SOMALIA: UN SRSG BRIEFS ON CONTACTS WITH DJIBOUTI

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 DJIBOUTI 000891 SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR AF, AF/E, AND INR/AA LONDON, PARIS, ROME FOR AFRICA-WATCHER CJTF-HOA FOR POLAD E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/14/2018 TAGS: PREL PGOV MOPS SO ET DJ SUBJECT: SOMALIA: UN SRSG BRIEFS ON CONTACTS WITH DJIBOUTI PRESIDENT AND ARS LEADERS REF: A. 11/13/08 YATES-FRAZER EMAIL ¶B. 11/13/08 YAMAMOTO-YATES EMAIL ¶C. DJIBOUTI 613 ¶D. DJIBOUTI 388 Classified By: ERIC WONG, DCM. REASON: 1.4 (B) AND (D). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY. According to UN SRSG for Somalia Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah, Djibouti's President Guelleh agreed to see Ethiopian PM Meles in the coming weeks, in order to discuss a joint approach to Saudi Arabia for financial support to reduce economic pressure on Ethiopia to withdraw troops from Somalia precipitously. SRSG Ould-Abdallah highlighted Djibouti's key role in supporting UN efforts to broker TFG-ARS talks on Somalia. Formation of a 10,000-strong combined security force for Somalia remains an important objective, despite doubts the ARS can contribute the forces required. Citing recent discussions with TFG and ARS leaders, Ould-Abdallah reports that the TFG remains split on cabinet choices. Meanwhile, ARS Chairman Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Amed and Central Committee Chair Sharif Hassan Aden report having had a very positive trip to Somalia, to sensitize the populace about the Djibouti Process, but they remain concerned that lack of timely Ethiopian withdrawal risks strengthening al-Shabaab opponents. Ould-Abdallah transmitted to the Sharifs a message from mid-level Asmara-group members that they were open to joining the Djibouti Process, if given a face-saving way to do so. Ould-Abdallah is preparing for the next round of TFG-ARS talks to begin o/a November 22 in Djibouti. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (U) On November 14, Ambassador and DCM met with visiting Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General (SRSG) for Somalia Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah and UN Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS) poloff Ingrid Koeck. -------------- -------------- URGING PRES. GUELLEH TO APPROACH PM MELES AND SAUDI ARABIA -------------- -------------- ¶3. (C) The SRSG expressed concern that Ethiopia's leaders are acting impatiently toward Somalia, because of the financial strains of military engagement. Ethiopia faced significant financial problems, as a result of oil expenditures surpassing its incoming foreign exchange. Ould-Abdallah said he had met with Djibouti's President Ismail Omar Guelleh, and had urged Guelleh to work with Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi on a common approach for financial support from Saudi Arabia. Ould-Abdallah noted that Guelleh, who was born in Dire Dawa and has good relations with Meles (with whom he speaks in Amharic),had agreed to contact Meles with a view to a joint approach to the Saudis after the December 7-8 Eid Al-Adha holiday. ¶4. (C) Ould-Abdallah highlighted the extremely positive role the Government of Djibouti played as host of several rounds of TFG-ARS talks on Somalia. As an IGAD member and neighbor of Somalia, GODJ provided "political, moral, and psychological support" for Somali talks, he said. Key GODJ interlocutors on Somali issues included President Guelleh, Guelleh's former cabinet chief Ismail Houssein Tani (elevated in mid-2008 to the newly created "Secretary-General" of the Presidency),and Minister for Islamic Affairs Hamoud Abdi Soultan. Minister Soultan had had the same fundamentalist Islamic education as ARS hard-liners, spoke only Arabic or Somali (rather than French like other senior Djiboutian officials),and was "no sympathizer" of Ethiopia, but remained loyal to President Guelleh's efforts to promote Djibouti as a neutral interlocutor in Somali affairs, Ould-Abdallah said. Three meetings on Somalia would occur in Djibouti in the following week, including discussions on justice and reconciliation beginning November 22. Despite pressure to hold Somali talks in Nairobi, the presence of some 30 ARS moderates in Djibouti reduced travel and per diem expenses, he noted, and avoided distractions caused by Nairobi's larger diplomatic community and media presence. ¶5. (C) Some Asmara-based ARS hard-liners would attend the Djibouti meetings, but ex-CIC Shura Chairman Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys planned to travel to Jeddah. Ould-Abdallah highlighted Imam Oman Omar as one of the extremist DJIBOUTI 00000891 002 OF 003 hard-liners now resident in Asmara; formerly resident in the UK, Omar had been expelled from Mauritania in June 2003 and had reportedly even been told by Djibouti's President Guelleh to moderate his comments, he said. -------------- -------------- CREATING ALTERNATE SECURITY FORCE REMAINS "OUR OBJECTIVE" -------------- -------------- ¶6. (C) On funding for the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), Ould-Abdallah said AU officials had decided to postpone an AU conference on reconstruction and development for Somalia, from November to February. Thus, the AU and UNPOS would jointly convene a conference to address strengthening AMISOM's security, in light of the cease-fire agreement signed two weeks earlier. Ould-Abdallah underscored that creating a combined security force with a troop strength of 10,000 remained an important objective, with half provided by the TFG and the remainder by the ARS. The TFG was able to contribute approximately 4,000 troops, trained in Ethiopia and Uganda; on the