RAHMON HOLDS FORTH - DAS KROL'S MEETINGS WITH

C O N F I D E N T I A L DUSHANBE 001402 SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/CEN E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/18/2018 TAGS: EAID ECON EINV PREL PGOV PHUM TI SUBJECT: RAHMON HOLDS FORTH - DAS KROL'S MEETINGS WITH PRESIDENT RAHMON AND FOREIGN MINISTER ZARIFI. Classified By: AMBASSADOR TRACEY A. JACOBSON, 1.4 (B) AND (D) ¶1. (C) Summary: In a two and half hour meeting on November 11, Rahmon urged greater U.S. attention to Afghanistan and the problem of narcotics trafficking, and said the global financial crisis was affecting Tajikistan because of lower prices for aluminum and cotton. While claiming Tajikistan was well-prepared to face the next winter, Rahmon showed himself misinformed about the progress of agricultural reforms. He blamed Uzbek obstructionism for most of the problems Tajikistan faced, including its over reliance on cotton exports and the failure of regional states to make long-term water sharing agreements. Rahmon admitted the Tajik judiciary was corrupt, but avoided DAS Krol's attempt to engage him on civil society development. Foreign Minister Zarifi made similar arguments about Afghanistan and Uzbekistan, gave some more details on Tajik plans to build the Rogun hydropower station, and urged more educational cooperation between the United States and Tajikistan. End Summary. ¶2. (C) Rahmon opened the meeting with congratulations on the election of Barack Obama, saying the U.S. elections showed "high democratic principles." Rahmon hoped that the new administration would not implement sharp changes in Central Asia policy, but would pay greater attention to developing countries, including Afghanistan. "We have an open door policy. We are allies in the fight against extremism, and transborder organized crime." Rahmon said that Tajikistan would have relations with "everyone," regardless of the situation (note: he seemed to be referring to the conflict in Georgia). "We are no longer living in an ideological world. Of course, it's hard for those who have long experience in another system." Afghanistan is Getting Better and Worse -------------- ¶3. (C) Rahmon reiterated familiar points on Afghanistan; "We know Afghanistan not from newspapers or the internet; it's our environment." Don't leave Afghanistan to the side. You need to increase efforts there; it's important to your image, and to the fight against international terrorism. Pakistan also needs more attention. "I always said Afghanistan is not the home of the Taliban - Pakistan is." ¶4. (C) Rahmon admitted the situation in Afghanistan was better than it was six years ago, but urged that we expand efforts against narcotics production and trafficking. Tajikistan needed "serious help" as it lacked the equipment to stop import of narcotics, and urged us to provide more scanning equipment. He also suggested that the U.S.-funded bridge at Nizhniy Pyanj had allowed an increase in drug trafficking. Rahmon was frustrated with Afghan counternarcotics efforts, saying their cooperation with Tajikistan was not very effective. The Uzbek Yoke -------------- ¶5. (C) Rahmon complained that Uzbekistan refused to work with Afghanistan and Tajikistan on counternarcotics. Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan hid their drug problems. Dostum was one of the biggest drug smugglers, Rahmon said. Even the Russian newspapers wouldn't mention drug abuse problems in these two countries; they just accused Tajikistan of being the main drug conduit "because our lobby isn't as strong." Qdrug conduit "because our lobby isn't as strong." ¶6. (C) In response to a question about his views on President Karimov's 6 3 formula for resolving the Afghan conflict, Rahmon said "if he really wanted to help, he'd get Dostum in line." He continued that Karimov had an incomprehensible policy - "he doesn't have normal relations with anyone." ¶7. (C) Rahmon went on to complain that Uzbekistan prevented agreements among Central Asian states on water sharing, and that Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan had a secret agreement on use of the Amu Darya waters, which excluded Afghanistan. Uzbekistan understood the needs of upstream countries to use water for power generation and irrigation, but "they just don't want Tajikistan to develop economically." The long term water sharing problems were not solved at this year's Commonwealth of Independent States summit in Bishkek, and wouldn't be solved anytime soon. Tajikistan was ready for a water sharing agreement with Uzbekistan "along the lines of other transboundary water sharing agreements." But Uzbekistan didn't want this. Financial Crisis, Winter Crisis -------------- ¶8. (C) The global financial crisis was a serious problem for Tajikistan, because of the drop in cotton and aluminum prices which led to less money in the state budget. Remittances would also decline, and investment. But there would not be a winter power and food-security crisis on the scale of last winter's. The government was reducing the amount of cotton grown, making room for more food production, and had introduced freedom to farm. This would not eliminate food deficits, but would help. "I told people to produce a two year stockpile of wheat and flour." Ambassador told Rahmon that she personally had observed that local officials were forcing farmers to plant wheat between the cotton plants, rather than uprooting the cotton