Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08DJIBOUTI676
2008-08-21 09:41:00
SECRET//NOFORN
Embassy Djibouti
Cable title:
SECURITY ENVIRONMENT PROFILE QUESTIONNAIRE
VZCZCXRO5672 RR RUEHROV DE RUEHDJ #0676/01 2340941 ZNY SSSSS ZZH R 210941Z AUG 08 ZDS FM AMEMBASSY DJIBOUTI TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 9456 INFO RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE RHMCSUU/FBI WASHINGTON DC RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC RUEKDIA/DIA WASHDC
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 DJIBOUTI 000676
C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (ADDED NOFORN CAPTION)
NOFORN
DEPARTMENT OF DS/TIA/ITA, SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/17/2018
TAGS: ASEC PTER DJ
SUBJECT: SECURITY ENVIRONMENT PROFILE QUESTIONNAIRE
REF: STATE 07558
DJIBOUTI 00000676 001.2 OF 005
Classified By: RSO Ellen Tannor for reasons 1.4 (c) and (d)
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 DJIBOUTI 000676
C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (ADDED NOFORN CAPTION)
NOFORN
DEPARTMENT OF DS/TIA/ITA, SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/17/2018
TAGS: ASEC PTER DJ
SUBJECT: SECURITY ENVIRONMENT PROFILE QUESTIONNAIRE
REF: STATE 07558
DJIBOUTI 00000676 001.2 OF 005
Classified By: RSO Ellen Tannor for reasons 1.4 (c) and (d)
1. (SBU) DEMONSTRATIONS
A. (U) ARE THERE ANY ETHNIC OR RELIGIOUS COMMUNITIES IN
COUNTRY CAPABLE OF CARRYING OUT SIGNIFICANT ANTI-AMERICAN
DEMONSTRATIONS?
The majority of Djiboutians are Somalis with
clan ties to Somaliland (northwestern Somalia). The
population is 99 percent Sunni Muslim.
B. (U) HAVE THERE BEEN ANTI-AMERICAN DEMONSTRATIONS IN THE
COUNTRY WITHIN THE LAST 12 MONTHS?
NO
C. (U) HAVE DEMONSTRATIONS TAKEN PLACE NEAR OR IN FRONT OF
U.S. DIPLOMATIC FACILITIES?
There have been small demonstrations at the
Ministry of Equipment and Transport located next door to the
Embassy that were resolved peacefully, but no demonstrations
directed at the Embassy or U.S. interests.
D. (U) WHAT IS THE AVERAGE SIZE OF AN ANTI-AMERICAN
DEMONSTRATION?
-N/A
E. (U) ARE ANTI-AMERICAN DEMONSTRATIONS USUALLY TRIGGERED BY
U.S. FOREIGN POLICY INITIATIVES, MILITARY ACTIONS, OR BY
DOMESTIC ISSUES?
-N/A
F. (U) ARE DEMONSTRATIONS GENERALLY VIOLENT OR PEACEFUL?
-N/A
G. U) IF VIOLENT, HAVE ANY DEMONSTRATIONS RESULTED IN DAMAGE
TO USG PROPERTY OR INJURIES TO USG EMPLOYEES?
-N/A
H. (U) IF VIOLENT, HAVE ANY DEMONSTRATORS EVER PENETRATED OUR
PERIMETER SECURITY LINE?
-N/A
I. (U) HAVE THERE BEEN ANTI-GOVERNMENT DEMONSTRATIONS IN THE
COUNTRY WITHIN THE LAST 12 MONTHS?
Yes, there have been several small-scale
anti-government demonstrations over the past year. Most of
the demonstrations protested inadequate social services and
poor economic conditions, particularly the lack of food,
electricity and water, coupled with increasing prices and
high unemployment. In July and August 2008, there were
demonstrations about food and domicile relocation.
On July 31, an estimated 200 poor immigrants from the Ariba
district of the capital city of Djibouti engaged in a violent
clash with police as they protested the government's removal
and displacement of residents in the capitals Balballa area.
Tear gas was dispersed on the excitable crowd, and calm and
order was restored within two hours.
On August 11, over 500 people, mainly nomads from rural
communities and Ethiopian immigrants, protested at the
offices of the government's refugee agency, in the
neighborhood near the Presidential residence (within 2 miles
from Embassy residences) over the lack of food in the country
and the improper distribution of food aid.
J. (U) HAVE DEMONSTRATIONS TAKEN PLACE NEAR OR IN FRONT OF
U.S.
DIPLOMATIC FACILITIES?
-No.
K. (U) WHAT IS THE AVERAGE SIZE OF AN ANTI-GOVERNMENT
DEMONSTRATION?
