EMBASSY DUSHANBE REQUEST FOR FY09

C O N F I D E N T I A L DUSHANBE 001269


CENTCOM FOR CCJ5, SOCCENT FOR J33, DIA FOR DHO-2, STATE FOR SCA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/06/2018
TAGS: PGOV MAS OVIP PREL TI
SUBJECT: EMBASSY DUSHANBE REQUEST FOR FY09
USCENTCOM/SOCCENT COUNTER NARCO TERRORISM TRAINING EVENTS

REF: A. SECDEF-APPROVED FY2009 GLOBAL FORCE MANAGEMENT
ALLOCATION PLAN (GFMAP)/CJCS/151900Z MAY
2008

B. CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF (CJCS)
INSTRUCTIONS 3710.01/28MAY93 FOR
DELEGATION OF AUTHORITY FOR APPROVING
OPERATIONAL SUPPORT TO DRUG AND/OR LAW
ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES AND COUNTER-DRUG
RELATED DEPLOYMENT OF US DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE (DOD) PERSONNEL

C. 08 DUSHANBE 1131 (DTG 101115Z SEP 08)

D. 08 STATE 105455 (DTG 021659Z OCT 08)

Classified By: Tracey Jacobson, Ambassador, U.S. Embassy Dushanbe, STATE;
REASON: 1.4 (a) and (d)


1. (C) Summary. In accordance with REFs A and B, this
message is an Embassy Dushanbe request for FY09 DOD
operational support under 1004, National Defense
Authorization Act 1991, as amended for development of Counter
Narco Terrorism (CNT) training deployments with the National
Guard Special Forces (SF) Battalion, the Border Guard SF
Battalion/Separate Group for Special Reconnaissance, and the
Ministry of Interior Special Purpose Police Squad (OMON).
Post requests four CNT events for FY 2009, as sourced in the
past two years.


2. (U) U.S. agency requesting CNT events. This request has
been approved by the Ambassador, Embassy Dushanbe, and is
made through the Embassy Dushanbe, Acting Drug Enforcement
Agency Country Officer (DEA CO),Mr. Paul Hackett.


3. (C) Partner Nation (PN) organizations requesting these
events. GEN-MAJ Rajabali Rahmonali, Commander of the Tajik
National Guard, GEN-MAJ Sherali Mirzo, Commander of the
Border Guards, and Tajik Interior Minister Solehov have
requested that their SF battalions/OMON receive the proposed
training.

Justification for the CNT Training
--------------


4. (C) Narcotics, ultimately destined for the U.S. and other
international markets are transshipped from Afghanistan
through Tajikistan. Embassy Dushanbe reporting concerning
transit/trafficking activity in Central and South Asia
indicates that past and current levels of narcotics
trafficking activity in Tajikistan are significant and are
likely to increase in conjunction with this year,s poppy
harvest in Afghanistan. Due to persistent security incidents
and the lack of coordinated efforts, as of July 2008, the
poppy eradication campaign in Afghanistan was relatively
ineffective, and cultivation levels for the year are expected
to increase. The funds generated from the sale of narcotics
are used to support terrorist activity and organized crime,
and the trafficking of drugs through Tajikistan fosters
corruption, violent crime, AIDS, and economic distortions,
all of which are destabilizing factors in the USCENTCOM area
of responsibility.


5. (C) The Tajik National Guard and Border Guards Special
Forces battalions, and the Ministry of Interior OMON
detachment, among other agencies, are the primary Counter
Narco Terrorist (CNT) special operations capable forces in
Tajikistan. The continuation of the CENTCOM, SOCCENT, and
QEmbassy Dushanbe CNT training program, as part of the overall
Foreign Internal Defense (FID) strategy and program for
Tajikistan, would expand and increase the development of a
strong combined and unified U.S./Tajik effort in disrupting
the escalation of illegal narcotics smuggled through Central
Asia and in denying insurgents and terrorists access to a
critical funding source for continued terrorist and insurgent
operations in Tajikistan and the region.


6. (C) A tactical CNT program promotes greater regional
stability, decreases the amount of illegal narcotics
transiting through Tajikistan and Central Asia to
international markets in the Russia, Europe and the United
States and is an indirect approach for defeating
international terrorism and insurgents that threaten the
stability of Tajikistan and the region. In the post 9/11
environment, a Tajik CNT capability has become more critical
in combating terrorist/narcotic activity and supports
USCENTCOM theater objectives for security cooperation and
both CENTCOM,s and the U.S. Special Operations Command,s
(USSOCCOM) regional and global war on terrorism.


7. (C) Critical training tasks that the Tajik National Guard,
Border Guards, and OMON squads have requested include the
following: staff organization and planning, orders
production, mission analysis and the military decision making
process, intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB),
direct action (raids and ambushes),special reconnaissance,
close quarters combat/battle (CQC/B),sniper/observe
operations, military operations in urban terrain (MOUT),
Counter-Improvised Explosive Device (C-IED),Sensitive Site
Exploitation (SSE),tactical communications and basic combat
life saving.


8. (C) Embassy Dushanbe requests that pre-deployment site
surveys (PDSS) and/or assessments be scheduled for all
events. The National Guard and Border Guard SF Battalions and
the MOI OMON have requested detailed training schedules and
programs of instruction (POI) be provided following each
PDSS. Training will be conducted at the Fakhrabad, Lahur,
and Karatag training areas in Tajikistan. Other training
locations within Tajikistan may be designated by the host
nation.

Rules of Engagement
--------------


10. (C) CJCS standing Rules of Engagement (ROE) are in
effect. Deploying forces will not under any circumstances
accompany U.S. DEA or PN counter-parts on actual CNT field
operations or participate in any activity in which
hostilities are imminent. Embassy Dushanbe Country Team
further understands that units and individuals deployed
outside the United States, its territories and possessions
will deploy with assigned weapons and ammunition, whenever
possible. When carrying weapons is not required in country,
the weapons will be stored in a secure location which
provides reasonable access. Any change in carry condition
will be coordinated with the RSO. Diplomatic plated vehicles
will be used for transport of all weapons to and from
training locations.


11. (C) Justification. US SOF units and individuals must be
capable of providing their own force protection when forward
deployed in all threat environments. Embassy Dushanbe
Regional Security Officer (RSO),Mr. Seth Green, is the
coordinating official for all weapons, ammunition and other
sensitive items issues. Mr. Green can be contacted at the
Embassy Dushanbe at comm: 992 37 229 2901 or 992 90 700 0911
or by unclass email at greense@state.gov or class email at
greense@state.sgov.gov.

Human Rights Verification
--------------


12. REFTEL C is Embassy Dushanbe,s Leahy Human Rights
Vetting Requests for the National Guard and Border Guards SF
QVetting Requests for the National Guard and Border Guards SF
Battalions and for the MOI,s OMON. REFTEL D is the
response to this request, stating that the Department of
State possesses no credible information of gross violations
of human rights by the identified units and commanders.

Points of Contact for Training
--------------


13. Defense and Army Attache, Embassy Dushanbe, LTC Daniel

R. Green is responsible for assisting the CNT team with
issues while they are in Tajikistan. DEA Dushanbe Country
Officer, Acting Country Attache Paul Hackett will be kept
informed of any issues should they arise.



14. (U) Any questions concerning this message or CNT
training should be directed to the Defense Attache, LTC
Daniel Green, at 992-37-229-2701 or 992-90-700-7030 or the
DEA Acting Country Attache, Paul Hackett, at 992 37 224 2807
or 992 90 700 7095.

JACOBSON