plants for better wheat results. Rahmon seemed unaware of this practice, and said farmers needed to rotate crops. ¶9. (C) Rahmon then switched over to the benefits of cotton. Tajikistan exported tons of fruit, but Uzbekistan blocked the shipments and the fruit rotted. Thus Tajikistan still needed cotton exports to bring in hard currency and provide employment. Rahmon noted that child labor in cotton was still a problem, but this was because low cotton prices which prevented farmers from paying salaries and being forced to have their children join them in the fields. Family labor in agriculture is &traditional,8 according to Rahmon. ¶10. (C) Rahmon expected the electricity supply to be better this winter, as Tajikistan had started rationing early to save water, and had more generating capacity from Sangtuda-1 and the Dushanbe heating station. DAS Krol noted that the United States would give Tajikistan $6 million worth of assistance this coming winter. Rahmon thanked him for this, but said it was not enough. He added that Tajikistan would build the Rogun hydropower station regardless of Uzbek objections, calling it "a matter of life or death for Tajikistan." The World Bank was not serious about organizing an international consortium to build the dam, so Tajikistan would build Rogun itself during the next four years. Civil Society - Don't Bother Me -------------- ¶11. (C) DAS Krol commented that President-elect Obama came from a civil society background, and would likely emphasize civil society development in his foreign policy. Rahmon avoided serious discussion of this issue, launching into a rambling discourse about inconsistencies in U.S. foreign policy priorities; the gap between poor and rich countries was widening, while the west only paid attention to countries with oil and gas. Georgia had to defend itself alone because it lacked oil. The U.S. needed to stop its "information war" against Iran, as this increased oil prices. A new cold war had started between the U.S. and Russia, judging from President Medvedev's recent state of the nation speech. "If you dictate to the world how to live, it only helps the totalitarians" Rahmon said. Qtotalitarians" Rahmon said. ¶12. (C) Focusing his mental energies slightly more, Rahmon said Tajikistan did not need stark political changes. "We are never going to be European." But Tajiks wanted to live in a normal civilized way. Reform of the political system must be in accordance with Tajik traditions and history. Things had improved for civil society since the civil war, and there were now thousands of non-governmental organizations and several independent newspapers. But the justice system was lacking in trained personnel, and was "more corrupt than others." In the end, in terms of our assistance, Rahmon said &"we didn,t need 17 years of training, seminars and round tables; we need infrastructure." The Toy -------------- ¶14. (C) Rahmon concluded with general comments on the region, saying that President Karimov,s assertion that the only alternative to himself would be an extremist leader was wrong. 8They are normal and civilized people there." Rahmon predicted Karimov, who he called &sick8 several times, would be in office for another 7-10 years. President Nazarbaev was "a good person" with a multivector policy. Bakiev was not bad in comparison with his predecessor, but faced strong Russian pressure over Manas air base. China was also unhappy about the U.S. base in Kyrgyzstan. "We don't want to be a toy passed back and forth between great powers." Foreign Minister Zarifi -------------- ¶15. (C) Following Rahmon, DAS Krol had a meeting with Foreign Minister Zarifi which covered much of the same ground, but in less time. On Afghanistan Krol told Zarifi the United States supported reconciliation, but only when led by the democratically elected government of Afghanistan, within the framework of the constitution. He hoped Tajikistan shared this position, to which Zarifi said nothing. ¶16. (C) Krol urged that the Government of Tajikistan pay more attention to its public image, noting that recent Financial Times and New York Times articles on Tajikistan had been overwhelmingly negative, and had focused on child labor, the cotton sector, and corruption. He also noted persistent problems the Ministry of Justice created for non-governmental organizations such as the National Democratic Institute and Mercy Corps, and its non-cooperation on reform of the criminal procedure code. He also raised trafficking in persons, telling Zarifi that Tajikistan and the United States needed to work together to help Tajikistan improve its ranking. ¶17. (C) Krol also raised the Nuclear Smuggling Outreach Initiative, noting the assistance and training which Tajikistan could receive if it joined the Initiative. The USG had replied to Tajik concerns about joining the Nuclear Smuggling Outreach Initiative, and the two governments could work together to resolve any problems. Krol asked whether Tajikistan was still interested in this initiative, emphasizing its importance to the United States ¶18. (C) Zarifi took the issues in order. Noting he had spent his childhood working in cotton fields, he said Tajik government efforts to end child labor were going in the right direction, but faced obstacles of custom and poverty. The Government could not ignore the problem, but it was a problem of tradition, not of forced labor. The Government needed to improve technology in the