Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08DUSHANBE751
2008-06-06 11:29:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Dushanbe
Cable title:
TAJIKISTAN: WIDESPREAD DISSENT, BUT DIFFERENT
VZCZCXYZ0001 RR RUEHWEB DE RUEHDBU #0751/01 1581129 ZNY CCCCC ZZH R 061129Z JUN 08 FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0617 INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 0102 RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 0145 RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0174 RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 0114 RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC 0089 RUEKJCS/JCS WASHDC 0037 RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE VIENNA AU
C O N F I D E N T I A L DUSHANBE 000751
SIPDIS
STATE DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/CEN
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/05/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV TI
SUBJECT: TAJIKISTAN: WIDESPREAD DISSENT, BUT DIFFERENT
PROGNOSES FOR THE FUTURE
REF: DUSHANBE 635
Classified By: Ambassador Tracey A. Jacobson for reasons 1.4 (b) AND (d
)
C O N F I D E N T I A L DUSHANBE 000751
SIPDIS
STATE DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/CEN
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/05/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV TI
SUBJECT: TAJIKISTAN: WIDESPREAD DISSENT, BUT DIFFERENT
PROGNOSES FOR THE FUTURE
REF: DUSHANBE 635
Classified By: Ambassador Tracey A. Jacobson for reasons 1.4 (b) AND (d
)
1. (C) Summary: A recent visit by an INR analyst to assess
Tajikistan's political situation found media, business, and
religious figures increasingly willing to bluntly criticize
President Rahmon, but also found a lack of consensus on when
or whether rising discontent with his administration will
translate into political instability. End Summary.
2. (C) From May 12-15, David Abramson, from the Bureau of
Intelligence and Research, came to Tajikistan to assess
Tajikistan's political stability. Abramson and EmbOffs met
with journalists, political analysts, religious figures, and
businesspeople in Dushanbe and Kulyab.
Clicking Their Heels and Hoping For Something Better
-------------- --------------
2. (C) Our interlocutors all said that the vast majority of
people in Tajikistan were deeply disaffected, and that they
had lost all confidence that the Government could turn the
economy around. Journalists and political analysts predicted
deepening crises in the banking and agriculture sectors.
Abduvohid Shomolov, a researcher on corruption at the
Strategic Research Center, a government think tank, gave
numerous reasons why Tajikistan had further to fall: the
"psychological degradation" of the Tajik public; increasingly
blatant corruption; lack of competent government officials;
bad leadership.
3. (C) Mehmonsho Sharifov, a political analyst in Dushanbe,
predicted that the country's dire situation would soon
provoke conflict, saying to us that "something simply has to
happen soon." When pressed, however, he could not identify a
way in which change would come about. The political
opposition has been neutralized and ineffective; people
choose to voice their opposition by leaving for Russia or
elsewhere; fears of reigniting the tension that caused the
civil war remain a disincentive to publicly expressing
dissent.
Outside Influences
--------------
4. (C) Abdulloh Rahnamo, a highly regarded expert at the
Strategic Research Center, spoke to us about religious
influences. He downplayed the religious aspects of
Tajikistan's deepening relationship with Iran, focusing on
"natural" historical and cultural ties; despite Sunni-Shiite
differences, Tajiks are simply curious about Iran. He said
that Tajikistan has been drawn closer to Iran out of economic
necessity, and because of Uzbekistan's relationship with
Russia, but he emphasized that "we are not taking their
religious route." Iran itself recognized the need to shift
away from promoting religious principles to cultivating more
secular cultural and educational ties.
5. (C) On the other side of the religious spectrum, Hoji
Mirzo, an eminent imam at a Friday mosque in Kulyab, said
that the Salafis were a "dangerous group that can cause
splits among young Tajiks." The actual influence of the
group, however, is debatable. Rahnamo classified them as a
fringe group with little following; he added that the
authorities use the specter of Salafi-inspired radicalism to
justify aspects of their restrictive religious policies.
None of our sources had comprehensive information about the
source of the Salafis' financing.
Qsource of the Salafis' financing.
The Insiders
--------------
6. (SBU) Our sources referred to power struggles within
President Rahmon's inner circle, but they pointed out that
the inner circle is so small that very few people fully
understood the dynamics of the Rahmon family relationships.
