SCENESETTER FOR AIR FORCE SECRETARY DONLEY

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 DOHA 000706 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/29/2018 TAGS: PREL MOPS PGOV QA SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR AIR FORCE SECRETARY DONLEY REF: DOHA 664 Classified By: Ambassador Joseph E. LeBaron, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Mr. Secretary, Embassy Doha welcomes your visit to Qatar. Given the closure of the Government of Qatar through October 6 for Eid Al-Fitr, we do not yet have confirmed appointments for you. We have requested office calls for you with the Heir Apparent, Sheikh Tamim Al Thani, and the Chief of Staff of the Qatar Armed Forces, MG Hamad Al-Attiyeh. Because the time you have available for host country meetings is late on Sunday, we are likely to be offered a dinner by MG Al-Attiyeh. A meeting with Sheikh Tamim is not impossible, but unlikely. ¶2. (C) Below we provide the Country Team's views on how your visit can best advance the U.S. Government's strategic objectives in Qatar. We also discuss the key strategic trends in the military relationship that we project will continue through 2011. We start, however, with a brief review of the bilateral relationship. -------------- THE US-QATAR RELATIONSHIP -------------- ¶3. (C) The breadth and depth of Qatar's relationship with the U.S. is impressive, especially for a small country the size of Connecticut, with only 1.7 million inhabitants, of whom only about 225,000 are actually Qatari citizens. -- The U.S.-Qatar military relationship is extremely important, as you know. Qatar provides the U.S. military exceptional access to two major Qatari military installations, Al Udaid Air Base and Camp As-Saliyeh - perhaps CENTCOM's most important operating installations outside of Iraq. Qatar charges us no rent, and in fact is funding over $700 million in construction projects for the exclusive use of the U.S. military. -- The economic relationship between Qatar and the United States is vital. U.S. energy companies have invested tens of billions of dollars in the oil and gas industry here. Qatar, which holds the third largest natural gas reserves in the world after Iran and Russia, is expected to become in 2009 one of the most important suppliers of imported liquefied natural gas (LNG) to the U.S. market. -- Our cultural relationship with Qatar is strong and growing. Qatar has committed itself like few other Arab states to modernizing its educational system, and has turned decisively to the Unites States for help. Qatar has imported branch campuses of six U.S. universities, including Texas A&M, Carnegie-Mellon, Weill-Cornell Medical School, Georgetown, Virginia Commonwealth, and Northwestern. It is instituting a U.S. model of charter schools at the elementary and secondary levels. -- Because it is so small and its energy resources so large, Qatar now has an annual per capita income of over $60,000. Even with the current global financial crisis, Qatar's national revenues will continue growing, and Qatar should soon have the highest per capita income in the world. -- The U.S. government is concerned about the treatment of foreign workers in Qatar. The massive demand for foreign workers to develop the country's infrastructure often leads to exploitation and abysmal working conditions for the laborers. In fact, Qatar has been ranked Tier 3 (the lowest) in the State Department's Trafficking in Persons Report for ¶2008. -- In the US-Qatar political relationship, Qatar's foreign policy initiatives have too often been at odds with U.S. objectives, including Qatar's relations with Hamas, Hezbollah, and Sudan. Qatar's wealth also makes Qatar's citizens potential sources of money for violent extremists. Cooperative efforts to prevent these financial flows have long been on our bilateral agenda. -- Qatar has the potential to be a partner in U.S. policy initiatives to provide aid to struggling regional states, given the Qatar government's large revenues. We frequently approach them about participating financially in these initiatives. -------------- -------------- DOHA 00000706 002 OF 004 THE MILITARY RELATIONSHIP: KEY TRENDS THROUGH 2011 -------------- -------------- ¶4. (S) Following are the key trends over the next three years that we believe will have the greatest impact on our military relationship: -- Qatar will continue to modernize its military through the purchase of U.S. weapons systems, though competition will continue from the French, British, and others. Despite Qatar's wealth, Qatar's defense purchases will be made in the context of a frugal military budget. Economic development will remain Qatar's top spending priority. -- Qatar will continue to face a formidable challenge staffing its military with Qataris because there are so few Qataris and because more attractive salaries exist in the private sector. The continued dependence on foreign nationals, particularly in the enlisted ranks, will continue to present concerns about transfers of sensitive U.S. technologies. -- The Qatari leadership will seek to increase the prestige of its military within the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and the international arena, but has no clearly defined strategy for doing so. Likewise, Qatar is attracted to the latest military systems, even while its military modernization is not guided by a national security strategy, at least not one we're aware of. -- Qatar's defense purchases are currently misaligned with the maritime threats to its energy infrastructure and the ballistic missile threats it faces from Iran. But Qatar's recent C-130 and C-17 aircraft purchases do align with its desire to carve out a niche in the region and internationally for humanitarian relief and disaster response. This trend will continue. -- In the short term, irritating customs and immigration issues stemming from Qatar's need to demonstrate sovereignty over Al Udaid Air Base will continue to plague the mil-mil relationship. -- We expect that the biggest factor in our engagement through 2011 will be Qatar's sensitivity to the large, enduring U.S. military presence. While Qatar's hosting of that presence exposes it to regional criticism and, potentially, to terrorist attack, Qatar's leadership and most of the Qatari population will continue to see the U.S. military presence as an important deterrence to the aggression of surrounding states, principally Iran and Saudi Arabia. -- We expect, therefore, that Qatar will continue to pursue a policy of strengthening and deepening the military relationship through increased combined