cotton sector, and gradually by step the problem would be resolved. ¶19. (C) Addressing National Democratic Institute, Zarifi said there were different ideas of democracy in the Government, and that certain ministers were always against National Democratic Institute while the Ministry of Foreign Affairs generally supported the Institute's presence in Tajikistan. No one "at the top" had tried to influence the National Democratic Institute registration issue, it stayed at the ministerial level. Zarifi believed there would be a solution eventually. He had warned other ministers that the issue would not disappear, especially if the Democratic Party won the presidential election in the United States. He asked that the USG remain patient. Qthat the USG remain patient. ¶20. (C) On the Nuclear Smuggling Outreach Initiative, Zarifi assured Krol that Tajik policy and practice to protect nuclear materials was strong, and the United States and Russia would have no reason to fear problems with control of nuclear material here or illegal transfers of such material. Tajikistan was in discussions with China about Chinese commercial exploitation of Tajik uranium resources, but this would proceed strictly in accordance with International Atomic Energy Agency rules and safeguards. ¶21. (C) Zarifi said of the TIP issue only that the problem existed in Tajikistan and that "several structures" of the GOTI were working on countering it; but narcotics trafficking was a bigger problem. ¶22. (C) Zarifi turned to the subject of Afghanistan, largely repeating what President Rahmon had said in the previous meeting. A key element in helping the country was to develop the irrigation system in northern Afghanistan, but this required consensus among the five central Asian states and Afghanistan on water sharing; which Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan opposed. ¶23. (C) Krol agreed that water sharing was a key issue in the region, and described how he had recently raised water sharing with the Uzbek government, only to be told it was not the United States' business and that Uzbekistan had threatened to blockade Tajikistan if the Tajiks moved forward on construction of Rogun. ¶24. (C) Zarifi commented that because of high world oil and gas prices, the Rogun hydropower station would provide cheaper electricity than gas-powered stations could. Uzbek gas-powered stations were old and inefficient, and he predicted that Uzbekistan would soon come around and ask to join in efforts to build Rogun. Until construction started in earnest, the Uzbeks would obstruct with threats and complaints of environmental damage. Tajikistan would begin building the dam in late 2009, and by summer 2010, Zarifi confidently asserted, the Uzbeks would ask to buy into the project. The first stage of Rogun, getting one turbine into place and producing electricity required $500 million, of which the Tajik government could afford only $200 million. Zarifi was sure the Government could find financing for the other $300 million (note: this missing amount approximates the cost of the massive presidential palace nearing completion in the center of Dushanbe). After that, electricity export revenue from the dam would pay for its further construction. He predicted the total cost of the Rogun project at $3 billion. ¶25. (C) Zarifi called for more high level attention from the USG, noting the last presidential meeting was in 2002. He also again asked for the establishment of an American university in Dushanbe, and for more American students to come to Tajikistan. Ambassador replied that the University of Montana was in discussions with the Government of Tajikistan on establishing a program in Dushanbe, and that the number of American students had shot up, from 6 a year ago to 60 this past summer. Zarifi said six thousand American students would do more good in Tajikistan than the return of the National Democratic Institute; Ambassador agreed, and asked for Zarifi's support for Peace Corps to establish a program in Tajikistan. Zarifi said Peace Corps would be very useful for Tajikistan, as it would make a huge impact on English learning in rural areas. ¶26. (C) At the conclusion of the meeting, Ambassador pressed Zarifi to move more quickly on full utilization of the bridge at Nizhniy Pyanj, informing him that pedestrians and non-commercial vehicles were still being forced to use the ferry. Comment -------------- ¶27. (C) Rahmon's comments were mostly the same arguments he has used over and over in previous high-level meetings; democracy and political reform must go slowly, following Tajik traditions which conveniently serve his interests. The President clearly feels stymied by Uzbekistan, and will need concerted multilateral assistance to resolve problems with its larger neighbor so that both can make best use of their shared water resources. Rahmon's surprise on hearing that Qshared water resources. Rahmon's surprise on hearing that his officials are ignoring his freedom to farm decree, and his cavalier confidence about preparations for next winter, suggest how isolated he is from information about the country. Foreign Minister Zarifi's call for more students and support for Peace Corps is an opportunity we should not miss to make a long-term and serious impact on education, English language capacity, and economic development in this increasingly vulnerable country. End Comment. ¶28. (U) DAS Krol cleared this cable. JACOBSON