THE NEXT 3 YEARS--AN INTERAGENCY FIELD ASSESSMENT

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 11 DOHA 000664

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/16/2018
TAGS: PREL AMGT KSPR ECON QA

SUBJECT: THE NEXT 3 YEARS--AN INTERAGENCY FIELD ASSESSMENT
OF KEY TRENDS AND STRATEGIC CHALLENGES IN QATAR

REF: A. DOHA 574

B. DOHA 558

Classified By: Amb. Joseph LeBaron, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

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Introduction
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-- (C) The long cable below reports the interagency consensus
on nine key trends in Qatar over the next 36 months, forged
in the field on September 2 during an interagency off-site
led by the Ambassador at a CENTCOM Foreign Headquarters' SCIF.

-- (C) In addition to the Embassy's Country Team members,
participants at the off-site included representatives from
CENTCOM J5, ARCENT, and senior representatives from the
National Geospatial Intelligence Agency.

-- (C) Next Steps: USG departments and agencies in Qatar will
work over the coming months to systematically synchronize USG
engagement here on eight issue areas:

a) Expansion of military cooperation
b) Further cooperation on counterterrorism
c) Coordination on aid to struggling regional states
d) Dialogue on Qatar's political and economic engagement with
Iraq
e) Information sharing on Iran
f) Al Jazeera: editorial policy and broadcast operations
g) Human Rights: Qatar's Tier 3 Trafficking in Persons
ranking
h) Deepening the commercial relationship

--- (U) Specific steps on these issue areas for USG policy
appear below in paragraph 10, "Imperatives for United States
Policy in Qatar."

End Introduction.

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POLITICAL AND DIPLOMATIC TRENDS
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1. (U) Expected trends in Qatar's internal political
situation and foreign policy over the next 36 months include:

-- (S) A continuation of a tight grip on power by the Al
Thani family, which has controlled pre- and post-independent
Qatar for 140 years.

-- (S/NF) Within the ruling family, a continuation of the
rule of Amir Hamad bin Khalifa, who overthrew his father in
1995 and who appears/appears to be in no danger of being
overthrown himself by some rival member or faction of the Al
Thani family. (Note: That said, the USG has many intelligence
gaps on the internal politics of the Al Thani family. There
are still many known unknowns. End Note.)

-- (S) The twin roles that personality and risk play in the
creation and execution of Qatar's foreign and domestic
policies will continue to be dominant.

-- (S) The strategic risks to Qatar are as much to the
ruling Al Thani family as they are to the State of Qatar. In
fact, the distinction between the State and the Al Thanis is
thin, varying, and uncertain.

-- (S) Accordingly, the foreign policy of Qatar can be
considered little more than Al Thani family policy,
determined by a few Al Thanis at the very top, led by the
Amir, Shaykh Hamad bin Khalifa, and by Shaykh Hamad bin
Jassim, who is Prime Minister and Foreign Minister.

-- (S) To put it another way, the foreign policy of this
micro-state is both personality-driven and the product of an
unceasing evaluation by the Al Thanis of the domestic and
international risks to their family's 140-year grip on power.


-- (C) Al Jazeera television, launched more than a decade
ago, put this small state on the map, and negatively so, in
the eyes of regional states. The Tunisians and Saudis, as
examples, reduced their diplomatic representation after
unflattering reports about those states' ruling families
aired on the network.
-- (C) In late 2007, Qatar moved to repair frayed
relationships. As such, Saudi Arabia returned an Ambassador
to Doha, and Tunisia has since re-opened its embassy. The
Qataris have given some assurances on toning down negative Al
Jazeera coverage, but Qatar's desire to influence events
inside and outside the region is not expected to change.

-- (C) Qatar will seek to increase its influence in the
region and in the world by leveraging its immense
energy-based wealth. It will continue to seek to place
itself in a position to act as a mediator in regional
disputes, such as the deal it recently brokered with Lebanese
political factions. It will do so not just for reasons of
pride and ego, but in order to reduce instability in the
region on the assumption that political and economic
instability is especially threatening to tiny states such as
Qatar.
-- (S) Accordingly, Qatar will continue to have a working
relationship with Iran even while it maintains a strategic
military partnership with the United States, all in an effort
to mitigate the strategic risk to the Al Thani family and its
control of the state and its hydrocarbon resources.

