IRELAND WILLING TO CONSIDER RESETTLING GUANTANAMO

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 DUBLIN 000436

SIPDIS

S/WCI FOR AMB. WILLIAMSON

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/25/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV PREF CJAN EUN KJUS KTIA EI
SUBJECT: IRELAND WILLING TO CONSIDER RESETTLING GUANTANAMO
DETAINEES

REF: DUBLIN 223

Classified By: Acting Pol/Econ Chief Dwight Nystrom. Reasons 1.4 (b/d)
.


1. (S) Summary: On July 15, 2008 Ambassador-at Large for War
Crimes Issues Clint Williamson met Michael Flahive, Assistant
Secretary in the Irish Department of Justice, Equality and
Law Reform, and Darach Mac Fhoinnbhairr (MAC-FIN-BAR),
Director, America,s Section, Department of Foreign Affairs
to determine whether Ireland would consider resettling
detainees from the U.S. military base at Guantanamo Bay.
Both officials raised genuine concerns, but agreed to
consider the case files of 23 low-threat detainees who cannot
be returned to their home countries for fear that they will
be tortured or killed. Mac Fhionnbhairr commented that the
Minister of Foreign Affairs had already decided to consider
the resettlement, though the Minister of Justice would be the
final arbiter. The GOI has not yet decided to accept
detainees; however, they are willing to look at a dossier of
detainees and are actively considering the request.
Williamson's demarche was an encouraging start. End summary.

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The View of the Justice Department
--------------


2. (S) During his meeting with Flahive, Ambassador Williamson
reviewed the status of the Guantanamo detainees, noting that
23 of the 270 detainees have been cleared by the Department
of Defense for transfer or release, but could not be returned
to their home countries for fear of mistreatment. This group
includes 16 Uighurs, four Uzbeks, an Egyptian, a Somali, and
a West Bank Palestinian. Williamson proposed the
resettlement of one or more individuals (to be determined by
the GoI) in Ireland.


3. (S) Flahive asked what would be required of Ireland.
Williamson replied that Ireland would need to apply its own
law, possible job and language training, and maintain contact
with the individuals to ensure that they did not slip back
into a terrorist mold for lack of other opportunities.
(Note: Ireland has a very effective refugee resettlement
program run by the Reception and Integration Agency in the
Department of Justice, Equality and Law Reform. End note.)
In response to Flahive's statement that Ireland will not want
anyone who did not want to be relocated to Ireland,
Williamson assured him that no detainee would be resettled
involuntarily.


4. (S) Williamson pointed out that a number of issues raised
by Flahive would have to worked through, such as
international travel allowances/restrictions; family
reunification requests; long-term medical treatment; the
radicalization threat of the detainees; and the possibility
that resettled detainees would use their freedom in Ireland
and their accessibility to a free press to harangue the
United States, or in the case of the Uighurs, China.


5. (S) Flahive noted that most of the detainees proposed for
resettlement were ethnic Uighurs and asked about China's
view. Williamson acknowledged that in the case of Albania,
where eight detainees, including five Uighurs, had been
resettled, the Chinese had protested through a diplomatic
note, though no other repercussions had been forthcoming. It
clearly has not been a long-term irritant in Chinese-Albanian
relations. Williamson went on to point out that Chinese
authorities had threatened to execute the Uighur detainees if
they were returned to China, saying that the U.S. Government
was seeking the resettlement of the Uighurs in countries such
as Ireland that can effectively resist Chinese pressure to
deport the Uighurs to China. Williamson pointed out that
other European countries were seriously considering accepting
detainees and that the EU,s foreign policy chief Javier
Solana was supportive of the effort.


6. (S) In the end, Flahive agreed to consider the case files
of the 23 lower-threat detainees. Williamson undertook to
release the confidential files on the 23 individuals to the
Government of Ireland as soon as possible. He also offered
to facilitate a visit by Irish authorities to Guantanamo to
interview any individual detainees they were considering
accepting.

--------------
The View of the Department of Foreign Affairs
--------------


7. (S) During his meeting with Mac Fhionnbhairr, Ambassador
Williamson again reviewed the status of the detainees. Mac

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Fhionnbhairr raised most of the same concerns as Flahive.
Somewhat more cautious in his statements than Flahive, Mac
Fhionnbhairr nonetheless quickly got down to the specifics of
how such a transfer would work. When Mac Fhionnbhairr asked
if the United States was making a formal request; Williamson
responded that the Irish Government should consider his
demarche such a request. As the meeting ended, Mac
Fhionnbhairr stated that Micheal Martin, Minister of Foreign
Affairs, had already decided to consider the request to take
detainees. Nonetheless, Mac Fhionnbhairr said, the final
decision would lie with Dermot Ahern, the Minister of
Justice, Equality and Law Reform. (Note: Dermot Ahern,
Foreign Minister from September 2004-May 2008, is noted for
his humanitarian initiatives. End note.)

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Comment
--------------


8. (S) The question of accepting detainees had clearly been
discussed at high levels prior to the meeting. The Irish
officials were prepared, appeared ready to listen, clearly
understood Williamson's arguments, and seemed somewhat
favorably disposed to the demarche. One of Flahive,s
staffers was toting, and used, a thick file. Flahive,
pointing out that Ireland had a robust annual refugee intake
(though UNHCR) and had accepted 11 Cuban refugees from the
United States who had been sheltering at Guantanamo (reftel),
was at pains to assure Williamson that his questions were not
intended to sound "pessimistic" about Ireland's willingness
to accept detainees. Mac Fhionnbhairr's comment that the
Minister of Foreign Affairs had already decided to consider
the resettlement was particularly telling. The GOI has not
yet decided to accept detainees; however, they are willing to
look at a dossier of detainees and are actively considering
the request. Ambassador Williamson,s demarche was an
encouraging start.


9. (S) This cable has been cleared by Ambassador Williamson.
FOLEY