(C) RAND: QATAR DANGEROUSLY SLOW ON CRITICAL

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 DOHA 000651 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/04/2018 TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR MASS MCAP QA SUBJECT: (C) RAND: QATAR DANGEROUSLY SLOW ON CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE SECURITY REF: A. DOHA 630 ¶B. DOHA 515 ¶C. DOHA 475 (NOTAL) Classified By: AMBASSADOR JOSEPH E. LEBARON, FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D ). -------------- (C) KEY POINTS -------------- -- Qatar's critical gas and oil infrastructure is quite vulnerable to attacks by Iran, its proxies, and unaffiliated terrorist groups, according to a 2005 Rand security study circulated only to Qatar. This vulnerability still has not been addressed, Rand's Doha Office told the Ambassador September 4th. -- That said, some elements of the study are being implemented by the Qatari Government in coastal defense, the Rand representatives said. -- Since the study three years ago, Qatar's defense establishment has not sought any update from RAND. -------------- (C) COMMENTS -------------- -- The absence of a formal national security strategy, at least that we are aware of, has made Qatar's defense purchases and development of its security forces appear sporadic and unfocused. The totality of their defense procurement requests, however, suggest an appreciation by the Qataris of the threat to their strategic center of gravity -- Qatar's hydrocarbon complex, both on and off-shore. -- The fact that the Qataris would, first, commission a comprehensive study of its strategic security, and separately accept CENTCOM offers to assist with security strategy development, then, second, not pursue the issue further suggests to us two possibilities: -- One is that the Qatari leadership does not want any single foreign entity to have too much sway over its strategic development; Qatar might be seeking advice and additional analysis elsewhere. -- The other possibility is that Qatar has concluded that trying to defend against an Iranian attack is simply too big a challenge to overcome. Given Qatar's tiny size, the Amir has decided that the U.S. military presence, plus active diplomacy on his part to reduce regional instability, are much more effective deterrents to the Iranians and others than Qatar's security forces could ever be. Hence, the Amir has decided to allocate national resources accordingly, betting on an enduring U.S. presence and the deterrence it provides. -- Either way, Qatar's critical hydrocarbon facilities and delivery network face threats from terrorists -- a vulnerability that we will continue to urge the Qatari leadership to address. END KEY POINTS AND COMMENTS -------------- CRITICAL VULNERABILITIES -------------- ¶1. (C) Ambassador met on September 4 with RAND-Qatar Policy Institute Director Dr. Richard Darilek and RAND analyst Dr. Bruce Nardulli and received a briefing on RAND's study, commissioned by the Government of Qatar, on Qatar's security environment. Nardulli, the author of the report, noted that the study was completed in 2005 so was not current, but reflected issues that he believed still needed to be addressed. As RAND analysts have done in the past, Nardulli emphasized that the report was protected by contractual agreements with the Qatari Government and could not be published or shared without the Qataris' approval. Nardulli was willing, however, to brief the Ambassador in confidence on the report's findings. ¶2. (C) Nardulli said his report demonstrated that Qatar's DOHA 00000651 002 OF 002 offshore oil and gas platforms were vulnerable to attack and/or seizure by terrorists or Iranian proxies. The report also highlighted the vulnerability of LNG tankers, either at sea or in port, which could be scuppered to block passage into the Ras Laffan facilities or could potentially be used as a weapon against the port, not unlike a commercial aircraft. When RAND observed in its report that the QAF current fleet of Mirage fighter aircraft could do little to address this threat, according to Nardulli, "it created problems with the French and their allies in the Qatari Air Force." ¶3. (C) The RAND report concluded, however, that the threat of ballistic or cruise missiles launched by Iran is low because "they need 50-meter accuracy or better in order to hit the LNG trains," and Nardulli said that unclassified information regarding Iran's capabilities suggested that Iran had not yet achieved that level of accuracy. Nardulli said that the report did not address threats to the utility supply network for Ras Laffan -- which one expatriate oil executive described to Ambassador as an "Achilles heel." (Ref A) ¶4. (C) The Qataris appear to be "embracing elements of the report's recommendations," Nardulli advised, by pursuing a USD 500 million contract with EADS for radars to address coastal security, which is an important element of infrastructure protection. (NOTE: According to Northrop-Grumman contacts, the program has been delayed due to Qatari requirements for EADS to be responsible for all aspects of the contract, to include development of real estate and infrastructure, not just the radar system. END NOTE) ¶5. (C) Nardulli expressed his concern that the Qataris may be purchasing equipment far too sophisticated for what they truly need and can operate, so whether or not these systems will make a difference, in his opinion, is an open question. ¶6. (C) The RAND report was "fairly well received" by Qatari senior defense leaders when it was briefed to them in February 2005, but beyond a few small clarifications, RAND has not been asked to follow up on any aspect of it. Nardulli said he did not know if the Chief of Staff provided some version of the report's findings to Heir Apparent Sheikh Tamim, who oversees the security sector for his father the Amir. (NOTE: In early 2008, Sheikh Tamim offered to provide a copy of the RAND study to the CENTCOM Commander; it has not been delivered. END NOTE) LeBaron