SCENESETTER FOR SPECIAL ENVOY WILLIAMSON'S VISIT

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 DOHA 000817

SIPDIS

FOR SPECIAL ENVOY RICHARD WILLIAMSON FROM AMBASSADOR LEBARON

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/19/2018
TAGS: PREL PHUM QA SU
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR SPECIAL ENVOY WILLIAMSON'S VISIT
TO QATAR

REF: DOHA 760

Classified By: Ambassador Joseph E. LeBaron, for reasons 1.4 (b, d).


1. (C) Embassy Doha welcomes your visit to Qatar. We have
requested host-country meetings for you with the Amir, the
Prime Minister (also officially the Foreign Minister),and
Minister of State for Foreign Affairs (and de facto Foreign
Minister) Ahmed Al-Mahmoud. It is Al-Mahmoud who by all
appearances has lead on the Qatari Initiative on Darfur.


2. (C) We know that your focus is Sudan. But we thought you
might find useful our views on Qatar, and how your visit can
best advance the U.S. Government's strategic objectives in
Qatar. We also discuss the key strategic trends in the
bilateral relationship over the coming three years. We start
below with a brief review of the bilateral relationship.

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THE U.S.-QATAR RELATIONSHIP
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3. (C) The breadth and depth of Qatar's relationship with The
U.S. is impressive, especially for a country the size of
Connecticut, with only 1.7 million inhabitants, of whom only
about 225,000 are actually Qatari citizens.

-- Because it is so small and its energy resources so large,
Qatar now has an annual per capita income of over $60,000.
Even through the current global financial crisis, Qatar's
national revenues will continue growing, and Qatar should
soon have the highest per capita income in the world.

-- Vast wealth has bolstered the country's political
ambitions, leading to Qatari foreign policy initiatives that
too often been at odds with U.S. objectives. Examples
include Qatar's relations with Hamas, Hezbollah, Iran, and
Syria.

-- During Qatar's 2006-07 stint on the UN Security Council,
the U.S. often found its behavior maddening, and Qatar's
support for major U.S. policy initiatives, especially on
Iran, tepid at best.

-- Until recently, Qatar was not fully cooperative in
intelligence sharing and combating terrorism financing, which
also led to tensions with Washington.

-- At the political level, the bilateral relationship has
been cold, driven initially by Al Jazeera coverage of
Operation Iraqi Freedom, though fueled as well by Qatar's
foreign policy. The Amir has not enjoyed a good relationship
with the current Administration, and he is hoping the
incoming team will reach out to him.

-- In contrast to the political relationship, the U.S.-Qatar
military relationship is solid. Qatar provides the U.S.
military exceptional access to two major Qatari military
installations, Al Udaid Air Base and Camp As-Saliyeh - two of
CENTCOM's most important operating installations outside of
Iraq. Qatar charges us no rent, and in fact is funding over
$700 million in construction projects for the exclusive use
of the U.S. military.

-- The U.S.-Qatar economic relationship is vital. U.S.
energy companies have invested tens of billions of dollars in
the oil and gas industry here. Qatar, which holds the third
largest natural gas reserves in the world after Iran and
Russia, is expected to become in 2009 one of the most
important suppliers of imported liquefied natural gas (LNG)
to the U.S. market.

-- Our educational and cultural relationship with Qatar is
strong and growing. Qatar has committed itself like few
other Arab states to modernizing its educational system, and
has turned decisively to the United States for help. Qatar
has imported branch campuses of six U.S. universities,
including Texas A&M, Carnegie-Mellon, Weill-Cornell Medical
School, Georgetown, Virginia Commonwealth, and Northwestern.
At the elementary and secondary levels it is instituting a
U.S. model of charter schools.

-- Al Jazeera, the television network with an Arabic-speaking

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audience of some 60 million, is based on Qatar and funded by
the Amir. The network's biased coverage, particularly of
issues important to the U.S., has long been an irritant in
our bilateral relationship. We nevertheless recognize the
value of appearing on Al Jazeera in order to ensure that
official U.S. voices are heard in the Arab world. Because it
is funded by the Amir, Al Jazeera avoids reporting critical
of Qatar. In any event, it remains an excellent source of
outreach to Arab speakers around the world on Sudan, Darfur,
and other issues.

