MEET THE NEW TAJIK SPETZNAZ

C O N F I D E N T I A L DUSHANBE 001098 SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR DS/IP/SCA, DS/TIA/ITA, DS/T/ATA FOR BENKER, DS/ICI/CIL FOR ROBRAHN, SCA, INL FOR BUHLER E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/25/2033 TAGS: ASEC PINR TI SUBJECT: MEET THE NEW TAJIK SPETZNAZ Classified By: RSO SETH GREEN FOR REASONS 1.4(c,d) ¶1. (C) On August 20, RSO met with Major General Abdurauf YUSUPOV, First Deputy Minister of Interior and Lieutenant Colonel Dilshod ISLOMOV, Commander of the new Special Forces Battalion ("SpetzNaz") for the Ministry of Interior. The purpose of the meeting was to be introduced to the SpetzNaz Commander, receive a briefing on the unit, and to better understand the specific requests for assistance made by the Ministry. ¶2. (C) The Ministry of Interior created a new Special Forces Battalion ("SpetzNaz"),which replaced the former Quick Reaction Force ("SOBR") that was disbanded earlier in the year. The unit is in its infancy, receiving weapons the day before the RSO's visit. Their facility previously belonged to another Ministry of Interior unit, but had been abandoned for a few years. They are in the process of renovating their office space and have very little equipment. ¶A. Mission: SpetzNaz will be responsible for crowd control and mass disorder operations, maintaining order during natural disasters or other crisis, reinforcing checkpoints and aiding traffic police during high threat situations, detaining high threat criminals, and perimeter security during counter-terrorism / high threat operations by OMON. ¶B. Table of Organization: There are 180 officers serving in SpetzNaz on a contract basis. 150 will be operational and 30 are staff. The "all-officer-corps" unit has three Companies led by Deputy Commanders: A Chief of Staff leading the staff corps, a Chief of Logistics leading a logistics and support company, and a Chief of Operations leading the operational company. Each company has two platoons, with the Operational groups being the largest. Within the operational company, they also plan a sapper team and canine unit. ¶C. Candidate Requirements: Each candidate must be 170 centimeters or taller, pass a physical fitness test, pass a psychological and medical examination, graduate from university level study, obtain an officer's commission, and pass a board of examination led by the First Deputy Minister of Interior. After this, each candidate has a three month probation period on the team for the Commander to assess whether they will be retained. The Regional Security Officer observed the officers in formation receiving their morning briefing. All were young, mid-twenties to early thirties, and fit. ¶D. Weapons Systems: The team received Kalishnikov rifles (both 5.45 and 7.62) and Makarov pistols (9mm). They also have 6 Draganof sniper rifles, 4 Kalishnikov light machine rifles (RPKs),and 2 Kalishnikov automatic machine guns (PKs). They do not have their own shooting range, but expect to use the Academy's range near the Interior Forces compound. They had stocks of 7.62 ammunition, but at the time did not have any 9mm or 5.45 ammunition. (RSO NOTE: This is consistent with Tajik Government wide shortages. END NOTE.) ¶E. Protective Equipment and Less-than-Lethal: The team has 50 plastic helmets for riot control operations with Styrofoam padding, 60 riot control shields made from weak plexiglass, 50 PR-24 style batons, 2 Armored personnel carriers, and 50 body armor carriers with small steel plates that likely protect against stabbings, but are not ballistic resistant. protect against stabbings, but are not ballistic resistant. ¶3. (SBU) The Commander of the new unit, Colonel ISLOMOV, immediately spoke about the training he received in 2003 in Louisiana through the Anti-Terrorism Assistance program while he served in the Ministry's Internal Forces. He even pulled out the Crisis Response Team course book from his cabinet ) the only training manual he had. He expressed his appreciation for the training he received, and stated that he has passed along his knowledge to over 300 interior forces soldiers. He asked for the United States to assist him in building a basic training program for the new SpetzNaz unit, and for any assistance in developing standard operating procedures for his program. The Commander agreed to meet with the Anti-Terrorism Assistance needs assessment team in early September to discuss their training needs. ¶4. (C) COMMENT: The openness of the Ministry and full disclosure reveals both their need for American assistance, and their appreciation with Embassy's concerns regarding "mission creep" between this new unit and the Militia Detachment for Special Purposes (OMON) team, which has been well supported by the United States for the past six years. Aside from SpetzNaz's sapper and canine units, which don't appear to support the disclosed mission, this unit does not appear to duplicate assignments already supported by other Ministry teams trained or funded by the United States. ¶5. (C) This unit was created by the Minister, and has become General YUSUPOV's pet project. After last winter and the series of peaceful protests this past year, the Ministry understands they are on borrowed time before protests could turn violent. Many in Tajikistan still point to riots in 1992 as the catalyst for the Civil War, ignoring the social problems behind them. The Government of Tajikistan is looking for options to stay in power. The riot in 2006 following the no-show of Iranian-born rocker Arash demonstrated that the Ministry of Interior had no capacity to address basic crowd control. If the Government perceives a protest as being a threat, and has no training, human rights orientation, or less-than-lethal option, they are likely to follow the Uzbekistan example as an effective tactic to put down anti-government protests. ¶6. (C) General YUSUPOV commented that having an all officer corps in SpetzNaz allowed him to screen candidates to ensure they would help de-escalate situations rather than enflame them. As this is a new unit, the timing and openness of the Ministry provides the United States with a unique opportunity to influence the training, standard operating procedures, infuse western-style policing, less-than-lethal protective equipment, and human rights training. Abdicating this opportunity leaves the team with either Uzbek-style crowd control (ex. Andijon 2006),or an inept response opening the potential for further instability. Post will be pursuing training and other engagement opportunities in the near future. END COMMENT. ¶7. (U) The point of contact for this and all security related matters at Post is Regional Security Officer Seth Green. JACOBSON