-- (C) Nothing would more please Qatar, which hosts an
Israeli trade office and has contacts with Hamas and Iran,
than to play a visible role alongside us in resolving the
Palestinian conflict. Qatari craves a role helping the U.S.
bring about lasting peace in the region and argues that
larger states, such as Saudi Arabia and Egypt, have been slow
to achieve anything meaningful in partnership with us.

-- (C) Qatar's tendency to bump up against initiatives of
larger states rubs many of its neighbors the wrong way, but
the Amir appears sincere in wanting to promote cooperation
and resolve conflicts. We expect Qatar's activities in this
regard to increase as Qatar's wealth expands.

-- (C) One upward trend, from the U.S. side, is to ask Qatar
for financial support for various policies and aims around
the world. Unfortunately, these requests -- worthy as they
are -- are made in generally piecemeal fashion, often leaving
the Qataris with the impression that their bankroll is more
valuable to us than their strategic partnership. Frictions
in this area can be expected to build, absent high-level
direct engagement with Qatar's leadership on our overall
global strategy.

-- (C) On the domestic front, the Amir and a small circle of
family members making all the major decisions in the country
will continue their demonstrated commitment to the rule of
law and to more participatory government. But they will
continue to move extremely cautiously in the holding of
elections.

-- (C) The pace of reform will depend on how Qatar deals with
the influx of foreign workers and the societal changes caused
by rapid progress.

-- (C) Qatar will continue to rely on skilled and unskilled
labor from abroad. (The official population figure for Qatar
is 1.5 million though the Embassy is told privately that it
is closer to 1.7 million. This is an increase of more than
100% since 2004, and is due almost exclusively to the
importation of foreign labor.)

-- (C) There are powerful economic incentives to paying
expatriate workers low wages and providing them with few
services. Influential Qataris have an economic interest in
the existing system, and this will be difficult to reverse.
The potential exists for tensions to erupt between Qatar and
countries whose nationals work in Qatar over the mistreatment
of expatriate workers in Qatar. Many of the sending
countries will continue to turn a blind eye to abuses, since
their economies rely heavily on remittances from foreign
workers.

-- (C) The population increase will continue to place a great
burden on the country's physical infrastructure, as services
such as water and electricity must be expanded at a rate of
10% per year.
-- (C) The Qataris themselves will continue to experience
alienation in the face of cascading change. The increase in
the Qatari population has come largely from societies with
different religious, linguistic, and cultural norms than
Qatar. They tend to be Hindu or Buddhist, and few speak
Arabic. Gross economic disparities will lead to an increase
in crime.

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TRENDS IN QATAR'S MILITARY
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2. (S) Expected trends in Qatar's military over the next 36
months include the following:

-- (S) Qatar will continue to face a formidable challenge
staffing its military, both in its senior and junior officer
corps while the enlisted ranks will continue to be an
attractive economic occupation for third country nationals.
The Qatar Armed Forces' senior leadership is reaching
retirement age and there is a shortage of mid-grade officers
willing to step up to the time and energy demands placed on
senior military leaders. There is also a shortage of junior
officers, as the drive to fill more private sector jobs and
booming economy are providing them with economic incentives
to careers outside the military.

-- (S) There will be continued growth in the number of
enlisted personnel, but this growth will be among
third-country nationals who have no vested interest. The
preponderance of foreign nationals in the enlisted ranks will
continue to be a cause for U.S. concern with the transfer of
defense technologies to the Qatari Armed Forces. Qatar's
ability to absorb these advanced technologies, coupled with
the disclosure and access concerns of foreign nationals
working on or around U.S. weapons systems, will further
complicate the already confusing and cumbersome FMS process
for Qatar defense weapons purchases.

-- (S) Qatar will continue to modernize its military through
the purchase of U.S. weapons systems, with continued
competition from French, British, Russian, and other
international firms looking to gain a foothold in this
expanding lucrative market. Qatar recognizes that U.S.
systems are the most advanced in the world and have
confidence in the battle tested performance and quality of
U.S. weapons and the accompanying logistics life-cycle
support. It is still attracted to French and British
systems, however, due to the exigencies of the U.S. foreign
military sales system. As Qatar learns the U.S. foreign
military sales system, it will buy more U.S. systems.

