THE IMPACT OF NOT RIGHTSIZING EMBASSY DUSHANBE'S

UNCLAS DUSHANBE 000526 SIPDIS SIPDIS AIDAC DEPT FOR SCA/CEN AND SCA/EX DEPT PASS TO USAID E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: AMGT EAID SNAR MASS PREL TI SUBJECT: THE IMPACT OF NOT RIGHTSIZING EMBASSY DUSHANBE'S MANAGEMENT PLATFORM Ref: (a) April 10 MSP Senior Review for Embassy Dushanbe; (b) April 11 Spratlen-Jacobson e-mail; (c) Dushanbe 522 ¶1. Summary: Embassy Dushanbe's thoroughly inadequate management staffing means we have had to turn down important positions requested by the Drug Enforcement Agency, Office of Defense Cooperation, and USAID. We understand the need for "triage" in the current budgetary environment, but urge the Department to consider this mission's unique history and current position as a front line state in the battle against terrorism and drugs, and provide additional FTE for the management section. End Summary. How We Got Here -------------- ¶2. As we noted in successive Mission Strategic Plans, front channel communications, and the recent inspection report (ISP-I-08-17A), Embassy Dushanbe's American staffing has tripled over the last few years, without a concomitant increase in management staffing. Essentially, we have a similar level of resources now, as a mid-sized mission with a robust foreign policy agenda located full time in Tajikistan, as when Embassy Dushanbe was co-located with Embassy Almaty, and staffed by 17 unaccompanied Americans. Four years ago, the Diplomatic Readiness Initiative awarded positions to other posts in the region to right-size their management sections. Embassy Dushanbe didn't benefit because at the time, it was considered part of Embassy Almaty. ¶3. Adequate American management staffing is critical given the enormous challenges related to Tajikistan's high level of corruption, crumbling infrastructure, bureaucratic inefficiencies, and remote location at the end of a long supply chain. Given these challenges, we are unable to support the existing mission community adequately with the staffing we now have, and thus have established a moratorium on new positions. This means that we have turned down NSDD-38 requests for additional positions from DEA, Office of Defense Cooperation, and USAID. The inspectors acknowledged the imbalance between management and program staff and recognized the necessity of the moratorium saying, "The Ambassador has been courageous in dealing with this imbalance. She has declared a moratorium on further NSDD-38 decisions unless and until the embassy's management capacities including staffing and space will support further growth. Her position should be sustained." The inspection report called for additional management staffing. The Impact: Drug Enforcement Administration -------------- -------------- ¶4. In 2006, the Drug Enforcement Agency decided to move its regional hub from Tashkent to Dushanbe, based both on a worsening relationship with Uzbekistan and Tajikistan's status as the majority transshipment point for Afghan poppy bound for Russian and European markets. We initially approved positions for three agents and one administrative specialist, but because the office must build relationships with all five countries in Central Asia, DEA requested two additional agents. The workload, including the investment of time necessary to build relationships to the point where trust is sufficient to allow real exchange of information and joint activities, demands additional resources. Unfortunately, we have had to turn them down. We are missing a real opportunity to develop the capacity of the Central Asian transit countries to bring down criminal networks and stem the flow of narcotics and Qdown criminal networks and stem the flow of narcotics and narco-profits, which fuel corruption and provide funding to terrorists. The Impact: Office of Defense Cooperation -------------- ¶5. Tajikistan is Central Command's third most important country for counter-narcotics work, after Afghanistan and Pakistan. CENTCOM is funding important capacity building work here, including the renovation of border posts, training facilities, and equipment. The office is woefully understaffed to handle the amount of CENTCOM assistance - $15 million of ongoing projects -- and would like to establish a position (contract or long term TDY) to help manage its contracting and monitoring. We have had to turn down this request, with the end result that we are not able to support CENTCOM's mandate to play a greater role in fighting narcotics trafficking (and related terrorist financing) in a country bordering an active war zone. The Impact: USAID -------------- ¶6. USAID has asked to move its regional education advisor from Almaty (where it doesn't have an education program) to Tajikistan, where it does. Tajikistan is the most vulnerable country (and worst performer) in Europe and Eurasia in relation to a number of education indicators including education spending, secondary and tertiary enrollment, vocational education and pre-school education. For this reason, USAID's implementing partner has established its regional headquarters here in Dushanbe. Moving the USAID regional education advisor to Dushanbe would allow USAID to provide better oversight of the regional program and to better design and manage an expanded education assistance portfolio in Tajikistan. Education, in turn, is a powerful weapon against the poverty and despair which make people vulnerable to recruitment by drug mafias or extremists. However, we have had to turn this position down. The Impact - Language Training -------------- ¶7. We have also had to turn down requests for two long term TDYs for members of the Defense community who had proposed to come to Dushanbe for Persian language training. Tajikistan is one of only three Persian-speaking countries. In-country training for U.S. Government personnel is not possible in Iran and not practical in Afghanistan given the security concerns there. Tajikistan would make a prime training ground for such immersion training and it is no surprise that we are beginning to receive such requests. However, absent an increase in management staffing, the embassy cannot handle the additional administrative burden imposed by long-term language trainees. Next Steps -------------- ¶8. We had useful discussions with Dirk Richards from M's rightsizing office during his visit April 7; he supported our request for additional assistance on the management front. The OIG has also supported the need. In his memo to the OIG, Assistant Secretary Boucher listed Embassy Dushanbe's need for an increase in SIPDIS management staffing as the Bureau's top human resources priority. Ideally, post requires a second management officer (who would serve as Deputy while simultaneously supervising the financial management and human resources units),a Supervisory GSO, and another Information Management position. We would need to see progress in filling these management positions before we could consider lifting our staffing moratorium to do the work we need to do in fighting narcotics and terrorism and promoting education. We look forward to continuing to work with Washington to address this critical need. HUSHEK