SETTING THE SCENE FOR ADMIRAL FALLON'S AND DASD

C O N F I D E N T I A L DUSHANBE 000102 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPT FOR SCA DIA FOR DHO2 CENTCOM FOR CCJ5 E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/16/2018 TAGS: PREL PGOV MASS MCAP OVIP TI AF SUBJECT: SETTING THE SCENE FOR ADMIRAL FALLON'S AND DASD SHIVERS' 21-22 JANUARY 2008 VISIT TO TAJIKISTAN REF: 07 DUSHANBE 1516 (DTG 191336Z OCT 07) Classified By: Tom Hushek, CDA, U.S. Embassy Dushanbe, STATE; REASON: 1.4 (a) and (d) ¶1. (C) Summary. Embassy Dushanbe looks forward to the upcoming joint CDR USCENTCOM/DASD Central and South Asia visit to Tajikistan. This cable provides updates only to reference scenesetter cable, and as an update, is primarily addressed to Admiral Fallon. As offered your November visit, President Rahmon wishes to provide his views on how best to approach Uzbek President Karimov while you are in Tashkent. Rahmon may also make a pitch for additional U.S.-funded infrastructure projects. ¶2. (C) Although Department of Defense and CENTCOM military and security-related programs are progressing well, worsening economic conditions and lack of democratic reforms threaten long-term internal and regional stability. During 2007, President Rahmon continued to consolidate his hold over the government by ensuring that individuals from his home district held most of the top ministerial, law enforcement, and revenue-related positions. It is commonly understood that he is consolidating his position through nepotism and that he has not focused on appointing competent managers to key governmental posts. He and his appointees continue to argue that stability is paramount, and that reform is a slow process. ¶3. (C) Tajikistan has significant potential to achieve more prosperity and stability. However, it also faces significant transnational threats that could affect regional and international stability. A recent crisis concerning cotton sector financing has worsened RELATIONS with International Financial Institutions and revealed weaknesses in Tajikistan's economic reform efforts. Tajiks under the age of 25 (over half the population) are more religious than older generations. Although religious extremism is not currently a major threat, worsening economic conditions and government restrictions on religious practices are alienating the country,s young people. As you and President Rahmon discussed previously, the future of Afghanistan is of primary significance to both Tajikistan and the United States. ¶4. (C) As before, the key theme that you can emphasize in your bilateral meetings and in the press opportunity is the linkage between Tajikistan's long-term security and economic prosperity and its progress in advancing democracy, the rule of law, and respect for human rights. President Rahmon and his advisors pay lip service to this message, but they view such reforms as threatening their hold on the country. Strong and consistent messages from high-ranking U.S. interlocutors will play an important role in improving Tajikistan's deteriorating economic and POLITICAL situation. End summary. BACKSLIDING ON DEMOCRACY -------------- ¶5. (C) President Rahmon and his inner circle view democratic reforms in Ukraine, Georgia, and Kyrgyzstan as destabilizing. Rahmon admires the "stability" Karimov has achieved in Uzbekistan and counts on the international community to give Tajikistan leeway as long as it remains &better8 than Uzbekistan or Turkmenistan. Rahmon's administration has taken steps to control all aspects of civil society in Qtaken steps to control all aspects of civil society in Tajikistan, while building the foundations of a personality cult around the president. Government officials are committed to protecting their own financial and POLITICAL interests. ¶6. (C) The government also believes it can ) and must - control religious life in the country. Many officials, especially among the security services, have an almost paranoid belief that religious expression will feed extremism, and they have employed extremely restrictive measures to control the predominantly Muslim population. Law enforcement officials regularly detain or question large numbers of young men and accuse them of membership in outlawed extremist groups, such as Hizb-ut-Tahrir or the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU). Government officials temporarily closed 213 mosques in Dushanbe in 2007 and banned women from wearing the hijab in public schools and institutions. A restrictive draft law on religion was shelved at the end of the year, but religious party leaders have called the government's policy "secular extremism." Government officials are very defensive about their religious policy, as they have been criticized by international groups. However, they expect the United States to be sympathetic to the need to monitor and control Islam in the post-9/11 era. They claim that Tajiks are grateful that they can practice Islam after the fall of Communism and that they appreciate the government,s efforts. Tajikistan boasts Central Asia's only legal Islamic party, but like all POLITICAL parties other than the president's, its role in the democratic process is extremely limited. ¶7. (C) Government officials generally try to parry any discussion of better governance and democratic reform by