SCENESETTER FOR FBI DIRECTOR'S APRIL 8-9 VISIT TO

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 DOHA 000239

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/25/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER PHUM QA
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR FBI DIRECTOR'S APRIL 8-9 VISIT TO
QATAR

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Michael A. Ratney,
for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (S) Director Mueller: Embassy Doha welcomes your April
8-9 visit to Qatar. Your visit is formally hosted by the
Director of Qatar State Security (QSS),Nasir Al-Ali, and his
deputy Mohamad Al-Misnad. During your last visit here, in
December 2004, you met with Minister of State for Internal
Affairs Sheikh Abdulla bin Nasser Al Thani, whom you will
meet again this time. You will also see Qatar,s Attorney
General, Dr. Ali Al-Marri, whom you last met February 27 in
Washington. The Deputy Attorney General Masoud Al-Ameri and
the Director General of Public Security (effectively Qatar,s
police chief) Major General Saad Al-Khuleifi are expected to
join the meetings. We are also hoping to arrange a meeting
with either the Amir, Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani, or
his son, the Heir Apparent, Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani.


2. (S) This visit will focus on improving both intelligence
sharing, especially in counterterrorism, and law enforcement
cooperation. Qatar lags behind other Gulf countries in
overall counterterrorism intelligence sharing with the U.S.,
though GOQ cooperation is improving when a strong nexus is
made to a law enforcement investigation. It is vital that we
expand this relationship. Points and background on specific
CT issues are being coordinated interagency and will be
provided to you separately.


3. (C) In addition to CT and law enforcement issues, we
recommend that you encourage AG Al-Marri and the Interior
Minister, Sheikh Abdulla, to use their influence to finalize
and implement the draft Qatari law on Trafficking in Persons
(TIP). While commending the government for its cooperation
with DOJ in this area, you should make clear that much more
must be done to protect the large vulnerable population of
Qatar and that the USG will continue to support such efforts.

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DETAINEES IN GUANTANAMO AND CHARLESTON
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4. (C) Qatari national Jarallah Al-Marri is currently being
held in Guantanamo Bay; his brother, Ali, is in the U.S.
Naval Brig in Charleston. (The Al-Marri are a large tribe in
Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and elsewhere in the Gulf, and the two
prisoners are not closely related to the Attorney General.)
A third individual, Sudanese citizen Sami Al-Hajj, is of
interest to the Qataris because he was a cameraman for the
Doha-based Al-Jazeera television network at the time he was
taken into custody. Although the Qataris realize that this
is not an FBI issue, you should nevertheless expect a strong
pitch to transfer to Qatar three detainees, two in Guantanamo
and one in the Naval Brig in Charleston.


5. (S) AG Al-Marri is personally engaged on this issue,
raises it frequently with the Embassy, and discussed it
recently in Washington with Attorney General Mukasey, Deputy
Secretary of Defense England, and DOD General Counsel Haynes.

SIPDIS
Al-Marri believes his has been extremely cooperative on
issues of high priority for the U.S. and is frustrated that
the USG has not mapped out a clear path for these prisoners,
release or transfer.


6. (S) The Qatari AG has said he is prepared to take any
action permitted under Qatari law that would clear the way
for their to transfer to Qatar. While he understands that
the ultimate decision on these cases rests with the U.S.
Department of Defense, he very much wants to secure the
transfer of these three individuals, believes the
relationship he has developed with DOJ should help in that
regard, and is certain to ask for your assistance.


7. (S) Ali Al-Marri, the Charleston detainee, may soon be
indicted in the U.S. on material support charges. The U.S.
has formally transmitted a judicial assistance request to the
GOQ seeking banking records and other evidence that could
support his prosecution in the U.S. The Qatari AG
understands that this detainee,s unique legal status means
he is not a likely candidate for return to Qatar. He will
suggest, however, that his ability to cooperate on our
judicial assistance request depends on our ability to
cooperate on his priorities, i.e. transfer of the other
detainees.


8. (S) Based on Al-Marri,s meetings in Washington, he is
hoping for a transfer of at least Jarallah Al-Marri in April.
At this point, however, you should note only that that we
are working on the terms of a transfer arrangement acceptable
to both of our governments, focusing on Jarallah Al-Marri in
Guantanamo, and we hope to coordinate a transfer as soon as

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possible.


