FRAUD SUMMARY - DJIBOUTI

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 DJIBOUTI 000687 DEPARTMENT FOR CA/FPP DEPARTMENT PASS TO KCC WILLIAMSBURG KY SIPDIS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: KFRD CVIS CPAS CMGT ASEC DJ ET ER SO XA SUBJECT: FRAUD SUMMARY - DJIBOUTI REF: STATE 74840 ¶1. Country Conditions: The Republic of Djibouti is a developing and stable African country in the Horn of Africa. Although exact statistics are unavailable, unemployment is estimated in excess of 50 percent of the working-age population. Over two- thirds of the country's estimated 650,000 residents live in the capital, also called Djibouti. Djibouti attracts numerous economic migrants and refugees from neighboring Eritrea, Ethiopia, and Somalia. ¶2. Since the suspension of all visa operations in Eritrea in December 2006, and of non-immigrant visa processing in Yemen in April 2008, Post has been processing an increased number of visa requests from both countries. ¶3. The level of consular fraud in Djibouti is low but believed to be increasing. -------------- NIV FRAUD -------------- ¶4. NIV fraud has become increasingly sophisticated. Lying continues to be a method; document fraud has evolved as the interest to travel to the U.S. has become ever more popular with the increasing American presence in Djibouti. ¶5. Tourism: Young applicants age 22-35--including couples going on their 'honeymoon', wanting to visit family, or planning to visit the U.S. for tourism--produce fraudulent documents to prove ties to Djibouti. False documents are computer-generated to show stable employment and sufficient finances to support self and family. Fraudulent bank statements are also included in the package with an official stamp and signature. Spot checks by Post's consular fraud prevention unit (FPU) have helped identify such fraud; recurring transaction numbers and incorrect balances can be fraud indicators. Applicants also commonly obtain a new passport as an attempt to conceal prior travel to what are considered as possibly 'undesirable' locations (i.e., to other predominantly Muslim countries). ¶6. Students: The few Djiboutian student visa applicants received are typically children of government ministers or of other government officials. These applicants are legitimate. ¶7. The suspension of all visa operations at Embassy Asmara has shifted the bulk of Eritrean student visa applicants seeking to enroll in associate, bachelor's, master's or doctoral degree programs to Djibouti. While some Eritrean students qualify for a student visa, it is evident that many--especially students seeking an associate or bachelor's degree--seek student visas as a means to easily immigrate to the U.S. Post noticed that most Eritrean students only apply to one school, and have not searched for or applied to other schools. Also, they apply to schools with relatively easy enrollment, most notably Maharishi University, in Fairfield, IA, which has a unique work-study program that offsets the cost of tuition. Maharishi students usually spend a short time in the classroom at the beginning of the program, work at internships at high-paying firms to offset the cost of school, and then return for additional classroom work before receiving their degrees. As students pay only $4,200 up front, the program attracts overseas students with limited funds. ¶8. Post conducts text searchs in CCD for sponsors' names, to determine whether there are recurring sponsors in the student visa applicant pool. ¶9. Post conducted a validation study in early 2008 on 2006 and 2007 Djiboutian NIV applicants, which confirmed the return of approximately 75% of applicants. However, post believes that future validation studies may show a lower return rate. The Ministry of Finance's Director of Economics concurred with Post's observation that an increasing number of lower middle class B1/B2 applicants do not find the job market attractive, and therefore tend to falsify supporting documents (i.e., employment letters or bank statements) in hopes of appearing stable to qualify for a U.S. non-immigrant visa. ¶10. Djibouti possesses porous borders, and Post continues to be concerned about possible terrorists entering the country seeking to travel to the U.S. Post continues to be diligent in processing SAOs to curb the possibility of issuing a visa to a wanted terrorist. In addition, we work with the regional LEGATT team for additional spot checks. ¶11. Post has been informed by Djibouti-American contacts and DJIBOUTI 00000687 002 OF 004 French authorities that Djiboutian passports can be purchased by Somalis. In addition, French authorities have reportedly seized Djiboutian passports from Somali immigrants in France. Djiboutian authorities neither denied nor confirmed this claim. -------------- IV FRAUD -------------- ¶12. Most Djiboutian IV applicants are bona fide. However, the majority of immigrant petitions received in Djibouti are family reunification petitions for Somali citizens. Post has a high rate