- Between 50 and 500 plus
L. (U) ARE DEMONSTRATIONS GENERALLY VIOLENT OR PEACEFUL?
Demonstrations are peaceful, but sometimes have
elements of non-deadly violence. In the past, police have
been injured from thrown rocks and other objects. No serious
injuries or fatalities have been reported.
M. (U) IF VIOLENT, HAVE ANY DEMONSTRATIONS RESULTED IN DAMAGE
TO USG PROPERTY?
No.
2. (U) MACRO CONFLICT CONDITIONS
A. IS THE HOST COUNTRY ENGAGED IN AN INTERSTATE OR INTRASTATE
CONFLICT? (THIS MAY INCLUDE BATTLES BETWEEN ORGANIZED AND
DJIBOUTI 00000676 002.3 OF 005
VIOLENT DRUG CARTELS)
-Yes
In April 2008, Djiboutian authorities protested Eritrea's
deployment of troops and construction of military
fortifications along their common border, particularly on the
peninsula of Ras Doumera, near the strategic Bab al Mandeb
strait between the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea. On June 10,
the first exchange of small arms fire occurred between the
two countries, when Eritrean forces fired on Eritrean troops
fleeing to Djibouti. There were approximately 70 to 80
casualties reported, including approximately 10 deaths, on
the Djiboutian side; and an unknown number on the Eritrean
side. Djibouti has appealed to the Arab League, the African
Union (AU),and the United Nations, but Eritrea has not
granted any visas to admit fact-finding missions into Eritrea.
To date, a military force on both sides remains at the
border, with no resolution in sight for the foreseeable
future.
B. (U) IF AN INTRASTATE CONFLICT, IS IT AN INSURGENCY LIMITED
TO A SPECIFIC REGION OR IS IT A COUNTRYWIDE CIVIL WAR?
N/A
C. (U) IF LIMITED TO A SPECIFIC REGION, ARE ANY U.S.
DIPLOMATIC FACILITIES LOCATED IN THIS REGION?
N/A
D. (U) HAVE ANY OF THE FACTIONS INVOLVED IN INTRASTATE
CONFLICTS SIGNALED OR DEMONSTRATED AN ANTI-AMERICAN
ORIENTATION?
N/A
3. (U) HOST COUNTRY CAPABILITIES
A. ARE LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES PROFESSIONAL AND WELL-TRAINED?
(SBU) There are two main law enforcement entities in
Djibouti: the National Police and the Gendarmerie.
The Djiboutian National Police Force are considered to be the
lesser trained of the law enforcement entities, as there is
no specific education requirement. Their entire training
academy is 6 months long. They also lack adequate resources
to perform their job capably. The lack of transportation,
fuel, and communications equipment, affects police
responsiveness.
Although police receive initial entry-level training, it is
not regularly reinforced. The National Police are responsible
for protection of the mission and neighborhoods. They are
posted directly outside the mission and fulfill all duties as
requested. They are professional and responsive to the best
of their ability.
(SBU) The Gendarmes are deemed to be the better trained, more
professional, and better respected law enforcement entity in
Djibouti.
The Gendarmerie recruits candidates with a 10th grade
education or above, and recruits spend 2 years in military
training before graduation. However, their lack of resources
makes them equally incapable of performing at the desired
level.
Currently, the Gendarmes have one vehicle per brigade for
patrols; a brigade consists of 8-12 people.
B. (U) HAVE THEY BEEN TRAINED BY U.S. AGENCIES? IF SO, PLEASE
ELABORATE ON EFFECTIVENESS OF TRAINING.
Select officers within Djiboutian law enforcement
have received DS/ATA, INL/ILEA, FBI, or NCIS training.
The training is welcomed and appreciated, but because of its'
infrequency, it is difficult to evaluate its' overall
effectiveness.
It continues to be challenging to get the various law
enforcement officers in training, due to frequent last-minute
changes and cancellations.
We underscored to leadership that such activities make
helping the Djiboutians difficult.
C. (U) ARE LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES CONFRONTED WITH SERIOUS,
WIDESPREAD CORRUPTION INSIDE THEIR AGENCIES?
It is very common for law enforcement officers to
request fees for services that should be provided without
charge, particularly with the immigrant population. It is
also known that law enforcement will sell fuel from their own
official vehicles for profit. Such improper actions appear to
DJIBOUTI 00000676 003.2 OF 005
be standard operating procedure for Djibouti's poorly paid
law enforcement officers.
D. (U) ARE THE INTELLIGENCE SERVICES PROFESSIONAL AND CAPABLE
OF DETERRING TERRORIST ACTIONS?
(S/NF) Yes, intelligence services are very
capable and professional. However, their capabilities lie
within Djibouti city; they have limited capability to monitor
activities outside the capital. They have demonstrated the
capability to deter terrorism and have been successful in
intercepting and turning over suspected terrorists to US
authorities.
