SCENESETTER FOR SPECIAL ENVOY WILLIAMSON'S VISIT

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 DOHA 000817 SIPDIS FOR SPECIAL ENVOY RICHARD WILLIAMSON FROM AMBASSADOR LEBARON E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/19/2018 TAGS: PREL PHUM QA SU SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR SPECIAL ENVOY WILLIAMSON'S VISIT TO QATAR REF: DOHA 760 Classified By: Ambassador Joseph E. LeBaron, for reasons 1.4 (b, d). ¶1. (C) Embassy Doha welcomes your visit to Qatar. We have requested host-country meetings for you with the Amir, the Prime Minister (also officially the Foreign Minister),and Minister of State for Foreign Affairs (and de facto Foreign Minister) Ahmed Al-Mahmoud. It is Al-Mahmoud who by all appearances has lead on the Qatari Initiative on Darfur. ¶2. (C) We know that your focus is Sudan. But we thought you might find useful our views on Qatar, and how your visit can best advance the U.S. Government's strategic objectives in Qatar. We also discuss the key strategic trends in the bilateral relationship over the coming three years. We start below with a brief review of the bilateral relationship. -------------- THE U.S.-QATAR RELATIONSHIP -------------- ¶3. (C) The breadth and depth of Qatar's relationship with The U.S. is impressive, especially for a country the size of Connecticut, with only 1.7 million inhabitants, of whom only about 225,000 are actually Qatari citizens. -- Because it is so small and its energy resources so large, Qatar now has an annual per capita income of over $60,000. Even through the current global financial crisis, Qatar's national revenues will continue growing, and Qatar should soon have the highest per capita income in the world. -- Vast wealth has bolstered the country's political ambitions, leading to Qatari foreign policy initiatives that too often been at odds with U.S. objectives. Examples include Qatar's relations with Hamas, Hezbollah, Iran, and Syria. -- During Qatar's 2006-07 stint on the UN Security Council, the U.S. often found its behavior maddening, and Qatar's support for major U.S. policy initiatives, especially on Iran, tepid at best. -- Until recently, Qatar was not fully cooperative in intelligence sharing and combating terrorism financing, which also led to tensions with Washington. -- At the political level, the bilateral relationship has been cold, driven initially by Al Jazeera coverage of Operation Iraqi Freedom, though fueled as well by Qatar's foreign policy. The Amir has not enjoyed a good relationship with the current Administration, and he is hoping the incoming team will reach out to him. -- In contrast to the political relationship, the U.S.-Qatar military relationship is solid. Qatar provides the U.S. military exceptional access to two major Qatari military installations, Al Udaid Air Base and Camp As-Saliyeh - two of CENTCOM's most important operating installations outside of Iraq. Qatar charges us no rent, and in fact is funding over $700 million in construction projects for the exclusive use of the U.S. military. -- The U.S.-Qatar economic relationship is vital. U.S. energy companies have invested tens of billions of dollars in the oil and gas industry here. Qatar, which holds the third largest natural gas reserves in the world after Iran and Russia, is expected to become in 2009 one of the most important suppliers of imported liquefied natural gas (LNG) to the U.S. market. -- Our educational and cultural relationship with Qatar is strong and growing. Qatar has committed itself like few other Arab states to modernizing its educational system, and has turned decisively to the United States for help. Qatar has imported branch campuses of six U.S. universities, including Texas A&M, Carnegie-Mellon, Weill-Cornell Medical School, Georgetown, Virginia Commonwealth, and Northwestern. At the elementary and secondary levels it is instituting a U.S. model of charter schools. -- Al Jazeera, the television network with an Arabic-speaking DOHA 00000817 002 OF 004 audience of some 60 million, is based on Qatar and funded by the Amir. The network's biased coverage, particularly of issues important to the U.S., has long been an irritant in our bilateral relationship. We nevertheless recognize the value of appearing on Al Jazeera in order to ensure that official U.S. voices are heard in the Arab world. Because it is funded by the Amir, Al Jazeera avoids reporting critical of Qatar. In any event, it