of fraud in this area since there is no competent civil authority in Somalia. All civil documents from Somalia can be easily purchased and falsified. ¶13. The applicants typically have little to no evidence of a relationship to the petitioner. Photos are almost never produced. When photos do exist, they are clearly staged. (Note: Staged does not necessarily mean fraud. Staged can also mean photographs by a paid studio portrait with fake backdrop.) Additionally, the majority of applicants are illiterate, and so there are no letters exchanged between petitioner and applicant. Phone calls are expensive and usually are made through prepaid cards, which leave no usable record. Money transfer receipts are often offered as proof of relationship. However, they tend to be handwritten on scraps of torn notebook paper, and often do not indicate the name of either petitioner or applicant, but rather use the name of a neighbor, relative, etc., in a position to send or collect the money. ¶14. With the establishment and the expansion of in Djibouti of Camp Lemonier-?-headquarters for approximately 2,200 U.S. military forces--Post has seen an increase in K1 visas. Some beneficiaries are female prostitutes working in local bars. Rudimentary English skills make them unable to answer simple questions about their fiance. ¶15. In addition to fraudulent marriages, an egregious number of unrelated and overage children are added to petitions. Children are often stated to be significantly younger than they are. To ensure that all the children in a family will be younger than 21 at the time of petitioning, some or all of their ages may be significantly regressed. On many occasions, the panel physician has informed the Consular Officer that children are either suspected to be over 21, or are unrelated applicants. -------------- DV FRAUD -------------- ¶16. Post began processing Diversity Visas (DVs) in 2007. Most of the winners are Somalis, who present the same documents and at times have the same sponsor. This is a concern for Post, considering the lack of competent government authorities to issue police records, civil documents, school records, etc., in Somalia. It is therefore very difficult for Post to verify Somali DV applicants. -------------- ACS AND PASSPORT FRAUD -------------- ¶17. The same factors that influence IV fraud also affect passport and citizenship fraud. Post is sometimes forced to rely on voluntary DNA testing to adjudicate CRBA cases for children born in Somalia. ¶18. Another problematic and questionable factor is parents' ability to transfer citizenship to their child. Some parents have lived out of the United States for so long it is hard for them to prove at least 3 years physical presence in the United States. ¶19. Due to the high number of U.S. military servicemen in Djibouti, Post has recognized an increase of CRBA cases from them and their Djiboutian or Ethiopian girlfriends. To protect the servicemen from the ring of prostitutes that target them and to prevent fraud, Post suggests DNA exams from the serviceman and the child in question. ¶20. Post has experienced an increasing number of cases where Somali-Americans have lost their passports during their visit to Somalia. Post believes there is a possibility that Somali- Americans return to Somalia upon receiving nationality and give their passports to family members (such as their brother, sister or cousin) who have similar physical features to the AmCit. The family member then travels to the U.S. with the passport. Once DJIBOUTI 00000687 003 OF 004 the family member arrives in the U.S., the AmCit reports his or her passport lost or stolen. Since post now has access to the DSH, we use this tool to track the entry and exits of AmCits who report their passports lost or stolen. ¶21. Many new Legal Permanent Residents (LPRs) visiting their countries of origin for vacation also report their travel documents or green cards lost. Post relies on the DHS Regional Office to provide a travel letter. -------------- ADOPTION FRAUD -------------- ¶22. Foreign adoption is extremely difficult in Djibouti. By law, only non-Djiboutian children (e.g., a baby born to an Ethiopian mother and unknown father) are eligible for foreign adoption. The difficulty in completing an adoption here deters all but the most determined would-be parents. It is not unusual for the process to take up to a year to complete. We therefore believe adoption fraud is negligible. --- DNA --- ¶23. Post has frequently found that the only usable evidence of relationship is DNA. We have found a decreasing number of cases with negative DNA results. However, approximately 40 per cent of cases where we suggest DNA testing never follow through with such testing. We believe that word is spreading that DNA can not be 'fooled', and abandoned cases know that they will be caught if they attempt to do DNA testing. Many of the negative DNA tests come back close, but do not meet the required threshold for proof. We suspect identify fraud in