Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08DJIBOUTI780
2008-09-28 08:44:00
SECRET//NOFORN
Embassy Djibouti
Cable title:  

U.S. EMBASSY DJIBOUTI RECEIVES CAMP LEMONIER EOD

Tags:  ASEC PTER DJ 
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VZCZCXRO3611
RR RUEHROV
DE RUEHDJ #0780/01 2720844
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 280844Z SEP 08 ZDS
FM AMEMBASSY DJIBOUTI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 9571
INFO RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHMCSUU/FBI WASHINGTON DC
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 DJIBOUTI 000780 

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (ADDED NOFORN TO PARA 5)

NOFORN
SIPDIS
TERREP

DS/IP/AF, DS/IP/OPO, DS/DO/ICI, DS/DSS/TIA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/26/2023
TAGS: ASEC PTER DJ
SUBJECT: U.S. EMBASSY DJIBOUTI RECEIVES CAMP LEMONIER EOD
ASSISTANCE FOR SUSPICIOUS PACKAGE

DJIBOUTI 00000780 001.2 OF 002


Classified By: ACTING RSO THERON BUNNELL for reasons 1.4 (c) and (g)

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 DJIBOUTI 000780 C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (ADDED NOFORN TO PARA 5) NOFORN SIPDIS TERREP DS/IP/AF, DS/IP/OPO, DS/DO/ICI, DS/DSS/TIA E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/26/2023 TAGS: ASEC PTER DJ SUBJECT: U.S. EMBASSY DJIBOUTI RECEIVES CAMP LEMONIER EOD ASSISTANCE FOR SUSPICIOUS PACKAGE DJIBOUTI 00000780 001.2 OF 002 Classified By: ACTING RSO THERON BUNNELL for reasons 1.4 (c) and (g) ¶1. (SBU) At approximately 11:50 on 09/25/2008, RSO was informed by LGF that the embassy mail truck tested positive for explosives. RSO ordered the LGF to move the truck out of the Sally Port (vehicle access point) to the embassy parking area for a secondary itemiser inspection. The embassy CAC Sally Port is only 10 meters from the chancery building and 50 meters from the Ambassador's residence. RSO felt that moving the vehicle as far away from the chancery as possible was warranted. Embassy LGF conducted a second inspection which resulted in a positive hit for RDX and TATP. RSO ordered the truck to be moved away from the embassy parking area, which is where the embassy has the least protection due to a substandard perimeter wall. The truck was moved to a large open lot on the south side of the embassy. The embassy wall at this location is 12 feet high and reinforced. RSO alerted embassy personnel of the situation and that RSO was seeking assistance from Camp Lemonier EOD. RSO elected not to sound the duck and cover alarm because the vehicle had had a visual and physical inspection conducted by LGF at the south drop arm barrier prior to entering the CAC, where the only itemiser is located. The RSO requested people to remain indoors until EOD verified threat. ¶2. (SBU) There was a detachment of Marines from the 8th Provisional Security Company from Camp Lemonier already at the embassy due to a previously scheduled Random Antiterrorism Mission (RAM). RSO requested that the Marines take up positions at the south and north drop arm delta barriers. LGF and host national police were withdrawn from the south lot area. Police informed the adjacent elementary school (only teachers were present) and requested they evacuate through their west exit away from the embassy compound. ¶3. (SBU) EOD arrived at approximately 12:30. RSO met with EOD and explained the situation. RSO showed the print out of itemiser hits and directed them to the vehicle location. EOD performed a secondary inspection of the vehicle and its contents. This inspection used a zone method and the vehicle and its contents were broken down into five sections. EOD took swab samples of each section and requested the RSO to use the itemiser again on each sample taken. EOD performed the same test with their equipment. After recalibration of the itemiser the RSO tested five swabs provided by EOD. Only sample number 1 tested positive for RDX and TATP. Sample number 1 was taken from the mail pouches. RSO and EOD called Camp Lemonier K-9 explosives detection unit for further assistance. EOD decided to remove the mail bags from the embassy vehicle and separate the bags into manageable working sections. The bag that tested positive was opened by EOD and several photos of the boxes were taken. RSO informed DCM and GRPO of situation and received concurrence that if the K-9 responded to explosive that the package would be blown in place. ¶4. (SBU) At approximately 13:40, Camp K-9 unit arrived at embassy and proceeded to conduct the sweep. K-9 conducted a search of the vehicle and all its unclassified mail pouches. The K-9 responded to a positive hit on one specific parcel. K-9 team, EOD and RSO felt that four positive hits warranted blowing the parcel in place. RSO sounded the duck and cover alarm and informed embassy personnel of what was happening. EOD set up a water cannon charge that is designed to separate any explosive material inside the box without detonating it. EOD stated the blast would blow the parcel out toward the sea, away from the embassy and adjacent elementary school. Again the duck and cover alarm was sounded and RSO gave EOD permission to execute detonation. ¶5. (S/NF) After EOD inspected the contents of the parcel, the all clear was given. The contents turned out to be hand rolled cigars that were sent from JR Cigar Company originating from South Carolina. The box was addressed to an embassy GRPO chief. DCM and GRPO chief were brought out to the scene to inspect the package. GRPO chief confirmed that he had ordered the box of cigars. EOD stated that traces of TATP and RDX on the box indicated that somewhere along the line of shipping and handling, someone had come into direct contact with both TATP and RDX explosive types. ¶6. (SBU) RSO requested that Camp NCIS (who have a good evidence collection unit) assist Embassy NCIS agent with collecting evidence. NCIS collected parcel contents and soil DJIBOUTI 00000780 002.2 OF 002 from surrounding area of blast for further analysis. Investigation is ongoing, and post requests guidance and assistance from DS/IP/AF. WONG

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