E. (U) HAVE THE INTELLIGENCE SERVICES BEEN COOPERATIVE WITH
U.S.EMBASSY REQUESTS FOR INFORMATION AND SUPPORT?
(S) Yes, the National Security Service has been
extremely cooperative with Embassy requests; what they lack
in experience they make up for in cooperation. The Embassy
enjoys a strong relationship.
F. (U) ASSUMING THERE HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANT TERRORIST THREATS
IN RECENT YEARS, HAVE HOST COUNTRY SECURITY SERVICES BEEN
ABLE TO SCORE ANY MAJOR ANTI-TERRORISM SUCCESSES?
-Yes
G. (U) HAS HOST COUNTRY BEEN RESPONSIVE (RE: TIMELINESS AND
ALLOCATION OF RESOURCES) TO EMBASSY REQUESTS FOR PROTECTIVE
SECURITY?
(C) Host country has been extremely responsive.
However, they lack the minimum resources to make effective
change in security when requested.
At best, Embassy resources are our only deterrent and best
defense against crime.
H. (U) HOW DOES THE EMBASSY ASSESS THE OVERALL SECURITY AT
MAJOR AIRPORTS IN THE COUNTRY? (EXCELLENT; VERY GOOD,POOR.)
(SBU) Overall airport operations are managed by a
private firm, Dubai Ports World (DPW). However, the security
at the airport is managed by the Gendarmerie and works
relatively well, given the lack of security resources and
training.
Official traveling persons possessing tickets and necessary
documentation are allowed into certain sections of the
airport. However, according to DPW, some 1,200 individuals
have VIP credentials allowing them varying degrees of
unlimited access to the airport.
All persons and bags are screened through x-ray; however,
there is no x-ray screening for cargo. While the Gendarmerie
presents a professional front, their operating procedures and
use of x-ray remain dubious at best. The commercial runway
adjacent to flight lines used by the French and U.S. Military.
(SBU) Djibouti is one of the few countries that accept direct
flights from Somalia, which poses its own inherent security
risks. In addition, there are daily cargo flights from
Ethiopia carrying khat, which attracts numerous khat
distributors upon the flights arrival.
I. (U) HOW EFFECTIVE ARE CUSTOMS AND IMMIGRATION CONTROLS
AGENCIES? (EFFECTIVE; AVERAGE; INEFFECTIVE)
(S/NF) With the implementation of TIP/PISCES
(software that tracks every person entering and leaving the
country, but not transiting through),the Djiboutian
immigration officials have shown improvements in their
immigration controls at the airport.
(SBU) In 2006, the Port of Djibouti contracted with Lloyd's
Register Quality Assurance Limited (LRQA) to assist with
implementation of the International Organization for
Standardization (ISO) Publicly Available Specification (PAS)
28000:2005. ISO/PAS 28000:2005 is a non-regulatory industry
standard for supply-chain security management and conducts
independent certification of management systems. LRQA and DPW
identified the ISPS Code as a requirement for compliance with
the ISO/PAS 28000:2005 standards. LRQA audited the Port of
Djibouti container terminal in July 2006 and identified major
non-conformities. LRQA conducted a revisit in August 2007 and
found that all major non-confomities had been resolved.
(SBU) An April 2007 review of the Djibouti Ports security
measures by the U.S. Coast Guard International Port Security
(IPS) Team found that Djibouti had "substantially
implemented" the International Ship and Port Facility
Security (ISPS) Code.
J. HOW EFFECTIVE ARE BORDER PATROL FORCES? (EFFECTIVE;
AVERAGE; INEFFECTIVE).
DJIBOUTI 00000676 004.2 OF 005
(SBU) Ineffective. Border control remains one of
the single most important problems in Djibouti as Djibouti
receives hundreds of illegal immigrants, refugees, and
internally displaced people weekly. Djibouti is 11 miles from
the Somali border, and immigrants and refugees walk across
daily.
The borders are extremely porous and immigration simply does
not have the resources or the manpower to institute tighter
controls.
Previously, the majority of refugees were coming from
Somaliland, but now many hail from southern Somalia( e.g.,
Mogadishu) due to the recent increase in violence in Somalia.
This raises security concerns, as the host government has no
effective way of determining identity or managing the flow of
refugees who are now visible in all parts of the capital.
The border control forces conduct patrolling missions with
the U.S. forces from Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa
(CTJF-HOA),as part of joint military training, which
provides some deterrence. However, the lack of resources at
every level limits the government's effectiveness.
There are security assistance and training programs in
progress or being developed to overcome this deficiency.
--------------
INDIGENOUS TERRORISM
--------------
4. OTHER INDIGENOUS TERRORIST GROUPS
A. ARE THERE INDIGENOUS, ANTI-AMERICAN TERRORIST GROUPS IN
COUNTRY?
