SOMALIA: UN SRSG BRIEFS ON CONTACTS WITH DJIBOUTI

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 DJIBOUTI 000891

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR AF, AF/E, AND INR/AA
LONDON, PARIS, ROME FOR AFRICA-WATCHER
CJTF-HOA FOR POLAD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/14/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV MOPS SO ET DJ
SUBJECT: SOMALIA: UN SRSG BRIEFS ON CONTACTS WITH DJIBOUTI
PRESIDENT AND ARS LEADERS

REF: A. 11/13/08 YATES-FRAZER EMAIL

B. 11/13/08 YAMAMOTO-YATES EMAIL

C. DJIBOUTI 613

D. DJIBOUTI 388

Classified By: ERIC WONG, DCM. REASON: 1.4 (B) AND (D).


1. (C) SUMMARY. According to UN SRSG for Somalia Ahmedou
Ould-Abdallah, Djibouti's President Guelleh agreed to see
Ethiopian PM Meles in the coming weeks, in order to discuss a
joint approach to Saudi Arabia for financial support to
reduce economic pressure on Ethiopia to withdraw troops from
Somalia precipitously. SRSG Ould-Abdallah highlighted
Djibouti's key role in supporting UN efforts to broker
TFG-ARS talks on Somalia. Formation of a 10,000-strong
combined security force for Somalia remains an important
objective, despite doubts the ARS can contribute the forces
required. Citing recent discussions with TFG and ARS
leaders, Ould-Abdallah reports that the TFG remains split on
cabinet choices. Meanwhile, ARS Chairman Sheikh Sharif
Sheikh Amed and Central Committee Chair Sharif Hassan Aden
report having had a very positive trip to Somalia, to
sensitize the populace about the Djibouti Process, but they
remain concerned that lack of timely Ethiopian withdrawal
risks strengthening al-Shabaab opponents. Ould-Abdallah
transmitted to the Sharifs a message from mid-level
Asmara-group members that they were open to joining the
Djibouti Process, if given a face-saving way to do so.
Ould-Abdallah is preparing for the next round of TFG-ARS
talks to begin o/a November 22 in Djibouti. END SUMMARY.


2. (U) On November 14, Ambassador and DCM met with visiting
Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General (SRSG) for
Somalia Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah and UN Political Office for
Somalia (UNPOS) poloff Ingrid Koeck.

-------------- --------------
URGING PRES. GUELLEH TO APPROACH PM MELES AND SAUDI ARABIA
-------------- --------------


3. (C) The SRSG expressed concern that Ethiopia's leaders are
acting impatiently toward Somalia, because of the financial
strains of military engagement. Ethiopia faced significant
financial problems, as a result of oil expenditures
surpassing its incoming foreign exchange. Ould-Abdallah said
he had met with Djibouti's President Ismail Omar Guelleh, and
had urged Guelleh to work with Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles
Zenawi on a common approach for financial support from Saudi
Arabia. Ould-Abdallah noted that Guelleh, who was born in
Dire Dawa and has good relations with Meles (with whom he
speaks in Amharic),had agreed to contact Meles with a view
to a joint approach to the Saudis after the December 7-8 Eid
Al-Adha holiday.


4. (C) Ould-Abdallah highlighted the extremely positive role
the Government of Djibouti played as host of several rounds
of TFG-ARS talks on Somalia. As an IGAD member and neighbor
of Somalia, GODJ provided "political, moral, and
psychological support" for Somali talks, he said. Key GODJ
interlocutors on Somali issues included President Guelleh,
Guelleh's former cabinet chief Ismail Houssein Tani (elevated
in mid-2008 to the newly created "Secretary-General" of the
Presidency),and Minister for Islamic Affairs Hamoud Abdi
Soultan. Minister Soultan had had the same fundamentalist
Islamic education as ARS hard-liners, spoke only Arabic or
Somali (rather than French like other senior Djiboutian
officials),and was "no sympathizer" of Ethiopia, but
remained loyal to President Guelleh's efforts to promote
Djibouti as a neutral interlocutor in Somali affairs,
Ould-Abdallah said. Three meetings on Somalia would occur in
Djibouti in the following week, including discussions on
justice and reconciliation beginning November 22. Despite
pressure to hold Somali talks in Nairobi, the presence of
some 30 ARS moderates in Djibouti reduced travel and per diem
expenses, he noted, and avoided distractions caused by
Nairobi's larger diplomatic community and media presence.


5. (C) Some Asmara-based ARS hard-liners would attend the
Djibouti meetings, but ex-CIC Shura Chairman Sheikh Hassan
Dahir Aweys planned to travel to Jeddah. Ould-Abdallah
highlighted Imam Oman Omar as one of the extremist

DJIBOUTI 00000891 002 OF 003


hard-liners now resident in Asmara; formerly resident in the
UK, Omar had been expelled from Mauritania in June 2003 and
had reportedly even been told by Djibouti's President Guelleh
to moderate his comments, he said.

-------------- --------------
CREATING ALTERNATE SECURITY FORCE REMAINS "OUR OBJECTIVE"
-------------- --------------


6. (C) On funding for the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM),
Ould-Abdallah said AU officials had decided to postpone an AU
conference on reconstruction and development for Somalia,
from November to February. Thus, the AU and UNPOS would
jointly convene a conference to address strengthening
AMISOM's security, in light of the cease-fire agreement
signed two weeks earlier. Ould-Abdallah underscored that
creating a combined security force with a troop strength of
10,000 remained an important objective, with half provided by
the TFG and the remainder by the ARS. The TFG was able to
contribute approximately 4,000 troops, trained in Ethiopia
and Uganda; on the other hand, it was unclear whether the ARS
could even contribute 1,500, he said. What was important, he
said, was that the joint force begin to be established--even
if incrementally--and funded as soon as possible.