other hand, it was unclear whether the ARS could even contribute 1,500, he said. What was important, he said, was that the joint force begin to be established--even if incrementally--and funded as soon as possible. -------------- TFG REMAINS SPLIT ON CABINET CHOICES -------------- ¶7. (C) Citing recent discussions in Addis Ababa with TFG Prime Minister Nur Hassan Hussein, Ould-Abdallah said TFG President Yusuf and the TFG PM had not agreed on a new cabinet. Despite the IGAD agreement two weeks earlier, TFG Pres. Yusuf had rejected the PM's nominees as "enemies of Somalia," and was traveling to Nairobi today in order to lobby TFG parliamentarians. According to Ould-Abdallah, Nur Adde claimed Yusuf benefited commercially from an agreement to export some 700,000 head of cattle to Saudi Arabia for the upcoming Eid. Ould-Abdallah had decided to draw on UNPOS funds to pay per diem expenses to keep the MPs in Nairobi, contrary to his usual practice of paying them only in Somalia. -------------- -------------- ARS SEEKS PROGRESS ON AID AND ETHIOPIAN WITHDRAWAL -------------- -------------- ¶8. (C) Ould-Abdallah discussed his November 13 talks with ARS Chairman Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed and Central Committee Chair Sharif Hassan Aden (which tracked closely with ref A). The ARS leaders had reported having a very positive trip to Somalia, and had extended visits to Beled Weyne and other areas to sensitize the populace on the Djibouti Process and to "build momentum" for further peace talks. While glad to have participated in recent IGAD meetings in Nairobi, both ARS leaders had reiterated support of the UN and Djibouti Process. On the other hand, they felt that Ethiopia's failure to observe its agreement to withdraw from 5 areas in Mogadishu risked giving al-Shabaab opponents the upper hand. ¶9. (C) Ould-Abdallah underscored the importance of Ethiopia taking timely steps to "relocate" Ethiopian troops from at least one to two of the five areas in Mogadishu identified in the withdrawal agreement signed between Somalia's Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and Alliance for the Re-Liberation of Somalia (ARS) moderates led by Chairman Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed. While Ethiopia sought to follow its own timetable, failure to show progress risked emboldening opponents of the Djibouti Process. ¶10. (C) Ould-Abdallah said Sheikh Sharif had agreed to reach out explicitly to Asmara-based ARS representatives who had felt "left out" of the Djibouti Process and who had informed the SRSG that they would "in principle" be willing to join the process, if given a face-saving way to do so. ¶11. (C) The ARS leaders had expressed concern that al-Shabaab were executing a deliberate strategy of seizing control of ports (e.g., Kismayo and Merca) in order to control surrounding areas and commercial flows; such a strategy complicated efforts to combat piracy. The ARS leaders had requested that ransom not/not be paid to pirates. The ARS DJIBOUTI 00000891 003 OF 003 leaders were also concerned about the stability of TFG leadership, citing possible efforts by the former PM to seek the impeachment of President Yusuf. Whereas in Nairobi President Yusuf had decried Somali opposition as predominantly Hawiye, the ARS did not espouse such clan divisions and therefore backed the IGAD formula of parliamentary representation following the traditional "4.5" formula. (Ould-Abdallah said he had no objection to expanding parliament, "if it aids peace." As for "regime change," Ould-Abdallah conceded that the TFG President and PM were "not functional," but highlighted the need to replace them "efficiently", if at all, citing the absence of any clear alternative to replace Pres. Yusuf.) ¶12. (C) Sheikh Sharif and Sharif Hassan appealed for humanitarian aid for areas now secured by the ARS, such as Beled Weyne and Jowhar. Ould-Abdallah cited the "serious problem" of the WFP and ICRC providing millions of dollars of unmonitored humanitarian aid to a single overall contractor who had not changed in the last 15 years; the contractor was reportedly a member of Aweys' Hawiye/Habr-Gedir/Ayr subclan and also linked to prominent Djiboutian businessman Abdourahman Boreh. Ould-Abdallah suggested this Ayr subcontractor was funneling support to extremists. ¶13. (C) Citing recent discussions with the President of Somaliland, Ould-Abdallah said the October 29 terrorist attacks in Hargeisa and Puntland underscored that the security of Somaliland could not be divorced from the insecurity in the south. He noted that many of the "Islamicist" hard-liners hailed from Somaliland, even if they had no link to its government. ¶14. (C) Ould-Abdallah concluded by saying that he was encouraging direct talks between the ARS and Ethiopia, citing historical precedents of talks between the USG and Viet Cong, or between Israel and Palestine. He noted that in response to ARS assertions that the Ethiopian intervention of December 2006 precipitated instability in Somalia, he highlighted that fighting in Somalia had been ongoing 15 years earlier, since December 1991. ¶15. (C) COMMENT. We defer to Embassy Nairobi and the Somalia Unit, who are in regular contact with Ould-Abdallah, to put his remarks in broader context. From Djibouti's perspective, however, Ould-Abdallah underscored that the helpful role of the Djiboutian government--and especially President Ismael Omar Guelleh--in brokering Somali talks extended beyond merely offering a venue, and included the influence that Guelleh could bring to bear on ARS members, the Somali business community, and neighboring states. Post will continue (and expand) its engagement with Djiboutian actors on Somali issues. END COMMENT. SWAN