planning, training, exercises, and operations. -- The U.S. Embassy seeks to develop that relationship along the lines of the relationship that exists between the U.S. Forces in Korea and the Republic of Korea Armed Forces. -------------- -------------- HOW YOUR VISIT CAN HELP THESE STRATEGIC ENGAGEMENT GOALS -------------- -------------- ¶5. (S) PROVIDING A RESPONSE ON LAIRCM: Qatar looks to the USG for a response to Qatar's request to install Large Aircraft Infrared Counter Measures (LAIRCM) on five dedicated aircraft used by the Amir, his wife, the Heir Apparent, and the Prime Minister. Qatar originally requested the system in September 2003, over five years ago. -- DSCA is currently is unwilling to engage Qatar on the acquisition of LAIRCM. DSCA's initial concern was that the Amir's aircraft was not exclusively his; in fact, it is. Another concern involves maintenance - only citizens of certain countries are allowed to maintain the system, so this issue would also have to be addressed. -- It may be that the U.S. is reluctant to release this technology to Qatar, but this has never been officially articulated and the lack of response troubles the Qataris, who perceive a real need to protect the Amir and the senior leadership from potential threats -- which are more pronounced in their view due to the U.S. military presence in country. Your giving Qatari officials feedback on the DOHA 00000706 003 OF 004 request would mark a positive step forward. -- You should acknowledge to MG Al-Attiyah that Qatar has submitted a request for the installation of LAIRCM on five aircraft used by senior Qatari officials and offer to look into the request and provide a response. ¶6. (S) GETTING THE PATRIOT MISSILES BACK ON THE RAILS: You should encourage Sheikh Tamim to authorize us to put the Patriots back on rails, as the final decision is likely his. -- On October 15, 2007, a routine test sequence resulted in the accidental launch of a Patriot Missile from a battery at Camp As-Saylieh. The missile landed on the Qatari COS' farm a few kilometers from Camp As-Saylieh, with no injuries or property damage. U.S.-Qatari cooperation on the investigation was good and the Qataris appreciated that ADM Fallon responded quickly to their request to stand both batteries down and physically remove missiles from the launchers. -- The Qataris originally signaled that they would agree to putting the Patriot batteries back up, but first asked for the full report on the incident, temporary rules of engagement, and an analysis of the Patriots' coverage area to ensure that the city of Doha is covered and not just the military bases. -- Completion of the final report took longer than expected, but has since been briefed to senior Qatari military officers. In early September, however, we were informed that the Government of Qatar seeks to establish strategic-level rules of engagement (as opposed to tactical procedures) on exactly when, where, and how the Patriots may be used. -- We believe that the delay in the return to operational status likely boils down to Qatari sovereignty concerns. The GOQ may require the U.S. to ask for some form of permission or approval prior to firing missiles. -- LTG Dempsey and LTG North have engaged MG Al-Attiyah personally for redeployment of Patriots, but to no avail. CENTCOM and AFCENT are aware of the rules-of-engagement request and are concerned about the ramifications and precedence set by entering into such discussions. -- The current situation, however, is lose-lose for both countries in terms of security. If Sheikh Tamim's answer is that we need bilateral discussions on strategic-level rules of engagement before doing so, the Embassy will coordinate on next steps with CENTCOM. ¶7. (C) PRAISE FOR DEFENSE SALES: You should compliment Qatar for signing contacts with Boeing in July for two C-17s (with an option for two more) and with Lockheed-Martin for four C-130Js (also with an option for two more) and encourage the Qataris to continue down this positive path. Boeing anticipates initial delivery of the first C-17 in August-September 2009. -- The C-17 and C-130 sales (hybrid DCS-FMS cases) are a signal the Qataris are beginning to invest in their own defense capabilities, especially in the area of humanitarian relief. Qatar is also looking at U.S. helicopters and Hellfire II missiles as part of its National Security Shield Effort, and possibly F-16 or F-18 fighter aircraft as well as an integrated air defense system. ¶8. (C) APPRECIATION OF EFFORTS TO ADD SECOND RUNWAY AT AL UDAID: You should thank Sheikh Tamim and MG Al-Attiyah for their ongoing efforts to secure Qatari financing for this expansion. -- AFCENT has long wanted Qatar to build a second runway at Al Udaid something the Qataris had long resisted. In March, the Qataris agreed to build it and, apparently, pay for it. Final decision for payment currently rests with the Ministry of Finance. MG Al-Attiyah expects positive resolution in the near future. ¶9. (C) ENCOURAGE RESOLUTION OF ONGOING CUSTOMS ISSUES: You should note U.S. understanding that military facilities provided for U.S. use in Qatar are sovereign Qatari territory, and in this context express our desire to resolve customs problems that plague our overall bilateral strategic defense relationship. A meeting is scheduled for October 29-30 in Tampa to discuss these issues and work towards DOHA 00000706 004 OF 004 establishing permanent procedures acceptable to both sides. -- Customs problems continue to plague our working-level engagement with the Qatari Armed Forces. There have been numerous incidents in which Coalition personnel violated established Qatar customs procedures on entry or exit from the country, leading to Qatari accusations that U.S. personnel are not respecting Qatari sovereignty. These led Qatar, in March 2007, to implement troublesome new customs procedures for personnel, equipment, and cargo entering or transiting the country. -- CENTCOM J5, AFCENT, and OMC Qatar personnel held discussions with the Qatari Armed Forces in June and November 2007 and March 2008, which led to agreement on temporary procedures. Only constant, daily OMC Qatar and AFCENT interaction with the Qatar Armed Forces GHQ and Customs and Ports Authority officials prevent detrimental effects to U.S. operations. -- We regard the temporary procedures as a stepping stone for permanent procedures that respect U.S. and Qatar sovereignty, support U.S. operations and are in line with the Defense Cooperation Agreement. But in the meantime, some goodwill from the Qatari side would go a long way toward easing U.S. military operations in Qatar. LeBaron