TSA ASSESSMENT FINDS QATAR'S AVIATION SECURITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 DOHA 000868 SIPDIS TSA HQ FOR KIP HAWLEY AMMAN FOR TSAR BRYANT CHEVALIER ABU DHABI FOR FAA REP ROY BARNETT AND ICE FRANKFURT FOR TSA OFFICE STATE FOR EEB/JOHN BYERLY AND BRIAN SILER STATE FOR DS, DSS, DS/T/ATA, AND DS/IP E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/17/2018 TAGS: EAIR ASEC QA SUBJECT: TSA ASSESSMENT FINDS QATAR'S AVIATION SECURITY STILL LACKING REF: DOHA 820 Classified By: Amb. Joseph LeBaron for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). -------------- (C) KEY POINTS -------------- -- A November 29 to December 8 TSA assessment of Doha International Airport (DIA) found that previously identified shortcomings in meeting International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) security standards remain unaddressed. Moreover, the team assessed that boarding gate screening for flights to the U.S. remains inconsistent and judged that adequate procedures will not be sustained in TSA's absence. -- The team's assessment indicated that those security responsibilities under QATAR Airways' purview are up to standard; the Qatari police who screen the passengers continue to be problematic. -- TSA is internally discussing next steps and will send additional representatives to Doha as needed over the next few months to monitor and assess the situation and provide assistance. -------------- (C) COMMENT -------------- -- Ambassador plans to call at the earliest opportunity on the Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) Chairman, Minister of State for Interior Affairs, and QATAR Airways CEO to highlight our continued concerns over aviation security. -- Though a Secretarial Action would clearly disgruntle the Qataris and affect the bilateral relationship, Post believes such action would likely force QATAR to oversee, perform, and resource police screening properly, or contract with a private entity to fix the problem (as advocated by QATAR Airways). -- While contract screening may in time present its own set of problems, the police are clearly unable to consistently screen passengers adequately. Left unaddressed, the deficiencies in this regard will worsen as airport expansion continues and a new, much larger airport opens in a few years. -- The CAA has made incremental progress over the past year in establishing oversight mechanisms, but it remains too bureaucratically weak and unfocused to carry out proper regulatory authority. The Authority has begun hiring a small cadre of inspectors but on the whole remains overly reliant on a single expatriate security advisor for management, policy, and liaison with foreign observers such as TSA. End Key Points and Comment. ¶1. (C) A TSA team comprising Amman-based TSA Representative (TSAR) Bryant Chevalier and Frankfurt-based Transportation Security Specialists Alva Ellis and Christopher Brown visited Doha November 29 to December 8 to assess Doha International Airport (DIA) against ICAO Annex 17 security standards and inspect QATAR Airways against TSA regulations for flights to the U.S. As directed by TSA, the team spent a majority of its time at the gates where the U.S.-bound flights boarded due to continuing inconsistencies in the screening of passengers and hand-carried baggage. During two meetings with Qatari representatives toward the end of their visit, described in detail below, the TSA team emphasized the continued, serious USG concerns with general airport security, especially the boarding gate screening procedures for flights to the U.S. ¶2. (U) Qatari participants in the meetings included Deputy Director of Airport Police Essa Al-Rumaihi, CAA Vice Chairman Ibrahim Abdulgadir, CAA Security Advisor Ian Gilchrist, QATAR Airways Security Manager Benny Thomas, and two recently-hired CAA inspectors. Also participating for the USG were DCM DOHA 00000868 002 OF 004 Ratney and Econoff Fabrycky. -------------- Problem Areas, and TSA's Options -------------- ¶3. (C) During a December 4 meeting at the CAA, Chevalier provided the team's interim findings, emphasizing the consistent problems observed in sustaining required security measures at the boarding gate for flights to the U.S., to include: inadequate hand-wanding of females, inconsistent physical searches of hand-carried baggage, contamination of hand-carried baggage by returning screened items to unscreened passengers, mixing of screened and unscreened female passengers, and a lack of consistent police supervision. He emphasized that TSA HQ views the situation in QATAR as serious and is planning stepped-up engagement over the next few months to determine the sustainability of passenger screening. Planned visits to QATAR include: -- The International Industry Representative (IIR) based in Frankfurt, within 30-60 days. -- The TSAR, within 30-60 days. -- Another inspection team to review ICAO standards and procedures for flights to the U.S., within 4-6 months. ¶4. (C) Chevalier noted that if improvements are not observed, options for TSA leadership include the recommendation of a Secretarial Action, based on the open ICAO requirements and concerns over passenger screening. Underscoring that "this is very serious," he explained the process, noting that if the TSA Administrator recommends to the Secretary of Homeland Security such action, QATAR would likely face a 90-day action plan to demonstrate sustained improvements. If adequate progress is not made, the Secretary has several options available, including suspension of flights to the U.S. Chevalier concluded by noting that the inspection team's findings sufficiently established that current