KOSOVO/CHAD HIGH ON IRISH FOREIGN AFFAIRS AGENDA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 DUBLIN 000043 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/23/2018 TAGS: PGOV PREL MOPS PARM KV EI SUBJECT: KOSOVO/CHAD HIGH ON IRISH FOREIGN AFFAIRS AGENDA REF: A. DUBLIN 33 ¶B. STATE 1087 ¶C. 07 STATE 167308 Classified By: DCM Robert J. Faucher; Reasons 1.4 (B) and (D). Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) During a meeting with visiting Office Director Kathy Allegrone, Irish Foreign Affairs Political Director Rory Montgomery stated that Ireland is likely to quickly recognize a declaration of independence by Kosovo, though not without misgivings. Montgomery reaffirmed Ireland's commitment to the planned ESDP mission to Chad, but indicated it was very unlikely that Ireland would make further military contributions to the NATO force in Afghanistan. He noted that Ireland is firmly committed to the Oslo Process, which seeks to ban cluster munitions. End summary. Kosovo -------------- ¶2. (C) During her visit to Ireland January 18, EUR/WE Office Director Kathy Allegrone met with Department of Foreign Affairs Political Director Rory Montgomery, who was eager to discuss the unfolding situation in Kosovo (Ref C). Commenting that Kosovo was discussed for four hours at the recent EU Political Directors' meeting in Ljubljana, Montgomery noted that EU policy on Kosovo has gradually coalesced. For example, he said, the EU consensus agreement to push forward with the planned civilian European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) rule of law mission to Kosovo was a decision that had exceeded his expectations, though he admitted that the timing of the mission was not yet fully agreed. (Note: Montgomery said that ten Irish police officers have already applied for the ESDP mission. End note.) ¶3. (C) Montgomery commented that he perceived five groupings of EU member states on the Kosovo question. There are those nations that have few doubts and unequivocally support unilateral independence, including the French and British. A second group -- the majority of EU member states including Ireland -- are queasy about unilateral independence, but recognize that there is no better alternative. (The Irish Government, Montgomery said, sees no logical reason to oppose Kosovo's independence.) Another group -- including Sweden and the Netherlands -- have serious worries that insufficient consultation has taken place and question the legal basis for unilateral independence, but in the end they are likely to support independence. (In the meantime, Montgomery noted, this groups acts as a useful brake to slow down the process.) A fourth group is distinctly nervous and unhappy about unilateral independence, including Bulgaria, Romania and Greece. Finally, Cyprus, totally opposed, is in a group of its own. ¶4. (C) In reply to Allegrone's question about how Ireland viewed UNSC resolution 1244 and whether this would affect KFOR operations, Montgomery noted that the Irish Attorney General had determined that resolution 1244 would remain in effect until the Security Council determined otherwise. Ireland, he stated, intends to maintain its presence in KFOR. (Note: Ireland employs a "triple lock" mechanism to ensure that its overseas peacekeeping missions do not infringe on the nation's long-held policy of military neutrality. Before peacekeeping forces can be deployed, the proposed mission must have a UN mandate, be approved by relevant government departments (such as defense and foreign affairs),and authorized by the Parliament (Dail). End note.) ¶5. (C) In the end, Montgomery predicted, Ireland will quickly recognize a declaration of independence by Kosovo -- though it won't be among the first wave of nations to do so. Chad -------------- ¶6. (C) Montgomery reviewed the history of the Irish decision to participate in the ESDP mission to Chad, which began, he said, over a lunch between Irish Prime Minister (Taoiseach) Bertie Ahern and French President Sarkozy in September 2007 and culminated on November 5, 2007 with Irish Cabinet approval for the mission. He described a confluence of DUBLIN 00000043 002 OF 002 events that made Ireland's participation in the Chad mission possible, including available peacekeeping capacity from Ireland's completion of UN missions in LIBERIA and Lebanon in 2007, and no clear niche for Ireland military capabilities in the peacekeeping mission to Darfur. (Interestingly, Montgomery revealed that Irish political leaders would have preferred to engage in Darfur rather than Chad, but could not figure out how.) Montgomery reiterated that about 350 Irish peacekeeping troops will be sent to Chad and that the ESDP mission will be commanded by Irish Major General Pat Nash. While it is clear there is a role for the EU in Chad, Montgomery said, he nonetheless expressed concern that the ESDP mission was approved for only one year. He wondered how the mission could achieve success in such a short time period and what its exit strategy would be. Afghanistan -------------- ¶7. (C) When pressed by Allegrone whether Ireland could contribute more to the NATO peacekeeping effort in Afghanistan, Montgomery politely, but flatly, stated that there was little or no prospect of further Irish contributions. (Note: Ireland, a member of Partnership for Peace, currently contributes seven troops to the force in Afghanistan. End note.) Montgomery said that excess Irish peacekeeping capacity would be fully utilized in Chad. When Allegrone pointed out that there would be some perfect niches for Ireland in Afghanistan and that the peacekeeping effort there was a serious European problem, in part because of the drug trade, Montgomery admitted that there was little political stomach in Ireland for further engagement in Afghanistan. He speculated that Irish political leaders and the Irish public see Afghanistan as "too American, too NATO, and too dangerous." Oslo Process: Cluster Munitions -------------- ¶8. (C) Montgomery also raised the matter of Ireland's firm support of the Oslo Process, which seeks to ban cluster munitions (Refs A and B). (Note: Ireland is one of the founding member states of the Oslo Process. End note.) He said that Ireland would be hosting an Oslo Process conference in May 2008, at which, he anticipated, there would be considerable pressure for a complete ban. Nonetheless, he acknowledged that a total ban would make it difficult to achieve buy-in from a number of Western European nations that use cluster munitions, and voiced the opinion that, though the debate would be difficult, the final outcome would reflect a consensus view. FOLEY