SCENESETTER FOR AUGUST 26 CENTCOM COMPONENT

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 DOHA 000587 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/19/2018 TAGS: PREL MOPS PGOV QA SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR AUGUST 26 CENTCOM COMPONENT COMMANDERS CONFERENCE Classified By: Ambassador Joseph LeBaron, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) Embassy Doha welcomes CENTCOM leadership, staff, and component commanders to Qatar. During the last CCC, in May 2008, both GEN Petraeus and LTG (P) Dempsey met with Qatari Armed Forces Chief of Staff (COS) MG Hamad al-Attiyah. During this visit, we hope to arrange meetings with MG al-Attiyah and other Qatari leaders. The following information on Qatar represents the Country Team's consensus view on the state of the U.S.-Qatar relationship and current issues on the mil-mil agenda. ¶2. (C) At the strategic level, the U.S.-Qatar military relationship is in good shape. Qatari officials regard our strategic partnership as permanent, outliving any political differences with Washington. The Qataris appreciate the frequent high-level DOD visitors here, but will nevertheless be concerned about where the transition in Washington will leave the U.S.-Qatar military relationship. ¶3. (C) Despite the positive atmosphere at the strategic level, our operational-level cooperation continues to be hampered by difficulties with Qatari Customs. Some of the problems are self-inflicted, including troops and contractors transiting Al-Udeid Air Base with alcohol, pornography, and occasionally drugs. Some of the customs difficulties may also be a GOQ "tool" to remind us of their sovereignty, but unfortunately in ways that have a serious impact on U.S. operations here. Managing that operational-level cooperation, and overcoming these problems, requires a great deal of engagement - by the Embassy, by CENTCOM, and by our frequent senior-level visitors. -------------- -------------- DEVELOPMENTS IN THE U.S.-QATAR MILITARY RELATIONSHIP -------------- -------------- ¶4. (S) PATRIOT MISSILE LAUNCH: On October 15, 2007, a routine test sequence resulted in the accidental launch of a Patriot Missile from a battery at Camp As-Saylieh. The missile landed on the Qatari COS' farm a few kilometers from Camp As-Saylieh. Fortunately, no one was hurt and there was no property damage. U.S.-Qatari cooperation on the investigation was good and the Qataris appreciated that ADM Fallon responded quickly to their request to stand both batteries down and physically remove missiles from the launchers. The investigation revealed a software gap that allowed the missile to be fired even in training mode and a doctrinal gap that allowed the firing sequence to be executed without the launchers being physically disconnected from the launch controller. The Qataris signaled that they would agree to putting the Patriot batteries back up, but first asked for the full report on the incident, temporary rules of engagement, and an analysis of the Patriots' coverage area to ensure that the city of Doha is covered and not just the military bases. Completion of the final report took longer than expected, but has since been briefed to senior Qatari military officers and we are now close to redeploying the batteries. According to discussions between COS and LTG North on August 1, from the Qatari military perspective, everything is ready and is only waiting final review and approval by the Heir Apparent, Sheikh Tamim, who has been out of the country. ¶5. (C) DEFENSE SALES: Until recently, the U.S. had never made a major defense sale to Qatar. In July, however, Qatar signed contracts with Boeing for two C-17s with an option for two more, and with Lockheed-Martin for four C-130Js with an option for two more. Boeing anticipates initial delivery of the first aircraft in August-September 2009. The C-17 and C-130 sales (hybrid DCS-FMS cases) are a signal the Qataris are beginning to invest in their own defensive capabilities. They are also looking at U.S. helicopters and Hellfire II missiles as part of their National Security Shield effort, and possibly F-16 or F-18 fighter aircraft as well as an integrated air defense system. ¶6. (C) DEVELOPMENT OF NEW NAVAL BASE: We had been told that Qataris finally settled on a location for a new naval base in the north of the peninsula, but MG al-Attiyeh recently told DepSecDef England, without further explanation, that those DOHA 00000587 002 OF 004 plans are indefinitely on hold. When ultimately developed, the Qataris have made clear that the base will be large enough to host the largest U.S. naval vessels and very much want the U.S. to utilize it. During then-TRANSCOM Commander GEN Schwartz's visit in April, the Qatari COS mentioned that the base could be used as a seaport for military cargo and logistics support. The Qataris also have plans to develop a major new commercial port south of Doha and intend it to be large enough to accommodate the largest U.S. Naval vessels, including aircraft carriers. ¶7. (C) SECOND RUNWAY AT AL-UDEID: AFCENT has long wanted Qatar to build a second runway at Al-Udeid, something the Qataris had long resisted. In March, the Qataris agreed to build it and, apparently, to pay for it. Final decision for payment currently rests with the Ministry of Finance. COS expects positive resolution in the near future. ¶8. (C) CUSTOMS ISSUES: Customs problems continue to plague our working-level engagement with the Qatari Armed Forces. There have been numerous incidents in which Coalition personnel violated established Qatar customs procedures on entry or exit from the country, leading to Qatari accusations that U.S. personnel are not respecting Qatari sovereignty. These led Qatar, in March 2007, to implement troublesome new customs procedures for personnel, equipment, and cargo entering or transiting the country. CENTCOM submitted a counterproposal in June 2007. CENTCOM J5, AFCENT, and OMC Qatar personnel held discussions with the Qatari Armed Forces in June and November 2007 and March 2008, which led to agreement on temporary procedures. Only constant (daily) OMC Qatar and AFCENT interaction with the Qatar Armed Forces GHQ and Customs and Ports Authority officials prevent detrimental effects to U.S. operations. We regard the temporary procedures as a stepping stone for permanent procedures that respect U.S. and