--(S) The Qatari military works on a frugal budget, with
national priority given to economic development. Although
senior military leaders understand and accept the
subordination of defense needs to economic development, the
inability to fund force modernization adequately and rapidly
causes tension between the Qatari Armed Forces Services
Chiefs and the Ministry of Finance. The level of friction
and frustration contributes to the desires of many senior
leaders to expedite their exodus from the armed forces. This
trend of fiscal frugality with regards to defense spending
will continue to govern the pace of weapons system
procurement and modernization.

-- (S) The Qatari leadership will seek to increase the
prestige of its military within the GCC and the international
arena but has no clearly defined strategy for doing so.
Likewise, Qatar is attracted to the latest military systems,
although its military modernization is not guided by a
national security strategy. The preeminence of the Qatari
Amiri Air Force currently drives modernization efforts, and
confidence in the Air Force senior leader corps is evident in
their designation as procurement committee chairs for weapon
systems across the services. This "cart before the horse"
trend of weapon system procurement driving Qatari national
defense posture in lieu of national or military security
strategy will continue. In many regards, the recent purchase
of strategic and tactical airlift platforms is misaligned
with the maritime and ballistic missile threat from Iran;
however, it does align with Qatar's desire to carve out a
niche in the region and on the international stage as a Human
Relief and Disaster Response force.

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TRENDS IN U.S.-QATAR MILITARY RELATIONS
--------------


3. (S) Expected trends in Qatar's military relationship with
the U.S. over the next 36 months include the following:
-- (S) In the short term, tactical irritants will degrade a
strong operational-level relationship. Our military
relationship with the Qataris is plagued with irritating
customs and immigration issues. The U.S. Army has considered
moving elements currently in Qatar elsewhere in the region
owing to the operational seaport customs difficulties.
(Ambassador's Comment: What we, the USG, consider tactical
and operational irritants might unfortunately be viewed by
some Qataris as challenges to sovereignty -- irritants to us
that rise to sovereignty challenges for them. End Comment.)

-- (S) It will remain difficult for the U.S. military to
identify and meet the needs of the Qatari military because
they either do not have, or have not shared with us, a
coherent national security strategy.

-- (C) In the medium term, interoperability will strengthen
the U.S.-Qatar military relationship. Increased foreign
military sales, education, and training will professionalize
the Qatari Armed Forces and strengthen our bilateral
relationship.

-- (C) In the long term, the biggest impediment to engagement
with Qataris will remain sensitivities about their
sovereignty faced with the enduring U.S. presence. Qatar
will continue to look to the U.S. military presence for
protection. Qatar will wish to strengthen and deepen the
relationship with increased combined planning, exercises,
operations, and training along the lines of the relationship
between the U.S. Forces Korea and the Republic of Korea Armed
Forces.

-- (S) Qatar-U.S. relations at the political level will
continue to affect the quality of our military relationship.

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COUNTERTERRORISM AND COUNTERPROLIFERATION TRENDS
-------------- ---


4. (S) Expected trends in counterterrorism and counter
proliferation over the next 36 months include:

-- (S) Due to its small size and great wealth, Qatar will not
be a major source of jihadists leaving to engage in terrorism.

-- (S) Qatar's citizens can, however, support terrorism
financially, and the capacity of the Qataris to do so may
outstrip the ability of the government to stop it.

-- (S) Qatar will continue to be an inconsistent partner in
combating terrorist financing. Qatar has been reluctant to
fight terrorist financing, in part because of fear of
embarrassment; if it acts against terrorist financing, it
would be a tacit admission that it has a problem in this
regard. Qatar has also been reluctant to combat the
financing of terrorist groups and activities because it does
not want to invite an attack by antagonizing terrorist groups.

-- (S) The emergence of Doha as a major transportation hub
for the fast-growing Qatar Airways means that more bad actors
will try to transit through Doha. The Qatari authorities,
wishing to protect Qatar Airways financial health, may wish
to turn a blind eye to this transit instead of acting against
it.

