Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08DUSHANBE1557
2008-12-23 04:34:00
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Embassy Dushanbe
Cable title:
TAJIKISTAN: 2008 COUNTRY REPORTS ON TERRORISM
how-toVZCZCXRO3045 RR RUEHLN RUEHSK RUEHVK RUEHYG DE RUEHDBU #1557 3580434 ZNR UUUUU ZZH R 230434Z DEC 08 FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1281 INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE RUEILB/NCTC WASHINGTON DC 0002
UNCLAS DUSHANBE 001557
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR S/CT (RHONDA SHORE) AND NCTC
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV PTER PREL ASEC TI
SUBJECT: TAJIKISTAN: 2008 COUNTRY REPORTS ON TERRORISM
REF: STATE 120019
UNCLAS DUSHANBE 001557
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR S/CT (RHONDA SHORE) AND NCTC
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV PTER PREL ASEC TI
SUBJECT: TAJIKISTAN: 2008 COUNTRY REPORTS ON TERRORISM
REF: STATE 120019
1. (SBU) Following is the text of Dushanbe's 2008 Country Report on
Terrorism:
As the poorest of the former Soviet countries, the Tajik
governmentQs main impediment to counterterrorism remained its lack
of resources. The government, particularly the Border Guards, lacked
appropriate technical equipment, personnel, and training to
effectively interdict illegal border crossings and to detect and
analyze hazardous substances. Individual border guards and other law
enforcement personnel were not motivated to interdict smugglers or
traffickers due to systematic corruption, low income, conscripted
service, and lack of support from senior Tajik government officials.
As a result, Tajikistan served as a transit country for extremists
and terrorists traveling to and from Afghanistan and Pakistan. To
address this issue, the United States and other donors assisted the
government of Tajikistan to secure its 1400 kilometer porous border
with Afghanistan. Assistance included the rehabilitation and
equipping of three border outposts on the border with Afghanistan,
the creation of an Analytical Center to process counternarcotics
information, and a $5 million U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) radio
program to improve Border Guard communications capability. DOD held
four Counter Narcoterrorism Training (CNT) (formerly Joint Combined
Exchange Training (JCET)) events with Tajik security forces to
improve their capacity to conduct counterterrorism operations.
The U.S. Embassy administered training on chemical weapons response
and detection of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The Defense
Institute for Legal Studies conducted a Response to Terrorism course
in Dushanbe that representatives from several ministries attended.
Tajikistan also participated in exercise Regional Cooperation 08,
sponsored by the U.S. Department of Defense and hosted by
Kyrgyzstan. This exercise focused on dealing with terrorism, and
strengthened cooperation between the Central Asian countries. The
Counter Narcotics program continued to assist Tajikistan with
facilities construction, communications equipment, and training,
totaling nearly $10 million. This effort helped stabilize the
border regions and combat terrorism by stopping potential terrorists
attempting to cross the Tajik border, and enabling Tajikistan to
better control its borders. Tajikistan endorsed the joint
U.S.-Russia co-chaired Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear
Terrorism. The Tajik government also participated in regional
security alliances, including the Shanghai Cooperation
Organization.
Since September 11, 2001, the Government of Tajikistan has allowed
its airspace to be used for counterterrorist actions in support of
Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). Tajikistan prohibited
extremist-oriented activities and closely monitored groups it listed
as terrorist organizations, such as the Islamic Movement of
Uzbekistan (IMU) and Hizbut-Tahrir (HT). The Government of
Tajikistan believed that HT, in particular, was active in the
northern part of the country. U.S. government analysts believed
that supporters of terrorist groups such as al-QaQida, the Islamic
Jihad Union (IJU) and the IMU were active in the region this year.
The Government of Tajikistan did not provide safe haven for
terrorists or terrorist organizations. However, the countryQs poor
economic climate and government policies to restrict Islamic
religious practice provided conditions that religious extremists
could exploit. Under the guise of fighting extremism, the
government of Tajikistan has taken increased measures against
Qgovernment of Tajikistan has taken increased measures against
opposition parties in the country, particularly the Islamic
Renaissance Party of Tajikistan (IRPT),the only legal Islamic
political party in Central Asia. Tajik law enforcement and security
officials viewed the Salafi religious movement as a serious threat
to national security, comparing Salafists to the IMU. Security
organizations have diverted significant resources used to fight
terrorism in the country to investigate Salafists.
