TAJIKISTAN - A/DAS PAMELA SPRATLEN'S DISCUSSIONS

C O N F I D E N T I A L DUSHANBE 000494 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/CEN E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/09/2018 TAGS: EAID ECON EINV PREL PHUM TI SUBJECT: TAJIKISTAN - A/DAS PAMELA SPRATLEN'S DISCUSSIONS ON OSCE MANDATE RENEWAL AND NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTE Classified By: AMBASSADOR TRACEY A. JACOBSON, 1.4 (B) AND (D) ¶1. (U) Summary: On April 2, Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary for Central Asia and Public Diplomacy Pamela Spratlen told senior GOTI officials that the United States supported the OSCE Chairman in Office's (CiO) proposal as the basis for negotiation on renewal of the OSCE mandate in Tajikistan. Her interlocutors said they would not accept the CiO's draft, and wanted to &correct8 the mandate and ensure OSCE funding served GOTI priorities. The MFA said the government would rather see the June 30, 2008 mandate decision deadline pass rather than yield to the OSCE,s draft. On the National Democratic Institute registration, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Presidential Apparat both gave formulaic responses promising nothing, but hoping for a mutually acceptable solution. The Institute will likely leave Tajikistan this month. End Summary. ¶2. (SBU) A/DAS Spratlen discussed the OSCE mandate and the National Democratic Institute (NDI) on April 2 with Presidential Foreign Relations Adviser Erkin Rahmatulloev, and with Deputy Foreign Minister Erkin Kasimov. Rahmatulloev on OSCE -------------- ¶3. (C) A/DAS Spratlen began the meeting with Rahmatulloev by expressing the United States' gratitude for Tajikistan's continuing support for our efforts in Afghanistan, and in counternarcotics. She emphasized that the United States-Tajik relationship was multidimensional, with human rights, economic development, and security all vital parts of it. A/DAS Spratlen underlined for Rahmatulloev that the United States viewed the OSCE's Human Dimension activities as vital, along with a commitment to a market economy in economic reform activities, and urged that the GOTI work with the Chairman in Office of the OSCE to conclude a new mandate which included strong human dimension activities. She in particular emphasized that the United States supported the Chairman's draft mandate as it covered all three dimensions in a balanced and comprehensive way. She noted that the GOTI,s draft omits mention of market economy reforms as well as explicit mention of democracy and human rights. She said funding and implementation of planned OSCE border security projects would depend on the mandate continuing to include strong human dimension and economic reform components. ¶4. (C) Rahmatulloev replied that Tajikistan wanted an "open and transparent" relationship with the United States, and appreciated United States assistance on economic issues, education, border security, and other areas. He said President Rahmon was well-informed about the range of United States-Tajikistan cooperation. Taking up the OSCE question, he said "we want you to understand us correctly" Tajikistan did not wish to reduce human dimension activities, but did want to refocus on Tajikistan's current most pressing problems, including economic development and "ecological issues." He said that Tajikistan,s situation had changed since development of the original mandate, but the OSCE had failed to take account of the state of the country after the civil war. A/DAS Spratlen, reinforced by Ambassador, countered that the Human, Economic, and Security dimensions Qcountered that the Human, Economic, and Security dimensions were interlocking. Tajikistan had suffered through a civil war, the most serious consequences of which were in the humanitarian sphere, including in education, health care, religious tolerance, and balancing the needs of Tajikistan's regions. She also noted that neighboring Afghanistan faced its greatest challenges in the humanitarian sphere. Rahmatulloev said he "totally agreed" with A/DAS Spratlen, and that the GOTI was ready to work with the OSCE on an acceptable mandate, but then reiterated that the OSCE mandate must change to reflect the economic needs of Tajikistan. The Region - Problems with Uzbekistan, and the SCO Can't Help -------------- -------------- ¶5. (C) Rahmatulloev raised the regional aspects of Tajikistan's economic problems and the recent winter economic crisis, emphasizing that Uzbekistan hindered Tajikistan's economic development by blocking trade (including energy) and preventing development of Tajik hydropower. Rahmatulloev said that the Shanghai Cooperation Organization could not help resolve problems between Tajikistan and Uzbekistan because its principal member states, Russia and China, "had no enthusiasm" for water and power issues in the region. In response to A/DAS Spratlen's question, Rahmatulloev noted the agenda for the next SCO summit was still under discussion, but that in May an agenda would begin to take shape. He told Ambassador he would share details about the summit with the embassy once they became clearer. Power Purchasing Agreement - Cart Before Horse -------------- - ¶6. (C) A/DAS Spratlen noted the importance of moving forward on developing electricity for Afghanistan. Ambassador reminded Rahmutalloev that Tajikistan needed to conclude a Power Purchasing Agreement (PPA) with Afghanistan and Pakistan as soon as possible, to help attract investors and eventually to help Tajikistan diversify its customer base for electricity exports. Rahmatulloev said that a PPA would be easy to conclude if investment money were already in hand to build power lines to Pakistan. We noted that this was exactly the wrong approach, and that AES had left Tajikistan in part because of lack of progress on a PPA. Rahmatulloev argued again that money should come first, and repeated the oft-heard appeal that the United States invest in a large hydro power project at Dostijum, to provide electricity to the Chinese-owned copper mine in Logar Province, Afghanistan. Ambassador emphasized that investment in hydropower was a commercial decision for U.S. companies, to which Rahmatulloev insistently replied "it is not a private sector issue. It is a political issue." They Have Every Right to Overthrow Us -------------- ¶7. (C) A/DAS Spratlen told Rahmatulloev that in Washington some analysts worried that Tajikistan risked becoming a "failed state" as indicated by the Government's inability to respond to the winter power and food crisis. She asked what steps Tajikistan was taking to avoid another crisis next winter. Rahmatulloev replied that he recognized that this was "a dangerous time" for the Government, and said that President Rahmon, during a recent meeting with senior officials, had