remains an excellent source of outreach to Arab speakers around the world on Sudan, Darfur, and other issues. -------------- -------------- QATAR'S STRATEGY OF BALANCING COMPETING INTERESTS -------------- -------------- ¶4. (C) The Amir's family, the Al Thanis, have ruled Qatar for more than a century. Given the small size of Qatar and a desire to stay in power, the Al Thani family does its best to stay on good terms with larger regional players, such as Iran and Saudi Arabia. While the relationship with Riyadh had been strained following perceptions in the Kingdom that Al Jazeera's coverage of the Saudi royal family was unflattering, leading the Saudis a few years ago to pull their ambassador, a Saudi Ambassador returned to Doha early this year. ¶5. (S) The Qataris deeply distrust Iran and oppose that neighbor's nuclear weapons program. But sharing the third largest natural gas reserves in the world with Iran (under the Gulf) obliges the Qatari leadership to maintain a "working relationship" with Tehran. As an example of the balancing act Qatar plays with Iran -- and other relationships -- Qatar will not close the one Iranian bank serving Qatar, as we have asked. Nor, however, will Qatar allow Iran to open additional banks, as we expect the Iranians would like. Instead, in classic Qatari fashion, the government announced it had granted permission -- on the same day our Treasury Secretary visited Doha in June -- to the sole operating Iranian bank to open a second branch. Such behavior does not satisfy either the U.S. or Iran, but it exemplifies how the Al Thani leadership tries to maintain balance between competing interests. (Think also of Qatar's relations with Iran juxtaposed to the considerable U.S. military presence in Qatar.) ¶6. (S) Qatar's contacts with both Israel (which maintains an overt diplomatic presence in Doha) and Hamas are consistent with the current Amir's stated desire to have good relations and contacts with everyone. The Qatari leadership also appears to calculate that maintaining relations with bad actors such as Hezbollah and the Iranians helps ensure Qatar's security by serving as an insurance policy against attack -- a real concern given Qatar's hosting of U.S. military personnel and the perception of this by extremist elements in the region. -------------- -------------- THE TREND FOR INCREASED DIPLOMATIC ACTIVISM BY QATAR -------------- -------------- ¶7. (C) Qatar, led by the Amir and Prime Minister, successfully mediated the Lebanese conflict in June, to much acclaim in the region. In doing so, the Qatari leadership reaffirmed its belief that Qatar's policy of getting along with everyone has its rewards. The parties to the Lebanese conflict were brought to Doha and lodged in the Sheraton Hotel. Senior Qatari officials, including the Prime Minister and Amir, shuttled back and forth between various hotel rooms in a coordinated effort to narrow the gaps between the parties. The Qataris were at pains to convince Hezbollah to sign on to the draft agreement that the other parties, in some cases begrudgingly, had accepted. That changed when the Amir made separate calls to the Presidents of Syria and Iran and asked for them to bring Hezbollah's leadership to heed. They did, and Qatar's leaders drew three important conclusions: (1) a small state getting along with everyone can accomplish what larger states (Jordan, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia in the Lebanese example) cannot; (2) good relations with bad actors (in this case Syria nd Iran) can lead to tangible and beneficial reslts for the region and the world; and (3) resolvig the Lebanese conflict increased regional stabiity and paid dividends for Qatar's own security an global standing. We would also draw the concluion that DOHA 00000817 003 OF 004 financial resources, which Qatar has in abundance, can also help pave the way to resolutions of disputes. ¶8. (C) Considering Qatar's vast wealth (Qatar has yet to fully ramp up its natural gas production),its growing confidence in mediating disputes and the prestige that such involvement brings, we expect Qatar will continue to carve out a regional diplomatic role for itself in the coming years. A few of Qatar's initiatives have foundered, including an effort to mediate a ceasefire between the Yemeni government and the Shia' Houthi rebels in the north. A half-hearted attempt to bring Hamas and Fatah rivals together also yielded