-No
B. IF YES, HOW MANY? PLEASE NAME GROUPS.
-No
C. HAVE GROUPS CARRIED OUT ANTI-AMERICAN ATTACKS WITHIN THE
LAST 12 MONTHS?
-No
D. WERE ANY OF THESE LETHAL ATTACKS?
-N/A
E. HAVE GROUPS ATTACKED U.S. DIPLOMATIC TARGETS?
-N/A
F. HAVE GROUPS ATTACKED U.S. BUSINESS, U.S. MILITARY, OR
U.S.RELATED TARGETS?
-N/A
G. HAVE GROUPS LIMITED THEIR ATTACKS TO SPECIFIC REGIONS OR
DO THEY OPERATE COUNTRY-WIDE?
-N/A
H. IF ATTACKS ARE LIMITED TO REGIONS, ARE THERE ANY
U.S.DIPLOMATIC FACILITIES LOCATED IN THESE REGIONS?
-N/A
5. (SBU OTHER INDIGENOUS TERRORIST GROUPS
A. ARE THERE OTHER INDIGENOUS TERRORIST GROUPS (NOT
ANTI-AMERICAN)IN COUNTRY?
-No
B. IF YES, HOW MANY? PLEASE NAME GROUPS.
-N/A
C. HAVE GROUPS CARRIED OUT ATTACKS IN THE CAPITAL OR IN AREAS
WHERE U.S. DIPLOMATIC FACILITIES ARE LOCATED?
-N/A
D. WERE ATTACKS LETHAL AND/OR INDISCRIMINATE?
-N/A
E. HAVE THERE BEEN ANY AMERICANS KILLED OR INJURED IN THESE
ATTACKS?
-N/A
--------------
TRANSNATIONAL TERRORISM
--------------
6. (SBU) TRANSNATIONAL TERRORIST INDICATORS
A. ARE THERE ANY FOREIGN TERRORIST GROUPS THAT HAVE A
PRESENCE IN COUNTRY? PROVIDE NAMES.
-Yes, the Jihadist group Al-Itihaad Al-Islamiya
DJIBOUTI 00000676 005.3 OF 005
(AIAI) exists in Djibouti although it has been largely
absorbed by the United Western Somali Liberation Front
(UWSLF); elements of which have cooperated with Al-Qaida East
African. Members of Al-Shabaab have also been present in
Djibouti, elements of which have cooperated with Al-Qaida
East African (AQEA).
B. HOW DOES POST ASSESS THIS PRESENCE? IS IT AN OPERATIONAL
CELL? FINANCIAL CELL? SUPPORT CELL? PROPAGANDA CELL?
U) Three main ethnic insurgent groups with an
active presence in Djibouti are:
1) United Western Somali Liberation Front (UWSLF) 2) the
Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF),and 3) the Oromo
Liberation Front (OLF). There are also members of the
Council of Islamic Courts (CIC) present in Djibouti, but not
a unified organization. Ethnic insurgents groups (OLF, ONLF,
CIC) are not assessed to have operational cells in Djibouit.
The OLF, ONLF and UWSLF all conduct fund raising , obtain
medical care and other services in Djibouti. Actual training
activities are unknown.
C. IS THE HOST GOVERNMENT SYMPATHETIC TO THESE GROUPS?
C) The host government is not sympathetic to
these ethnic insurgent groups; however, the government is
aware of their presence and continues to monitor their
movements and actions inside the country.
D. ARE THERE SUSPECT NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS (NGOS) IN
THE COUNTRY THAT HAVE A RELATIONSHIP WITH ANY OF THESE GROUPS?
-No
E. ARE THERE ANY ETHNIC OR RELIGIOUS COMMUNITIES IN COUNTRY
THAT ARE SYMPATHETIC TO THESE GROUPS?
(S/NF) The Eritrean Embassy has been known to
provide support to elements of the CIC in Djibouti. Many
Somali-speaking Djiboutians voiced support for the CIC and
opposed Ethiopian action in Somalia. The CIC does not exist
anymore it has been absorbed by ARS.
F. HOW DOES POST ASSESS THE LEVEL, INTENT, AND SCOPE OF
HOSTILE INTELLIGENCE SERVICES (IRAN, IRAQ, SYRIA, SERBIA,
SUDAN ET. AL.) IN COUNTRY RELATIVE TO POTENTIAL ANTI-AMERICAN
TERRORIST ACTS?
(S/NF) Eritrea is believed to support terrorism
and insurgent elements.
G. HOW DOES POST ASSESS THE AVAILABILITY OF WEAPONS AND
EXPLOSIVES IN COUNTRY OR FROM NEARBY COUNTRIES FOR HOSTILE
TERRORIST ELEMENTS?