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QATAR'S STRATEGY OF BALANCING COMPETING INTERESTS
-------------- --------------


4. (C) The Amir's family, the Al Thanis, have ruled Qatar for
more than a century. Given the small size of Qatar and a
desire to stay in power, the Al Thani family does its best to
stay on good terms with larger regional players, such as Iran
and Saudi Arabia. While the relationship with Riyadh had
been strained following perceptions in the Kingdom that Al
Jazeera's coverage of the Saudi royal family was
unflattering, leading the Saudis a few years ago to pull
their ambassador, a Saudi Ambassador returned to Doha early
this year.


5. (S) The Qataris deeply distrust Iran and oppose that
neighbor's nuclear weapons program. But sharing the third
largest natural gas reserves in the world with Iran (under
the Gulf) obliges the Qatari leadership to maintain a
"working relationship" with Tehran. As an example of the
balancing act Qatar plays with Iran -- and other
relationships -- Qatar will not close the one Iranian bank
serving Qatar, as we have asked. Nor, however, will Qatar
allow Iran to open additional banks, as we expect the
Iranians would like. Instead, in classic Qatari fashion, the
government announced it had granted permission -- on the same
day our Treasury Secretary visited Doha in June -- to the
sole operating Iranian bank to open a second branch. Such
behavior does not satisfy either the U.S. or Iran, but it
exemplifies how the Al Thani leadership tries to maintain
balance between competing interests. (Think also of Qatar's
relations with Iran juxtaposed to the considerable U.S.
military presence in Qatar.)


6. (S) Qatar's contacts with both Israel (which maintains an
overt diplomatic presence in Doha) and Hamas are consistent
with the current Amir's stated desire to have good relations
and contacts with everyone. The Qatari leadership also
appears to calculate that maintaining relations with bad
actors such as Hezbollah and the Iranians helps ensure
Qatar's security by serving as an insurance policy against
attack -- a real concern given Qatar's hosting of U.S.
military personnel and the perception of this by extremist
elements in the region.

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THE TREND FOR INCREASED DIPLOMATIC ACTIVISM BY QATAR
-------------- --------------


7. (C) Qatar, led by the Amir and Prime Minister,
successfully mediated the Lebanese conflict in June, to much
acclaim in the region. In doing so, the Qatari leadership
reaffirmed its belief that Qatar's policy of getting along
with everyone has its rewards. The parties to the Lebanese
conflict were brought to Doha and lodged in the Sheraton
Hotel. Senior Qatari officials, including the Prime Minister
and Amir, shuttled back and forth between various hotel rooms
in a coordinated effort to narrow the gaps between the
parties. The Qataris were at pains to convince Hezbollah to
sign on to the draft agreement that the other parties, in
some cases begrudgingly, had accepted. That changed when the
Amir made separate calls to the Presidents of Syria and Iran
and asked for them to bring Hezbollah's leadership to heed.
They did, and Qatar's leaders drew three important
conclusions: (1) a small state getting along with everyone
can accomplish what larger states (Jordan, Egypt, and Saudi
Arabia in the Lebanese example) cannot; (2) good relations
with bad actors (in this case Syria nd Iran) can lead to
tangible and beneficial reslts for the region and the world;
and (3) resolvig the Lebanese conflict increased regional
stabiity and paid dividends for Qatar's own security an
global standing. We would also draw the concluion that

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financial resources, which Qatar has in abundance, can also
help pave the way to resolutions of disputes.


8. (C) Considering Qatar's vast wealth (Qatar has yet to
fully ramp up its natural gas production),its growing
confidence in mediating disputes and the prestige that such
involvement brings, we expect Qatar will continue to carve
out a regional diplomatic role for itself in the coming
years. A few of Qatar's initiatives have foundered,
including an effort to mediate a ceasefire between the Yemeni
government and the Shia' Houthi rebels in the north. A
half-hearted attempt to bring Hamas and Fatah rivals together
also yielded nothing.


