Fraud Report - Doha

UNCLAS DOHA 000852 E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: KFRD CVIS CPAS CMGT ASEC QA SUBJECT: Fraud Report - Doha ¶1. (U) COUNTRY CONDITIONS: Qatar's population consists of a large majority of third country nationals (TCNs). NIV applicants from Bangladesh, Egypt, India, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Palestine, Philippines, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen account for a large portion of post's visa workload. No one nationality accounts for more than 30 percent of post's applicant pool. Our IV applicant pool is small but similarly diverse and growing. Post's fraud investigator verifies the documents of IV applications against known exemplars and conducts investigations of NIV applications as referred by interviewing officers. Thanks to large natural gas and petroleum resources, Qatar's economy continues to grow at a record pace, with a population now estimated at upwards of 1.7 million. This growth has brought a tremendous influx of new people to Qatar and, combined with Qatar's expansion of its natural gas exports, also fueled inflation to double digits five years in a row. With this growth and economic pressure on the working and lower classes in particular, Post's fraud workload and concerns continue to grow. We receive applications from all across the economic spectrum, from white collar to unskilled laborers. The FPU has seen growth in the number of NIV, DV and U.S. Passport fraud schemes reported in Qatar. Post's fraud investigator resigned early in the year to accept a position in another office of the embassy. We have been without fraud support for most of the reporting period. Post welcomed the arrival of the new Fraud Investigator last month, and investigations and fraud review resumed. 2.(U) NIV FRAUD: There is generally little fraud associated with applications from citizens of Qatar, with the exception of naturalized Qataris. A recent application from a family of naturalized Yemeni-Qataris appeared to be the usual shopping trip, until a review from IAFIS revealed that one of the party had been working in a liquor store in the United States and had been arrested for selling to a minor, and another member of the group had been arrested in the US for petty theft. The applicants received a second interview and were refused the visa. Among the expatriate community that applies for visas, fraud appears to be generally unsophisticated, usually involving questionable letters of employment. We have only rarely seen photo-substituted documents. Many of the oil and gas businesses in Qatar send TCN employees to the U.S. for training. Verifying the employment of the applicants is often required. Post still has problems contacting appropriate officials, and it can take many days and phone calls to confirm simple facts. H-1B and L-1 visa fraud remain areas of concern. Post continues to receive applications from Indian nationals who exaggerated their work experience when filing for an H1-B petition through friends or family in the United States. FPU returned files to DHS for companies suspected of benching, as anecdotal evidence from visa interviews suggests some applicants don't know exactly for whom they will be working and are often sent out to other companies upon arrival in the U.S. FPU/I works with the FPUs in Chennai and New Delhi to verify educational documents and other qualifications. Petitioners are also checked for applicants who have been submitted for revocation by Chennai and New Delhi for possible indicators of fraud for current cases in Doha. Post processes a high number of non-immigrant visas for domestic employees of Qatari families and government officials. These domestic employees routinely travel with their employers to the U.S. Post is aware of one specific report of domestic servant abuse involving a Qatari diplomat but otherwise has received no reports of trafficking in A3, G5 and B1 Visas. Post adheres to Department policy in requiring a signed contract between employers and their domestic employees that shows the employee is treated according to U.S. Labor Law standards. As part of our SOP with Qatar Airways, Post revoked the visas of over 50 Qatar Airways crew members who had resigned or were terminated. 3.(U) IV FRAUD: All IV petitions and applications received at post involve TCNs. Most IV beneficiaries are citizens of the Philippines or South Asian or Arab countries. All IV cases are screened by the Fraud Investigator against FPU and other post exemplars. The Fraud Investigator relies heavily on the FPUs in Manila, India, Thailand, Yemen, and Sudan, among others. Typical IV fraud usually involves applicants trying to conceal prior marriages, or in one case a marriage that had not been terminated prior to the subsequent marriage to an American. Post has had several cases of beneficiaries or petitioners being married to more than one person at the same time. 4.(U) DV FRAUD: FPU verified 10 DV visa applications during the current period. DV applicants in Doha are all TCNS who are often from high-fraud countries such as Bangladesh, Somalia, Sudan and Yemen. FPU works with U.S. Embassy counterparts in Dhaka, Sanaa, Katmandu and other posts to verify documents, especially birth certificates and education certificates. Fraud has been detected most often in the educational documents submitted to support a baccalaureate degree. Upon examination by FPUs in the country of origin, many are quickly identified as fabricated or altered to cover their lack of the required education qualification. 5.(U) ACS AND US PASSPORT FRAUD: Post continues to receive requests from foreign citizens to authenticate suspect academic credentials from online institutions who are not accredited and for whom it is difficult to determine if the "degree" holder actually earned the qualifications. "Degrees" are often notarized or certified as true copies by a notary public in the U.S. rather than through a school registrar. We recently received authentications from "Capitol University." These "degrees" are then used by the recipients to claim qualifications they do not hold and to earn a higher salary rate under Qatar's labor laws. 6.(U) ADOPTION FRAUD: None. Post received no adoption applications today in FY 2008. Adoption is not allowed in Qatar for non-Muslims. Muslims are allowed to adopt in Qatar, but this generally does not occur due to the extended nature of Qatari families and that orphans are treated as Qatari citizens upon abandonment. As such, only Muslim Qatari citizens can adopt. In limited cases, the Family Court of Qatar grants guardianship if the orphan's religious, national and cultural background matches with that of the guardian. 7.(U) ASYLUM AND OTHER DHS BENEFITS: Post receives few V92/93 cases or other DHS benefits cases. However, with the launch of Qatar Airways flights to Newark and Washington-Dulles International Airports, Post receives an increasing number of calls from Airport Immigration and Qatar Airways Transit Unit to verify the travel documents, visas and passports of transit passengers headed to the U.S. 8.(U) COOPERATION WITH HOST GOVERNMENT AUTHORITIES: The FPU and Consular Section maintain close ties with a wide range of host country officials, including Airport Immigration, the Capital Police, Qatar Airways, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of the Interior, Qatar's prison system. Cooperation is very good for TCN visa fraud. Punishments for fraud usually include possible jail time, loss of sponsorship and deportation from Qatar. Fraud among Qatari citizens is very low. 9.(U) AREAS OF PARTICULAR CONCERN: An area of particular concern is fraud emanating from third countries perpetrated by TCNs either resident in Qatar or visiting here. Qatar's current TCN population accounts for anywhere from 75 to 90 percent of Qatar's population. The Visa Unit received NIV applications from over 100 different nationalities during the previous year. Many IV cases come from high fraud countries and, as noted above, have increased in complexity and number. Post continues to see fraudulent letters for crew work on Norwegian cruise lines, although this has decreased significantly. Post received one authentic petition for a worker on Norwegian, which was probably the most scrutinized offer Norwegian has ever submitted. After thorough investigation it was found to be legitimate and the visa was issued. 10.(U) STAFFING AND TRAINING: FPU consists of one-part time Fraud Prevention Manager and one full-time Fraud Investigator (FPU/I). FPM is K. Quinn Andrus, Vice Consul, who also serves as Visa Unit Chief. FPU/I is Arshad Karim. FPM attended the FPM course at FSI in 2007. LEBARON