-- (S) Doha is likewise likely to emerge as a transit point
for illicit technology. Those attempting to transit with
illicit technology are likely to be non-Qatari, so the
possibility exists that the authorities will take measures to
stop it.
-- (S) The American military presence in Qatar will continue
to be a target for terrorism.

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LAW ENFORCEMENT TRENDS
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5. (S) Expected trends in law enforcement over the next 36
month include:

-- (S) Growth and societal changes in Qatar have outpaced the
ability of the government to address effectively the 21ST
century law enforcement challenges it faces, and this trend
will likely continue.

-- (S) Like the military, the Ministry of the Interior and
the Internal Security Force (a semi-autonomous paramilitary
security force which augments the MOI) will continue to face
a formidable challenge in qualitatively staffing and
retaining its officer corps and enlisted ranks. The Qatar
MOI's senior leadership is reaching retirement age; there is
a shortage of junior officers, as the drive to fill more
private sector jobs and booming economy is providing them
with economic incentives to leave the public safety/security
services.

-- (C) Qatar's crime rate is among the lowest in the world,
but there has been a 330% increase in crime across the board
since 2005. This trend will continue due to the increase in
the expatriate population, rapid economic development,
widespread use of the internet, and the MOI's slow pace to
adapt to and implement necessary institutional changes. The
Qatari government will continue responding to this threat by
adopting biometric technologies and information sharing with
other law enforcement jurisdictions. Improving the level and
timeliness of that information sharing remains a top priority
for Post's law enforcement and security representatives.

-- (C) The Qatari judiciary is largely independent. Qataris,
not just foreigners, are prosecuted for criminal conduct
according to the same standards as expatriates. This
approach represents a commitment to rule of law at the
highest levels of the GOQ and will continue.

-- (S) There is a crisis in the recruitment and retention of
qualified law enforcement officers. The Qatari police force
is the smallest in the Gulf. If it is to meet this
challenge, the force must increase officer pay and adopt an
internationally accredited career professional development
program.

-- (C) The reliance on expatriate labor will increase the
likelihood that criminals will relocate here. Currently, all
expatriates seeking residency in Qatar, to include laborers,
must be fingerprinted by MOI in order to facilitate a
criminal records check from their home country before
residency status is granted. However, the reliability of
those checks from other countries without a centralized and
automated criminal justice system database is suspect.

-- (C) Rapid economic development is increasing the
opportunities for money laundering and cybercrime in the
country despite expanded GOQ efforts to combat it.

-- (C) The court and prison systems are overburdened and will
continue to be so during the next 36 months. There is one
courthouse for the entire country, located in Doha. That,
combined with a limited number of judges, has resulted in a
significant backlog of cases going before the judiciary.
There are plans to reduce the backlog by increasing the
number of judges and courthouses, which will assigned to
jurisdictions outside of Doha. In addition, Qatar is seeking
Post's assistance in exploring the use of alternative
sentencing methods, to include probation and work-release
programs. There are also plans to reduce or eliminate the
annual judicial holiday, which currently runs from June
through September. Qatar only has one prison for convicted
criminals, which stays at or near its maximum capacity of 560
prisoners most of the year. The only relief to overcrowding
is through an annual amnesty program which releases
approximately 15% of the population during Ramadan and
International Human Rights Day. Plans are underway for the
construction of a new and larger prison in the next three
years.

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ECONOMIC AND ENVIRONMENTAL TRENDS
--------------


6. (S) Expected trends in economics and the environment over
the next 36 month include:

-- (S) The "megatrend" driving all other economic and
environmental trends, in addition to many of the other trends
discussed, is the growing exploitation of hydrocarbon
resources leading to rapid increase in wealth. In the next
three years, Qatar will double its output of liquefied
natural gas (LNG) to 77 million tons per annum. In doing so,
Qatar will run sustained major budget surpluses (USD 17
billion in 2007). Estimates by the IMF and the World Bank
predict double digit economic growth until 2012. There is an
estimated USD 130 billion in capital investment planned for
the next seven years. Such a vast amount of money in the
economy presents the risk of inflation, so Qatar will seek
offshore investments to send the money out of the domestic
economy, including to the U.S., via its sovereign wealth fund.