these cases; for example, an aunt or a sister claiming to be the mother. ¶24. Post also finds a significant number of legitimate families will slip in additional children. Where more than one child is DNA tested, one may come back legitimate while another returns as no relation. ¶25. Marriages where no children are available to DNA test are particularly difficult to prove. Often, there is no relationship between the two spouses, because the marriage was arranged and the spouses knew each other for only a matter of days. While the vast majority of the marriage arrangements involved payment to the AmCit or LPR, the applicants still appear to take the arrangement seriously, and consider it to be a valid marriage. -------------- V92s and V93s -------------- ¶26. All the issues detailed in IVs above apply to V92s and V93s. However, we find a significantly higher percentage of relationship fraud in 92s and 93s. For Visas 93, in cases of spouses without children, the vast majority were married well after the I-590 was approved, usually only weeks or in some cases just hours prior to departure for the U.S. During the interview, they frequently claim that they were living together as spouses for several months prior to the filing the I-590, but only decided to marry when departure was imminent. Post believes that many unmarried refugees accept the highest financial bidder for a spouse after they receive their travel date. -------------- ALIEN SMUGGLING -------------- ¶27. While Post has not identified any alien smuggling trends, it cannot discount the possibility of alien smuggling in IV cases, particularly when post must rely on DNA testing to determine relationship. Djibouti is a major transit country for economic and political migrants from Eritrea, Ethiopia, and Somalia heading to the Middle East. In a desperate attempt to reach their destination, the migrants become targets for traffickers and smugglers. -------------- DS CRIMINAL FRAUD INVESTIGATION -------------- ¶28. The RSO and ARSO support the Consular Section fraud investigations. They also provide information regarding possible visa fraud we may encounter due to the evolving DJIBOUTI 00000687 004 OF 004 dynamics of Djibouti?s economy. One of the three FSNs in the Consular Section is dedicated to fraud investigation, but has not taken any formal fraud detection training. The RSO FSN Investigator (FSNI),who assists the Consular Section with fraud investigations, is an experienced investigator who has received field investigation training. This partnership between the RSO and Consular Section has strengthened Post's fraud prevention. All investigations results are reported in writing. -------------- HOST CRIMINAL FRAUD INVESTIGATIONS -------------- ¶29. Citizenship is not conferred by birth in Djibouti; to inherit citizenship, at least one parent must be a documented Djiboutian. The Government will not issue a birth certificate for a child deemed to be non-Djiboutian. However, most Djiboutians are documented, and those documents are well organized and maintained by the government. Upon gaining independence from France in 1977, Djibouti launched a campaign to document its citizens. -------------- COOPERATION WITH HOST GOVERNMENT AUTHORITES -------------- ¶30. The government cooperates with Post and is willing to assist us with combating visa fraud. -------------- AREAS OF PARTICULAR CONCERN -------------- ¶31. As detailed above, a key concern is insufficient ability to authenticate documents presented by the many Somali applicants who appear at Embassy Djibouti. As a result, it is difficult to establish with satisfaction the bona fides of Somali travelers, many of whose applications are thus denied, in the absence of guidance to the contrary from the Department. ¶32. Long delays in responding to requests for Security Advisory Opinions (SAOs) is another concern. Djibouti's predominantly Muslim and ethnic Somali society means a large number of applicants must await 'further administrative processing.' Lack of specific date or place of birth information for many CLASS hits has required Post to submit numerous SAO requests--the vast majority of which are cleared, albeit weeks later (if not longer). ¶34. ConOff works closely with the French and other Consulates to share and receive information on fraud trends in Djibouti. In order to combat fraud from applicants from Eritrea, Yemen and Somalia, Post also works closely with regional posts to verify documents. -------------- PERSONNEL ISSUES -------------- ¶35. Post has only one Consular Officer (Civil Service on excursion) and a back-up Consular Officer (untenured JO). ConOff has taken PC541 (Fraud Prevention for Consular Managers) at FSI and acts as the Fraud Prevention Manager. The Senior FSN in Post?s Consular Section serves as the Fraud and ACS assistant. No formal fraud detection training has been provided, but she has been nominated by Post for the upcoming LES Fraud Prevention Workshop. Current ConOff will leave post in August 2009. WONG