(S/NF) There is a high degree accessibility to
and availability of weapons, chemicals and heavy equipment
from neighboring countries around Djibouti, particularly
Somalia. There has been recently documented evidence of
weapons from China passing through Djibouti en route to
Ethiopia, although not terrorist-related. The port remains
an active transport hub for weapons movements in the region,
including Ethiopia and Somalia.
(S/NF) In December 2007, a walk-in source
provided information on MANPADS which were subsequently
surrendered to U.S. officials and destroyed by CJTF-HOA EOD
AT Camp Lemonier, Djibouti.
SYMINGTON
C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (ADDED NOFORN CAPTION)
NOFORN
DEPARTMENT OF DS/TIA/ITA, SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/17/2018
TAGS: ASEC PTER DJ
SUBJECT: SECURITY ENVIRONMENT PROFILE QUESTIONNAIRE
REF: STATE 07558
DJIBOUTI 00000676 001.2 OF 005
Classified By: RSO Ellen Tannor for reasons 1.4 (c) and (d)
1. (SBU) DEMONSTRATIONS
A. (U) ARE THERE ANY ETHNIC OR RELIGIOUS COMMUNITIES IN
COUNTRY CAPABLE OF CARRYING OUT SIGNIFICANT ANTI-AMERICAN
DEMONSTRATIONS?
The majority of Djiboutians are Somalis with
clan ties to Somaliland (northwestern Somalia). The
population is 99 percent Sunni Muslim.
B. (U) HAVE THERE BEEN ANTI-AMERICAN DEMONSTRATIONS IN THE
COUNTRY WITHIN THE LAST 12 MONTHS?
NO
C. (U) HAVE DEMONSTRATIONS TAKEN PLACE NEAR OR IN FRONT OF
U.S. DIPLOMATIC FACILITIES?
There have been small demonstrations at the
Ministry of Equipment and Transport located next door to the
Embassy that were resolved peacefully, but no demonstrations
directed at the Embassy or U.S. interests.
D. (U) WHAT IS THE AVERAGE SIZE OF AN ANTI-AMERICAN
DEMONSTRATION?
-N/A
E. (U) ARE ANTI-AMERICAN DEMONSTRATIONS USUALLY TRIGGERED BY
U.S. FOREIGN POLICY INITIATIVES, MILITARY ACTIONS, OR BY
DOMESTIC ISSUES?
-N/A
F. (U) ARE DEMONSTRATIONS GENERALLY VIOLENT OR PEACEFUL?
-N/A
G. U) IF VIOLENT, HAVE ANY DEMONSTRATIONS RESULTED IN DAMAGE
TO USG PROPERTY OR INJURIES TO USG EMPLOYEES?
-N/A
H. (U) IF VIOLENT, HAVE ANY DEMONSTRATORS EVER PENETRATED OUR
PERIMETER SECURITY LINE?
-N/A
I. (U) HAVE THERE BEEN ANTI-GOVERNMENT DEMONSTRATIONS IN THE
COUNTRY WITHIN THE LAST 12 MONTHS?
Yes, there have been several small-scale
anti-government demonstrations over the past year. Most of
the demonstrations protested inadequate social services and
poor economic conditions, particularly the lack of food,
electricity and water, coupled with increasing prices and
high unemployment. In July and August 2008, there were
demonstrations about food and domicile relocation.
On July 31, an estimated 200 poor immigrants from the Ariba
district of the capital city of Djibouti engaged in a violent
clash with police as they protested the government's removal
and displacement of residents in the capitals Balballa area.
Tear gas was dispersed on the excitable crowd, and calm and
order was restored within two hours.
On August 11, over 500 people, mainly nomads from rural
communities and Ethiopian immigrants, protested at the
offices of the government's refugee agency, in the
neighborhood near the Presidential residence (within 2 miles
from Embassy residences) over the lack of food in the country
and the improper distribution of food aid.
J. (U) HAVE DEMONSTRATIONS TAKEN PLACE NEAR OR IN FRONT OF
U.S.
DIPLOMATIC FACILITIES?
-No.
K. (U) WHAT IS THE AVERAGE SIZE OF AN ANTI-GOVERNMENT
DEMONSTRATION?
- Between 50 and 500 plus
L. (U) ARE DEMONSTRATIONS GENERALLY VIOLENT OR PEACEFUL?
Demonstrations are peaceful, but sometimes have
elements of non-deadly violence. In the past, police have
been injured from thrown rocks and other objects. No serious
injuries or fatalities have been reported.
M. (U) IF VIOLENT, HAVE ANY DEMONSTRATIONS RESULTED IN DAMAGE
TO USG PROPERTY?
No.