nothing. ¶9. (C) Qatar, with a population of fewer than 250,000 citizens, will never be a military power. Having its sites set on regional diplomacy and mediation is quite realistic, however. Qatar is building large numbers of hotels and conference facilities. Already, influential Qataris express concern about what they will do with all the money that is projected to accrue in the coming years. Putting that money to the global good, and improving the stability in a turbulent region where Qatar's military resources are meager, makes inherent sense. What resources Qatar is putting into its military are aimed at providing airlift capacity for humanitarian interventions. Qatar in the coming months will take possession of U.S.-supplied C-17 aircraft, and it is well possible that Qatar may seek to use those aircraft to bolster tangibly its diplomatic initiatives, such as by supplying humanitarian needs in Africa. -------------- HOW YOUR VISIT CAN ADVANCE EMBASSY STRATEGY -------------- ¶10. (C) The Embassy views your visit as an exceptional opportunity to help put the bilateral political relationship, at the juncture of two U.S. administrations, on positive trajectory. Building on the successful Lebanese mediation, the GOQ appears serious about trying to resolve the Darfur conflict in concert with the Arab League, African Union, United Nations and other partners. The Qataris would welcome a public U.S. endorsement of their effort and our partnership. Al-Mahmoud has told the Ambassador he is realistic about the difficulty of achieving an agreement, but that for humanitarian reasons Qatar will not be deterred from forging ahead no matter how long it takes. ¶11. (C) Qatari officials acknowledge that Sudan is not Lebanon (where many Qataris maintain homes and have long personal experience) and as such need help and guidance from other countries. In response to concerns that Qatar's initiative on Darfur may be another means of trying to rehabilitate Bashir, the Qataris maintain this is not the case. They seem to have come around to the view that Bashir and his government must take some actions up front. While the GOQ acknowledges that some deferral of Article 16 proceedings may be necessary to bring Bashir to Doha, in the event that talks take place here, they appear to accept for now that such a decision is well down the road. ¶12. (C) Your visit is a timely answer to Qatari perceptions that the U.S. is largely absent on the Qatari Darfur initiative. Senior Qatari officials have taken note that your counterparts from Canada and the UK have both visited Doha in recent weeks. Of higher profile, France's Special Envoy, Issa Maraut, has been posted to the French Embassy in Doha and expects to remain here at least until December. Maraut, with whom you last met in March, is eager to meet with you here. Reftel provides his earlier views on the Qatari Initiative. In that conversation with us, he was more encouraged than discouraged by the Qatari approach. ¶13. (C) Your assuring the Qataris that we want them to succeed, while gently guiding them to the right paths for success on Darfur, will not only increase the prospects for success in Sudan, but could help put the U.S.-Qatari relationship on a more positive trajectory. On the heels of visits by the UK and Indian Prime Ministers in the past month, and Qatar's not being invited to the November 15 G-20 Summit, Qatar perceives a growing disconnect between Doha and Washington at the highest levels. Your visit comes at a time when the GOQ is focused on the incoming Administration in DOHA 00000817 004 OF 004 Washington and the continuity -- or lack thereof -- in U.S. policies after January 20. It will be important that you stress the broad consensus in the USG, both the Executive Branch and Congress, on moving forward on Darfur and that you are prepared to respond to concerns about what support the incoming Administration will likely give. ¶14. (C) While the military, commercial and educational relationships the U.S. maintains with Qatar are excellent, the political relationship will take a concerted effort to improve. In giving Qatar our support for the ongoing initiative -- which they will pursue regardless of the U.S. view -- and the benefit of our advice, you can ensure that the Qataris at least take heed of U.S. views on this issue, and perhaps set the stage an improved political climate in a bilateral relationship of increasing importance on many fronts. LeBaron