SOMALIA - ARS WORRIES ABOUT AL-SHABAAB EXPANSION

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 DJIBOUTI 000946 SIPDIS DEPT FOR AF/E E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/25/2018 TAGS: PGOV PINR SOCI SO ET DJ ER SUBJECT: SOMALIA - ARS WORRIES ABOUT AL-SHABAAB EXPANSION Classified By: Nairobi Somalia Unit Counselor Bob Patterson. Reasons: 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY. In a November 24 conversation, Alliance for the Re-Liberation of Somalia (ARS) Chairman Sheikh Sharif agreed with Special Envoy for Somalia Yates that recent al-Shabaab gains in Somalia were worrying and unconvincingly pegged the lack of a promised ARS counter-offensive to respect for the October 26 Djibouti cessation of hostilities agreement. Sheikh Sharif criticized the Transitional Federal Government (TFG)-created Benadir Administration as "headed by a warlord." The Chairman seemed unperturbed by TFG President Yusuf's rumored efforts to disrupt progress toward a TFG - ARS unity government. He hoped that Ethiopian forces would withdraw from Somalia soon and worried about what he thought was IGAD's effort to upstage the UN SRSG in the Somali reconciliation process. End summary. ARS Rationale for Lack of Counteroffensive vs. al-Shabaab -------------- ¶2. (C) In a November 24 conversation on the margins of Djibouti Process High-Level Committee negotiations over the composition of a unity government, ARS Chairman Sheikh Sharif and Deputy Sharif Hassan agreed with Special Envoy for Somalia John Yates that recent al-Shabaab gains in Somalia were worrying. ARS forces had not launched a counter-offensive, Sheikh Sharif argued unconvincingly, because of the ongoing peace process and the cessation of hostilities agreement that emerged from the October 25 - 27 Djibouti negotiations. (In meetings and telephone calls with S/E Yates after that agreement was signed, Sheikh Sharif had promised action against al-Shabaab inroads in Merka and Lower Shabelle.) "If we fight," Sheikh Sharif continued, "there will be no difference between us and others in the eyes of the local community." ARS forces in Jilib, Jama, in Bay and Bakool, and even at Kilometer 50 stood ready to fight. "If you (the USG) give us the go-ahead, we will attack," Sheikh Sharif said, but he worried that the TFG would think the ARS was attempting to take more territory in order to strengthen its hand in the unity government negotiations. Instead, Sheikh Sharif alleged that the ARS had instead been attempting to get Somalis in al-Shabaab-occupied areas to defend themselves. ¶3. (C) When S/E Yates noted that al-Shabaab Spokesman Mukhtar Robow was offering aid organizations security guarantees in Merka and suggested that was something that ARS might have considered in an effort to diminish the authority of al-Shabaab, Sheikh Sharif replied that Hiran and Jowhar were safely in ARS hands, and urged that aid be funneled to those regions instead. For the time being, it was impossible for the ARS to work jointly with the TFG in other areas (e.g., Mogadishu),because "the TFG is held responsible by Somalis for killing and looting and the arrival of Ethiopian forces. We have to make them presentable before we can work with them," he said. Bad Benadir Administration -------------- ¶4. (C) The ARS scored the new Benadir Administration (septel) as "not the one we wanted." They had set their parameters with TFG Prime Minister Nur Adde one month ago and were disappointed that the Administration's governor was a "warlord." In Sheikh Sharif's account, he had been a deputy to corrupt Mogadishu Mayor Mohammed Dheere and had worked with the warlord "Finish." Sheikh Sharif listed the criteria he believed had been agreed upon, and alleged that most of them had been violated by the TFG. Ethiopia/IGAD -------------- ¶5. (C) The ARS was actively seeking "good relations" with IGAD, but was not certain how to proceed, Sheikh Sharif said. He noted that IGAD had internal problems (e.g., non-participation by Eritrea),which often meant that Somalis thought only of Ethiopia when they talked of the organization. It was important to the ARS and to Somalis that Ethiopia keep its promise to withdraw its troops, and that IGAD not attempt to usurp the UN-led Djibouti Process, Sheikh Sharif stressed. The ARS had "great confidence in SRSG Ould-Abdallah, and wanted him to head the reconciliation process. Sheikh Sharif had been distressed to read in the October 29 IGAD final communique that IGAD had labeled itself DJIBOUTI 00000946 002 OF 002 the "anchor" in the Somali peace process. Need for Public Diplomacy -------------- ¶6. (C) S/E Yates urged the ARS to publicly condemn the kidnapping and killing of aid workers, and he mentioned the recent stoning death of a 13-year-old girl as another instance when an ARS statement would have been appropriate. Timely statements would demonstrate the principled nature of the ARS and implicitly contrast its behavior with that of al-Shabaab, he said. Little Concern About Yusuf -------------- ¶7. (C) Sheikh Sharif seemed unconcerned about efforts that TFG President Abdullahi Yusuf might make to undermine the Djibouti Process. Terming the ARS - TFG rapprochement "transparent," he guessed that there was little Yusuf could do that would not be seen "by the whole world." Yusuf "will regret any effort to reverse the reconciliation process," Sheikh Sharif said. SWAN