-- (S) A critical dependence on foreign labor will continue.
Qatar's economy is dependent upon both managerial/technical
expertise and manual labor from abroad. Although Qatar is
engaging in educational reform which will fill some human
resources gaps over the long-term, the ambitions of the elite
for Qatar's future are greater than the capability of the
local population to implement it. Calls by the country's
leadership for "Qatarization" - the drive to move Qataris
into managerial and technical positions in place of foreign
workers, will continue publicly, while genuine implementation
will fade or not be achieved.

-- (S) The financial sector will experience a qualitative and
quantitative increase. The Qatar Investment Authority will
play an increasing role, as financial managers seek offshore
investment opportunities as a place to turn current financial
surpluses into long-term benefits. Plans for a single,
unified, regulator will be fulfilled. Foreign stock
exchanges will help develop and expand the financial market's
offerings. Insurance products will become increasingly
important as a means of protecting investments. The banking
sector will show increasing assets, liquidity, Islamic
options, and regional expansion. There is likely to be a
consolidation of local banks, and a move by the remaining
banks from retail services to investment, trade finance, and
wealth management.

-- (S) There will be piecemeal liberalization and
diversification. For example, the telecommunications
industry is gradually being opened to the private sector, and
some economic decisions, such as patent and trademark
regulations and standards, will be made in concert with GCC
partners.

-- (S) Qatar's role as a regional and international
transportation hub will grow. Doha International Airport
will serve an estimated 10 million passengers in 2008. This
is a fivefold increase from a decade ago. Phase One of the
new airport is scheduled to open in 2010 with a passenger
capacity of 24 million. Qatar Airways will increase its
route network, including its U.S. destinations. There are
plans for a new seaport which will increase capacity by five
times in the first phase. Hotel capacity will quadruple from
the current 7000 rooms by 2012.

-- (S) Qatar will continue its commitment to becoming a
leader in science and technology. Relaxed investment laws
will attract more foreign participation in the science and
technology sectors. Internet usage has already increased to
more than 300,000 users, an increase of 866% since 2000, and
is expected to grow further. Qatar has the second lowest
rate of "brain drain" in the world behind the U.S., according
to a World Economic Forum Executive Opinion Survey.

-- (C) There will be growing concern over the environment and
food safety, but pollution will continue. The newly
established Ministry for the Environment exemplifies this
growing concern for the environment. Energy companies in
Qatar are increasingly aware of environmental challenges and
will try to address them.

-- (C) The rapidly increasing population will strain public
services such as water supplies, roads, and other
infrastructure components. Electricity demand is expected to
increase from 3419 megawatts in 2008 to over 10,000 megawatts
in 2012. Water usage will grow from 150 million gallons per
day in 2008 to 330 million gallons per day in 2012.
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TRADE TRENDS
--------------


7. (C) Expected trends in trade, particularly with the United
States, over the next 36 months include:

-- (C) Qatar will continue to seek the latest technologies.
The Qatari leadership knows that its fossil fuels will run
out and is determined to use its current wealth to integrate
technology into its economy and society. But other than the
mere desire to acquire new technologies, there does not
appear to be a coherent strategy that identifies Qatar's
technology needs and how to fulfill them in a systematic way.

-- (C) Qatar spends USD 180 billion combined in the following
sectors: oil and gas, health and medical sanitation
projects, information communication technology, aerospace,
architecture construction engineering, safety and security,
franchising and education/training. These huge expenditures
will continue and the potential opportunities for U.S.
exporters will grow.

-- (C) Qatar will seek to become a "mega-brand" by marketing
itself as an international destination of "global" quality.
Qatar however lacks the services and supplies to maintain its
brand name. The poor quality of labor (born in part of a
disenfranchised labor force) and sparseness of services may
cause major bottle-necks in its infrastructure.

-- (C) Qatar's pattern of "creative destruction" will
continue its growth trend, sweeping away the old and
replacing infrastructure with larger and more modern
versions. This will represent expanded opportunities for
U.S. businesses.

-- C) Qatar recognizes that the U.S. is the world's leader in
education and training, and education and training will
provide enormous opportunities for the U.S.