Qatar sovereignty, support U.S. operations and are in line with the Defense Cooperation Agreement. Recent concerns of abuse of sovereignty by visiting DVs has led the Qataris to tighten procedures for the use of the DV lounge at AUAB, unfortunately, these changes occurred without notification and coincidentally during an unplanned diversion of an aircraft carrying GEN Petraeus. ¶9. (S) DEPORTATION OF U.S. PERSONNEL: The Government of Qatar, through the Ministry of Interior (Immigration) and Customs and Ports Authority have stepped up penalties on U.S. personnel who the Qataris believe violated Qatari law, whether deliberately or accidentally. Most recently, eight U.S. service members (six USAF security personnel and two USA EOD personnel) were deported following their detention by Emiri Guard security and intelligence personnel. The U.S. personnel were engaged in Personnel Security Operations area familiarization/reconnaissance which took them onto Emiri Palace grounds. QAF Intelligence and Emiri Guard Security forces viewed this as "targeting" and "reconnaissance" despite the innocence of the mission. This instance highlights the growing need for U.S. forces in Qatar to coordinate activities "outside the gate" through this Embassy with host country agencies. ¶10. (C) RELOCATION OF CENTCOM FORWARD HEADQUARTERS (CFH) and other facilities from Camp As-Saylieh: The Qataris eventually want all U.S. facilities out of Camp As-Saylieh and two committees are currently discussing different aspects of the move. Sticking points will be the timeline (ours long, Qatar's short) and cost-sharing. The new CFH at Al-Udeid should be completed and fully mission capable in May ¶2009. A new SOCCENT Forward Headquarters will also be completed in 2009. -------------- THE BROADER U.S.-QATAR RELATIONSHIP -------------- ¶11. (C) Over the coming years, Qatar's importance to the U.S. will only grow. Qatar is now the largest LNG exporter in the world and has the world's third largest reserves after Russia and Iran. By the end of 2009, Qatari will become a major supplier of LNG to the U.S. market. Fueled by growing exports of oil and LNG, Qatar's economy has been booming. Some estimates put per capita income at USD 60,000. Between DOHA 00000587 003 OF 004 now and 2012, Qatar's LNG exports will double, bringing a corresponding growth to Qatar's economy and the global financial clout of Qatar's sovereign wealth fund, the Qatar Investment Authority. Unfortunately, wild economic growth is also producing 14 percent inflation (felt most acutely in the housing market) and feeding a demand for cheap construction labor in a country that already has a very poor record on treatment of foreign workers. ¶12. (C) IRAQ: The Amir thinks we made a big mistake toppling Saddam Hussein, but shares our view that restoration of order and a successful democratic transition in Iraq are of paramount importance not only to Iraq but to the region, and their officials state publicly that the Coalition needs to stay in the country to establish wider security. However, a strong distaste for Iraq's Shia-dominated government drives Qatar's resistance to follow through on some of our priorities, including comprehensive debt forgiveness and greater political engagement. Unlike Saudi Arabia and the UAE, Qatar has made no commitment to send an ambassador to Baghdad. In his recent meeting with DepSecDef England, the Emir reiterated that the U.S. can't leave Iraq right away, but identified the challenge as finding a strong leader who can control the country, adding that it would be chaos if the U.S. left too soon. ¶13. (S) IRAN: Iran hangs heavily over our relationship with Qatar, which worries that we may have plans for Iran, perhaps even military plans, that we are not sharing with them. Qatar fears and deeply distrusts Iran, and shares our concern about its nuclear program, which it regards as unstoppable. But because of Qatar's geographic proximity, vulnerability of its energy installations, and the fact that its massive off-shore gas reserves are shared with Iran, Qatar will do nothing to engender an antagonistic relationship. During the DepSecDef visit, the Emir identified Iran as the key to the whole region and expressed hope that incentives now being offered to Iran will encourage its leadership to be more reasonable. -------------- ISSUES TO RAISE -------------- ¶14. (S) During host nation meetings by senior U.S. military officials, we recommend making the following points: -- Thank the Government of Qatar (GOQ) for its continued partnership and support for the war on terror and our broader U.S. military operations in the region. Note that this is especially evident from the access Qatar gives the U.S. military at Al-Udeid Air Base and Camp As-Saylieh, and GOQ-funded construction at Al-Udeid. -- Explain that despite the political transition in Washington following U.S. elections, there will be considerable continuity in our military relationship with Qatar. -- Congratulate MG al-Attiyeh on signing contracts in July for purchase of C-17 and C-130 aircraft. We have a strong commitment to help the GOQ derive maximum benefit from these purchases, which represent an important advancement in our mil-mil relationship. -- Note that a logical next step in our strategic relationship would be for Qatar to join the maritime Coalition. The new NAVCENT commander, VADM Gortney, just visited Qatar and looks forward to engaging the GOQ regularly. -- Tell MG al-Attiyeh that we are pleased that our Special Forces personnel are participating/mentoring an ongoing Qatari exercise in Mongolia and we are always looking for such ways to deepen our military relationship. -- Note that all information required by the GOQ on the Patriot missile batteries has been provided and ask when we should expect Sheikh Tamim to approve putting the missiles back on the rails. -- Note that customs procedures affecting U.S. operations at DOHA 00000587 004 OF 004 Al-Udeid and Camp As-Saylieh remain an irritant in what otherwise is a solid working relationship, and request GOQ assistance in establishing workable, long-term technical solutions in this area. -- Query COS on his vision of the relationship at the working level and ask what we can do better in order to eliminate issues/customs problems which continue to plague our working-level engagement and negatively affect operations. LeBaron