said "we should be grateful to the Tajik people that they did not overthrow us after this past winter, as they have every right to do so." He also admitted that the investment climate was poor, and said that a major problem for Tajikistan was that "we have good laws, but poor implementation of them." He said he was well aware of the need for Tajikistan to not lose more investors like AES. Referring to Karl Marx, he commented that "we are still at the first stage of capitalism, capital accumulation." Rahmatulloev worried that a drought predicted for this coming spring and summer would cause further economic damage. National Democratic Institute - Noncommittal -------------- ¶8. (C) A/DAS Spratlen reaffirmed that support for human rights was a key part of our policy around the world, and that in many places, including Tajikistan, the United States worked with non-government organizations to advance knowledge of and respect for human rights. An important partner NGO, the National Democratic Institute, was about to leave Qthe National Democratic Institute, was about to leave Tajikistan because of the Government's refusal for two years to register them as a legal entity. If NDI left, it would do so "noisily." This would send a negative signal to other NGOs in central Asia, and to American policy leaders. She noted that the letter from NDI Chairman Madeleine Albright to President Rahmon urging registration for NDI was a sign of the significance of this matter, but the letter had gone unanswered. ¶9. (C) Rahmatulloev replied that NDI was a "constant issue" for him. He gave a short disquisition on the NGO registration laws, said the matter was with the Ministry of Justice, noted that he was a bit confused about the true status of an NGO that was funded by the United States Government, but said he would work for a "mutually satisfactory" solution. He agreed that a noisy departure should be avoided and agreed look into the issue, but was vague about how, and made no assurances. Ambassador noted that the Ministry of Justice recently told NDI that it would never obtain registration, and that the Ministry of Justice would find new problems in every registration application. Rahmatulloev said in the past NDI had been able to operate despite the lack of registration; A/DAS Spratlen and Ambassador emphatically noted this was no longer desirable or even possible. Kasimov on OSCE and National Democratic Institute -------------- -------------- ¶10. (C) A/DAS Spratlen's conversation with Deputy Foreign Minister Kasimov illuminated GOTI goals for the OSCE. After forcefully reiterating the GOTI's view that the OSCE mandate was obsolete, and must change its focus to reflect what the GOTI perceives as Tajikistan's greatest needs today, Kasimov emphasized that the GOTI was unhappy with the way programs were developed in the OSCE and stated openly that activities of the OSCE Center in Dushanbe should reflect GOTI priorities. Ambassador noted that some European states would rather see the OSCE closed in Tajikistan than have a watered-down mandate, and that the OSCE mandate needed to reflect the interests of donors, the OSCE, and the GOTI. Kasimov assured Spratlen that the GOTI did not plan to withdraw from its commitments as a democracy, but would not accept the CiO's draft mandate, and would go without an OSCE Center if necessary. He raised the possibility that some OSCE permanent institution move its offices to Dushanbe to reflect the better conditions in central Asia. Kasimov offered a formulaic response similar to Rahmatulloev's when asked about NDI; "we'll look into the matter." Ambassadors - Keep the Heat On -------------- ¶11. (C) At a dinner for A/DAS Spratlen hosted by Ambassador, the Chiefs of Mission of France, Germany, Britain, Turkey, and the OSCE argued for a unified and hard line on the OSCE mandate, up to and including closing the OSCE center rather than accepting Tajikistan's proposed changes to the mandate. They predicted that Tajikistan would fold if presented with the real possibility of closure of the mission, because its desire to avoid losing foreign assistance was particularly acute in the wake of the IMF misreporting. The European Commission Charge d'Affaires said that the EC had approved a new $28 million assistance package to Tajikistan, but was withholding any disbursements pending a successful IMF staff monitoring program at the Central Bank. The group also noted that Tajikistan is seeking new sources of financing from Arab states, pointing to President Rahmon's recent meetings with leaders of Algeria and Yemen, and with potential Saudi investors. Even the Chinese have expressed concern about misreporting to the IMF, Ambassador added, showing that Tajikistan was not finding it easy to find easy money. Comment: Openness, Some Good, Some Bad -------------- ¶12. (C) We were struck by the frankness of the comments by Rahmatulloev and Kasimov. The story that President Rahmon admitted in front of senior officials that the Government could have faced a serious crisis of public confidence because of its failure to respond to the winter crisis was the first report we have had of any self-examination and criticism at the top, and the first indication that Rahmon is aware of the damage to his credibility. However, we have Qaware of the damage to his credibility. However, we have seen no sign that this awareness translates into action - Rahmon has remained publicly silent about the winter crisis, and the Government in general shows few signs of being better organized for next winter. ¶13. (C) Comment Continued: Kasimov's comments about the OSCE mandate were also illuminating, but not encouraging. He openly said what we have already understood, that the GOTI wants more control over the OSCE Center's funding and activities. ¶14. (C) Comment Concluded: Regarding NDI, the GOTI offered weak words and promised no action, and we predict NDI will leave Tajikistan this month. NDI submitted another registration application package to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for legalization on April 8, noting that the documents exactly replicated the successful application package of another U.S.-funded NGO, the International Center for Not-for-Profit Law, with only the names changed to make this NDI's application. After legalization, NDI will submit the package to the Ministry of Justice. NDI expects MOJ to reject this package on legalistic grounds, and the non-committal, formulaic answers given to A/DAS Spratlen by senior officials suggest NDI is right. The departure of NDI would leave the embattled civil society sector weaker, but if it cannot win legal permission to operate, we would support a public, but strategically worded departure ) for now. End Comment. ¶15. (U) A/DAS Spratlen has cleared this cable. JACOBSON