-- (C) An informal quota system exists by which the Qataris
purchase items from a variety of nations to curry favor with
different firms and governments, but this is changing. The
U.S. will in any event remain the top exporter to Qatar
bolstered by Qatar's big ticket purchases of Boeing and
Lockheed aircraft.

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TRENDS IN EDUCATION AND MEDIA
--------------


8. (C) Expected trends in Qatar's society, and educational
and media sectors over the next 36 months include:

-- (C) Despite an upcoming change in the U.S. administration,
and regional issues such as Iraq, Iran and Palestine, trends
in public opinion regarding the USG will continue to be
conflicted for the next 36 months. Qatari public opinion
based on time-series data from polling trends since 2002 to
2007 indicates that Qataris are split about equally on
Qatar's relations with the United States: 60% of the Qataris
who responded said that they were not confident about the
USG's ability to address regional problems, yet 33% said that
the United States is Qatar's most important ally, a number
more than double the next runner-up, Saudi Arabia. More than
80% of the respondents said that they appreciated the role of
the U.S. in maintaining stability, security, trade, and
higher education in Qatar. Despite this, a small majority
stated that they did not support the U.S. military's
continued use of facilities in Qatar.
-- (C) Al Jazeera (AJ) maintains high viewership in Qatar
with more than 50% of the media market share. Over the next
36 months, there will be a steady expansion of AJ in Africa
and Asia, and through subsidiaries into other markets, such
as Turkey. AJ will slowly but steadily lose market share
within the region.

-- (C) No change in local media coverage trends is foreseen
in the next 36 months. Newspapers in Qatar, both English and
Arabic, will discuss certain political and economic issues
candidly but never criticize the ruling Al Thani family or
foreign policy. According to several polls, about 40% of
Qataris get information from newspapers and this high rate of
readership is likely to continue. The presence of
Northwestern University's Medill School of Journalism may
affect local media coverage, but primarily beyond the
36-month window.

-- (C) Government financial support and a desire to provide
more Qataris with quality higher education will continue to
fuel the education sector in Qatar. Education City will
attract two new schools with international reputations -
probably from the United States - a law school and an
institution offering an MBA. The education system will
continue its standardization and major reform, mostly
borrowed from Western models including the United States.
Stated Qatari Government policy last year was that the
Ministry of Education would soon disappear and be replaced by
the Supreme Education Council, but that policy has been
reversed. Government schools can be expected to exercise more
autonomy along the lines of the independent schools formerly
administered by the Supreme Education Council, as the
Ministry of Education works to establish a common core
curriculum across schools in Qatar.

-- (C) Female students will continue to dominate higher
education, as percentages of university-educated women
continue to trend upwards and rates for men trend downwards.
Almost 46% of Qatari women between the ages of 25 and 29 have
acquired university level education. Amongst Qatari men
within the same age group, only 26% had university education.
This will remain the case as long as incentives remain the
same as today, with the Government offering jobs with good
benefits to Qataris whether or not they finish secondary
school or pursue university studies.

-- (C) Private sector employers will continue to come up
short in finding qualified Qataris to fill jobs requiring
technical/vocational training. Qatar currently lacks the
community college or vocational training system needed to
respond to private sector needs. The Minister of Education
will likely adopt the Australian technical and vocational
education model and open one or more schools, but the gap
between the unprepared high school graduates and employers
will only begin to close toward the end of the 36-month
period.

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QATAR'S DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS
--------------


9. (C) Expected demographic trends in Qatar over the next 36
month include:

-- (C) Qatar's population has doubled over the past five
years. As many as 1.6 million of the estimated 1.7 to 1.8
million population is of foreign origin. These numbers are
expected to grow among every nationality and region of
origin, checked only by Qatari security concerns about
certain nationalities such as Pakistanis and Iranians.

-- (C) Qataris constitute 8-12% of the population. As the
foreign population grows, Qataris will become a smaller
minority in their own country despite a relatively high birth
rate. Qatar will not increase the size of its citizen
population by easing restrictions on naturalization.

-- (C) Qataris under the age of 35 will be increasingly well
educated, urban, and wealthy. They will possess an
extraordinary range of opportunities distracting from the
business of building their country. As their wealth
increases, Qataris are having larger families, increasing the
chances that the Qatari population will become increasingly
younger.