--------------
TFG REMAINS SPLIT ON CABINET CHOICES
--------------


7. (C) Citing recent discussions in Addis Ababa with TFG
Prime Minister Nur Hassan Hussein, Ould-Abdallah said TFG
President Yusuf and the TFG PM had not agreed on a new
cabinet. Despite the IGAD agreement two weeks earlier, TFG
Pres. Yusuf had rejected the PM's nominees as "enemies of
Somalia," and was traveling to Nairobi today in order to
lobby TFG parliamentarians. According to Ould-Abdallah, Nur
Adde claimed Yusuf benefited commercially from an agreement
to export some 700,000 head of cattle to Saudi Arabia for the
upcoming Eid. Ould-Abdallah had decided to draw on UNPOS
funds to pay per diem expenses to keep the MPs in Nairobi,
contrary to his usual practice of paying them only in Somalia.

-------------- --------------
ARS SEEKS PROGRESS ON AID AND ETHIOPIAN WITHDRAWAL
-------------- --------------


8. (C) Ould-Abdallah discussed his November 13 talks with ARS
Chairman Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed and Central Committee
Chair Sharif Hassan Aden (which tracked closely with ref A).
The ARS leaders had reported having a very positive trip to
Somalia, and had extended visits to Beled Weyne and other
areas to sensitize the populace on the Djibouti Process and
to "build momentum" for further peace talks. While glad to
have participated in recent IGAD meetings in Nairobi, both
ARS leaders had reiterated support of the UN and Djibouti
Process. On the other hand, they felt that Ethiopia's
failure to observe its agreement to withdraw from 5 areas in
Mogadishu risked giving al-Shabaab opponents the upper hand.


9. (C) Ould-Abdallah underscored the importance of Ethiopia
taking timely steps to "relocate" Ethiopian troops from at
least one to two of the five areas in Mogadishu identified in
the withdrawal agreement signed between Somalia's
Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and Alliance for the
Re-Liberation of Somalia (ARS) moderates led by Chairman
Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed. While Ethiopia sought to follow
its own timetable, failure to show progress risked
emboldening opponents of the Djibouti Process.


10. (C) Ould-Abdallah said Sheikh Sharif had agreed to reach
out explicitly to Asmara-based ARS representatives who had
felt "left out" of the Djibouti Process and who had informed
the SRSG that they would "in principle" be willing to join
the process, if given a face-saving way to do so.


11. (C) The ARS leaders had expressed concern that al-Shabaab
were executing a deliberate strategy of seizing control of
ports (e.g., Kismayo and Merca) in order to control
surrounding areas and commercial flows; such a strategy
complicated efforts to combat piracy. The ARS leaders had
requested that ransom not/not be paid to pirates. The ARS

DJIBOUTI 00000891 003 OF 003


leaders were also concerned about the stability of TFG
leadership, citing possible efforts by the former PM to seek
the impeachment of President Yusuf. Whereas in Nairobi
President Yusuf had decried Somali opposition as
predominantly Hawiye, the ARS did not espouse such clan
divisions and therefore backed the IGAD formula of
parliamentary representation following the traditional "4.5"
formula. (Ould-Abdallah said he had no objection to
expanding parliament, "if it aids peace." As for "regime
change," Ould-Abdallah conceded that the TFG President and PM
were "not functional," but highlighted the need to replace
them "efficiently", if at all, citing the absence of any
clear alternative to replace Pres. Yusuf.)


12. (C) Sheikh Sharif and Sharif Hassan appealed for
humanitarian aid for areas now secured by the ARS, such as
Beled Weyne and Jowhar. Ould-Abdallah cited the "serious
problem" of the WFP and ICRC providing millions of dollars of
unmonitored humanitarian aid to a single overall contractor
who had not changed in the last 15 years; the contractor was
reportedly a member of Aweys' Hawiye/Habr-Gedir/Ayr subclan
and also linked to prominent Djiboutian businessman
Abdourahman Boreh. Ould-Abdallah suggested this Ayr
subcontractor was funneling support to extremists.


13. (C) Citing recent discussions with the President of
Somaliland, Ould-Abdallah said the October 29 terrorist
attacks in Hargeisa and Puntland underscored that the
security of Somaliland could not be divorced from the
insecurity in the south. He noted that many of the
"Islamicist" hard-liners hailed from Somaliland, even if they
had no link to its government.


14. (C) Ould-Abdallah concluded by saying that he was
encouraging direct talks between the ARS and Ethiopia, citing
historical precedents of talks between the USG and Viet Cong,
or between Israel and Palestine. He noted that in response
to ARS assertions that the Ethiopian intervention of December
2006 precipitated instability in Somalia, he highlighted that
fighting in Somalia had been ongoing 15 years earlier, since
December 1991.


15. (C) COMMENT. We defer to Embassy Nairobi and the Somalia
Unit, who are in regular contact with Ould-Abdallah, to put
his remarks in broader context. From Djibouti's perspective,
however, Ould-Abdallah underscored that the helpful role of
the Djiboutian government--and especially President Ismael
Omar Guelleh--in brokering Somali talks extended beyond
merely offering a venue, and included the influence that
Guelleh could bring to bear on ARS members, the Somali
business community, and neighboring states. Post will
continue (and expand) its engagement with Djiboutian actors
on Somali issues. END COMMENT.
SWAN