energy prices kept below international market levels; increasing scarcity of highly skilled labor; inflation and the government's heterodox policies to contain it, including price controls. Continuing Argentine arrears to international creditors (including over $20 billion in default claims by international bondholders, including U.S. citizens, and over $7 billion owed to official creditors, approximately $360 million of which is owed to the U.S. government) and a large number of arbitration claims filed by foreign companies, including U.S. companies, are legacies of the 2001/2002 economic crisis that remain to be resolved and adversely affect Argentina's investment climate. ¶20. (SBU) Promoting U.S. economic/commercial interests: In support of U.S. companies operating in Argentina, we are encouraging the GoA to support a more welcoming investment climate, with greater regulatory, legal, and tax regime consistency. We expend a good deal of effort supporting and working with U.S. companies. We are working closely with the GoA and the Paris Club of sovereign creditors to resolve long-standing arrears to the USG and are encouraging the GoA to resolve claims of U.S. holders of defaulted Argentine bonds. Regarding ongoing WTO trade negotiations, Argentina has staked out a hard-line position that links acceptance of developed economy agricultural sector proposals with more developing nation flexibility on industrial tariff cuts. We have been urging them to adopt a more constructive approach. WAYNE