9. (S) Meanwhile, the family of the Sudanese citizen, Sami
Al-Hajj, continues to reside in Qatar and pressures the Amir
to help facilitate his release. Al-Hajj has become a cause
celebre for Al Jazeera, which broadcasts frequent stories on
his incarceration and appeals for his release. The Sudanese
Government informed the GOQ in December that it has no
objection to Al-Hajj's transfer to Qatar, though we have told
the GOQ that, even if Al-Hajj were approved for transfer, the
USG would be reluctant to send him to a third country. (We
understand there are currently discussions with the
Government of Sudan on his repatriation.)

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TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS
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10. (C) The dark underbelly of Qatar's spectacular
energy-driven growth is the abysmal working conditions of the
hundreds of thousands of Asian and South Asian workers
brought here to build the country's roads and modern
high-rises and provide the services and manual labor that
Qataris never will. Along with most of its Gulf neighbors,
Qatar was downgraded last year to Tier 3 in the annual State
Department TIP report, and as such was liable for U.S.
sanctions (which were waived by Presidential Determination).
While there appears to be growing sensitivity to the issue at
senior levels, many influential Qataris led by the prosperous
but competition-free business community strenuously resist
anything that smacks of liberalizing labor and immigration
laws, fearing an erosion of their privileged position in a
country where Qataris constitute at best 15 percent of the
population.


11. (C) There has been little progress by the GOQ on TIP
since the release of the State Department's annual TIP Report
last June. Neighboring countries (Kuwait, Bahrain, and the
UAE) have issued anti-TIP legislation; Qatar has not. The
GOQ has long promised a comprehensive anti-TIP law and major
changes to the Sponsorship Law (which itself often creates
harshly inequitable conditions for more than 90 percent of
Qatar's foreign workforce) but new legislation has not been
issued. While there have been isolated cases of forced
prostitution (not prosecuted),most TIP victims in Qatar are
male and female domestic workers (who are not covered under
the Labor Law) and male unskilled and semi-skilled laborers.
The government has agreed to finance and host a USD 225,000
DOJ program to better equip law enforcement personnel and
labor inspectors to identify TIP crimes and protect victims,
but the program has not yet begun.


12. (C) Your visit presents an opportunity to urge the GOQ at
the highest levels to pass and enact legislation to
criminalize and prosecute TIP crimes and protect TIP victims.
You should also deliver a message that Qatar, because of its
extraordinary wealth is unusually positioned to set an
example in the region for just and humane treatment for the
foreigners who are building their country. In the meantime,
existing criminal statues, rather than civil provisions of
the Labor Law, can be used to prosecute crimes of forced
labor and prostitution.

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A VITAL MILITARY RELATIONSHIP...
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13. (S) The U.S. has a lot at stake in Qatar. Al-Udeid Air
Base and other U.S. military facilities are critical to
CENTCOM operations from Iraq to Afghanistan to the Horn of
Africa. Qatar hosts approximately 9,000 U.S. forces, some
100 U.S. and Coalition aircraft, as well as the CENTCOM
Forward Headquarters, the Combined Air Operations Center,
SOCCENT Forward Headquarters, and other important DOD
facilities. Qatar is funding hundreds of millions of dollars
in construction for the U.S. at Al-Udeid Air Base. Our hosts
regularly send military personnel to the U.S. for training,
and after years of sourcing their military hardware in
Europe, are showing increasing interest in buying American,
with a major sale of C-17 aircraft first on the list.

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... AND A STRATEGIC PARTNER IN ENERGY
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14. (C) Qatar is exceptionally friendly to U.S. energy
companies and appreciates the competence and expertise they
bring to the country's economic development. Since 1999,
there has been USD 60 billion in foreign investment in
Qatar's energy sector with the majority, about USD 40

DOHA 00000239 003 OF 004


billion, coming from U.S. firms, including ExxonMobil,
ConocoPhillips, Anadarko, and Occidental. Soon, nearly 20
percent of ExxonMobil's global Revenue will derive from
Qatar. Qatar is also of growing importance to the U.S. from
an energy security perspective as this small emirate will
next year become a major supplier of LNG to the U.S.
following the recent CFIUS approval of $2.2 billion
development by Qatar Petroleum, ExxonMobil and
ConocoPhillips of the Golden Pass LNG terminal in southeast
Texas. Qatar is now the world's largest LNG exporter and
will soon be the U.S.' largest source of imported LNG.


15. (U) At over USD 60,000, Qatar's per capita income is
already ranked in the top five in the world, alongside
Luxembourg and Liechtenstein. Between now and 2012, Qatar's
LNG exports will more than double, bringing a corresponding
growth to Qatar's economy and global financial clout.