2. (U) Point of contact on this issue is William von Zagorski,
vonzagorskiwf@state.gov.
JACOBSON
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR S/CT (RHONDA SHORE) AND NCTC
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV PTER PREL ASEC TI
SUBJECT: TAJIKISTAN: 2008 COUNTRY REPORTS ON TERRORISM
REF: STATE 120019
1. (SBU) Following is the text of Dushanbe's 2008 Country Report on
Terrorism:
As the poorest of the former Soviet countries, the Tajik
governmentQs main impediment to counterterrorism remained its lack
of resources. The government, particularly the Border Guards, lacked
appropriate technical equipment, personnel, and training to
effectively interdict illegal border crossings and to detect and
analyze hazardous substances. Individual border guards and other law
enforcement personnel were not motivated to interdict smugglers or
traffickers due to systematic corruption, low income, conscripted
service, and lack of support from senior Tajik government officials.
As a result, Tajikistan served as a transit country for extremists
and terrorists traveling to and from Afghanistan and Pakistan. To
address this issue, the United States and other donors assisted the
government of Tajikistan to secure its 1400 kilometer porous border
with Afghanistan. Assistance included the rehabilitation and
equipping of three border outposts on the border with Afghanistan,
the creation of an Analytical Center to process counternarcotics
information, and a $5 million U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) radio
program to improve Border Guard communications capability. DOD held
four Counter Narcoterrorism Training (CNT) (formerly Joint Combined
Exchange Training (JCET)) events with Tajik security forces to
improve their capacity to conduct counterterrorism operations.
The U.S. Embassy administered training on chemical weapons response
and detection of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The Defense
Institute for Legal Studies conducted a Response to Terrorism course
in Dushanbe that representatives from several ministries attended.
Tajikistan also participated in exercise Regional Cooperation 08,
sponsored by the U.S. Department of Defense and hosted by
Kyrgyzstan. This exercise focused on dealing with terrorism, and
strengthened cooperation between the Central Asian countries. The
Counter Narcotics program continued to assist Tajikistan with
facilities construction, communications equipment, and training,
totaling nearly $10 million. This effort helped stabilize the
border regions and combat terrorism by stopping potential terrorists
attempting to cross the Tajik border, and enabling Tajikistan to
better control its borders. Tajikistan endorsed the joint
U.S.-Russia co-chaired Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear
Terrorism. The Tajik government also participated in regional
security alliances, including the Shanghai Cooperation
Organization.
Since September 11, 2001, the Government of Tajikistan has allowed
its airspace to be used for counterterrorist actions in support of
Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). Tajikistan prohibited
extremist-oriented activities and closely monitored groups it listed
as terrorist organizations, such as the Islamic Movement of
Uzbekistan (IMU) and Hizbut-Tahrir (HT). The Government of
Tajikistan believed that HT, in particular, was active in the
northern part of the country. U.S. government analysts believed
that supporters of terrorist groups such as al-QaQida, the Islamic
Jihad Union (IJU) and the IMU were active in the region this year.
The Government of Tajikistan did not provide safe haven for
terrorists or terrorist organizations. However, the countryQs poor
economic climate and government policies to restrict Islamic
religious practice provided conditions that religious extremists
could exploit. Under the guise of fighting extremism, the
government of Tajikistan has taken increased measures against
Qgovernment of Tajikistan has taken increased measures against
opposition parties in the country, particularly the Islamic
Renaissance Party of Tajikistan (IRPT),the only legal Islamic
political party in Central Asia. Tajik law enforcement and security
officials viewed the Salafi religious movement as a serious threat
to national security, comparing Salafists to the IMU. Security
organizations have diverted significant resources used to fight
terrorism in the country to investigate Salafists.
2. (U) Point of contact on this issue is William von Zagorski,
vonzagorskiwf@state.gov.
JACOBSON