citing the need for stability. They remind us that the civil war ended only a few years ago (it was mostly over with by the mid-1990s),and that democratic reform is a slow process. Government officials deny that the lack of POLITICAL pluralism or religious restrictions have generated any discontent. Our discussions would indicate otherwise, although vocal or violent opposition is unlikely in the near term. Since the president's re-election in November 2006, most members of the opposition have been removed from positions of authority, reneging on one of the key provisions ending the civil war. ON THE VERGE OF ECONOMIC DISASTER -------------- ¶8. (C) Government officials have failed to implement an effective or coherent macroeconomic policy, resulting in rapidly deteriorating economic conditions and financial crisis. Inflation in 2007 reached 18%, and prices for basic foodstuffs rose 50-100%. The cotton sector, the largest part of the agricultural economy (although it only benefits elite wholesalers),is on the verge of collapse, and corruption remains rampant. Despite a few small steps over the last year towards improving the investment climate, international investors do not view Tajikistan as a viable place to do business. It was recently reported that the American energy company AES has decided to leave the country, despite earlier plans to invest $1 billion in the energy sector. Entities such as the Committee on Investments and State Property and the Agency to Fight Corruption and Economic Crimes are ineffective, and we do not consider their establishment to constitute a fundamental commitment to economic reform. ¶9. (C) International financial assistance may have enabled the government to continue irresponsible spending and avoid controlling corruption. Government officials have been dishonest with international financial organizations, such as the IMF, repeatedly misreporting Central Bank operations in order to hide from the IMF large government-guaranteed loans to support the cotton sector - loans amounting to $400 million which now cannot be repaid. The Government is now seeking another IMF bailout, but any such program is likely Qseeking another IMF bailout, but any such program is likely to come with very tough conditions the president may find tough to swallow. Increased unconditional economic assistance from China and Iran undermine the importance of improving the business climate to attract private investors, and the relationship with Russia often works against the U.S. (and European) programs on rule of law and good governance. In the past, the Tajiks have looked to the U.S. to keep pace with Chinese, Iranian, and Russian investment in hydropower, transmission lines, telecom, roads and tunnels. They are now looking to the United States to support additional financing from the IMF. ¶10. (C) Government officials have begun to see declining support for financial assistance. Tajikistan,s pleas to the IMF were met with skepticism and concern that the government continues to spend public money on extravagant projects, such as a $100 million Presidential Palace, instead of on projects that benefit the population at large. ¶11. (C) You will once again witness the veneer of Dushanbe's active consumer economy, which hides the underbelly of massive corruption and industrial decay. Government officials, including Foreign Minister Zarifi and President Rahmon, insist on talking "economics before politics." However, they turn a deaf ear when we insist that only reforming their business climate will attract Western investors, and they dismiss the suggestion that corruption scares off businesses. They point to over $800 million in no-strings-attached Chinese loans they have received for infrastructure projects, and tell us to bring American companies to Tajikistan. ¶12. (C) Corruption, turf wars between power brokers, and organized criminal gangs continue to send legitimate business people elsewhere. In 2007, many local businesses have been harassed or shut down by officials for numerous reasons. Investors bristle at the hassle of Tajik corruption; repeated demands for money from low and mid-level officials across the government dissuade entrepreneurs. Small businesses flourish outside the official economy trading agricultural and consumer goods, avoiding taxes and customs fees. PROBLEMS WITH REGIONAL INTEGRATION -------------- ¶13. (C) Tajik officials profess enthusiasm for regional integration, but RELATIONS with Uzbekistan and Afghanistan are problematic. Rahmon,s personal rivalry with Karimov has fed the antagonistic relationship between the countries. Uzbekistan, which controls the main ground transport routes into Tajikistan causes Tajikistan serious problems with electricity and gas supplies, customs, imports, exports, visas, landmines, and water sharing. Foreign Minister Zarifi has even unofficially told the Ambassador that he will lobby NATO to have old Soviet-era weapons transferred from former Eastern-bloc countries to face an eventual Uzbek invasion. ¶14. (C) Government officials also recognize the importance of trading with Afghanistan, but the State Committee on National Security hindered bridge operations and related road projects following the August 26 ceremonial opening of the U.S.