There appears to be a rivalry between President Rahmon's
children, especially his daughter Tahmina, and his brother in
law, Hasan Asadullzoda. (Note: This rivalry manifested
itself in early May, when rumors spread that President
Rahmon's son, Rustam, reportedly shot Asadullzoda (reftel)).
7. (C) Zaid Saidov, a businessman and former Minister of
Industry, knows Asadullzoda well because of his prior
government service and business connections. While
Asadullzoda is sometimes identified as a pragmatic influence
in President Rahmon's administration, Saidov said that
Asadullzoda's primary aim is to "control everything for
himself." He could not shed light on whether Asadullzoda was
a legitimate contender to succeed Rahmon, but Saidov did
comment about his undue influence over Tajikistan's economic
resources.
8. (SBU) Our sources also commented on Rahmon's rivalry with
the Dushanbe Mayor, Makhmadsaid Ubaidulloev. The two circles
of power do not intersect; each has carved out its fiefdom.
Our sources found it curious that President Rahmon has been
unable to unseat Ubaidulloev from either of his powerful
positions ) Mayor of Dushanbe or Speaker of the upper house
of Parliament.
9. (SBU) Popular discontent fuels speculation and rumor about
these "insiders." The Rumors that President Rahmon's son,
Rustam, shot and killed Asadullzoda persist weeks after the
alleged event, despite the fact that Asadullzoda has been
seen numerous times in public and has met with diplomats.
Separating fact from fiction, or from wishful thinking, has
become difficult.
What to Make of This
--------------
10. (C) Comment: Our meetings did not uncover a specific
near-term threat to political stability amidst a decaying
economic situation. The degree and tone of public criticism
is sharper than in previous years, and unlike in the past,
the criticism is often directed at President Rahmon. It is
unlikely, however, that Tajiks will soon translate their
discontent into a grassroots movement for change. Labor
migration serves both as an economic lifeline and a political
safety valve for the country's poorest communities.
Similarly, while young Tajiks continue to flock to mosques,
religion is unlikely to become a force for political change
in the next year. Rivalries among Tajikistan's political
elite are more likely to cause instability in the near term
than popular discontent.
11. (C) Comment continued: Time will change this set of
circumstances. Younger generations are less fearful of
igniting the tensions that led their parents to engage in
war. Part of the country's stability is based on the
perception that the government maintains tight control over
the population. If this perception seriously weakens, there
is a chance for popular dissatisfaction to turn ugly. End
Comment.
JACOBSON
SIPDIS
STATE DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/CEN
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/05/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV TI
SUBJECT: TAJIKISTAN: WIDESPREAD DISSENT, BUT DIFFERENT
PROGNOSES FOR THE FUTURE
REF: DUSHANBE 635
Classified By: Ambassador Tracey A. Jacobson for reasons 1.4 (b) AND (d
)
1. (C) Summary: A recent visit by an INR analyst to assess
Tajikistan's political situation found media, business, and
religious figures increasingly willing to bluntly criticize
President Rahmon, but also found a lack of consensus on when
or whether rising discontent with his administration will
translate into political instability. End Summary.
2. (C) From May 12-15, David Abramson, from the Bureau of
Intelligence and Research, came to Tajikistan to assess
Tajikistan's political stability. Abramson and EmbOffs met
with journalists, political analysts, religious figures, and
businesspeople in Dushanbe and Kulyab.
Clicking Their Heels and Hoping For Something Better
-------------- --------------
2. (C) Our interlocutors all said that the vast majority of
people in Tajikistan were deeply disaffected, and that they
had lost all confidence that the Government could turn the
economy around. Journalists and political analysts predicted
deepening crises in the banking and agriculture sectors.
Abduvohid Shomolov, a researcher on corruption at the
Strategic Research Center, a government think tank, gave
numerous reasons why Tajikistan had further to fall: the
"psychological degradation" of the Tajik public; increasingly
blatant corruption; lack of competent government officials;
bad leadership.