-- (C) South Asians from India, Sri Lanka, Nepal, Bangladesh,
and Pakistan account for an estimated 800,000 to 900,000 of
the expatriate population and work in a variety of sectors,
including construction, import/export, labor, business, and
information technology.

-- (C) Several Arab countries' nationals have a major
presence in Qatar, including Egypt, Palestine (typically
long-term residents),Yemen, Jordan, Lebanon, Sudan, and
Syria. Expatriate Arabs constitute an estimate 300,000 to
400,000 of the population. They tend to work in engineering,
accounting, import/export, education, energy, services,
hotels, and beauty.

-- (C) An estimated 200,000 East Asians live in Qatar. They
are mainly from the Philippines, Indonesia, Japan, South
Korea, and China. East Asians are prominent in the fields of
mechanical technology, energy, construction, engineering,
housekeeping, and labor.

-- (C) There are an estimated 10,000 to 20,000 Iranians
living in Qatar. Many Iranians in Qatar are long-term
residents. The Qatari Shia population is estimated at 10
percent of the Qatari national population. Qatari women
marry Iranian men, a rare instance of a female Qatari
marrying a foreign husband.

-- (S) There are as many as 40,000 Africans living in Qatar.
They come from Kenya, Nigeria, Somalia, Ethiopia, Eritrea,
and South Africa. African expatriates work mainly in
construction, labor, trade, import/export, energy, and oil
services.

-- (S) Europeans account for an estimated 20,000 to 25,000 of
the expatriate population. They are generally citizens of
the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Spain, and Turkey.
Europeans work in energy, shipping, engineering,
construction, management, education, finance, and investment.

-- (S) There are an estimated 5,000 to 12,000 expatriates
from North and South America (excluding the U.S.) residing in
Qatar. They are mainly from Canada, Brazil, Venezuela,
Mexico, and Colombia. These individuals work in energy,
oilfield services, education, and for Qatar Airways.

-- (S) There are approximately 8,000 American citizens
registered with the U.S. Embassy in Doha, compared with only
1,500 in 2000. Over 170,000 U.S. citizens transited through
Doha in 2007, and this figure will grow as Qatar's airport
expands and its national airline grows. At any given time,
the Embassy estimates that there are approximately 15,000
American citizens present in Qatar. American citizens are
prominent in the energy industry, working for ExxonMobil,
Conoco Phillips, Occidental, Chevron, and various energy
services companies. American citizens also work for military
contractors, the U.S. universities at Education City, the
American School of Doha, and a wide range of educational
institutions in Qatar. Continued growth in the education and
energy sectors will bring in more American citizens over the
next three years.

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IMPERATIVES FOR UNITED STATES POLICY IN QATAR
--------------


10. (S) Emerging from these trends are certain imperatives
for the United States in Qatar. We identify below areas
where U.S. policy should be focused and where we will
synchronize interagency efforts for maximum effect. (Note:
These issue areas, including Qatar's regional foreign
policies, will be examined in additional off-sites, as noted
above. End Note.)

Qatar's National Security and Defense Strategy

-- (S) The U.S. should work with Qatar to help it produce an
overarching national security strategy, guiding its military
development, defense purchases, cooperation with the U.S. and
other allies. Future off-sites will address how to bring
this about across the Qatari interagency.
-- (S) While the strategic military relationship with Qatar
is sound, there are "irritants" at the operational and
tactical level, principally with customs and immigration
regulations and procedures. We will address these in a
follow-on off-site between the Embassy and CENTCOM.

Regional Aid and Foreign Policy

-- (S) We will engage with the GOQ on aid to struggling
governments such as the PA, Lebanon, and Afghanistan. On
Iraq, we will establish a high-level dialogue on Qatar's
diplomatic representation in Baghdad, general engagement at
the ministerial level with Iraq's government, and forgiveness
of Iraqi debt.

