QATAR BEGS TO DIFFER WITH OUR ASSESSMENT OF ITS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 DOHA 000115 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/06/2018 TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM EFIN EINV KDEM LE SY QA SUBJECT: QATAR BEGS TO DIFFER WITH OUR ASSESSMENT OF ITS POLICIES IN LEBANON REF: A. STATE 10786 ¶B. STATE 12556 Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Michael A. Ratney, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). -------------- UNIFIL TROOP WITHDRAWAL -------------- ¶1. (C) Charge, accompanied by P/E Chief, delivered Ref A and B demarches February 7 to Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Ahmad Bin Abdullah Al-Mahmoud (number two at the Qatari MFA),stressing our expectation of Qatar's full cooperation in support of the Arab League's goal of bringing about unconditional presidential elections in Lebanon and the importance of Qatar's maintaining its troop contribution to UNIFIL. Charge began by thanking Qatar for its UNIFIL contribution, noting that this Arab component of over 200 troops was greatly appreciated in Washington. He asked Al-Mahmoud to consider extending its participation until August. ¶2. (C) Al-Mahmoud responded that he believed the final decision on withdrawing the troops had already been taken. He noted that Qatar had extended its participation in UNIFIL several times. If the decision was final, Charge urged the GOQ to approach other Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states on finding another Arab country to take up Qatar's contribution. Al-Mahmoud said he would pass the message to GOQ officials overseeing Qatar's participation in UNIFIL to see if Qatar's participation could be extended until August. If not, he said the GOQ would help find another Arab partner. Al-Mahmoud asked Charge if the U.S. had approached any other countries in the region on this issue. Charge could not say for certain, but told Al-Mahmoud we would endeavor to find the answer and get back to him. ¶3. (C) In a separate meeting, also February 7, Qatari Armed Forces Chief of Staff MG Hamad Al-Attiyah told visiting ARCENT Commander LTG James Lovelace that he had just returned from visiting Qatari troops deployed in Lebanon and described his country's mission there as complete. Qatar's troops, he said, were returning home that day. Al-Attiyah explained that Qatar was bringing home its troops because their its military was unable to meet the troop-strength demands of the UNIFIL deployment for such a sustained period of time. (Al-Attiyah added his personal view that Michel Sleiman was the best choice as president of Lebanon. It was in no one's interest to delay elections, he said, adding that Syria and Saudi Arabia were "meddling" in Lebanon.) -------------- VIEWS ON LEBANON'S PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS -------------- ¶4. (C) Turning to Syria, Charge asked Al-Mahmoud for Qatar's support publicly and privately to bring about presidential elections in Lebanon as soon as possible. He noted that Qatar's encouragement of Iran and Syria to play a positive role in scheduling the elections would be welcome. Al-Mahmoud told Charge that Qatar supports the Arab League initiative and is working to promote stability in Lebanon. Noting that Qataris have property and business interests in Lebanon, he said Lebanon's stability is important to Qatar. Ultimately, said Al-Mahmoud, Lebanon's problems must be resolved by the Lebanese themselves. At any rate, the GOQ maintained regular contact with Lebanese PM Siniora. ¶5. (C) Charge emphasized the U.S. view that Syria's actions were delaying Lebanese elections and creating a dangerous period of uncertainty and instability that allowed arms smuggling to Hizballah to continue. Acknowledging that Qatar maintains strong relations with Syria, Charge urged the GOQ to intercede with the SARG to allow Lebanese presidential elections to take place expeditiously. Charge also stressed the perception that Qatar was in the Syrian camp during the last Arab League meeting. Understanding the importance the Amir places on the bilateral relationship with the U.S., Charge told Al-Mahmoud that Qatari policy on Lebanon is one of the reasons the political relationship between Washington and Doha had been strained. -------------- GOQ ON BOARD WITH HOLDING ELECTIONS -------------- ¶6. (C) Somewhat agitated, Al-Mahmoud said allegations that Qatar was not working to support the Arab League position on Lebanese presidential elections were not true. He expressed Qatar's frustration that "some countries" appear intent on DOHA 00000115 002 OF 002 stirring up trouble between Qatar and the U.S. Charge suggested that Qatar could change perceptions in part by supporting and helping to fund the special tribunal for Lebanon. Charge reiterated the impression in Washington that Qatar was on the wrong side of Lebanon-related policies. He urged again that Qatar take immediate steps to set the record straight. ¶7. (C) Al-Mahmoud made clear that the GOQ is working in favor of the Arab League initiative on Lebanon and that Qatar firmly supports this measure. He told Charge he would get back to him on support for a Lebanese tribunal, noting that Qatar was very supportive of Lebanon and had funded infrastructure projects and places of worship there. He reiterated that statements by others are designed to damage the U.S.-Qatari relationship. Al-Mahmoud emphasized that the stability of Lebanon and Syria is very important to Qatar. The GOQ continues to believe that Syria must be brought into the Arab camp, especially given concerns over Iranian activities in the region. Isolating Syria, the GOQ believed, was the wrong approach. Al-Mahmoud assured Charge that the Amir is frank with all parties, including the Syrians, on Lebanon and other topics. He lamented that Qatar did not receive credit for pushing Syria to attend the Annapolis Conference or to negotiate with Israel. ¶8. (C) Charge responded that we do appreciate it when Qatar makes helpful efforts to advance peace in the region. He pointed out that Syria's condoning of violence in Lebanon makes it difficult for the U.S. work in partnership with Syria. The best thing Syria could do was allow the elections in Lebanon to take place. Al-Mahmoud said Syria needs assurances that changing its behavior will result in relationships that would replace the one they have with the Iranians. In the end, Al-Mahmoud declared, the GOQ does not defend Syria's actions but also does not believe isolating Syria is a solution. RATNEY