QATAR SHOWING INCREASED ATTENTION TO ENERGY

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 DOHA 000075 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPT OF ENERGY PASS TO A/S KKOLEVAR, COS KUPFER S/CT FOR BAVERILL DS/ATA FOR KMALOY E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/16/2037 TAGS: ENRG PTER PREL PGOV ECON ETTC EAID EAGR EFIN ASEC, EPET, EINV, TRGY, QA SUBJECT: QATAR SHOWING INCREASED ATTENTION TO ENERGY INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION BUT STILL NON-COMMITTAL ON CEIP Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Michael A. Ratney, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (S) Summary: Department of Energy Assistant Secretary for Electricity Delivery and Energy Reliability, Kevin Kolevar; DOE Secretary Bodman's Chief of Staff Jeff Kupfer; Pol/Econ Chief and Poloff met with Minister of State for Energy and Industry Dr. Mohammed Saleh Al-Sada and Qatar Petroleum Director of the Industrial Security Directorate, Brigadier Abdulaziz Al-Ansari, January 22 on the margins of Energy Secretary Bodman's visit to Qatar. A/S Kolevar and COS Kupfer underscored the current threat to critical energy infrastructure and the need for greater security due to the global implications from any attack. They offered a USG technical assessment of infrastructure vulnerabilities in Qatar and recommended moving forward urgently on the assessment. The Minister of State expressed interest in USG technical assistance; however, Al-Ansari cautioned that any cooperation would have to wait until his staff was fully constituted. End Summary. -------------- Concerns Noted -------------- ¶2. (S) Minister for State Al-Sada echoed A/S Kolevar's concerns regarding security and protection of energy infrastructure in Qatar, identifying two main threats to Qatar's energy sector: external (e.g. terrorist threats from Al-Qa'ida) and internal threats from the large number of unskilled third-country laborers employed on Qatari work sites. The Minister of State identified the number one GOQ concern as the exposure of infrastructure vulnerabilities and consequent risks to industrial facilities. The current GOQ priority, he said, was strengthening security at facilities throughout the country, focusing initially on critical energy infrastructure at the three main industrial centers of Ras Laffan Industrial City, Dukhan and Messiad. -------------- Qatari Strategic Security Initiatives -------------- ¶3. (S) According to Al-Sada, the Heir Apparent recently established an Industrial Security Steering Committee under the Ministry of Interior charged with managing the current nationwide industrial security apparatus and improving security capacity. The creation of the steering committee was part of the Heir Apparent's strategic security initiatives, including the planned establishment of an integrated National Crisis Center (NCC) and development of the National Security Shield (NSS). The NCC would provide coordinated command and control of security and civil defense units in response to national emergencies, while the NSS would create a series of interconnected fixed and mobile radar platforms to identify threats by sea, air and land. -------------- Security's Expanded Importance -------------- ¶4. (S) The Minister of State explained that the complexities of the security situation and the growth of industrial facilities had changed the nature of infrastructure protection. No longer was security an ancillary function - responsible only for entry/exit control and loss-prevention - it now encompassed planning, development and implementation of a long-term strategy. He identified the need for proactive security planning and operations in providing for business continuity and the establishment of continuity of operations (COOP) sites in the event of terrorist, occupational or natural disaster incidents. Al-Sada touted the creation of a single, structured and tiered response plan that delineated the coordination among various industrial companies, QP Security, MOI police, Internal Security Forces, and the Qatari Armed Forces. The plan incorporated individual company security plans (e.g. Conoco-Phillips, Exxon-Mobil, QatarGas, etc),and would be used in bi-annual exercises conducted by the individual companies, explained Al-Sada. -------------- QP Security: Continued Staffing Issues -------------- ¶5. (S) Brigadier General Al-Ansari, a career MOI police DOHA 00000075 002 OF 002 officer, said he was still attempting to establish the right mix of qualified people on his staff to carry out the recommendations made by a U.S. security consulting firm that had made recommendations on improvements to Qatar's newly created steering committee. He said U.S. assistance could not occur before he had established an effective operational staff. (Note: In several meetings with the Charge d'Affaires since July 2007, Al-Ansari has made this same argument.) As a start, Al-Ansari offered that he had 300 applicants who had been approved for industrial security positions. He shared his philosophy that improving security required a parallel approach with the incorporation of technology and building a trained force of security professionals. Both Al-Sada and Al-Ansari agreed that the demand for trained personnel was greater than the current capacity to supply and train them. The Minister of State maintained that the Security Academy at College of the North Atlantic-Qatar (CNAQ) was doing a good job in training staff, but that the demand outpaced the academy's capacity of supply. -------------- Urgency Explained and a Way Forward -------------- ¶6. (S) In response, A/S Kolevar reinforced the need for urgency in establishing a CEIP program in Qatar, stating that a new U.S. administration would take six months to a year to gain knowledge sufficient to re-engage on an assistance program. The benefit of moving forward on a program within the next year would be the continuity Embassy staff and current DoE officials could provide. A/S Kolever recommended a formal USG assessment by summer 2008 of Qatar's needs, especially with respect to training, as the next step forward. The Qataris were non-committal. Post recommends a letter from Secretary Bodman to the Qatari Energy Minister following up on this visit and urging early engagement on CEIP. ¶7. (U) This message has been cleared by A/S Kolevar. RATNEY