2. (U) MACRO CONFLICT CONDITIONS
A. IS THE HOST COUNTRY ENGAGED IN AN INTERSTATE OR INTRASTATE
CONFLICT? (THIS MAY INCLUDE BATTLES BETWEEN ORGANIZED AND
DJIBOUTI 00000676 002.3 OF 005
VIOLENT DRUG CARTELS)
-Yes
In April 2008, Djiboutian authorities protested Eritrea's
deployment of troops and construction of military
fortifications along their common border, particularly on the
peninsula of Ras Doumera, near the strategic Bab al Mandeb
strait between the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea. On June 10,
the first exchange of small arms fire occurred between the
two countries, when Eritrean forces fired on Eritrean troops
fleeing to Djibouti. There were approximately 70 to 80
casualties reported, including approximately 10 deaths, on
the Djiboutian side; and an unknown number on the Eritrean
side. Djibouti has appealed to the Arab League, the African
Union (AU),and the United Nations, but Eritrea has not
granted any visas to admit fact-finding missions into Eritrea.
To date, a military force on both sides remains at the
border, with no resolution in sight for the foreseeable
future.
B. (U) IF AN INTRASTATE CONFLICT, IS IT AN INSURGENCY LIMITED
TO A SPECIFIC REGION OR IS IT A COUNTRYWIDE CIVIL WAR?
N/A
C. (U) IF LIMITED TO A SPECIFIC REGION, ARE ANY U.S.
DIPLOMATIC FACILITIES LOCATED IN THIS REGION?
N/A
D. (U) HAVE ANY OF THE FACTIONS INVOLVED IN INTRASTATE
CONFLICTS SIGNALED OR DEMONSTRATED AN ANTI-AMERICAN
ORIENTATION?
N/A
3. (U) HOST COUNTRY CAPABILITIES
A. ARE LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES PROFESSIONAL AND WELL-TRAINED?
(SBU) There are two main law enforcement entities in
Djibouti: the National Police and the Gendarmerie.
The Djiboutian National Police Force are considered to be the
lesser trained of the law enforcement entities, as there is
no specific education requirement. Their entire training
academy is 6 months long. They also lack adequate resources
to perform their job capably. The lack of transportation,
fuel, and communications equipment, affects police
responsiveness.
Although police receive initial entry-level training, it is
not regularly reinforced. The National Police are responsible
for protection of the mission and neighborhoods. They are
posted directly outside the mission and fulfill all duties as
requested. They are professional and responsive to the best
of their ability.
(SBU) The Gendarmes are deemed to be the better trained, more
professional, and better respected law enforcement entity in
Djibouti.
The Gendarmerie recruits candidates with a 10th grade
education or above, and recruits spend 2 years in military
training before graduation. However, their lack of resources
makes them equally incapable of performing at the desired
level.
Currently, the Gendarmes have one vehicle per brigade for
patrols; a brigade consists of 8-12 people.
B. (U) HAVE THEY BEEN TRAINED BY U.S. AGENCIES? IF SO, PLEASE
ELABORATE ON EFFECTIVENESS OF TRAINING.
Select officers within Djiboutian law enforcement
have received DS/ATA, INL/ILEA, FBI, or NCIS training.
The training is welcomed and appreciated, but because of its'
infrequency, it is difficult to evaluate its' overall
effectiveness.
It continues to be challenging to get the various law
enforcement officers in training, due to frequent last-minute
changes and cancellations.
We underscored to leadership that such activities make
helping the Djiboutians difficult.
C. (U) ARE LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES CONFRONTED WITH SERIOUS,
WIDESPREAD CORRUPTION INSIDE THEIR AGENCIES?
It is very common for law enforcement officers to
request fees for services that should be provided without
charge, particularly with the immigrant population. It is
also known that law enforcement will sell fuel from their own
official vehicles for profit. Such improper actions appear to
DJIBOUTI 00000676 003.2 OF 005
be standard operating procedure for Djibouti's poorly paid
law enforcement officers.
D. (U) ARE THE INTELLIGENCE SERVICES PROFESSIONAL AND CAPABLE
OF DETERRING TERRORIST ACTIONS?
(S/NF) Yes, intelligence services are very
capable and professional. However, their capabilities lie
within Djibouti city; they have limited capability to monitor
activities outside the capital. They have demonstrated the
capability to deter terrorism and have been successful in
intercepting and turning over suspected terrorists to US
authorities.
E. (U) HAVE THE INTELLIGENCE SERVICES BEEN COOPERATIVE WITH
U.S.EMBASSY REQUESTS FOR INFORMATION AND SUPPORT?
(S) Yes, the National Security Service has been
extremely cooperative with Embassy requests; what they lack
in experience they make up for in cooperation. The Embassy
enjoys a strong relationship.
F. (U) ASSUMING THERE HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANT TERRORIST THREATS
IN RECENT YEARS, HAVE HOST COUNTRY SECURITY SERVICES BEEN
ABLE TO SCORE ANY MAJOR ANTI-TERRORISM SUCCESSES?