3. (C) Mehmonsho Sharifov, a political analyst in Dushanbe,
predicted that the country's dire situation would soon
provoke conflict, saying to us that "something simply has to
happen soon." When pressed, however, he could not identify a
way in which change would come about. The political
opposition has been neutralized and ineffective; people
choose to voice their opposition by leaving for Russia or
elsewhere; fears of reigniting the tension that caused the
civil war remain a disincentive to publicly expressing
dissent.
Outside Influences
--------------
4. (C) Abdulloh Rahnamo, a highly regarded expert at the
Strategic Research Center, spoke to us about religious
influences. He downplayed the religious aspects of
Tajikistan's deepening relationship with Iran, focusing on
"natural" historical and cultural ties; despite Sunni-Shiite
differences, Tajiks are simply curious about Iran. He said
that Tajikistan has been drawn closer to Iran out of economic
necessity, and because of Uzbekistan's relationship with
Russia, but he emphasized that "we are not taking their
religious route." Iran itself recognized the need to shift
away from promoting religious principles to cultivating more
secular cultural and educational ties.
5. (C) On the other side of the religious spectrum, Hoji
Mirzo, an eminent imam at a Friday mosque in Kulyab, said
that the Salafis were a "dangerous group that can cause
splits among young Tajiks." The actual influence of the
group, however, is debatable. Rahnamo classified them as a
fringe group with little following; he added that the
authorities use the specter of Salafi-inspired radicalism to
justify aspects of their restrictive religious policies.
None of our sources had comprehensive information about the
source of the Salafis' financing.
Qsource of the Salafis' financing.
The Insiders
--------------
6. (SBU) Our sources referred to power struggles within
President Rahmon's inner circle, but they pointed out that
the inner circle is so small that very few people fully
understood the dynamics of the Rahmon family relationships.
There appears to be a rivalry between President Rahmon's
children, especially his daughter Tahmina, and his brother in
law, Hasan Asadullzoda. (Note: This rivalry manifested
itself in early May, when rumors spread that President
Rahmon's son, Rustam, reportedly shot Asadullzoda (reftel)).
7. (C) Zaid Saidov, a businessman and former Minister of
Industry, knows Asadullzoda well because of his prior
government service and business connections. While
Asadullzoda is sometimes identified as a pragmatic influence
in President Rahmon's administration, Saidov said that
Asadullzoda's primary aim is to "control everything for
himself." He could not shed light on whether Asadullzoda was
a legitimate contender to succeed Rahmon, but Saidov did
comment about his undue influence over Tajikistan's economic
resources.
8. (SBU) Our sources also commented on Rahmon's rivalry with
the Dushanbe Mayor, Makhmadsaid Ubaidulloev. The two circles
of power do not intersect; each has carved out its fiefdom.
Our sources found it curious that President Rahmon has been
unable to unseat Ubaidulloev from either of his powerful
positions ) Mayor of Dushanbe or Speaker of the upper house
of Parliament.
9. (SBU) Popular discontent fuels speculation and rumor about
these "insiders." The Rumors that President Rahmon's son,
Rustam, shot and killed Asadullzoda persist weeks after the
alleged event, despite the fact that Asadullzoda has been
seen numerous times in public and has met with diplomats.
Separating fact from fiction, or from wishful thinking, has
become difficult.
What to Make of This
--------------
10. (C) Comment: Our meetings did not uncover a specific
near-term threat to political stability amidst a decaying
economic situation. The degree and tone of public criticism
is sharper than in previous years, and unlike in the past,
the criticism is often directed at President Rahmon. It is
unlikely, however, that Tajiks will soon translate their
discontent into a grassroots movement for change. Labor
migration serves both as an economic lifeline and a political
safety valve for the country's poorest communities.
Similarly, while young Tajiks continue to flock to mosques,
religion is unlikely to become a force for political change
in the next year. Rivalries among Tajikistan's political
elite are more likely to cause instability in the near term
than popular discontent.
11. (C) Comment continued: Time will change this set of
circumstances. Younger generations are less fearful of
igniting the tensions that led their parents to engage in
war. Part of the country's stability is based on the
perception that the government maintains tight control over
the population. If this perception seriously weakens, there
is a chance for popular dissatisfaction to turn ugly. End
Comment.
JACOBSON