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COMMITMENT TO EDUCATIONAL REFORM, RULE OF LAW
--------------


16. (C) Beyond strong military and energy relationships,
there is a lt going right in Qatar from the U.S.
perspective Qatar's commitment to modernize its educational
system is exemplified by Education City, a 2500-ace campus
on the outskirts of Doha. Managed by te Qatar Foundation,
the umbrella organization chired by the Amir's wife, Sheikha
Mozah, Educatio City is home to five U.S. college branch
ampuses (Texas A&M, Carnegie Mellon, Weill-Cornell Medical
School, Georgetown School of Foreign Service, and Virginia
Commonwealth University),with some 800 students currently
enrolled. Northwestern University in late 2007 announced its
intention to establish a school or journalism. Meanwhile,
primary and secondary school curriculum is being reformed
along U.S. standards and a network of competitive charter
schools is gradually replacing out-moded government-run
schools. And rule of law, if not full democratization, is
taking root firmly, though slowly.

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TROUBLESOME POLITICAL RELATIONSHIP
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17. (S) Although our relationship with Qatar remains solid in
the energy, military and educational fields, politically it
has soured steadily since the beginning of Operation Iraqi
Freedom (OIF). This trend began with Al-Jazeera's harshly
biased coverage of OIF in 2003, but it has been Qatar's
foreign policy initiatives - and its maddening behavior on
the UN Security Council for the past two years - that really
drove the deterioration. In addition, bilateral CT and
intelligence cooperation - of obviously critical importance
in this region - is now the worst of all GCC states.
Meanwhile, the senior Qatari leadership appears to have grown
jealous of our relationships with regional rivals and annoyed
that we don't give Qatar more attention, including
senior-level visits and visibility in our own regional
initiatives.


18. (S) Our own list of grievances with Qatar is long enough,
but at the core are its high-level engagement with Hamas
leaders even as we seek to isolate them; support for Syria
and its allies in Lebanon as we work to support the
democratic majority; serving as a flak for Sudan and
Hezbollah during its just-ended stint on the UN Security
Council; and a failure to follow through on its stated
commitment to forgive Iraqi debt.


19. (C) The Amir shares our view that restoration of order
and a successful democratic transition in Iraq are of
paramount importance not only to Iraq but to the region.
While the Qataris has expressed concerns about civil war in
Iraq, their officials also state publicly that the Coalition
needs to stay in the country to establish wider security.
However, a strong distaste for Iraq's Shia-dominated
government drives Qatar's resistance to follow through on
some of our priorities, including comprehensive debt
forgiveness.


20. (C) Al-Jazeera is by far the region's most prominent
media outlet and the bane of many governments in the region,
though no longer the irksome centerpiece of U.S.-Qatari
relations. The network is more than ten years old with an
Arabic-speaking audience of some 50 million viewers. In
November 2006, it launched an English-language channel with a
potential audience of 70 million and ambitions to compete
with the major U.S. and British satellite networks worldwide.
Since early 2006, the USG has seen a bumpy downward trend in
inflammatory anti-Western bias and inaccuracy in Al-Jazeera's

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content, though biased and inaccurate reporting continues to
appear.


21. (S) Qatar is often accused (by Jordan, the Palestinian
Authority, and others) of funneling money to Hamas, though we
have never seen clear evidence that this is happening. The
Qataris have been largely cooperative on counter-terrorist
finance issues, apparently anxious to avoid letting their
small but growing financial sector be exploited by
terrorists. The Qatar Authority for Charitable Works
monitors all domestic and international charitable activities
and approves international fund transfers by the charities.
Qatar has a Financial Information Unit that resides in the
Qatar Central Bank and can review suspect accounts. Local
banks work with the Central Bank and the FIU on CT finance
and anti-money laundering issues, and bank officials attend
U.S.-sponsored conferences on these subjects.


22. (S) Iran hangs heavily over our relationship with Qatar,
which believes we may have plans for Iran, perhaps even
military plans, that we are not sharing with them. During
its 2006-07 tenure on the UN Security Council, Qatar cast the
consensus-breaking (14-1) vote on Resolution 1696 in July

2006. (Qatar later joined consensus in two unanimous votes,
UNSCR 1736 and UNSCR 1747, to impose sanctions on Iran's
nuclear program.) Qatar does share our concern about Iran's
nuclear program and revolutionary ideology, but Qatar's
geographic proximity, vulnerability of its energy
installations, and the fact that its massive off-shore gas
reserves are shared with Iran, dictate a less confrontational
approach.


23. (C) We believe the Qatari leadership regards our
relationship as strategic and permanent, and they see the
military bases, energy contracts, and U.S. universities as
evidence of this. But at this point, the Qatari leadership
have written off the political relationship and are likely
waiting out the Administration hoping that bilateral
relations improve in 2009.
RATNEY