Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08DUSHANBE947
2008-07-21 03:09:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Dushanbe
Cable title:  

TAJIKISTAN - CONVICTION IN SUPREME COURT BOMBING

Tags:  PREL ASEC PTER PINR PGOV UZ TI 
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DE RUEHDBU #0947/01 2030309
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 210309Z JUL 08
FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0804
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 0175
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0206
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 0144
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC 0056
RHMFISS/FBI WASHINGTON DC 0031
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC 0121
RUEAWJA/DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC
RUEABND/DEA HQ WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
C O N F I D E N T I A L DUSHANBE 000947 

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR SCA/CEN, DS/IP/SCA, DS/TIA/ITA,
DS/T/ATA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/20/2018
TAGS: PREL ASEC PTER PINR PGOV UZ TI
SUBJECT: TAJIKISTAN - CONVICTION IN SUPREME COURT BOMBING
CASE, BUT NOT THE WHOLE STORY

REF: 07 DUSHANBE 928

Classified By: DCM Tom Hushek, Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L DUSHANBE 000947 SIPDIS DEPT FOR SCA/CEN, DS/IP/SCA, DS/TIA/ITA, DS/T/ATA E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/20/2018 TAGS: PREL ASEC PTER PINR PGOV UZ TI SUBJECT: TAJIKISTAN - CONVICTION IN SUPREME COURT BOMBING CASE, BUT NOT THE WHOLE STORY REF: 07 DUSHANBE 928 Classified By: DCM Tom Hushek, Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (SBU) Summary: A Tajik court has sentenced Komiljon Ishonqulov to 22 years in prison for the bombing of the Supreme Court building on June 16, 2007 (reftel). The Chief Justice of Tajikistan's Supreme Court publicly accused the Uzbek National Security Service (SNB) of orchestrating the bombing. This will further strain Tajikistan's already bad relations with Uzbekistan. End Summary. ¶2. (C) Dushanbe newspaper Asia Plus reported on July 12 that a court in Dushanbe sentenced Komiljon Ishonqulov to 22 years in prison for the June 16, 2007 bombing of the Supreme Court building. Per reftel, the bomb caused no injuries, only minor structural damage to the court. The court reportedly convicted Ishonqulov of terrorism, illegally possessing weapons and explosives, contraband, and "high treason." According to media reporting, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court Nusratullo Abdulloyev said at a press conference that the Uzbek National Security Service (SNB) carried out the attack. Abdulloyev said "Ishonqulov met in the Uzbek city of Denau with his friend 'Said,'", who worked for the SNB, "to carry out a bombing in Dushanbe for the purpose of destabilizing the situation." He identified "Said" as Bobosubkhon Mirzoyev, a former pro-government Popular Front leader and a fugitive from Tajik justice. ¶3. (C) In December 2007, Avesta news service identified Komiljon Ishonqulov and Hasan Simirkhanov as two men jailed and under investigation by the State Committee for National Security in connection with the bombing. We do not have any information on Ishonqulov's background. Simirkhanov is a former police officer. Media have not reported on Simirkhanov's legal process, but embassy's sources within the Interior Ministry who worked with Simirkhanov told us that he received a six year sentence for helping with the bombing. ¶4. (C) According to a source inside the Ministry of Interior, Hasan Simirkhanov held the rank of Senior Lieutenant in OMON. According to multiple sources, he used fraudulent documents and bribery to gain admission to the Ministry of Interior's police academy. After finishing his studies, he began working for the Ministry's human &#x
000A; resources department at headquarters, and became known for poor behavior and insubordination. He later moved to the Directorate for Criminal Investigations, and from there to the Militia Detachment for Special Purposes (OMON). ¶5. (C) Simirkhanov worked in OMON's First Mountain Unit, and showed an active interest in explosives. He was intelligent and was actively trying to learn more about explosives. The former OMON Commander, Colonel Oleg Zakharchenko, wrote to headquarters on at least one occasion refusing to admit Simirkhanov into OMON's Explosives Ordinance Disposal team. ¶6. (C) One source told embassy that Simirkhanov was drinking in a tavern near the Supreme Court before the blast. According to a source who claimed to have been present, he had never seen Simirkhanov drink before, and noticed Simirkhanov became upset when the blast occurred Qnoticed Simirkhanov became upset when the blast occurred and refused to leave the tavern to find out what had happened. ¶7. (C) OMON investigated the bombing and identified the explosive as 400 grams of TNT triggered by a multi-action "MUV 2" fuse. Their report indicated that they believed the bomb was a "trial run," because the explosive was small, contained no shrapnel, and was not placed to cause serious structural damage or be likely to hurt people. ¶8. (C) Multiple sources said Simirkhanov was arrested a month after the bombing, but not in connection with it; rather, his arrest was because of suspicions he was an Uzbek spy. Two sources told the embassy they saw an identification document of Simirkhanov's indicating that he was a Captain in the Uzbek National Security Service (SNB). A senior Ministry of Interior source indicated that the charge that he was the "mastermind" of the Supreme Court explosion was added later. Other sources also said Simirkhanov spoke English well, and that his wife worked for the United Nations. ¶9. (C) At the time of the explosion, speculation focused on the possibility of a revenge attack connected to cases then being heard in court, rather than on political terrorism. However, the Dushanbe Prosecutor at the time immediately called the case a terrorist action. The confusing picture which has emerged may reflect a blend of actual intrigue (perhaps the Uzbek SNB had a spy inside OMON who was caught) with the common tendency here to blame threatening events on foreign powers - by assigning blame for the bombing to the Uzbek government. Media reported that Chief Justice Abdulloyev linked Mirzoyev (aka "Said") with Mahmud Khudoberdiev, and said both were employed by the Uzbek National Security Service. Tajik security service officials recently told emboff that they believed Khudoberdiev was moving armed men through northern Afghanistan, with the intention of supporting the Tajik opposition in the Gorno-Badakhshan region. COMMENT - CONTRADICTIONS, AND ANGST ¶10. (C) It would be extremely embarrassing for the Tajik authorities to admit that an Uzbek spy infiltrated their elite counter-terrorism unit. While it is possible an Uzbek citizen fraudulently obtained employment at the Ministry of Interior, and later OMON, it seems unlikely the Uzbek SNB would use such a well placed infiltrator to execute a small and relatively insignificant bombing. There are also inconsistencies between press reports and source information. According to Ministry of Interior internal records and witnesses, Simirkhanov was on duty on June 16 and 17, 2007. However, media reports indicate that Simirkhanov and Ishonqulov illegally crossed the Tajik-Uzbek border on June 16 and 17. Additionally, if Simirkhanov was an Uzbek spy, it would be reasonable for him to receive the harsher sentence, rather than a sentence less than one-third the length of Ishonqulov's. ¶11. (C) Comment Continued: The Chief Justice's public accusation of Uzbek state involvement in the bombing represents an escalation in the long-running war of words between the Governments of Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, and will add further strain to a historically bad relationship. The incident will increase Tajik paranoia about Uzbekistan, and in the run-up to the August 28 Shanghai Cooperation Organization Summit in Dushanbe, will fuel rumors already in circulation (we have heard them in the past week from Russian diplomats, and local journalists) that Uzbek President Karimov will not attend the summit and that the summit itself could be called off or reduced in scale. It is still not clear who bombed the Supreme Court, or why; but Tajik-Uzbek relations just took QSupreme Court, or why; but Tajik-Uzbek relations just took another hit. End Comment. ¶12. (U) The point of contact for this and all security related matters at Post is Regional Security Officer Seth Green. JACOBSON

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