-built bridge across the Pyanj River. The SCNS is motivated by concern that open borders with Afghanistan will help foreign extremists enter the country. Interventions by the Embassy, however, led to a compromise that allowed a limited stream of truck traffic across the bridge starting in October. That success was followed by the arrival in mid-November of an assessment team from U.S. Customs and Border Protection that reviewed port operations with an eye toward recommending improvements in procedures followed by possible additional assistance in the form of equipment and mentoring by CBP Officer(s). We have consistently stressed the need for all Tajik government agencies -- in particular the Border Guards, who are subordinate to the State Committee on National Security, and the Customs Service -- to work together and cooperate directly with their Afghan counterparts to establish operating procedures for the bridge. The bridge is now accepting all truck traffic that previously crossed on the ferry, and operating hours were recently doubled to eight Qthe ferry, and operating hours were recently doubled to eight hours a day. Pedestrian traffic continues to cross by ferry. CENTCOM THEATER SECURITY COOPERATION -------------- ¶15. (U//FOUO) Current security assistance programs focus on improving capability of the Tajikistan armed forces in the areas of tactical and strategic communications, emergency response, English language, and in building a future leadership with Western principles. FMF/IMET funding levels for FY07 are $250K/$343K, DoS requested for FY08 $675/$565K, and DoD requested for FY 09 $600K/$700K. One security assistance project which has received considerable attention from the Minister of Defense is the delivery of 15,000 new BDU uniforms, to mark the 15th anniversary of the Republic of Tajikistan,s armed forces. The uniforms were ordered under FMF, and were on line for an on-time delivery for the parade and ceremonies on 23 February, until a shipping agent routed some of the uniforms through Uzbekistan, whose Customs Service impounded them as military contraband. Embassies Dushanbe and Tashkent are working together to convince the Uzbeks to release the cargo expeditiously. ¶16. (U) As a positive step, at the request of LTG Eikenberry, the Tajik Military Institute will begin training 30 officers from Afghanistan in January 2008. CSTC-A is funding the Afghans, travel. Nevertheless, the Tajik Ministry of Defense has requested additional equipment from the United States, including a generator and educational supplies for the Institute. CENTCOM, the ODC and CSTC-A are working to fill the request. This seems to be a sincere effort to assist in the process of building stability in Afghanistan, and stands in sharp contrast to the Tajik Border Guards' refusal to allow joint training with Afghan counterparts. ¶17. (U//FOUO) Tajikistan has also recently formally accepted the Global Peacekeeping Operations Initiative, funded at $1.5 million, with additional follow-on funding of up to $3.6 million. They formed an interagency commission, chaired by First Deputy Minister of Defense and Chief of the General Staff GEN-LT (U.S. 2 star equivalent) Ramil Nadirov, to explore the standup of a PKO unit. The Virginia National Guard allowed General Nadirov to witness first hand U.S. peacekeeping operations in Kosovo in September 2007. The commission will meet with DAO and ODC later in 2008 to formulate next steps. ¶18. (U//FOUO) The proposed CENTCOM-funded, Army Corps of Engineers contracted (Afghan-Engineer Division, AED) project to rebuild three border outposts in Southern Tajikistan has hit a snag. AED tendered bids for the contract, which was won by an Afghan firm. Yet the Border Guard Commander, GEN-MAJ (U.S. 1-star equivalent) Mirzo recently informed us that the Afghan company (or at least their workers) will not be allowed to work on the border sites, ostensibly for security reasons. This is similar to their prohibition on joint training with Afghan Border Guards. We have asked GEN-MAJ Mirzo to put his objection in writing and are working with JIACG-CN and AED on joint solutions to convince the Tajiks to reverse their decision. Not doing so puts the successful completion of this project worth $4.9 million in jeopardy. This the latest example of the Tajik State Committee for Security, motivated by suspicion of their southern neighbors, obstructing cross-border security cooperation. Proposed Talking Points -------------- ¶19. (U//FUOU) During your bilateral meetings with the President, Embassy Dushanbe recommends Commander USCENTCOM emphasize the following points. Note that in general, the Tajiks do not absorb subtle messages well, so a direct approach is recommended. For President Rahmon --(U//FOUO) Support to CENTCOM Operations - We appreciate Tajikistan's continuing support to the United States in the CENTCOM's area of responsibility. The generous SOFA, blanket overflight clearance and emergency divert agreement granted to DoD are a significant gesture of support, save valuable time and resources, and significantly contribute to the development of a stable Afghanistan. --(U//FOUO) We welcome recent steps by Tajikistan to build Q--(U//FOUO) We welcome recent steps by Tajikistan to build Afghanistan's capacity. Specifically, we are pleased that the Tajik Ministry of Defense's Military Institute will train 30 Afghan officers