9. (C) Qatar, with a population of fewer than 250,000
citizens, will never be a military power. Having its sites
set on regional diplomacy and mediation is quite realistic,
however. Qatar is building large numbers of hotels and
conference facilities. Already, influential Qataris express
concern about what they will do with all the money that is
projected to accrue in the coming years. Putting that money
to the global good, and improving the stability in a
turbulent region where Qatar's military resources are meager,
makes inherent sense. What resources Qatar is putting into
its military are aimed at providing airlift capacity for
humanitarian interventions. Qatar in the coming months will
take possession of U.S.-supplied C-17 aircraft, and it is
well possible that Qatar may seek to use those aircraft to
bolster tangibly its diplomatic initiatives, such as by
supplying humanitarian needs in Africa.

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HOW YOUR VISIT CAN ADVANCE EMBASSY STRATEGY
--------------


10. (C) The Embassy views your visit as an exceptional
opportunity to help put the bilateral political relationship,
at the juncture of two U.S. administrations, on positive
trajectory. Building on the successful Lebanese mediation,
the GOQ appears serious about trying to resolve the Darfur
conflict in concert with the Arab League, African Union,
United Nations and other partners. The Qataris would welcome
a public U.S. endorsement of their effort and our
partnership. Al-Mahmoud has told the Ambassador he is
realistic about the difficulty of achieving an agreement, but
that for humanitarian reasons Qatar will not be deterred from
forging ahead no matter how long it takes.


11. (C) Qatari officials acknowledge that Sudan is not
Lebanon (where many Qataris maintain homes and have long
personal experience) and as such need help and guidance from
other countries. In response to concerns that Qatar's
initiative on Darfur may be another means of trying to
rehabilitate Bashir, the Qataris maintain this is not the
case. They seem to have come around to the view that Bashir
and his government must take some actions up front. While
the GOQ acknowledges that some deferral of Article 16
proceedings may be necessary to bring Bashir to Doha, in the
event that talks take place here, they appear to accept for
now that such a decision is well down the road.


12. (C) Your visit is a timely answer to Qatari perceptions
that the U.S. is largely absent on the Qatari Darfur
initiative. Senior Qatari officials have taken note that
your counterparts from Canada and the UK have both visited
Doha in recent weeks. Of higher profile, France's Special
Envoy, Issa Maraut, has been posted to the French Embassy in
Doha and expects to remain here at least until December.
Maraut, with whom you last met in March, is eager to meet
with you here. Reftel provides his earlier views on the
Qatari Initiative. In that conversation with us, he was more
encouraged than discouraged by the Qatari approach.


13. (C) Your assuring the Qataris that we want them to
succeed, while gently guiding them to the right paths for
success on Darfur, will not only increase the prospects for
success in Sudan, but could help put the U.S.-Qatari
relationship on a more positive trajectory. On the heels of
visits by the UK and Indian Prime Ministers in the past
month, and Qatar's not being invited to the November 15 G-20
Summit, Qatar perceives a growing disconnect between Doha and
Washington at the highest levels. Your visit comes at a time
when the GOQ is focused on the incoming Administration in

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Washington and the continuity -- or lack thereof -- in U.S.
policies after January 20. It will be important that you
stress the broad consensus in the USG, both the Executive
Branch and Congress, on moving forward on Darfur and that you
are prepared to respond to concerns about what support the
incoming Administration will likely give.


14. (C) While the military, commercial and educational
relationships the U.S. maintains with Qatar are excellent,
the political relationship will take a concerted effort to
improve. In giving Qatar our support for the ongoing
initiative -- which they will pursue regardless of the U.S.
view -- and the benefit of our advice, you can ensure that
the Qataris at least take heed of U.S. views on this issue,
and perhaps set the stage an improved political climate in a
bilateral relationship of increasing importance on many
fronts.
LeBaron