-Yes
G. (U) HAS HOST COUNTRY BEEN RESPONSIVE (RE: TIMELINESS AND
ALLOCATION OF RESOURCES) TO EMBASSY REQUESTS FOR PROTECTIVE
SECURITY?
(C) Host country has been extremely responsive.
However, they lack the minimum resources to make effective
change in security when requested.
At best, Embassy resources are our only deterrent and best
defense against crime.
H. (U) HOW DOES THE EMBASSY ASSESS THE OVERALL SECURITY AT
MAJOR AIRPORTS IN THE COUNTRY? (EXCELLENT; VERY GOOD,POOR.)
(SBU) Overall airport operations are managed by a
private firm, Dubai Ports World (DPW). However, the security
at the airport is managed by the Gendarmerie and works
relatively well, given the lack of security resources and
training.
Official traveling persons possessing tickets and necessary
documentation are allowed into certain sections of the
airport. However, according to DPW, some 1,200 individuals
have VIP credentials allowing them varying degrees of
unlimited access to the airport.
All persons and bags are screened through x-ray; however,
there is no x-ray screening for cargo. While the Gendarmerie
presents a professional front, their operating procedures and
use of x-ray remain dubious at best. The commercial runway
adjacent to flight lines used by the French and U.S. Military.
(SBU) Djibouti is one of the few countries that accept direct
flights from Somalia, which poses its own inherent security
risks. In addition, there are daily cargo flights from
Ethiopia carrying khat, which attracts numerous khat
distributors upon the flights arrival.
I. (U) HOW EFFECTIVE ARE CUSTOMS AND IMMIGRATION CONTROLS
AGENCIES? (EFFECTIVE; AVERAGE; INEFFECTIVE)
(S/NF) With the implementation of TIP/PISCES
(software that tracks every person entering and leaving the
country, but not transiting through),the Djiboutian
immigration officials have shown improvements in their
immigration controls at the airport.
(SBU) In 2006, the Port of Djibouti contracted with Lloyd's
Register Quality Assurance Limited (LRQA) to assist with
implementation of the International Organization for
Standardization (ISO) Publicly Available Specification (PAS)
28000:2005. ISO/PAS 28000:2005 is a non-regulatory industry
standard for supply-chain security management and conducts
independent certification of management systems. LRQA and DPW
identified the ISPS Code as a requirement for compliance with
the ISO/PAS 28000:2005 standards. LRQA audited the Port of
Djibouti container terminal in July 2006 and identified major
non-conformities. LRQA conducted a revisit in August 2007 and
found that all major non-confomities had been resolved.
(SBU) An April 2007 review of the Djibouti Ports security
measures by the U.S. Coast Guard International Port Security
(IPS) Team found that Djibouti had "substantially
implemented" the International Ship and Port Facility
Security (ISPS) Code.
J. HOW EFFECTIVE ARE BORDER PATROL FORCES? (EFFECTIVE;
AVERAGE; INEFFECTIVE).
DJIBOUTI 00000676 004.2 OF 005
(SBU) Ineffective. Border control remains one of
the single most important problems in Djibouti as Djibouti
receives hundreds of illegal immigrants, refugees, and
internally displaced people weekly. Djibouti is 11 miles from
the Somali border, and immigrants and refugees walk across
daily.
The borders are extremely porous and immigration simply does
not have the resources or the manpower to institute tighter
controls.
Previously, the majority of refugees were coming from
Somaliland, but now many hail from southern Somalia( e.g.,
Mogadishu) due to the recent increase in violence in Somalia.
This raises security concerns, as the host government has no
effective way of determining identity or managing the flow of
refugees who are now visible in all parts of the capital.
The border control forces conduct patrolling missions with
the U.S. forces from Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa
(CTJF-HOA),as part of joint military training, which
provides some deterrence. However, the lack of resources at
every level limits the government's effectiveness.
There are security assistance and training programs in
progress or being developed to overcome this deficiency.
--------------
INDIGENOUS TERRORISM
--------------
4. OTHER INDIGENOUS TERRORIST GROUPS
A. ARE THERE INDIGENOUS, ANTI-AMERICAN TERRORIST GROUPS IN
COUNTRY?
-No
B. IF YES, HOW MANY? PLEASE NAME GROUPS.
-No
C. HAVE GROUPS CARRIED OUT ANTI-AMERICAN ATTACKS WITHIN THE
LAST 12 MONTHS?
-No
D. WERE ANY OF THESE LETHAL ATTACKS?
-N/A
E. HAVE GROUPS ATTACKED U.S. DIPLOMATIC TARGETS?
-N/A
F. HAVE GROUPS ATTACKED U.S. BUSINESS, U.S. MILITARY, OR
U.S.RELATED TARGETS?