beginning this month. More joint initiatives with Afghanistan are welcomed in the security arena. Integrating Tajikistan and Afghanistan economically is also vital and we and ask you to do everything possible to speed up conclusion of a power purchasing agreement to facilitate investment in regional power trade. --(U/FOUO) We stand ready to provide almost $5 million in direct aid to rebuild three border outposts in the Moskovskiy region. The project is in jeopardy due to an objection by the Tajik Border Guards concerning the Afghan contractor, which was selected using sound international business practices. We appreciate such concerns and will work to mitigate any risks you foresee and will maximize Tajik involvement through sub-contracts and direct hire of local Tajik tradesmen. We also look forward to Tajik Border Guard's direct participation in the oversight of these critical infrastructure projects. --(U//FOUO) We are pleased to hear that commercial vehicles continue to transit across the newly-completed bridge. This is a positive first step and while we understand the need for security, we encourage further use of the bridge to its full capacity. The United States plans to share the assessment report from U.S. Customs and Border Protection when it is finalized and hopes to offer a mentoring team of CBP officers to share experience when the port facility is finished. Please also remain aware of the continued need to closely cooperate with relevant agencies on the Afghan side of the border. --(U//FOUO) Regarding economic development, supporting growth of small and medium enterprises and reducing barriers to investment, such as corruption, will render significant long term benefits for Tajikistan. Misuse of funds in the Central Bank and from other sources to support the failing cotton sector and to fund show-projects like new palaces undermines your credibility, and reduces donor interest in supporting your government. --(U//FOUO) Likewise, the international community values adherence to human rights obligations -- religious expression, media freedom, minority rights, civil society and education -- as much as it values military security. Stifling POLITICAL pluralism and religious expression, and doing nothing to stop high-level corruption, will eventually destabilize Tajikistan. --(U/FOUO) Having already committed significant funding to Drug Control, Border Security and Counter Narcotics efforts, we would like to see additional results including arrests and convictions at all levels. Low-level seizures and confiscations are not an adequate indicator of our true, joint success in these areas. Proposed Speaking Points for Press Opportunity -------------- --- ¶20. (U) The Tajik media is largely self-censoring and as such will probably not ask difficult or stumping questions. This is an excellent opportunity to relay the below messages on behalf of the Country Team, as well as engage a generally neutral-friendly audience, who gains most of its information from the Russian media. --(U) If asked again about U.S. intentions regarding Ayni airfield (southwest of Dushanbe, recently refurbished with Indian assistance but not yet fully transferred to the Tajiks): The United states welcomes regional stability and cooperation just as we enjoy good cooperation with Tajikistan. We also recognize Tajikistan's sovereign right to cooperate with other partners, which is apparently ongoing at Ayni. We have no intentions of interfering with those security cooperation efforts. --(U) We consider Central Asians themselves at the center of our approach to this part of the world, and we reject any notions that Central Asia is merely an arena for outside Qnotions that Central Asia is merely an arena for outside powers to compete for influence. Tajikistan is not the object of America's geopolitical struggles with anyone. We aim to support your goal of an independent nation whose citizens have the opportunity to realize their destiny. This is why we funded and constructed a $38 million dollar bridge along with associated Border Control and Customs facilities, to facilitate legal traffic and trade between Tajikistan and Afghanistan. --(U) The United States considers security to be not just an issue of military capability; rather we believe that democratic and economic development and the respect for human rights are essential for long-term stability. This is why DOD training includes some "non-military" topics such as fighting corruption. --(U) Tajikistan is an extremely important country to the United States for several reasons: --Americans take particular interest in helping emerging nations such as Tajikistan achieve their own goals of independence. --Tajikistan faces significant transnational threats that are important to regional and international stability. Of primary significance to both Tajikistan and the United States is the future of Afghanistan. --It is in U.S. interests to join Tajikistan and its regional partners in combating these threats and further supporting Tajikistan's development and strategic options. ¶21. (U) POC: Lieutenant Colonel Dan Green, USA, Defense and Army Attache, USDAO Dushanbe, Voice: (992)(37) 229-2701, Cell: (992) (93) 570-7030, classified email: digredy(AT)dia.smil.mil or GreenDR2(AT)state.sgov.gov. Unclass email: SIPDIS GreenDR2(AT)state.gov. HUSHEK