Terrorist Finance

-- (S) The intelligence on Qatar's official support for
terrorists, particularly Hamas, is inconclusive, with
divisions on this issue even within the U.S. intelligence
community. We need a more accurate picture of the role of
the Qatari Government and its citizens in financing
terrorism, especially funds directed towards Hamas. This is
a critical piece of the bilateral relationship that stands in
the way of greater cooperation on the political level. We
also need more cooperation on terrorist finance, more
information sharing, more access to suspects of concern, and
more coordinated effort to disrupt AQ-related funding and
logistical activities in and through Qatar.

-- (S) There are policy and attitudinal differences between
the U.S. and Qatar over terrorism. For example, Hamas is
viewed very differently than Al-Qaida and its ilk. Qatar's
Central Bank currently cooperates on a range of
anti-terrorist finance efforts. We need to expand that
cooperation. Qatar has an agency charged with regulating
foreign charitable contributions by its citizens. We need to
deepen our relationship with it. As Qatar's financial
sector expands, and the country's wealth grows, so too will
the potential for Qatar to be a source of money from private
Qatar citizens to terrorist groups. Investing time and
effort at the front end of this trend will pay high dividends
later.

Al Jazeera

-- (S) We need to address al-Jazeera's intentionally anti-US
editorial policies and broadcasts. We need to get al-Jazeera
to help the War on Terror by giving more broadcast time to
credible voices that discredit the AQ program and ideology.
There should be less aggrandizement of those who preach
hatred of the United States and who espouse violent
extremism.

-- (S) The USG has a strong interest in using Al Jazeera to
reach its enormous Arabic-speaking audience. Our objective
is three-fold: ensuring that U.S. officials appear on its
broadcasts; increasing its professionalism; and mitigating
its most egregious editorial practices. To this end, we need
to fully coordinate public affairs efforts throughout the
Region to engage Al Jazeera and refute its unsubstantiated
claims through a rapid response unit. More polling data are
needed to evaluate better whether our use of Al Jazeera and
other Arabic-language media is having the desired impact.
Hence, we need to increase our polling of Al Jazeera's
audience. In the longer run, Northwestern University School
of Journalism campus in Qatar can act as resource and help
professionalize Al Jazeera's staff. We will devote time and
resources to help Northwestern establish a strong and lasting
working relationship with al-Jazeera.

Iran

-- (S) Qatar shares its natural gas resources with Iran, so
it will be loathe to allow its relationship with Tehran to
become overtly antagonistic even though most Qataris appear
to fear and distrust Iran. The U.S. military presence here
is evidence of the latter. There nevertheless continues to
be considerable regional distrust of Qatar's position on
Iran. We will engage the Qatari Government and people to
ensure that Qatar understands the threat posed by Iran and
works with us openly and cooperatively in addressing that
threat. We will work to heighten Qatari leadership's
awareness of and concern about Iranian state sponsorship
through the Quds Force and through the use of Hizballah as a
proxy.

Trafficking in Persons

-- (S) TIP remains one of the most persistent social ills in
Qatar and a major area where the bilateral relationship can
founder. A major U.S. imperative in Qatar is to raise
awareness on TIP, and human rights issues generally, and to
find ways to affect public attitudes and government policies.
We have begun to set up a closer working relationship on TIP
issues with the Qatar government and look to strengthen it
further. Our goal: to set up an effective Embassy-GOQ
mechanism to actively address Qatar's TIP Tier 3 Rating.

Taking Advantage of the U.S. Universities in Qatar

-- (S) The presence of major U.S. universities in Qatar
presents unusual opportunities to foster engagement with
Qatar, not only on education, but on a whole range of issues
including scientific research, national security, medical
research, and law enforcement. We will work to foster that
engagement, and by doing so will earn the gratitude of
ordinary Qataris, which we expect will have a positive effect
in other policy areas.

Deepening the Commercial Relationship

-- (SBU) We intend to take an already substantial U.S.-Qatar
commercial relationship to the next level. As a next step,
we are working with the beleaguered American Business Council
in country and leadership at the U.S. Chamber of Commerce in
Washington to establish a chapter of the American Chamber of
Commerce in Doha.

-- (SBU) The new entity would heighten the visibility of the
U.S. commercial presence and serve as a clearing house for
the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) on the full range of
resident U.S. company interests. This will complement our
current engagement with the Qataris' expressed interest in
negotiating a Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT).
LeBaron