-N/A
G. HAVE GROUPS LIMITED THEIR ATTACKS TO SPECIFIC REGIONS OR
DO THEY OPERATE COUNTRY-WIDE?
-N/A
H. IF ATTACKS ARE LIMITED TO REGIONS, ARE THERE ANY
U.S.DIPLOMATIC FACILITIES LOCATED IN THESE REGIONS?
-N/A
5. (SBU OTHER INDIGENOUS TERRORIST GROUPS
A. ARE THERE OTHER INDIGENOUS TERRORIST GROUPS (NOT
ANTI-AMERICAN)IN COUNTRY?
-No
B. IF YES, HOW MANY? PLEASE NAME GROUPS.
-N/A
C. HAVE GROUPS CARRIED OUT ATTACKS IN THE CAPITAL OR IN AREAS
WHERE U.S. DIPLOMATIC FACILITIES ARE LOCATED?
-N/A
D. WERE ATTACKS LETHAL AND/OR INDISCRIMINATE?
-N/A
E. HAVE THERE BEEN ANY AMERICANS KILLED OR INJURED IN THESE
ATTACKS?
-N/A
--------------
TRANSNATIONAL TERRORISM
--------------
6. (SBU) TRANSNATIONAL TERRORIST INDICATORS
A. ARE THERE ANY FOREIGN TERRORIST GROUPS THAT HAVE A
PRESENCE IN COUNTRY? PROVIDE NAMES.
-Yes, the Jihadist group Al-Itihaad Al-Islamiya
DJIBOUTI 00000676 005.3 OF 005
(AIAI) exists in Djibouti although it has been largely
absorbed by the United Western Somali Liberation Front
(UWSLF); elements of which have cooperated with Al-Qaida East
African. Members of Al-Shabaab have also been present in
Djibouti, elements of which have cooperated with Al-Qaida
East African (AQEA).
B. HOW DOES POST ASSESS THIS PRESENCE? IS IT AN OPERATIONAL
CELL? FINANCIAL CELL? SUPPORT CELL? PROPAGANDA CELL?
U) Three main ethnic insurgent groups with an
active presence in Djibouti are:
1) United Western Somali Liberation Front (UWSLF) 2) the
Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF),and 3) the Oromo
Liberation Front (OLF). There are also members of the
Council of Islamic Courts (CIC) present in Djibouti, but not
a unified organization. Ethnic insurgents groups (OLF, ONLF,
CIC) are not assessed to have operational cells in Djibouit.
The OLF, ONLF and UWSLF all conduct fund raising , obtain
medical care and other services in Djibouti. Actual training
activities are unknown.
C. IS THE HOST GOVERNMENT SYMPATHETIC TO THESE GROUPS?
C) The host government is not sympathetic to
these ethnic insurgent groups; however, the government is
aware of their presence and continues to monitor their
movements and actions inside the country.
D. ARE THERE SUSPECT NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS (NGOS) IN
THE COUNTRY THAT HAVE A RELATIONSHIP WITH ANY OF THESE GROUPS?
-No
E. ARE THERE ANY ETHNIC OR RELIGIOUS COMMUNITIES IN COUNTRY
THAT ARE SYMPATHETIC TO THESE GROUPS?
(S/NF) The Eritrean Embassy has been known to
provide support to elements of the CIC in Djibouti. Many
Somali-speaking Djiboutians voiced support for the CIC and
opposed Ethiopian action in Somalia. The CIC does not exist
anymore it has been absorbed by ARS.
F. HOW DOES POST ASSESS THE LEVEL, INTENT, AND SCOPE OF
HOSTILE INTELLIGENCE SERVICES (IRAN, IRAQ, SYRIA, SERBIA,
SUDAN ET. AL.) IN COUNTRY RELATIVE TO POTENTIAL ANTI-AMERICAN
TERRORIST ACTS?
(S/NF) Eritrea is believed to support terrorism
and insurgent elements.
G. HOW DOES POST ASSESS THE AVAILABILITY OF WEAPONS AND
EXPLOSIVES IN COUNTRY OR FROM NEARBY COUNTRIES FOR HOSTILE
TERRORIST ELEMENTS?
(S/NF) There is a high degree accessibility to
and availability of weapons, chemicals and heavy equipment
from neighboring countries around Djibouti, particularly
Somalia. There has been recently documented evidence of
weapons from China passing through Djibouti en route to
Ethiopia, although not terrorist-related. The port remains
an active transport hub for weapons movements in the region,
including Ethiopia and Somalia.
(S/NF) In December 2007, a walk-in source
provided information on MANPADS which were subsequently
surrendered to U.S. officials and destroyed by CJTF-HOA EOD
AT Camp Lemonier, Djibouti.
SYMINGTON