airport security measures are not to standard. He added that TSA would soon issue specific recommendations for Qatari authorities based on the findings. ¶5. (C) The Qatari interlocutors responded passively to the above points. Gilchrist noted that the CAA had been "reluctant to get involved in checkpoint design issues," but it is now clear that CAA must assume that level of responsibility. Al-Rumaihi reiterated points made previously about cultural sensitivities on searching women and how the police are trying to ensure consistent staffing and supervision. Abdulgadir took the team's point that sustainability is the main concern and thanked the team for its report. -------------- -------------- Security Sustainability for Flights to the U.S. Key -------------- -------------- ¶6. (C) During an outbrief December 6, Gilchrist stated that Qatar's goal with respect to flights to the U.S. is to move past the Emergency Amendment to help make the airline's commercial operations more efficient (i.e., by making sure security standards are good enough elsewhere that there does not have to be an EA and thus additional security procedures). He understood that right now TSA is generally happy with the screening for flights to the U.S., but the rest of the airport is a problem. ¶7. (C) Chevalier corrected him, stating that TSA is not satisfied with the screening procedures for flights to the U.S.; this is the primary concern. The team believes that when TSA inspectors are not present, the required security procedures will not be maintained. Even when inspectors were present, the U.S. team had to undertake corrective actions to ensure passengers were adequately screened. On the positive side, Ellis noted that passenger check-in, hold and transfer baggage screening, aircraft security, and catering security are up to standard, based on the team's assessment, but the DOHA 00000868 003 OF 004 gate screening had deficiencies every day. Chevalier informed the Qatari representatives that TSA HQ requested that the team extend its stay (to observe flights to the U.S.) through December 8, and stressed the need for fundamental changes in the airport's passenger screening. He further noted that team members would brief TSA HQ on their findings, after which TSA will communicate a way forward to the Government of Qatar. ¶8. (C) In a separate conversation with Col. Al-Rumaihi, DCM identified the quality of police screening as the fundamental ongoing problem. Al-Rumaihi appeared to understand the gravity of the situation but offered no remedy for it. He currently operates the airport with a few hundred police staff (the work of most of whom he acknowledges is inadequate),but opening the new airport in 2011 will require close to 2000 police personnel at minimum, he observed. -------------- ICAO Shortcomings Remain Unaddressed -------------- ¶9. (C) During the outbrief, Chevalier reiterated that the team focused on the deficiencies at the boarding gate for flights to the U.S. Of the nine open items from last year's assessment, one is closed (access control to the baggage area) but eight still remain open. Chevalier stressed that the primary concern remains the substandard level of screening at all the checkpoints per ICAO standards. For example, no security personnel are posted at transfer screening checkpoints to control passenger flow on the entry side, and police often misidentify which passenger sets off an alarm or do not screen all passengers. ¶10. (C) On quality control, Gilchrist noted that there is an "embryonic infrastructure" which, he acknowledged, still needs to be turned into a real program. Chevalier responded that this item could be closed in the future if implementation is effective. ¶11. (C) Turning to the other areas, Ellis reported that the risk assessment procedures item is still open, and the screening of passengers and cabin baggage is still not commensurate with ICAO standards. She noted that the hold baggage screening item is still open due to the poor quality observed at the primary screening checkpoint for originating passengers, meaning the area is still not sterile. Security should screen all baggage after it's turned over to the carrier. In response to Gilchrist's questions, Ellis acknowledged the team was satisfied with hold baggage and transfer baggage screening for the flights to the U.S. The team was also satisfied with other aspects of airport security, such as perimeter control and security lighting. ¶12. (C) Chevalier said TSA is looking for improvements, and he again offered training to help achieve security goals. He reiterated the team's concern that in the absence of U.S. inspectors deficiencies would continue. It appears to be a training, oversight, and human resourcing issue for the police; they do not have enough staff, and current staff are not doing the job or being supervised correctly. QATAR Airways has implemented the non-screening requirements of the EA for which it is individually responsible. He asked when TSA can expect to see sustainable improvements. ¶13. (C) Gilchrist responded that QATAR is a sovereign state and Annex 17 issues are between them and ICAO. He said that Qatar is under no obligation to provide a corrective action plan to the U.S. He noted ICAO had done two audits on QATAR and provided a corrective action plan, which the state of Qatar has accepted. ¶14. (C) Separately, Gilchrist asked the TSA team if the U.S. could provide sophisticated x-ray training (such as for the Smith-Heimann EDX machine in the premier lounge). Chevalier promised to look into it and respond. ¶15. (U) This cable has been cleared by TSA. DOHA 00000868 004 OF 004 LeBaron